Knafel Pontiac, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 10, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 818 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Knafel Pontiac, Inc. and District Lodge No . 54, of the
International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-6342
March 10, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND KENNEDY
On November 18, 1971, Trial Examiner John P. von
Rohr issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings,
findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recom-
mended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent,
Knafel Pontiac, Inc., Akron, Ohio, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN P. VON ROHR, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed
on March 29, 1971, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, for the Regional Director for Region
8 (Cleveland, Ohio), issued a complaint on May 20, 1971,
against Knafel Pontiac, Inc., herein called the Respondent or
the Company, alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the
Act. Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of
any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Exam-
iner John P. von Rohr in Akron, Ohio, on August 17 and 18,
1971. A brief was received from the General Counsel on
October 4, 1971, and it has been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I'hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is an Ohio corporation with its principal
office and place of business located in Akron, Ohio, where it
is engaged in the retail sale and servicing of automobiles. It
annually receives gross receipts from the retail sale of au-
tomobiles in excess of $500,000, and annually receives au-
195 NLRB No. 149
tomobiles directly from points located outside the State of
Ohio valued in excess of $50,000.
The Respondent concedes, and I find, that it is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District Lodge No. 54 of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background,- The Issues
In about the early part of November 1970, the Union con-
ducted an organizing campaign among Respondent's service
employees; these approximate 12-14 in number and com-
prised of automobile mechanics, body men, painters, and
lubrication men. Following the Union's request for recogni-
tion and bargaining, which was received and declined on
about November 25, 1970, a representation election involving
the aforesaid employees in the service department was con-
ducted on January 11, 1971. Upon determination of certain
challenged ballots, the Union was certified by the Board on
June 11, 1971.
The complaint alleges: (1) that Respondent caused Terry
E. Ballanger to be constructively discharged on or about
March 30, 1971, because it allegedly laid him off for dis-
criminatory reasons on a number of occasions between
December 4, 1970, and March 30, 1971; (2) that Respondent
discriminatorily laid off Lewis Klusty, Sr., on various un-
specified occasions in and after December, 1970; and (3) that
Respondent engaged in other conduct independently viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Denying the commission of any unfair labor practices, Re-
spondent defends on the ground that the various layoffs at
issue herein were based solely on economic considerations.
B. The 8(a)(1) Violations
1. William Knafel, president of the Company, has long,
been engaged in the building of handmade custom rifles.
Economically a fruitful avocation, these are sold to individu-
als around the country, usually for decorative or display pur-
poses, at prices ranging up to $2,000. About 2 weeks prior to
the January 11 election, Johnny Owens, a body shop me-
chanic, indicated that he was interested in purchasing such
a rifle. Knafel brought one from home and took it to the body
shop where he showed it to Owens. After discussing the
possibilities of a purchase, Knafel left the body shop and
walked through the service area carrying the rifle with him.
According to the testimony of Robert Klute, a mechanic,
Knafel at this time came up, pointed the rifle toward him, and
states, "We are going to have an election right now." Klute
said that Knafel then asked how he was going to vote and that
he responded he would vote "for the union." Employee Terry
Ballanger, who was working nearby, corroborated Klute's
testimony concerning the incident. Knafel denied pointing
the gun toward Klute and asserted that it was some other
employee, not he, who at this time made a remark to the effect
"how are you going to vote now Klute." Assuming the tes-
timony given by Klute and Ballanger to be the correct ver-
sion, the fact remains that on cross-examination Klute tes-
tified that the entire incident appeared to him as having
occurred in jest. In view of this concession, I fail to see where
Knafel's conduct on this occasion can be construed as coer-
cive. Accordingly, it is recommended that the 8(a)(1) allega-
tion in the complaint concerning this incident be dismissed.
KNAFEL PONTIAC
2. President Knafel held two or three meetings with the
service department employees in latter December and early
January during which he expressed his views concerning the
forthcoming representation election. The complaint alleges
that on one such occasion Knafel threatened employees with
loss of seniority rights and loss of vacation benefits. In sup-
port of this allegation Ballanger testified that during a meet-
ing held on January 8, 1971, Knafel stated, "if the union was
allowed to enter the Company we would no longer receive
seniority benefits or vacation pay except from the time the
contract was signed ." Employee Louis Klusty testified that
Knafel, in the context of discussing the Union activity, stated
"that seniority would not be recognized and everybody would
have to start out as a new man , and there would be no
recognition of percentage rate on vacation pay or anything
else." Employee Robert Klute said he recollected Knafel stat-
ing "that he wasn't going to honor any of the seniority
rights." Although Knafel vaguely testified about negotiating
"the best deal he could" with the Union concerning seniority
and vacations, he did not deny the testimony of the three
foregoing employees concerning these subjects. Upon their
uncontroverted testimony,--I find that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening its employees with
loss of seniority rights and vacation benefits if they selected
the Union as their bargaining representative.
3. Employee Robert Klute testified without contradiction
that immediately after the election on January 11 he was
asked by Phil Di Mascio, foreman of the body shop, if he had
voted for the Union. Klute said that he responded in the
affirmative, adding that he did not care who knew it. While
I would not recommend the issuance of a remedial order
solely on the basis of this incident if it stood alone, in view
of the violation found in the preceding paragraph, I find
Respondent's interrogation of Klute as to how he voted in the
Board election to be in further violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
C. The Alleged Discrimination
In early November 1970, employees Ballanger , Klusty,
Robert Klute, and Bill Irwin met with a representative of the
Union and at that time signed union cards. Although this
marked the beginning of the union campaign, Klusty did not
pass out any cards and from the record it is apparent that he
did not thereafter engage in any further union activity. Bal-
langer testified that subsequent to this meeting he passed out
approximately three union authorization cards. He also acted
as the union observer at the January 11, 1971, election.
While there is no direct evidence of company knowledge
concerning the organizational activities mentioned above,
Ballanger testified that at a meeting with the service em-
ployees on January 8, 1971, Knafel stated that he heard three
of the employees were instigating the union activity and that
he then named himself (Ballanger), Klusty, and Klute. Bal-
langer said he thereupon told Knafel that "he would say to
his face" that he was in favor of the Union. Without specify-
ing the occasions, Robert Klute testified that "at least five or
six times" prior to and after the election Knafel referred to
him, Klusty, and Ballanger as instigators of the Union.
Klusty gave confusing and contradictory testimony. Testify-
ing several times that Knafel named him, Klute, Ballanger,
and Bill Irwin as being instigators of the Union, at another
point in his testimony Klute said "he [Knafel] didn't mention
the names directly, but [he was told] the four men that were
involved." Knafel denied ever having made any statement to
the effect that he had learned that Ballanger , Klusty, Klute,
and Irwin were union instigators. However, when asked if
Ballanger ever volunteered a statement that he was for the
Union, Knafel responded that Ballanger may have made a
819
statement to that effect.' Knafel further testified that after the
third meeting which he held with the employees (in January)
five employees came up and told them they had applied for
union cards.' He did not give the names of these individuals.
While I was not particularly impressed with the credibility
of any of the witnesses who testified in this case, I credit the
substantially corroborative testimony of Ballanger , Klusty,
and Klute that at one of his meetings with employees, most
probably in January, Knafel did mention and name the four
employees whom he regarded as the union instigators. While
this may be taken to establish company knowledge at some
point in general, it should be noted that the discrimination
against Ballanger is asserted by the General Counsel to have
started on December 3, 1970, the time of Ballanger's first
layoff. Although not decisive to the case, I do not regard
Knafel's remarks in January 1971, as necessarily establishing
company knowledge of the employees' union activities in
November or early December 1970.
1. Terry Ballanger
Ballanger , a general line mechanic, was employed by Re-
spondent for approximately 5 years and 8 months. He was,
however, the least senior employee in the service department.
As previously indicated, the General Counsel contends
that Ballanger was constructively discharged about March
30, 1971, at which time he refused an offer to return to work
while on layoff status. It is the General Counsel's position
that Respondent in effect forced Ballanger to relinquish his
job at this time because prior thereto, beginning on December
3, 1970, it had harassed him by subjecting him to a series of
allegedly needless layoffs because of his union activities.
The dates and periods of Ballanger's layoffs, all of which
were temporary in nature and concerning which there is no
dispute, are as follows: December 4 to January 6, 1971; Janu-
ary 12 (1 day); January 21 (1 day); January 28 to February
10; and March 18 to March 29, 1971, the latter being the date
of recall which Ballanger declined on March 30, 1971.'
With respect to the layoff on December 4, 1970, Ballanger
testified that he was notified of this late on December 3 by
Richard Harvey, the acting service manager, who told him
that he had orders to lay him off but that he would be called
back to work as soon as possible. Ballanger testified that
about 10 minutes later he spoke to Knafel, telling him that
"work was still available" and that he "couldn't afford a
layoff for harassment purpose." While Ballanger acknowl-
edged that Knafel also told him that the layoff "was definitely
due to lack of work," I might parenthetically note that it
indeed seems peculiar that Ballanger would be so willing to
charge Respondent with "harassment" at this, the time of his
first layoff. In any event, in order to bolster his contention
that Respondent's layoff of Ballanger on December 4 was
discriminatorily motivated, the General Counsel introduced
testimony by Ballanger to the effect that work was still availa-
ble for him at the time of this layoff. In this regard Ballanger
testified that at the end of the day on December 3 there
remained about 4 hours of work to be performed on the car
he was working on. He also testified that an engine was
Employee George Cheatwood, a Respondent witness, also testified that
at one of the meetings Ballanger told Knafel that he was "for the Union."
Knafel said they volunteered this information "because they were afraid
that I was going to charge all of them with fraud and use the Union to protect
them." In this connection, Knafel explained that at about this time a General
Motor audit disclosed certain irregularities in the service department. This
involved, he testified, "that a number of instances mechanics had applied
false time to work orders stating that they had done repair work on custom-
ers' cars under the General Motors warranty plan."
3 Ballanger became employed with Taylor Pontiac on March 29, 1971.
820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
waiting in the service department for him to install in a car
owned by one Thomas Salter. According to Ballanger, Salter
personally wanted him to install the engine. As to the 4 hours
of remaining work, in view of my later finding that Respond-
ent was economically justified in laying off employees as part
of its cost cutting program, I find Respondent was also jus-
tified in letting one of the remaining employees perform this
work; and as concerns the installation of the engine in the
Salter car, suffice it to note that whatever personal agreement
Ballanger had with Salter, there is no showing that such
arrangement was made with Respondent's knowledge, con-
sent or approval.
Except for the fact that Ballanger was on layoff status for
1 day on January 12, the day after the election, no facts were
presented with respect to the circumstances of the other occa-
sions, noted above, when Ballanger was laid off.
Turning to Respondent's defense, there are two questions
to be examined and answered. The first is, was Respondent's
economic situation such that there was a need for any layoffs.
Secondly, assuming that layoffs were justified, does the evi-
dence establish that Respondent violated the Act in its selec-
tion of those to be laid off. As indicated below, I find the
answers to these questions to be yes and no, respectively.
Respondent, through the unrefuted testimony of President
Knafel and George Whitlock, the office manager, which I
here credit, established that the various layoffs which took
place during the period material hereto were precipitated by
a substantial reduction in its sales and service operations
which in large part was attributable to the General Motors
strike which began in the early fall of 1970. Demonstrating
the extent of the decrease in business in 'the service depart-
ment for the material months in 1970 as compared to 1969,
Respondent presented the following record of profits which
it sustained for the comparable periods:
1969 1970
Sept . $6,775 $5,143
Oct. 7, 621 6,155
Nov. 5,494 6,636
Dec. 4,737 3,615
As indicated above, except for the month of November, the
profits for the comparable periods declined in each of the
months during the last quarter of 1971.' In addition to the
Apart from the overall economically depressing effect of the General
Motors strike, particularly in the automobile business, Respondent' s service
department suffered because (1) the strike created a shortage of parts needed
for automobile repairs and (2) due to the decrease in new car sales because
of the strike, the related work performed by the service department, such
as servicing new cars for delivery and doing repair work under new car
warranties , also decreased accordingly
foregoing, the fact that Respondent was legitimately con-
cerned about cutting costs because of the decline in its busi-
ness is demonstrated by other measures taken by Respondent
even prior to the occasion of the alleged discrimination
against Ballanger or Klusty. It is thus undisputed that: (1) in
latter September or early October 1970, Respondent reduced
the number of hours of its clerical force. This was accom-
plished by rotating the four women clerks so that each
worked a 3-day week instead of the customary 5-day week;
(2) in October 1970, the salaries of all management employees
were cut by 33'/, percent; and (3) in October 1970, one of the
two porters employed by Respondent was laid off as part of
this cost cutting program.
But most damaging to the General Counsel's case is the
undisputed fact that Respondent 'laid off another employee,
George 'Cheatwood, 1 week before Ballanger's first layoff in
the mistaken belief that Cheatwood was the least senior of the
service mechanics.' Thus, Knafel credibly testified that
shortly after Cheatwood was laid off, the payroll clerk, Mrs
Runyon, asked him why he had laid off Cheatwood, pointing
out that Cheatwood was not the youngest man. She there-
upon procured the records and pointed out to Knafel that
Ballanger was the least senior of the mechanics. Knafel there-
upon went to Ballanger. Apprizing him of the situation, Kna-
fel at this point offered Ballanger a job'on the lubrication
rack.' Ballanger, however, refused the job.' He was thereupon
laid off. It is undisputed that Cheatwood was recalled as a
mechanic and that Respondent paid him for the time he had
been mistakenly laid off.8 Furthermore, the record reflects
that Robert Klute, a service mechanic, was also on , layoff at
this time. When Ballanger refused the lubrication job, Re-
spondent recalled Klute and gave him the job. Klute, it will
be recalled, was one of the employee organizers named by
Knafel as a union instigator. Although Klute was more active
than Klusty, the other alleged discriminatee herein, there is
no contention of any discrimination by Respondent against
Klute.
Turning to another matter, Ballanger testified that in latter
November 1970, Knafel told the service department em-
ployees that there was a lack of work and that he would leave
it up to them to decide if they would prefer regular type
layoffs or whether they would be willing to work on a rotating
basis; i.e., working less hours to the extent that the employees
would take turns so that each would be laid off for about only
1 day a week. Ballanger testified that the employees decided
they would rather rotate and that they so advised Knafel.
Earl Elswick, a service mechanic called as Respondent's wit-
ness, testified that, at this meeting a majority of the employees
decided that they did not want to rotate. When asked on the
witness stand which employees did not care to rotate, Elswick
without hesitation pointed to Ballanger and named him as
having voiced this position. Concerning the matter of this
vote, I am inclined to credit Elswick's testimony over Ballan-
ger's. In any event, I do not regard this as particularly impor-
tant since it is abundantly clear, and I find, that Respondent
started a rotating system of layoff among the service depart-
' Since the record is clear that Respondent held this mistaken belief, I
deem it unnecessary to decide conflicting testimony as to whether Knafel
was led to this belief by Ballanger's purported statement that Cheatwood
was the youngest man i
6 The regular lubrication man had been laid off previously
' Ballanger acknowledged that he was offered the lubrication job at the
time of the December 4 layoff. He declined the offer because its job did not
have a guaranteed weekly pay, as did the position of a mechanic.
Cheatwood testified that he had been laid off for about 2 or 3 days at
this time
KNAFEL PONTIAC 821
ment employees beginning in about November 1970.9 Fur-
ther, this system was continued for at least the first 2 or 3
months in 1971. While it is undisputed that a rotating system
was in effect among the service department employees
throughout the foregoing period, the record does not show
just how frequently the employees were laid off and which of
the particular service employees were laid off at any particu-
lar time." The General Counsel in effect argues that since all
this would be reflected in Respondent's records, I should
draw some inference adverse to Respondent's case because
Respondent did not introduce these records. However, the
burden of proving discrimination is that of the General Coun-
sel. If General Counsel had reason to believe that Respond-
ent's records would show discrimination in its implementa-
tion of the rotating system, surely means were available to
him whereby he could require their production."
In sum , and notwithstanding the presence of some suspi-
cious elements in the case which I have fully considered," I
am satisfied and find that a preponderance of the evidence
does not establish Respondent to have discriminated against
Ballanger in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as alleged
in the complaint. As previously found, the evidence amply
establishes that economic circumstances justified Respondent
to take steps to effect operational economies, including the
cost cutting measures heretofore noted in other departments,
as well as the various layoffs that are noted herein. The fact
that Respondent laid off employee Cheatwood prior to the
layoff of Ballanger under the mistaken belief that Cheatwood
had the least seniority is particularly convincing evidence
that its eventual selection of Ballanger was not unlawfully
motivated. Finally, it is undisputed that Ballanger was not
replaced, there being no new employees hired in the service
department until about a month prior to the instant hearing.
This is but further evidence that Respondent had no need for
his services at any time material herein.
It is recommended that the allegation in the complaint
pertaining to Ballanger be dismissed.
2. Louis Klusty
As previously noted, with the exception of his accompan-
ying three other employees to meet with the union organizer
at the outset of the campaign in early November 1970 and
signing an authorization card at this time, Klusty engaged in
no further union activity.
° Testimony of Klusty, Klute, Cheatwood, Elswick, Whitlock, and Kna-
fel.
10 Although the 1 day layoffs of Ballanger undoubtedly resulted from the
rotating system, in accounting for the longer periods of Ballanger's layoffs,
Knafel essentially explained that there were periods when even under the
rotating system there was not enough work available to keep all of the
mechanics busy. In view of the fact that no additional mechanics were hired
during the longer periods of Ballanger 's layoffs, I have no reason to doubt
this testimony.
11 The General Counsel did not object to any of the oral testimony by
Respondent witnesses concerning the rotating system.
" The 8(a)(1) violations have been heretofore noted. General Counsel
also points to an incident, not alleged as a violation, which occurred on
about December 2, 1970. It appears that on this occasion it came to Knafel's
attention that Ballanger took the side of another employee, Burrell Ryan,
over a discrepancy in Ryan's paycheck. According to Ballanger , Knafel at
this time came back and asked him to call a union vote right then, stating
that he was tired of all the trouble he was having and that the employees
could sit on a picket line for 9 months. Although Knafel gave a different
version, I here credit Ballanger . Nevertheless, while this may be further
indicative of Knafel's opposition to the Union, this does not effect my
ultimate decision herein.
The complaint alleges that during December, and two un-
known dates thereafter, Respondent discriminatorily laid off
Klusty for periods of 7 days, 3 days, and I day, respectively."
As evidenced by his confusing and often contradictory
testimony, amply demonstrated in the record, I find Klusty's
testimony to be highly unreliable. For example, in his pretrial
affidavit, Klusty stated: "I was off for seven days. Harvey told
me to return to work in seven days." However, whereas he
testified several times on cross -examination that he was laid
off for a 7-day period, there were other times on cross-exami-
nation when he conceded to never having been laid off for 7
consecutive days.
Apart from any layoffs that were only of 1 or one half day
duration, at best the testimony reflects that Klusty was laid
off for 3 or 4 consecutive days in the last week in December
1970. Concerning this occasion, Klusty testified as follows:
It was a Monday. - In fact, we were rotating at the
time and I was on my second Monday off and Richard
Harvey called me and told me he didn't have any work
for me, that I should return at the end of the week. I
think it was Thursday or Friday. I asked him why was
it that I didn't have any work, and he says, "Well, you
are a specialist and I don't have any work for you."
[Emphasis supplied.]
Aside from the foregoing, Klusty was entirely confused as
to the occasions and number of times he was otherwise laid
off and he was unable to give any particulars concerning these
matters which are so relevant to the allegations in the com-
plaint." Accordingly, not only is it entirely probable that the
occasions of the other layoffs were the result of the rotating
system (which even he conceded was in effect) but if Klusty
was treated any differently than the other employees, there is
no evidential data in the record which would enable me to
compare the number of times he was laid off with the layoffs
of other service department employees."
Concerning his layoff in latter December, I am mindful of
Klusty's testimony that after being notified of the layoff by
Harvey he called Knafel to ask why he was laid off. Knafel
advised he was being laid off because he was a specialist and
there was a lack of work. According to Klusty, he then asked
Knafel when he became a specialist, to which Knafel replied,
"Since the union came in." However, Klusty conceded that
he specialized in air conditioning and transmission work and
that there was "nobody else in the shop able to do it." Consid-
ering the entire evidence, I do not regard the incident of
Knafel's remark sufficient to establish discrimination.
Upon the entire record, and including the presence of ad-
verse economic circumstances which I have heretofore found
lawfully warranted the taking of various cost cutting steps by
the Respondent, including the layoff of employees, I find that
the General Counsel has failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) or
(1) of the Act by its layoffs of Klusty . It is recommended that
this allegation be dismissed.
" Klusty is still a Respondent employee.
Klusty conceded that he retained paycheck stubs which would record
this pertinent information. Apparently he kept these at home. There was no
request that he be permitted to go and bring them to the hearing. In general,
Klusty testified that he was laid off either "11 days all together" or "it was
between 10 and 15 days I was laid off."
" I do not credit Klute's testimony to the effect that no other employees
were laid off in the period of December 1970 through February 1971.
Obviously, this is not true, for as indicated in the preceding section, Klute,
Ballanger, Cheatwood, and others involved in the rotating system were laid
off during this period. I further discredit this testimony because of the
demonstrated unreliability of his other testimony and from my observation
of him as a witness.
822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent
set forth in section I, above, have a close , intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce'among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstrucitng commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices it will be recommended that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclu-
sions, of law and upon the entire record in this case , I hereby
make the following: ,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Respondent has not committed unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing -findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:16
ORDER
Respondent , Knafel Pontiac , Inc., its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with loss of vacation benefits or
seniority rights because of their support of the Union.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union sentiments or activities.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with , restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its shop and place of business at Akron, Ohio,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appen-
16 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , and recommended Older herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 .48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings , conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes
dix."" Copies of said notice on forms provided by the,,Re-
gional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by Re-
spondent's representatives , shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof , and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken , by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing
within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
" In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to lead
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing , within 20 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of
any of their vacation benefits or seniority rights because
of their union activities.
WE WILL NOT question our employees about their
union sentiments or activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, except to the extent that such rights may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment where
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
KNAFEL PONTIAC, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material . Any questions concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to
the Board 's Office, 1695 Federal Office Building, 1240 East
Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-522-
3715.