Kit Manufacturing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 28, 1962

138 N.L.R.B. 1290 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

1290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lion under (B), it led them unanimously to the conclusion that it provided exonera-
tion under (A) Here the General Counsel is using the reverse procedure. instead
of adopting the premise that the 8(e) proviso means what it says he reads into it
an unspoken condition giving it the reverse meaning and uses that as the indispen-
sable basis for declaring that (A) proscribes what but for such premise it clearly
permits Therein lies the fallacy in the prosecution's approach, embodied in the
following proposition in the brief
The proviso does not purport to exempt the construction industry unions from
any other provision of the Act. Strike action either to secure such an agreement
or to enforce observance of one previously made continues to be unlawful.
Each sentence begs the question: it does not say in connection with what "other
provision of the Act" the issue of an exemption based on the 8(e) proviso arises
and tinder what provision such strike action "continues to be unlawful." As previ-
ously pointed out, there was no piovision comparable to (A) before the 1959 amend-
ments, so the word "continues" has no pertinency in a context of (A) Besides,
the 8(e) proviso, as it reads, is not an "exemption" from (A): it is the inescapable
basis of exoneration thereunder. While (B) is not here involved, it may be noted
that the term "continues to be unlawful" as applied to the object therein described
assumes, inaccurately, that before the 1959 amendments, the law was settled in
regard to 8(b)(4) conduct for the purpose of obtaining a hot-cargo agreement In
fact, as Judge Wright pointed out in his opinion in this case (supra, footnote 2),
the Sand Door doctrine was concerned only with prohibited secondary activity to
"enforce" such an agreement. While his view that "striking to obtain a subcontractor
agreement was not illegal when the Taft-Hartley Act was amended" must be qualified
by the observation that that issue was as open then as it is now, the point is that
involved in such a question is whether the legality of the contract serves to exempt
from the express prohibitions of (B) strike action having the object of obtaining
one. So the proposition of the General Counsel, above quoted, whatever may
be said for the accuracy of its content, is only pertinent to a situation where a union
has resorted to the pressures recited in the body of 8(b)(4)(i) and (u) with an
object of compelling an employer to "cease" an existing business relationship, within
the express prohibition of (B), and the defense claims a special exemption because
its purpose was to obtain an agreement legal under the proviso of Section 8(e). We
do not reach such a question, since no violation of any secondary boycott prohibi-
tion under (B) is charged. We have only the question of whether (A) and the
proviso of 8(e) mean what they say. In agreement with every prior determination
thus far on this matter, I hold that they do
Upon the record and all of the foregoing, I hereby make the following:
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The agreement alleged to have been sought by Local 60 from the Charging Party,
through the conduct therein described, is not prohibited by Section 8(e). Hence
Local 60 did not have as an object "forcing or requiring any employer . . . to enter
into any agreement which is prohibited by Section 8(e), within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (A) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATION
Upon the foregoing conclusion and upon the entire record, it is hereby recom-
mended that the complaint be dismissed
Kit Manufacturing Company , Inc. and Sheet Metal Workers
International Association , Local 213, AFL-CIO. Case No.
19-CA-2/.06. September 28, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 30, 1962, Trial Examiner David Karasick issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
138 NLRB No. 123.
KIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 1291
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermedi-
ate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and
Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report and the entire record in the case, including the ex-
ceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the
Trial Examiner.'
1 The notice to all employees , attached to the Recommended Order of the Trial Ex-
aminer, is modified as follows : The first line below the signature is amended to read
"This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting."
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed on March 28, 1962, by Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, Local 213, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board , issued a com-
plaint on May 2, 1962 , alleging that Kit Manufacturing Company , Inc., herein
called the Respondent , violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act , as amended , 61 Stat. 136 , 73 Stat. 519 , herein called the Act. On
May 11, 1962 , the Respondent filed an answer , denying that it had engaged in the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint . A hearing, at which all parties
were represented, was held before Trial Examiner David Karasick on June 12, 1962,
at Boise , Idaho. Following the close of the hearing , briefs were filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent.'
Upon consideration of the entire record in the case and from my observation
of the witnesses , I make the following:
1 In a number of instances , the transcript of the bearing contains confused or inaccurate
transcriptions . One such inaccuracy appears at lines 19 to 24 on page 77 where a state-
ment made by Mr. Weston , counsel for the Respondent , is attributed to the Trial Examiner.
To correctly reflect the record , the transcript is hereby amended by deleting the words
"Trial Examiner" as they appear at line 19 , page 77, and substituting therefor the
words "Mr . Weston " Another such inaccuracy is the omission from the caption page of
the transcript of the appearance of Mr. Wesley R. Smith, on behalf of the Union.
Accordingly , the record is further amended to note the appearance for the Union of
Wesley R. Smith , international organizer , Sheet Metal Workers International Association,
Local 213 , AFL-CIO, 1041 South 8th Street West, Salt Lake City 4, Utah Despite
other inaccuracies , the transcript does adequately reflect the material facts and issues.
I therefore regard it as unnecessary , absent a motion by any of the parties , to amend
the transcript in other respects.
1292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent , a California corporation , owns and operates plants located in
Long Beach, California, and Caldwell, Idaho, where it is engaged in the manufacture
and sale of trailers and mobile homes. The Caldwell, Idaho, plant is the only plant in-
volved in this proceeding . During its past fiscal year, the Respondent purchased from
sources outside the State of Idaho for use at its Caldwell plant, materials valued
in excess of $-90,000 and during the same period sold and delivered to customers
located outside the State of Idaho finished products valued in excess of $50,000.
The Respondent concedes , and I find, that it has been , at all times material to this
proceeding , an employer engaged in commerce and operations affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent concedes , and I find , that the Union is a labor organization within
,the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The facts
The facts in this case are undisputed. On March 31, 1961, the Union was certified
by the Board as the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining
of all production and maintenance employees at the Caldwell , Idaho, plant of the
Respondent , excluding office clerical employees , professional employees , servicemen,
.and all supervisors as defined in the Act. The Respondent concedes, and I find, that
the unit so certified is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
Following the Union 's certification , the parties met on various occasions , without
arriving at an agreement. On September 27, 1961, Eli Weston , the Respondent's
attorney, together with V. T. Kruse, vice president, and Dewey Reber, manager of
the Caldwell plant, met with William C. Westergard and Carl H. Marcum, interna-
tional organizer and business representative , respectively , of the Union and a
negotiating committee consisting of two employees. A representative of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service was also present. At this meeting, Weston
presented the union representatives with a proposed contract which he declared was
the Respondent's final offer. The union representatives declined to accept the
proposal so offered since it failed to include provisions for union security and
wage increases which the Union had been seeking , and, in addition , embodied
changes in certain items upon which the parties had previously reached agreement.
At this point an impasse was reached.
Between October 10 and 20, 1961, Marcum got in touch with Weston and re-
quested that he, Weston , and Reber meet since a good deal of animosity had been
built up between Westergard and Kruse. Weston agreed to speak to Reber and
arrange a meeting. When a month passed and Marcum had heard no further
regarding the matter, he called Weston who stated that Reber had been in California.
Weston stated that he would check with Reber and then call Marcum within the
hour. A day or two later, on November 21 or 22, not having heard from Weston,
Marcum called. On this occasion, Weston stated that Reber declined to meet
and that they had nothing further about which to talk.
On November 27, 1961, the Union filed a charge with the Regional Office for
the Nineteenth Region of the Board in Case No. 19-CA-2341 (not published in
-NLRB volumes ) alleging that the Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act. The charge alleged, among other matters, that the Respondent had re-
fused to reduce to writing contract provisions previously agreed upon . On Decem-
ber 4, 1%1, Weston, in responding to this allegation in the charge, sent a letter
to an attorney attached to the Regional Office of the Board, in which he stated, in part:
With reference to the last charge , that , of course , is completely unfounded
as we have always been ready and willing to sign any items that we have agreed
upon , and as a matter of fact we proposed a counter -proposal incorporating
practically all of the items we had discussed. We could not agree upon a wage
increase, nor could we agree upon the union security, but we have always been
willing to sign the contract which we had agreed upon and we are now willing
to sign the same.
KIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 1293
On January 9, 1962, the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region dismissed
,the charge on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant further
proceedings.
. On March 13, 1962, Marcum wrote to Weston, stating that after the deadlock
which had occurred at the meeting on September 27 2 there had been "a noticeable
increase in production and sales in the industry" and the Union had made "progress
in organizing [the] industry" and due to these circumstances the Union requested
that the parties meet on March 22, 1962, for further negotiations.
Upon receipt of this letter, Weston wrote to Orville Turnbaugh, a member of
the staff of the Nineteenth Region of the Board, on March 16, 1962, stating that
since negotiations had previously reached an impasse and the charges alleging that
the Respondent had refused to bargain had been disposed of, he was advising
the Respondent that "we are not obliged to bargain further at this time" and
aequesting an "advisory opinion" on the question.
On the same date, Weston also wrote to Marcum, and sent a copy of the letter
to Turnbaugh, stating that he did not feel that the Respondent was obliged to
bargain or negotiate further at that time, that he thought further discussion would
be futile, but the Respondent did wish to comply with the law in all respects and
that he therefore was asking the Board for a ruling as to the Respondent's obligation
and would prefer holding the matter in abeyance until an answer from the Board
was received.
At Turnbaugh's suggestion, Weston and Reber met with Marcum and Wesley R.
Smith, international organizer for the Union, on March 22, 1962. Marcum opened
the discussion by remarking that in view of the $800,000 Boeing contract, the Re-
spondent should have had a pretty good year. This refered to a contract which
the Respondent had secured to supply trailers to'the Boeing Airplane Company
which had been the subject of a news release in one of the local newspapers on
October 6, 1961. Reber agreed and stated that the Respondent would like to get
additional contracts of that kind. The parties then discussed wage rates and union
security. Following this, Smith testified that Weston declared, "I don't think that
you fellows can get a contract." 3
At this point, Smith and Marcum requested an opportunity to caucus. They left
the room and discussed the matter between them Upon their return, they asked
whether the proposal which had been made by the Respondent on September 27,
1961, was still a valid offer. Reber replied that he saw no reason why it was not.
Weston, however, asked the union representatives if they would accept the proposal.
Smith stated that they were entitled to an answer and again asked whether or not
the proposal was still a valid offer. Weston and Reber said that they would need
time to think over the matter and it was agreed that the Respondent would give
the Union its answer on the following day.
The next day Weston called. Marcum answered the telephone, and Smith was
on an extension. Weston stated that they had not realized the day before that the
Union's certification had run out, that the Union no longer represened the employees
and as a consequence there would be no further negotiations.
On the same day, Weston sent the following letter to Marcum:
At yesterday's meeting, I suggested we would give you our statement with
reference to further negotiations and particularly with reference to the execu-
tion of any contracts.
Apparently you have misunderstood the reason for yesterday's meeting. We
only appeared to state our position and make it clear that we feel that we
have complied with the law in all respects and bargained in good faith at all
times. We reached a legitimate impasse last Fall and have no further obliga-
tions to bargain or negotiate or to sign contracts at this time.
As you know, a charge was filed against the company alleging, among other
things, a refusal to bargain, and these charges were dismissed. There has been
no attempt on your part to negotiate or bargain since September. Since you
did not appeal the decision, we can only assume that you agreed with the same
and it would seem, therefore, that any further negotiations would be not only
futile, but improper.
2 The letter erroneously refers to the date of this meeting as September 27, 1962, in-
stead of September 27, 1961.
O Marcum testified that Weston's statement was, "I don't believe you are going to get
a contract anyway " The Respondent offered no testimony following the conclusion of
the case presented by the General Counsel and the testimony of Smith and Marcum in
this, as well as in other respects relative to the issues herein decided, is undenied.
1294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On March 28, 1962, the Union filed the charge in this case. On April 5, 1962,
Weston sent a letter to a member of the staff of the Nineteenth Regional Office of
the Board with regard to this case, stating inter alia:
On March 13th, 1962, I received a letter from Mr. Marcum suggesting that
we negotiate further. I believe you have a copy of that letter. I answered
by stating I did not believe we were obliged to negotiate further, that they had
refused our counterproposal and that we had been absolved of any charges
of refusal to bargain and that in my opinion the matter was closed. However,
at the suggestion of Mr. Turnbaugh, we met with the union to explain our
position and we again affirmed our position that negotiations were legally at an
end. We suggested at this meeting, among other things, that we doubted if
the union had any right to represent the employees.
At this meeting a suggestion was made that we again submit the counter-
proposal submitted many months before, but on looking into the record and
finding that the year had elapsed from certification, and upon discussing the
matter with the company, I advised the union I did not think further negotia-
tions would be proper or legal, and since they had refused our counterproposal
we did not feel it proper to renew the proposal.
On April 16, 1962, the Respondent filed a petition, in Case No. 19-RM-389 (not
published in NLRB volumes) requesting an election to determine whether the Union
represents a majority of the employees in question.
B. Concluding findings
The undisputed evidence shows that the Union in this case was certified by the
Board as the exclusive representative of the employees of the Respondent in an
appropriate bargaining unit on March 31, 1961; that the Union and the Respondent
thereafter met and the parties reached an impasse in negotiations on September 27,
1961; and that on March 23, 1962, the Respondent declined to bargain further on
the ground that the certification year had expired and the Union no longer repre-
sented a majority of the employees. In so doing, the Respondent failed to fulfill
its duty to bargain on and after March 23, 1962.
It is well established that, absent unusual circumstances not present in this case,
the majority status of a union certified by the Board may not be questioned for
the period of 1 year following the certification. Ray Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S.
96. The Respondent in effect argues that since the year was so close to its end, the
Respondent was entitled to anticipate its right to question.the majority of the Union.
I do not believe it was entitled to do so. The majority status accorded a certified
union is absolute for the definite period of 1 year and may not be truncated, absent
a showing of unusual circumstances. N.L.R.B v. Holly-General Company, 305
F. 2d 670, (C. A. 9). Moreover, even after the 1-year period has expired, a union's
majority is presumed to continue and may be thrown into question only where the
employer in good faith has some reasonable ground for believing that it no longer
exists. Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664; Stoner Rubber Company,
Inc. 123 NLRB 1440. The record in this case is devoid of evidence which would
justify such a doubt on the part of the Respondent.
The Respondent contends that it was relieved of its duty to bargain on March 23,
1962, because the parties had reached an impasse on the preceding September 27.
This contention ignores the fact that the Respondent predicated its refusal to nego-
tiate, not on that ground, but for the purported reason that the certification year had
expired and that the Union no longer represented a majority of the employees.
Moreover, even if that were not true, the Respondent was not justified in declining
to bargain on the basis of the undisputed evidence in this record. Thus, the evidence
shows that by March 23. 1962, the circumstances which existed at the time the
impasse occurred had undergone a change. Under such conditions, an employer's
privilege afforded him by an impasse to withdraw from bargaining has ended. "An
impasse does not constitute a license to avoid the statutory obligation to bargain
collectively where the circumstances which led to the impasse no longer remain
in status quo." Boeing Airplane Company, 80 NLRB 447, 454; Central Metallic
Casket Co, 91 NLRB 572, 573.
The Union pointed out in its letter to Weston on March 13, and the Respondent
made no contrary assertion then or thereafter, that the industry had experienced
an increase in production and sales and the Union had progressed in its efforts to
organize the industry following the deadlock of September 27. In addition, the
Respondent's financial position had improved, as it conceded at the meeting on
March 22 and during oral argument in this case. Since the two major differences
between the parties which led to the halt in negotiations involved the question of
KIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 1295
union security and an increase in wages, it is reasonable to conclude that subsequent
advances by the Union in its organizing efforts in the industry and improvement of
the financial position of the Respondent were significant changes requiring further
exploration by the parties, if they both sincerely desired to overcome the impasse.
In its brief , the Respondent concedes that; as of September 27, "the employer was
perfectly free to assume that it had met all of the obligations of the law to bargain
and that it was relieved of further negotiations unless either side was willing to
give up its position or willing to accede to the position of the other ." However,
when the Union , on March 22, sought to determine whether it might accede to the
Respondent 's position , the Respondent placed this effort beyond the realm of realiza-
tion in refusing either to affirm or deny its willingness to abide by its proposal.
Yet, in his letter to the Regional Office of the Board on December 4, 1961 , Weston,
referring to the Respondent 's counterproposal , stated that "we have always been
willing to sign the contract which we had agreed upon and we are now willing to
sign the same."
When reviewed in the perspective of this record , the Respondent 's refusal on
March 23 to further meet or to negotiate impels the conclusion that it was attempt-
ing to forestall the Union's efforts to bargain until the certification year had ended
This conclusion is reinforced when viewed in the light of the Respondent 's conduct
on April 16, 1962, in filing a petition and thus attempting to subject the Union
to the test of an election , although there is no evidence in this record upon which
the Respondent could base a reasonable doubt that the Union 's majority continued
to exist. Cf . N.L R.B. v. Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Company, Ltd., 226
F. 2d 377 ( C.A. 9). In so doing , the Respondent was not bargaining in good faith,
for "pretended bargaining will not suffice" nor will an approach to the bargaining
table with one's mind "hermetically sealed against the thought of entering into an
agreement" meet-the requirements of the statute . N.L.R.B. v. Boss Manufacturing
Company, 118 F . 2d 187 (C.A. 7). Here, the refusal of the Respondent to take
a position to meet further with the Union removed the possibility of agreement
beyond reach of the parties and fell short of the requirement of good faith imposed
by the statute.
The Respondent 's conduct on and after March 23, 1962, whether regarded as
based upon the asserted ground that an impasse existed or upon the ground that
the certification year had expired and the Union no longer represented a majority,
was in either event an unjustified refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)( I)
and (5 ) of the Act4 Cf. N L R.B. v. Shannon & Simpson Casket Company, 208
F 2d 545 ( C.A. 9); Singer Manufacturing Company v . N.L R.B ., 119 F. 2d 131
(C.A. 7).
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
1
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section IIT, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE, REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices by
refusing on and after March 23, 1962, to bargain with the Union, representative
of its employees in an appropriate unit, it will be recommended that on request by
the Union the Respondent bargain with it, and, if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At all times material to the issues in this proceeding, the Respondent has been,
and now is, an employer engaged in commerce and in operations affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees at the Caldwell, Tdaho, plant of
the Respondent, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, service-
4 In view of the findings herein made. I deem it unnecessary to determine whether the
Respondent also refused to bargain in good faith, as the General Counsel contends, by
refusing to meet with the Union on November 21 or 22, 1961
1296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
men, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
3. The Union at all times material herein has been, and now is, the exclusive.
representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. By refusing, on and after March 23, 1962, to bargain collectively with the-
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate
unit, and by interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged,
and is engaging, in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning,
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is hereby recommended that Kit Manu-
facturing Company, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Sheet Metal Workers International As-
sociation, Local 213, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees
at the Caldwell, Idaho, plant in the appropriate unit, as found in section III, above.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act-
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, Local 213, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees
in the aforesaid unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
(b) Post in conspicuous places at its place of business in Caldwell, Idaho, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees customarily are posted, copies of the
notice 5 attached hereto marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region, shall, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify said Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the receipt
of this Intermediate Report what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith?
5 Since notices are customarily framed In the language of the statute and because of
their technical nature are often difficult for employees to understand, I am recommend-
ing that the notice in this case embody the simplified form which appears In the Appendix.
"In the event that these Recommendations are adopted by the Board, the words "as
ordered by" shall be substituted for the words "as recommended by a Trial Examiner"
In the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "as ordered by "
In the event that these Recommendations be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director In writing, within 10, days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
As Recommended by a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board,
we are posting this notice to inform our employees of the rights guaranteed them
in the National Labor Relations Act:
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Association , Local 213, AFL-CIO, as the law requires The employees
about whom we will bargain are employed in the following jobs:
All production and maintenance employees at the Caldwell , Idaho, plant,
but this does not include office clerical employees , professional employees,
servicemen , or supervisors as defined in the Act.
COLUMBINE BEVERAGE COMPANY 1297
WE WILL NOT interfere with the rights of our employees guaranteed them
in the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the above-
named Union or in any related manner.
All our employees are free to become members of Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national Association , Local 213 , AFL-CIO, or any other union, and they are also
free not to become members of any union unless in the future we shall enter into
a valid union-shop contract with a union represents our employees.
KIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY , 'INC.,
Employer.
Dated--------- ---------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 327
Logan Building, Seattle 4. Washington , Telephone Number, Mutual 2-3300, Exten-
sion 553, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
Columbine Beverage Company and International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Local Union No . 435. Case No. 27-CA-1084. Septem-
ber 28, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 28, 1962, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged
in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and
recommended dismissal of such allegations. Thereafter, the General
Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re-
port with supporting briefs. The Respondent's brief, in part, was
in support of the Intermediate Report.
The Board I has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner only insofar as they are consistent
with this Decision and Order.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that between July 21, 1961,
when the Respondent learned of Union's organizational activities at
the plant, and the end of the strike on September 15, 1961, the Re-
'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and
Members Leedom and Fanning].
138 NLRB No. 128.