Kohler Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 6, 1957

117 N.L.R.B. 321 (N.L.R.B. 1957)

KOHLER CO. 321
Kohler Co . and Local 833, UAW-CIO, International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America. Case No. 13-CA-1780. February 6,1957
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 12, 1956, after approximately 15 months of hearings
but before the proceeding was formally closed, the Respondent filed
a motion with the Trial Examiner seeking dismissal of the complaint'
upon the ground that the Charging Union, herein called the Union,
was not in compliance with Section 9 (h) of the Act because its inter-
national's trustees were "officers" of that organization, and admittedly
had not filed the non-Communist affidavits required of "officers" by
Section 9 (h). The Trial Examiner rejected the General Counsel's
contention that the status of the trustees as "officers" does not involve
an interpretation of the statutory language and is therefore not litiga-
ble under the holding of the Board in the Desaulniers case.' He held,
on the basis of the Union international's constitution which was in
evidence, that trustees are "officers" and as they had not filed non-
Communist affidavits, the Union was not in compliance with Section
9 (h). He therefore granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss the
complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Union filed
requests for review and reversal of the Trial Examiner's order, and
the Respondent filed a brief in support of the order.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Opinion and Order,
a copy of which is attached hereto, the requests for review and the
briefs of the parties, and is of the opinion that the Trial Examiner
erred in granting the motion to dismiss the complaint.2
The Supreme Court decided in the Coca-Cola case,' as it had in the
earlier Highland Park case,' that legal questions involving the mean-
ing of terms used in Section 9 (h) are directly litigable on the merits
in Board proceedings. As we read the decision in the Coca-Cola case,
the Supreme Court did not disturb the Board's rule that factual issues
arising under Section 9 (h), including who is an officer under the
constitutional test, are not directly litigable in representation or un-
fair labor practice proceedings but are to be determined adminis-
tratively only in collateral proceedings.5
The Coca-Cola case revolved about the meaning of the term "offi-
cers" as used in Section 9 (h).1 The Board had defined the statutory
1 115 NI.IIB 1025
° The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record and the
beets adequately present the is^uesm d the positions of the parties
4 N L B B v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Louisville, 350 U S 264
4 A, L if B v Highland Pai E }foiutfactvi ieq Co , 341 U S 322
° Uesaulnieis and company, 115 NLRII 1025
° Section 9 (Ii) piovides "No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question
aftecting commerce concerning the representation of employee, iaisod by a Liboi organiza-
117 NLRB No. 42.
423784-57-vol 117 22
322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
term "officer" as meaning "any person occupying a position identified
as an office in the constitution of the labor organization."' The Su-
preme Court expressly approved this definition as a "reasonable if
indeed not a compelling construction of the statute." The issue in
the instant case therefore does not involve the meaning of the statutory
language, but rather, whether under the Board's constitutional test
certain trustees of the Union's international occupy "a position iden-
tified as an office. " This is a factual issue and is not directly litigable,
as the Board has already held in Desaulniers and subsequent cases.'
Accordingly, we believe that the Trial Examiner erred in holding that
the status of the Union international's trustees was directly litigable
in this proceeding.9
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, that the issue is litigable, or if
the question were properly before us in a collateral proceeding,
we would still disagree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the
trustees are "officers" under the Board's constitutional test. For ap-
proximately 10 years, ever since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,
the Board has decided administratively that the UAW-AFL-CIO was
in compliance with Section 9 (h) without requiring the filing of non-
Communist affidavits by the international's trustees, thus deciding that
the latter were not "officers ." This determination of compliance has
been made in literally scores of cases involving the UAW-AFL-CIO
and its locals. There has been no recent change in the international's
constitution which now requires a different determination.
There is no question of any intent to evade or circumvent Section
9 (h). The position of international trustee was first created in the
international's 1947 constitution, after the Taft-Hartley Act became
effective. There seems little doubt but that the UAWW1--AFL-CIO
could and would have filed necessary affidavits by its trustees if the
Board had considered such filing necessary.'°
tion and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organiza-
tion unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or
within the preceding 12-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the
officers of any national or international labor oigamzation of which it is an affiliate or
constituent unit that lie is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such
party. . "
a Section 102 13 ( b) (3) of the Board ' s Rules and Regulations.
s Ekco Products Company, 117 NLRB 137, Mohawk Business Machines Corporation,
116 NLRB 248, Crensha-w's, Inc, 115 NLRB 1374 The Board respectfully disagrees
with the court decisions in Goodman Manufacturing Company v N. L. R B ., 234 F 2d 775
(C A. 7), and in N. L R. B. v Puerto Rico Food Products Corp, 232 F 2d 515 (C A 1).
9 While Member Rodger s is still of the opinion that the parties have the right to litigate
the fact of compliance (see his dissent in DesauTnmeis and Company, footnote 3, supra,
also N L R B v Puerto Rico Food Products Coip, supra) he considers himself bound by
the decisions of the Boaid to the coutr.iry, and concurs in the iesults reached Herein
19 We note, in this connection , that the union has attached to its request for review of
the Trial Examiner's Order, affidavits from the three trustees who were incumbents on the
date of issuance of the coniplamt, to the effect that they are not then, and had never been,
Communists Furthermoie, the present trustees also have filed Section 9 (h) affidavits
not in acquiescence with the Trial Examinei'a holding, but in nidei to pmo,ect the union's
position ui tutu it proceedings.
KOHLER CO. 323
Under the constitutional test, the union itself by designation in its
constitution determines who are its "officers." It is not for the Board
to determine who should be the union's officers on the basis of the
precise duties they may perform. Such a functional test has been
rejected by the Board with the approval of the Supreme Court in the
Coca-Cola case. In deciding that the Union was not in compliance
because of the failure of the international' s trustees to file non-
Communist affidavits, the Trial Examiner failed to give proper weight
to the Board's previous determination in this and other cases extend-
ing back over approximately 10 years that the trustees were not "of-
ficers." A renewed examination of the UAW-AFL-CIO constitu-
tion emphasizes the correctness of this determination.
The UAW's 1946 constitution on file with the Board provides in
section 1 of article 10 whose title is "Officers and Election" :
The elective officers of the International Union shall be one In-
ternational President, one International Secretary-Treasurer,
two (2) International Vice Presidents, whose duties shall be to
assist the International President, and such International Execu-
tive Board Members as the Convention may determine.
In the 1947 revision of its -constitution, the UAW created a "Board
of International Trustees" (article 50) charged "with the duty of
safeguarding all funds and property of the International Union by
causing the books and accounts of the International Secretary-
Treasurer to be audited quarterly." 11 Section 1 of article 10, de-
fining who are "officers" remained unchanged. The constitution was
again amended in 1949. Whereas section 3, article 10, had previously
provided that "The term of office of all elective officers shall be for
the period up to the next Convention and the term of office shall begin
immediately upon installation," the 1949 revision added the following
sentence, "The term of office of the Trustees shall be as provided in
Article 50." Section 4, article 10 was also amended at that time and
now reads as follows (emphasis indicates language added in 1949) :
Nominations and election of all elective officers and Trustee shall
take place in the regular order of business of the Convention and
election shall be determined by a majority vote of the delegates
voting. Candidates shall be elected to various offices by one
roll-call vote.
11 Article 50 is self -contained . It contains six sections devoted to the number and duties
of the trustees , tenure, manner of nomination and election , replacement of a trustee in event
of death , resignation or disqualification The officers listed in section 1 of article 10 aie
the full-time executives of the international . Tiustees , on the other hand, have only a
limited function, namely to "cause the books and accounts of the International Secretary-
Tiea,urer to b audited quarterly " (Al title 50 sect ion 1 ) They ma} serve not to exceed
a nmav]omu n of tiI'it-- (301 da'-e 'n me q'iai ter in perfo mance of their constitutional duty,
and ale paid on the basis of maximum international representative's salarv and expenses
324 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The 1949 constitutional provisions pertaining to trustees and officers
remained unchanged in the constitution in effect at relevant times in
this proceeding. Under that constitution, as under all the constitutions
in force since 1946, elective officers are specifically listed as the presi-
dent, the secretary-treasurer, two vice-presidents and such executive
board members as the convention may determine (article 10, section
1)." Under the maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, it would
seem that trustees, not being listed, are not "officers."
We recognize that there are certain expressions used elsewhere in
article 10 which may be said to give some color to the claim that trustees
are in fact "officers." Thus section 3, after providing that the "term
of office of all elective officers" shall be for the period up to the next
convention, continues with the separate sentence that the "term of
office of the Trustees shall be as provided for in Article 50." Section
4 also provides that "Candidates shall be elected to various offices by
one roll-call vote." On the other hand, other provisions emphasize a
distinction between "officers" and "trustees." Thus section 4 referred
to immediately above, also says "Nomination and election of all elec-
tive officers and Trustee shall take place in the regular order of busi-
ness of the Convention . .." [emphasis supplied]. Article 50 which.
describes the duties, tenure, etc., of trustees nowhere uses the term
"officer" to describe the position of trustee. "Term" rather than
"term of office" is used to describe the period of service of a trustee
(article 50, section 4). A trustee "shall become eligible as a candidate
for office in [not another office in] or as an employee of, the Interna-
tional Union only subsequent to an International Convention which
follows his resignation from the Board of Trustees." (Article 50,
section 6.) In short, there are secondary sources which, standing alone,
reveal an ambiguity as to whether trustees are "officers." It is clear
to us, however, that the plain constitutional provision describing who
are officers and the union's practical application of that term concur red
in by the Board for a period of almost 10 years, outweigh any such
equivocal phraseology, and should be decisive. We note that the Trial
Examiner has relied heavily for his contrary finding on the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the second Goodman
decision. We have recently pointed out in our decision in Ekco Prod-
ucts Company, 117 NLRB 137, which issued after the Trial Ex-
aminer's Opinion and Order, our view that the Goodman decision
continues to rely on criteria for determining who is an officer which
the Supreme Court has said are not relevant.
We find, therefore, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the trustees
are not "officers" of the Union's international within the meaning of
the Board's constitutional test. Accordingly, we shall reverse the
Trial Examiner's order dismissing the complaint, deny the Respond-
12 All executive board members have filed non-Communiet affidavits
KOHLER CO. 325
ent's motion to dismiss the complaint, and remand the case to the Trial
Examiner for the preparation of an Intermediate Report.
[The Board overruled the Trial Examiner's order of October 15,
1956; denied the Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint; and
remanded the case to the Trial Examiner for the preparation of an
Intermediate Report.]
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION, TO DISMISS
The hearing in this case was concluded on May 4, 1956, except for possible testi-
mony by one witness. On September 12, Respondent filed its motion to dismiss the
complaint, based on the Union's alleged failure to comply with Section 9 (h) of the
Act,' and also filed a memorandum of law supporting its motion.
Briefly summarized , Respondent 's motion asserts that the members of the Inter-
national Board of Trustees of UAW-CIO (herein called Trustees) are "officers"
of that labor organization as defined by the regulations of the Board, Section 102.13
(b) (3), and within the meaning of Section 9 (h) of the Act, and that said Trustees
had not filed the required affidavits on October 26, 1954, when the complaint issued.
Supporting the latter assertion Respondent attached a copy of a letter from the
Board's compliance officer dated August 17, 1956. Respondent relies on N. L. R. B.
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Louisville, 350 U. S. 264, and N. L. R. B. v.
Highland Park Manufacturing Company, 341 U. S. 322, to support its action in
presenting the question in this proceeding , and it relies mainly on Metcalf v. Mitchell,
269 U. S. 514, and Goodman Manufacturing Company v. N. L. R. B., 234 F. 2d
775 (C. A. 7), to support its position on the merits of the question.
Though on March 21, 1956, during the hearing, the General Counsel's representa-
tives announced that they had no objection to the litigation of the compliance ques-
tions within the confines of the Coca-Cola case (Record, p. 16, 365), they oppose
Respondent 's present motion on the limited ground that the issue may not be
litigated because the status of Trustees as "officers" does not involve an interpretation
of the statutory language, citing Desaulniers and Company, 115 NLRB 1025, and
Mohawk Business Machines Corporation, 116 NLRB 248. Their opposition states
no position on the merits of the question ; it does not dispute Respondent 's assertion
that the Trustees have not filed affidavits.
The Union's opposition takes issue both on the litigability question and on the
merits, though it also does not dispute that the Trustees have not filed affidavits.
The Union raises two other matters which will be disposed of preliminarily before
turning to the two main issues. Its plea of lathes is rejected as devoid of merit,
since under Section 9 (h) a question of the Board's jurisdiction to issue the complaint
is involved. Also rejected is the alternative request, with which the Union con-
cluded its opposition, that the Trial Examiner hold a hearing to take evidence on the
question whether the Trustees are officers and which is supported only with the
bare statement that it offers to produce proof which may supplement documentary
evidence in the record. Such a vague suggestion of undisclosed evidence of proble-
matical materiality is wholly inadequate to support the request; it indicates at best
an expression of hope, not the possession of, or the ability to produce , specific ma-
terial evidence.
' Sec 9 (h) No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting com-
merce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under
subsection (c) of this section, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made
by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the
Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period
by each oilicer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international
labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member
of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and
is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow
of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods. .
z Respondent had raised earlier compliance questions winch were based on different mat-
tei s than those now presented.
326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Litigability of the Question
The Supreme Court has twice rejected the Board's contention that compliance
questions may not be litigated in complaint or representation cases. Thus it stated
in the Coca-Cola case, supra, at p. 268:
Much may be said for the claim that an employer should not be permitted to.
disrupt or delay compaint or representation cases by raising questions respecting
Section 9 (h). But after Highland Park the argument comes too late.
The Court upheld, however, an application of the Board's "constitutional" test for
determining who is a union "officer," i. e., "any person occupying a position identified
as an office in the constitution of the labor organization." (Rules and Regulations,
Sec. 102.13 (b) (3).)
The present motion, which invokes that test and which relies upon the Board's
definition, opens an inquiry which seems squarely within the confines of the Coca-Cola
case, even under the most narrow interpretation of that decision. Actually, "litiga-
tion" in the usual sense is not here involved, since the motion is based on matter which
is already of record herein or which can be noted administratively from the Board's
official records. Thus, the UAW-CIO constitution came into evidence, without objec-
tion, early in the hearing (June 23, 1955); and the fact that the Trustees had not
filed the required affidavits as of October 26, 1954, is hereby administratively noted
from the official records of the Board.3 The latter finding leaves for determination
only a legal issue, whether the Trustees are "officers" within the meaning of Section
9 (h) and of the Board's definition of the term, i. e., it involves an interpretation of
the statutory language under the Board's constitutional test for determining who is an
officer of a labor organization.
The Desaulniers case does not, therefore, prevent a determination of the question,
since its holding was limited expressly to compliance matters which do not involve
interpretation of the statutory language. Moreover, the Board pointed out that there
was absent any allegation that the union representative there involved was an officer
under the Board's constitutional test. The Mohawk case is no more in point since
the Board simply applied the Desaulniers rule to a situation in which the Respondent
had sought in part to reopen the record to take evidence on the compliance status of
the charging union.4 Certainly those decisions cannot be construed so as to
preempt litigation within the area permitted by the Supreme Court.
3 Board decisions have reflected approval of the practice by Trial Examiners of making,
sometimes on their own motion, "administrative" determinations by noting from the Board's
official records facts both as to compliance and noncompliance by charging unions In
National Container Corporation, 96 NLRB 1387, for example, the Board upheld the Trial
Examiner's action in recommending dismissal of a complaint after he had determined ad-
ministratively that the Union was not in compliance. The significance of the Board's ruling
can best be gathered from the basis and rationale of the Trial Examiner's action as stated
in his Intermediate Report :
The Board has consistently held that, while the question as to whether a labor organi-
zation required by the Act to comply has in fact done so, is not a litigable issue,
the Board will make that deter urination administratively, in order to satisfy itself
that the requirements of the statute have been met . . In accordance with this
obligation, and while no issue is raised by the parties in this specific respect (though
the question of compliance is raised on other grounds, adverted to hereinafter), I have
consulted the Board's compliance records for assurance that the requirements of the
section have been satisfied. Those records disclose that Local 1, the Petitioner and
Charging Union herein, was not in compliance on the date the complaint was issued
[Emphasis supplied.]
4 It is also noted that in disposing of Respondent Mohawk's alternative motion to dismiss
on the basis of the Goodman ease, the only reference was to the first decision in that case
(227 F 2d 465), which was withdrawn by the Court in its second opinion, 234 F. 2d 775,
779 (C. A 7)
It is further noted that the full impact of the second Goodman decision and of N L. R. B.
V. Pue) to Rico Food Products Corp, 232 F. 2d 515 (C. A 1) on the Board's views have not
yet been fully disclosed. 'lie Board did not seek certiorari in either case, and it filed a
brief which opposed the union's petition for certiorari in Goodman, though on technical'
grounds. At one time the Board seemed prepared to concede that the Supreme Court had
decided the issue of litigability against it Thus it stated in part in its printed petition
for certiorari prepared for filing to the first Goodman decision, prior to its withdrawal
The court [of appeals] also held, contraiy to the Board, that the officer status of the
Trustee and District Secretaries was litigable in the hearing on the merits. This issue
KOHLER CO. 327
There is still another factor considered by the Supreme Court which brings the
present question further within the scope of permissible litigation approved in Coca-
Cola, and that is that the inquiry here opened can neither disrupt nor delay the de-
termination of this complaint case, since the time for filing briefs on the merits has
been extended to November 19, 1956, and since the inquiry relates only to matter
presently of record. The Court's concern with whether the injection of compliance
issues may have serious or negligible effects is here easily allayed: The present inquiry
offers no "impediment to the effectiveness of the administrative process in determining
the merits" of this proceeding. Coca-Cola case, at p. 268.
I therefore conclude that to the extent that a determination of the present question
involves litigation, it is litigation within the confines of the Coca-Cola case and
within the Board's constitutional test as there approved.
The Merits of the Question
As stated above, the motion presents the question whether the trustees of
UAW-CIO are "officers" of the Union within the Board's definition of the term
as "any person occupying a position identified as an office by the constitution of the
labor organization ." Since reference to the text of the UAW-CIO constitution is
necessary , the applicable sections of articles 10 and 50 are attached hereto as an
appendix.
Article 10 covers the subject of officers and elections, and section 4 provides for
the nomination and election of all elective officers and trustees at the same time,
place, and manner . Though section 1 does not include trustees in its listing of the
elective officers , other sections contain explicit recognition that the trustees in fact
occupy an office. Thus , section 3 after fixing the "term of office" of the elective
officers, provides that, "The term of office of the Trustees shall be as provided in
Article 50." Section 4, in turn, after fixing the time and manner of the nomination
and election both of elective officers and trustees , provides that candidates shall be
elected to the various offices by one roll-call vote. Section 3 of article 50 fixes the
terms of the trustees and contains provisions corresponding to those in section 4,
article 10, as to the nomination and election of the trustees.
The failure of the constitution to list the trustees among, or to expressly refer to
them as, "officers " is not , of course , conclusive , for as the Board defined the term'
it becomes one which is inseparable from the office which is occupied . See Metcalf
v. Mitchell, 269 U S. 514, 520; Coca-Cola, supra, at p. 269. Indeed , the regulation
does not even require that the position occupied be specifically designated or named
as an office , but only that it be identified as such, which carries a broader meaning.
Goodman Manufacturing Company, supra , at p. 778.
Here the constitution contains not only explicit recognition that the position occu-
pied by the trustees is an "office," but it attaches to the position attributes and inci-
dents which parallel those attached to positions which are admittedly offices Thus
the constitution created all the positions , provided for the manner of nomination and
election of candidates , and fixed the terms of office , the duties , and the compensa-
tion. Under the constitution the positions themselves are permanent in character
in the sense that each exists as an entity distinct from the existence of the occupant.
These, indeed , are but the incidents which are commonly understood to establish or
define an office. Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra , at p. 520.
The Union 's opposition is based in part on contentions that the trustees have no
functions relating to collective bargaining , to policy making decisions , or to the
usual labor union functions , and that their functions are comparable to those per-
formed by accountants . The "functional " test is one which the court of appeals
had applied in Coca-Cola and which the Supreme Court had rejected, viewing it as
one under which the "officers" would include "those members of a union who are
effective instruments of its policies." Coca-Cola, supra , at pp. 268-9.
The Goodman case involved litigation of the Board's constitutional test in a situa-
tion strikingly similar to the present one , both in the positions involved and the
constitutional provisions relating to them. In reversing the Board 's holding that
trustees of UE were not "officers " of that Union within the meaning of the Board's
definition of the term , the court relied mainly on the constitutional provisions
themselves , which were less explicit in identifying the position of trustees as an
office than are the provisions of the UAW-CIO constitution.
wag decided adverselis to the Board bis this Court in the Coca-Cola case, No. 79, this
Terns No question is raised here with respect to ruling of the court below on this
point. [Emphasis supplied ]
328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
First, the court was of the opinion that the mere provision for the nomination
and election of the trustees in the same manner as the general officers alone carried
a strong connotation that the trustees were to be elected to an office. Secondly, the
court felt that the powers and duties conferred on the trustees supported the conclu-
sion that they held a position identified as an office, and that they were not, to use
the Supreme Court's illustration in the Coca-Cola case, "boys in the back room or
other agencies of invisible government." Their main function, that of safeguarding
all properties of the union, was identical with that of the trustees here, though the
UE trustees were also to act as administrators of the procedure for the recall of
officers.5 In the third place, the court pointed to certain convention proceedings
concerning the election of the trustees as supporting its conclusion that the trustees
were recognized as officers. In the present case, more explicit recognition of such a
status appears in the constitution itself.
Hence the Goodman case plainly constitutes a fortiori authority as applied to the
facts in this case; to the extent that distinctions exist, the most significant ones more
strongly support the results there reached. In any event, the identification of the
position as an office is so explicitly made in the constitution that the same conclu-
sion is impelled here, regardless of what weight is to be given that case as a
precedent.
I therefore conclude (1) that the Trustees occupy a position identified as an
office in the Union's constitution, within the meaning of Section 102.13 (b) (3) of
the Board's Rules and Regulations, and (2) that the Trustees are officers of the
Union within the meaning of Section 9 (h) of the Act Since I have also found
that the Trustees had not, on October 26, 1954, filed the affidavits required by that
section, it follows that the motion to dismiss the complaint must be granted.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint be
granted, and said complaint is hereby dismissed.
8 The Board had relied on the latter factor as supporting its conclusion that the trustees
were not officers See Compliance Status of United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
of America, dated August 6, 1953 The court diew a contrary inference
APPENDIX i
ARTICLE lU
Officers and Elections
SECTION 1. The elective officers of the International Union shall be one (1) Inter-
national President , one (1) International Secretary -Treasurer , two (2 ) International
Vice-Presidents , whose duties shall be to assist the International President , and such
International Executive Board Members as the Convention may determine.
SEC. 2. The International Executive Board Members shall be nominated and elected
in the regions now established by the International Executive Board within the geo-
graphical districts as determined by the International Constitution . Only the dele-
gates from the Local Unions in such regions shall nominate and vote for their Interna-
tional Board Member. Any member in continuous good standing for one year, and
who has worked at least ninety ( 90) working days in a plant or plants located within
the region , whose Local Union is located within the region can be nominated and
elected. It shall require a two-thirds vote of the International Executive Board to
- change the composition of any region within a geographical district.
SEC 3. The term of office of all elective officers shall be for the period up to the
next Convention and the term of office shall begin immediately upon installation.
The term of office of the Trustees shall be as provided for in Article 50.
SEC. 4. Nomination and election of all elective officers and Trustees shall take place
in the regular order of business of the Convention and election shall be determined by
a majority vote of the delegates voting. Candidates shall be elected to various of-
fices by one ( 1) roll-call vote . In the election of the Vice-Presidents each delegate
may vote for two (2 ) candidates. If there are four (4) or more than four (4)
nominees for the two ( 2) offices and only one ( 1) candidate or no candidate receives
a majority vote, the candidate receiving the lowest number of votes shall be eliminated
unless such elimination would leave less than three ( 3) candidates in an election in
which both offices are to be filled or less than two ( 2) candidates when one (1)
office is to be filled.
SEC. 5. All elections of International Officers and International Executive Board
Members shall be by roll-call vote.
I All emphasis supplied.
BELOIT EASTERN CORPORATION
ARTICLE 50
329'
Board of International Trustees
SECTION 1. A three (3) member International Board of Trustees shall be created,
charged with the duty of safeguarding all funds and property of the International
Union by causing the books and accounts of the International Secretary-Treasurer to
be audited quarterly. The Board of Trustees shall designate a certified public ac-
countant to make such audits, and shall incorporate same in their report to the
International officers, Board Members, and all affiliated Local Unions as soon as
completed. The Board Of Trustees shall report its activities to the quarterly meetings
of the International Executive Board and to the International Convention. It shall
make recommendations to the Board and to the Convention for improving the handling
of the finances of the International Union and for safeguarding its funds and property.
SEC 2. Members of the Board of Trustees shall devote the time necessary to the
performance of their duties, not to exceed a maximum of thirty (30) days in any
quarter. Members of the Board of Trustees shall be compensated on the basis of
maximum International Representative's salary, and expenses.
SEC. 3. Nominations and elections of Trustees shall take place in the regular order
of business of the International Convention Candidates shall be nominated and
elected in one election. The candidates shall be nominated for a three (3) term
trusteeship, for a (2) term trusteeship, and for a one (1) term trusteeship. The
candidate receiving the highest number of votes for each of these three (3) positions,
respectively, shall be declared elected At each Constitutional Convention, a Trustee
shall be elected for a three (3) term period.
'SEC. 4. In the event of the death, removal or resignation of a Trustee, the following
procedure shall be utilized to fill the vacancy for the unexpired term until the next
subsequent Convention only The names of all regular delegates attending the pre-
ceding International Union Convention shall be copied from the official Convention
roll call The names of all delegates shall be written on uniform sized slips of paper
and deposited in a box by the Secretary-Treasurer, in the presence of the International
Executive Board, and the box shall be sealed and thoroughly shaken. The Interna-
tional Secretary-Treasuier shall then open the container and the member of the In-
ternational Executive Board selected for that purpose, and blindfolded, shall draw the
names of fifteen (15) delegates, one by one. After these names are drawn they shall
be read by the International Secretary-Treasurer in the presence of the International
Executive Board, and each name in succession shall be set opposite a number from one
(1) to fifteen (15). The vacancy shall be filled by the first individual in numerical
order on the list who accepts and who is eligible.
SEC. 5. A member of the Board of Trustees shall not, while holding such position,
be employed by the International Union as an International Representative or in any
other capacity whatsoever. Such member shall become eligible as a candidate for
office in, or as an employee of, the International Union only subsequent to an Inter-
national Convention which follows his resignation from the Board of Trustees.
Beloit Eastern Corporation and Pattern Makers League of North
America, AFL-CIO, Philadelphia Association , Petitioner. Case
No. 4-RC-3155. February 8,1957
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Morris Mogerman, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer i is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
I The name of the Employer appears as corrected at the hearing.
117 NLRB No. 40.