KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2020

14361925 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/361,925 05/30/2014 Marcia Alves De Inda 2011P02433WOUS 1973
24737 7590 03/02/2020
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
PAULSON, SHEETAL R.
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MARCIA ALVES DE INDA,
LEONIE FRANCELLE WAANDERS,
WENDY UYEN DITTNER, NAGARAJU BUSSA,
ARUN KUMAR MANI, and JANKE JÖRN DITTMER
__________________

Appeal 2019-004444
Application 14/361,925
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, JAMES P. CALVE, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.

CALVE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the decision
of the Examiner to reject claims 1–8, 10–14, 16–19, 21, and 22. Appeal Br.
2. Claims 9, 15, and 20 are cancelled. Id. at 18–21 (Claims App.); see Final
Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies Koninklijke Philips Electronics N. V. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 11, and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A system for scheduling a sequence of examinations of a
plurality of patients in a clinical setting, the system comprising:
a first data base comprising examination data relating to a
specific type of examination, the examination data including
time consumption, and the examination data relating usage of
resources associated with the specific type of examination,
a second data base comprising patient data of the
plurality of patients scheduled for upcoming examinations
within a specified time frame, the patient data comprising, for
each patient of the plurality of patients, an associated list of
examinations that the patient is to undergo, and
a scheduling unit operatively coupled to the first data
base and the second data base,
wherein the scheduling unit determines a sequence of
examinations for each patient of the plurality of patients subject
to a constraint that an estimated total examination time for each
patient is within a given maximum examination time, based on
their associated list of examinations and the examination data,
the sequence including information relating to time and type of
examination, and
the system further comprises an input unit that receives
progress information on progress of the plurality of patients
currently undergoing examination in accordance with the
sequence of examinations, and
wherein the scheduling unit modifies the sequence of
examinations for the plurality of patients subject to the
constraint that the estimated total examination time for each
patient is within the given maximum examination time when
the progress of the plurality of patients indicates that the total
examination time of at least one patient in the plurality of
patients is expected to exceed the given maximum examination
time, and communicates a modified schedule of examinations
to at least one patient of the plurality of patients.

Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.).

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–8, 10–14, 16–19, 21, and 22 are rejected as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter under a judicial exception to 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
Claims 1–4, 10–13, 16–19, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Egawa (US 2005/0228696 A1, pub. Oct. 13,
2005) and Kurian (US 2006/0053044 A1, pub. Mar. 9, 2006).
Claims 5, 6, 8, 14, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Egawa, Kurian, and Ono (US 2007/0271213 A1, pub.
Nov. 22, 2007).
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Egawa, Kurian, Ono, and Umeda (JP2008171298A, pub. July 24, 2008).
ANALYSIS
Claims 1–8, 10–14, 16–19, 21, and 22
Rejected under a Judicial Exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant argues the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 8–10. We
select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner determines that claim 1 recites a
mental process and a method of organizing human activity by scheduling
examinations of patients through collecting and comparing examination and
patient information to provide a schedule of a sequence of examinations that
do not provide a concrete, physical application. Final Act. 3–4, 13; Ans. 14.
The Examiner determines claim 1 lacks additional elements that are
significantly more than the abstract ideas because they are generic computer
structures performing generic functions that do not integrate the abstract
ideas into a practical application. Final Act. 4–6, 14–15; Ans. 14–17.
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Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible-subject matter as:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). However, “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted).
To distinguish patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications, we first
determine whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id.
at 217. If they are, we consider the elements of each claim, individually and
as an ordered combination, to determine if additional elements transform the
claim into a patent-eligible application, e.g., by providing an “inventive
concept” that ensures the patent amounts to significantly more than a patent
on the ineligible concept. Id. at 217–18.
The USPTO has issued guidance about this framework. 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to determine whether a
claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claim recites
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas
listed in the Revised Guidance (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then consider
whether the claim (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Id. at 56.
Step 1: Is Claim 1 to a Statutory Category?
The Examiner finds that claim 1 recites a system, which is a statutory
category of 35 U.S.C. § 101, namely, a machine. Final Act. 2; see Appeal
Br. 9 (arguing that claim 1 recites a system).
Alice Step 1, Revised Step 2A, Prong One: Are Judicial Exceptions Recited?
Appellant argues that the claims do not recite a mathematical concept,
a method of organizing human activity, or a mental process under the 2019
Revised Guidance. Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues that managing dynamic
changes to a multi-dimensional schedule is not a mental process because it
cannot be performed in a reasonable amount of time in one’s mind or even
using a computer. Reply Br. 2 (citing Appeal Br. 3–4). Appellant argues
that “determining a time for examination based on constraints is a relatively
trivial task” but the claims schedule and monitor a plurality of patients who
undergo a plurality of examinations so rescheduling requires each possible
rearrangement of scheduled examinations to be evaluated for each patient in
an “iterative trial-and-error approach [that] cannot feasibly be performed in a
person’s mind for any but the most trivial number of patients and/or
examinations.” Id. at 3. Appellant argues that rescheduling is not a certain
method of organizing human activity in the Revised Guidance. Id. at 3–4.
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We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites what the Revised
Guidance characterizes as “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity”
and “managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people (including . . . following rules or instructions).” Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see Ans. 14. The preamble of claim 1 recites this
abstract concept as one of “scheduling a sequence of examinations of a
plurality of patients in a clinical setting.” Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.).
Appellant’s Specification confirms that this activity involves certain
methods of organizing human activity under the 2019 Revised Guidance.
The field of the invention “relates to scheduling of a series of events, such as
medical examinations for a patient in a clinical setting.” Spec. 1:2–3. The
system “keeps the time spent on a series of related event, e.g. time spent by a
person in a clinical setting such as a hospital or other examination set-up
below a given threshold while maximising the utilisation of [equipment] and
number of recipients, i.e. persons.” Id. at 3:20–23.
Merely organizing patient health information is an abstract idea. See
In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x 938, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims to storing,
communicating, processing, and transmitting patient medical information via
a network recite an abstract idea of organizing patient health information).
Such activity also involves mental processes and concepts performed
in the human mind of observation, evaluation, and judgment as the Examiner
correctly determines. Final Act. 14; Ans. 14–15; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52; see SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F.
App’x 950, 951, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (replicating the mental processes
of a doctor to select different treatments is an abstract idea); CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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The first and second databases recite steps of organizing this human
activity involved in scheduling a sequence of examinations for a plurality of
patients by storing data related to this activity at a high level of generality.
“[a] first data base compris[es] examination data relating to a specific
type of examination, the examination data including time consumption, and
the examination data relating usage of resources associated with the specific
type of examination.” Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). “[A] second data base
compris[es] patient data of the plurality of patients scheduled for upcoming
examinations within a specified time frame comprising . . . an associated list
of examinations that the patient is to undergo.” Id.
The databases store data as such. They organize time and equipment
resources required for each examination of each patient and the “time frame”
needed to complete a sequence of examinations to facilitate management of
this patient activity and interactions with medical personnel performing the
examinations. The first data base can include statistical information on how
long each examination consumes including a minimum time, a mean time, a
maximum time, and a distribution for the duration of the examination. Spec.
5:1–5. The data relating to usage of resources associated with each specific
type of examination may include the number of examination stations and
information on equipment and operator availability that allows the system
“to optimise the schedules with a certain probability of the schedule being
complied with.” Id. at 5:5–7, 11:3–7.
The second data base includes data to organize each patient and their
associated list of examinations that must be conducted within a specific time
frame as a time constraint or a maximum time used for each specific patient
as set by an operator, hospital management or department. Id. at 11:8–17.
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The claimed “scheduling unit” is “operatively coupled to the first data
base and the second data base” and “determines a sequence of examinations
for each patient of the plurality of patients subject to a constraint that an
estimated total examination time for each patient is within a given maximum
examination time, based on their associated list of examinations and the
examination data, the sequence including information relating to time and
type of examination.” Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). It organizes patients to
arrive at examinations without delay, optimises equipment usage, and keeps
the time spent in a hospital/clinic below a maximum value. Spec. 11:24–27.
This limitation recites the abstract idea of organizing patient activity
into a sequence of examinations (interactions) subject to a constraint that the
examinations should occur “within a given maximum examination time.”
This limitation also recites a mental process that humans can and do perform
in their minds or with pencil and paper to schedule examinations of patients
in a sequence that ends within a maximum time, e.g., a day. Spec. 4:25–29.
As discussed above, the “maximum examination time” can be set by
an operator who schedules the examinations, hospital management, specific
departments, or as a default value. Spec. 5:14–26, 11:8–17. This feature
“optimises the usage of the equipment as well as keeping the time spent in
the hospital or clinic by the patient below a maximum value.” Id. at 11:27–
28. Such optimization of equipment usage and patient time also organizes
human activity and personal interactions and recites mental processes. See
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 & n.2 (holding that mental processes are not
patent-eligible even when a practical application is claimed such as a method
of conducting auctions to maximize sales revenue or optimizing organization
of sales representatives in a business).
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Furthermore, mathematical formulas may be used for scheduling.
The scheduling unit 16 may employ any appropriate existing
scheduling algorithm, e.g., linear programming, genetic
algorithms, or any other suitable algorithm including numerical
algorithms, or a combination of those to solve the problem with
the goal of keeping the total patient stay shorter than the pre-
determined maximum, while maximizing the number of
patients that can be served in a day.

Spec. 12:20–26. Using mathematical equations to schedule the activities of
patients undergoing medical examinations, without more, is an abstract idea.
See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Without additional limitations, a process that
employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information is not patent eligible.”); Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (mathematical concepts are an abstract idea).
The final limitation recites that
the scheduling unit modifies the sequence of examinations for
the plurality of patients subject to the constraint that the
estimated total examination time for each patient is within the
given maximum examination time when the progress of the
plurality of patients indicates that the total examination time of
at least one patient in the plurality of patients is expected to
exceed the given maximum examination time, and
communicates a modified schedule of examinations to at least
one patient of the plurality of patients.

Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). This step also involves the abstract idea of
organizing human activities of patients undergoing medical examinations
and their interactions with medical personnel performing the examinations.
It accounts for patients who arrive early, arrive late, cancel, or don’t show up
as well as equipment that fails or is being serviced. Spec. 16:7–14.
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Appellant’s arguments that this limitation is an “iterative trial-and-
error approach [that] cannot feasibly be performed in a person’s mind for
any but the most trivial number of patients and/or examinations” is not
commensurate with the scope of claim 1 and is not persuasive. Reply Br. 3.
Claim 1 recites a system that schedules a sequence of examinations
for “a plurality of patients” without specifying any number of patients or
examinations. The Field of the Invention describes “[t]he present invention”
as “scheduling of a series of events, such as medical examinations for a
patient in a clinical setting . . . or any other situation where use of resources
are to be scheduled to a number of users.” Spec. 1:2–5 (emphasis added);
see id. at 3:23–24 (“the recipients could be a number of clients, e.g. patients
. . . per day.” Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, claim 1 encompasses a
“trivial number of patients and/or examinations.” See In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the
proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their
ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the
applicant’s specification.”); Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056,
1062 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of
the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is
inconsistent with the specification and prosecution history.”).
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity and managing personal behavior or relationships
or interactions between people (including following rules or instructions),
mental processes, and mathematical concepts or equations discussed above.
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Alice Step 1, Revised Step 2A, Prong Two: Is There an Integration?
We next consider whether claim 1 recites additional elements that
integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application. Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (Revised Step 2A, Prong Two).
The Examiner determines that claim 1 does not integrate the judicial
exceptions into a practical application because it only recites a database and
a scheduling unit as generic components that perform generic functions that
amount to no more than mere instructions to apply the exceptions using a
generic computer component. Ans. 15–16. The Examiner also determines
that accessing the databases and obtaining progress information merely add
insignificant extra-solution activity to the abstract idea without improving
the functioning of a computer or another technology or technical field. Id.
Appellant argues that
the applicants’ claims are directed to dynamically scheduling a
sequence of examinations of a plurality of patients, based on the
constraint that the total examination time for each patient is
within a given maximum examination time. The applicants’
invention assures that each patient will complete his/her series
of examinations within this maximum examination time. The
applicants respectfully maintain that, assuming in argument that
the claims recite an abstract idea, the claims are directed to a
practical application of such an abstract idea.

Appeal Br. 10. The Examiner has the better position on this issue.
First, the claimed dynamic scheduling of sequences of examinations
of patients based on a total examination time for each patient merely recites
the abstract ideas identified in claim 1. Thus, these features cannot provide
an additional element to make claim 1 or those abstract ideas patent-eligible.
BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Second, it is well-settled that reciting an abstract idea in a physical
environment, without more, is insufficient by itself to make the abstract idea
patent-eligible. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Here, in contrast, the focus of the claims is not a physical-
realm improvement but an improvement in wholly abstract ideas—the
selection and mathematical analysis of information, followed by reporting or
display of the results.”); see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Here, the Specification describes changing a schedule “dynamically”
as adding new patients with a list of examinations may and altering a list of
examinations of a specific patient. Spec. 5:7–10. This concept is recited at a
high level of generality without any technical improvement to computers,
databases, or other technology. It does not link the abstract idea of dynamic
scheduling to a particular machine that is integral to the claims. It reshuffles
examinations to stay “within a given maximum examination time.” Thus, it
does not integrate the abstract ideas in claim 1 into a practical application.
The first and second data bases are data structures that contain data
without improved functionality. Spec. 11:3–12:19, 14:16–31, 15:20–16:2.
They merely apply the abstract ideas in a generic computer environment.
See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (although data structures add particularity, they
involve the abstract idea of organizing, displaying, and manipulating data).
As discussed above, the claimed scheduling unit also is recited at a
high level of generality to perform steps of organizing human activity and
may use any appropriate existing scheduling algorithm. Spec. 12:20–26.
Therefore, this feature does not integrate the abstract ideas into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
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The claimed “input unit” performs the generic function of inputting
data and may be a computer device or a keyboard operated by a health care
person. Spec. 7:32–34, 9:17–19. This feature cannot integrate the abstract
ideas into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Claim 1 lacks additional elements that integrate the abstract ideas into
a practical application. See BSG, 899 F.3d at 1286 (“[C]laims are not saved
from abstraction merely because they recite components more specific than
a generic computer.”); In re TLI Commc’ns Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding claims were directed to an abstract idea despite the
claims’ recitation of telephone units and servers); Mortg. Grader, Inc. v.
First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(claims reciting an “interface,” “network,” and a “database” are nevertheless
directed to an abstract idea).
Any innovation resides in the realm of the abstract ideas recited in
claim 1 rather than in a technical improvement to a particular technology
that is integral to the claim. The databases and scheduling unit operate as
expected. They collect, analyze, and process data to schedule examinations
of patients in a “sequence” that is estimated to be within a given maximum
examination time. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea
(encoding and decoding) does not render the claim non-abstract.”);
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”); Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(claims that improved an abstract idea, but not a computer’s performance,
were held unpatentable).
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Essentially, Appellant argues that claim 1 recites a combination of
abstract ideas that is a technological advance. The law holds otherwise.
Synopsys, Inc., 839 F.3d at 1151 (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still
an abstract idea.”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., 793 F.3d at 1335 (claims that
improved an abstract idea, but not a computer’s performance, were held
unpatentable); RecogniCorp, LLC, 855 F.3d at 1327.
As recited at such a high level of generality without any associated
improvements to computers or other technology, claim 1 merely recites the
automation of manual activities or mental steps, which does not integrate the
abstract ideas into a practical application. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to
perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to
render a claim patent eligible.”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a
computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed
subject matter.”); In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x at 941 (claims to organizing
patient health information recited little more than automation of a method of
organizing human activity with respect to medical information).
Even if we assume that the techniques claimed are “[g]roundbreaking,
innovative, or even brilliant,” that is not enough for eligibility. Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013);
accord buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 does not integrate the abstract
ideas recited therein into a practical application.

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Alice Step 2, Revised Step 2B –– Inventive Concept
We next consider whether claim 1 recites any elements, individually,
or as an ordered combination, that provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18. “The second step of the Alice test is satisfied when the
claim limitations involve more than performance of well-understood, routine
[and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Berkheimer
v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted, alteration in original); see also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
56 (explaining that the second step of the Alice analysis considers whether a
claim adds a specific limitation beyond a judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” activity in the field).
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites elements that courts
consider well-understood, routine, and conventional computer functions of
gathering data, accessing databases, and updating data using general purpose
computers that do not improve any technology and are not integral to the use
of the abstract ideas. Ans. 15–16. Individually, these limitations “apply”
the abstract ideas on generic components that perform generic functions.
USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘‘Changes in Examination
Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (“Berkheimer memo”) indicates that the Specification may
describe additional elements in a manner that indicates that the elements are
sufficiently well-known such that the Specification need not describe their
particulars to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). Berkheimer memo at 3–4. This is
such a case. Spec. 7:32–34, 9:17–19, 11:3–12:26, 14:16–31, 15:20–16:2.
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There is nothing unconventional about the “ordered combination” that
is not merely the sum of the parts. See In re TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 615
(holding that the “recited physical components behave exactly as expected
according to their ordinary use,” through “steps that generically spell out
what it means to ‘apply it on a telephone network’ [and] cannot confer
patent eligibility”); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (A sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for
exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recites an
abstraction.); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874
F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding a conventional ordering of steps
of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring data is not inventive).
The claimed ordering of the steps therefore is ordinary and conventional.
Accordingly, we determine that claim 11 does not recite any elements,
considered individually or as an ordered combination, that provide an
inventive concept sufficient to transform the abstract idea into patent eligible
subject matter. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–8, 10–14,
16–19, 21, and 22 as directed to a judicial exception.
Claims 1–4, 10–13, 16–19, and 22
Rejected as Unpatentable over Egawa and Kurian
The Examiner cites Kurian to teach a scheduling unit that modifies a
sequence of examinations of a plurality of patients subject to the constraint
that the estimated total examination time for each patient is within the given
maximum examination time as recited in independent claims 1, 11, and 16.
Final Act. 7–10. Appellant argues that Kurian does not address a maximum
examination time nor does Kurian assure that each patient completes a series
of examinations within a maximum examination time. Appeal Br. 14–15.
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The Examiner is correct in finding that Kurian teaches to adjust and
update a schedule of patient examinations, e.g., if unanticipated delays occur
or if a patient arrives earlier than scheduled. Kurian ¶ 41. Neural network
184 either updates the live schedule or maintains it. Id. Kurian’s system is
capable of rearranging a sequence of appointments if the task scheduled for
later in the same day is ready to be executed and the schedule is idle at the
moment because another task that is supposed to start is late. Id. ¶ 43. This
rearrangement sequence can accommodate early patient arrivals. Id. The
system also can shift a blocked time grouped into a sequence of similar
procedures to optimize daily or weekly schedules. Id. ¶ 44; see Final Act. 8
(citing Kurian ¶¶ 41, 42, 44 for the schedule modification limitation).
However, we agree with Appellant that these features of Kurian do
not teach a scheduling unit that modifies a sequence of examinations subject
to the constraint that the estimated total examination time for each patient is
within the given maximum examination time. The “total examination time”
is the total time of the sequence of examinations scheduled for a patient.
Egawa and Kurian both teach to schedule examinations to stay within a total
time of a single examination, but neither reference estimates the total time
for a sequence of examinations for each patient as claimed.
Kurian modifies a schedule when the examination time of a single
examination is expected to exceed the maximum time for that particular
examination. See Ans. 18. Kurian thus changes an appointment time for a
particular examination without regard to the total examination time of the
entire sequence of examinations for a patient as claimed. Kurian ¶¶ 41–44.
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1, 11, and 16 or their
respective dependent claims 2–4, 10, 12, 13, 17–19, and 22.
Appeal 2019-004444
Application 14/361,925

18
Rejections of Dependent Claims 5–8, 14, and 21
We agree with Appellant that claims 5–8, 14, and 21 are patentable
because they depend from independent claims 1, 11, and 16, and Egawa and
Kurian do not render those independent claims obvious. Appeal Br. 16.
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of these dependent claims.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–8, 10–14,
16–19, 21,
22
101 Judicial Exception 1–8, 10–14,
16–19, 21,
22

1–4, 10–13,
16–19, 22
103(a) Egawa, Kurian 1–4, 10–
13, 16–19,
22
5, 6, 8, 14,
21
103(a) Egawa, Kurian,
Ono
5, 6, 8, 14,
21
7 103(a) Egawa, Kurian,
Ono, Umeda
7
Overall
Outcome
1–8, 10–14,
16–19, 21,
22

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED