Kirk J. Krauss

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 24, 2019

15081458 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/081,458 03/25/2016 Kirk J. Krauss SVL920130055US4/
IBMP094C3
2968
63056 7590 10/24/2019
MOLLBORN PATENTS, INC.
2840 COLBY DRIVE
BOULDER, CO 80305
EXAMINER
KHOSHNOODI, FARIBORZ
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/24/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KIRK J. KRAUSS
Appeal 2018-007151
Application 15/081,458
Technology Center 2100
Before MARC S. HOFF, BETH Z. SHAW, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL,
Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 International Business
Machines Corporation, appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 1–3, 6, and 7. Final Act. 1. Claims 1–8 are currently pending. Id.
Claims 4, 5, and 8 are objected to. Id. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM. RELATED APPEALS

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
International Business Machines Corporation Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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This appeal relates to Appeal No. 2018-006995, Application No.
15/081,438. That appeal “contains computer program product claims and
system claims corresponding to the claims of the present application.”
Appeal Br. 2.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to scoring relationships between entities based
on proximity in space and time. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer program product for determining a relationship
score between a first physical entity and a second physical entity,
the computer program product comprising a computer readable
storage medium having program code embodied therewith, the
program code executable by a processor to:
generate, by the processor, a first computer-readable
representation of a first spatial region containing the first
physical entity;
generate, by the processor, a second computer-readable
representation of a second spatial region containing the second
physical entity;
compare, by the processor, the first computer-readable
representation and the second computer-readable representation
at decreasing spatial resolutions until a matching condition is
reached; and
assign, by the processor, a relationship score to one or
more of the first physical entity and the second physical entity
based on the resolution at which the matching condition is
reached.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Bell
Fireman
US 5,422,989
US 2009/0099862 A1
June 6, 1995
Apr. 16, 2009
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Application 15/081,458

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Adair
Guntur
Simms
US 2010/0161566 A1
US 8,346,020 B2
US 2014/0280318 A1
June 24, 2010
Jan. 1, 2013
Sept. 18, 2014

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Adair, Guntur, and Bell. Final Act. 3.
Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Adair, Bell, and Fireman. Final Act. 7.
Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Adair, Guntur, Bell, and Simms. Final Act. 8.
OPINION
Claim 1
Appellant argues that Adair is not directed to “determining a
relationship score between a first physical entity and a second physical
entity.” App. Br. 10–11. The Examiner finds, however, and we agree, that
Adair teaches this limitation because Adair teaches determining a “likeness
score” between a respective entity in the set of candidate entities and each
entity in the plurality of entities not included in the set of candidate entities.
Ans. 4 (citing Adair ¶ 7). To the extent Appellant argues the “relationship
score” is based on other factors recited in the claim that Adair allegedly does
not teach, such as “comparing two candidates at decreasing resolutions”
(App. Br. 11–12; Reply Br. 2), we are not persuaded because the Examiner
relied on Bell, not Adair alone, to teach the decreasing spatial resolutions.
Ans. 5–6. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments do not show nonobviousness
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where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective
teachings. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
To the extent Appellant argues Bell does not teach comparison of
images at decreasing spatial resolutions (Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br. 3), we
disagree, and we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings. The
Examiner relied on Bell to show decreasing spatial resolutions of images to
a prescribed base resolution, until matching is reached. Final Act. 5; Ans. 5–
6 (citing Bell, 11:52–63, 5:60–67, 6:1–4). We agree with the Examiner’s
findings that the combination of Adair and Bell therefore teaches “compare,
by the processor, the first computer-readable representation and the second
computer-readable representation at decreasing spatial resolutions unit a
matching condition is reached,” as recited in claims 1 and 9. Ans. 8–9 (citing
Bell, 11:52–63, 5:60–67, 6:1–4).
Appellant also argues, without further explanation, that Gunter’s
“CAD views cannot reasonably be construed as spatial regions containing
first and second physical entities, as claimed.” App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 3. We
are not persuaded by this argument because mere lawyer’s arguments and
conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled
to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just
attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to
rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.”); see also In re De Blauwe, 736
F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). We see no error in the Examiner’s finding
that Guntur teaches a system that generates a first 3D model of an object
(first spatial region) (Gunter 31:54–57) and a second model of the object
(second spatial region) (Gunter 31:66–67). Ans. 7–8.
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To the extent Appellant generally argues that the combination of
Adair and Gunter would not “work together” (App. Br. 13), we are similarly
unpersuaded. Not only is this contention unsubstantiated by any persuasive
evidence on this record, it is well settled that “a determination of
obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an
actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nor is the test for obviousness
whether a secondary reference’s features can be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references
would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id.
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. . . . [I]f a technique has
been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill
in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices
in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
application is beyond his or her skill.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.

Dependent Claim 2
Appellant argues that Adair’s likeness score is not a “matching
condition” and is not used for determining when to stop comparing two
computer readable representations, as claimed. App. Br. 15. We are not
persuaded by this argument. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Adair teaches exact matching, which is one of the “one or more” conditions
recited in dependent claim 2. Ans. 11 (citing Adair ¶ 35 (“100 percent
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likeness score”)). Accordingly, for this reason and for the reasons discussed
above with respect to claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claim 2.

Dependent Claim 3
Appellant argues that Fireman’s “tracking time . . . cannot reasonably
be considered to be equivalent to taking into account a temporal proximity
when determining a relationship score between two physical entities, as
claimed.” App. Br. 16. We disagree. As the Examiner explains, Fireman was
introduced to teach “a temporal proximity between the first entity and the
second entity when assigning the relationship score.” Final Act. 7 (citing
Fireman ¶ 38). We agree with the Examiner that Fireman’s teaching of “a
proximity between at least two of the plurality of entities” and “a temporal
extent of the proximity” (Fireman ¶ 38) teaches the disputed limitation.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 3.

Dependent Claim 6
Appellant argues: “A word search in Adair shows that the phrase ‘bit
vector’ does not exist anywhere in Adair. Further, the cited lines of Guntur
read ‘generating a final 3D model of the object in the 3D global physical
view using the first and second 3D models.’.” App. Br. 16.
The Examiner explains in the Answer how Gunter teaches the
disputed limitations of claim 6. Ans. 12–13 (citing Gunter 16:1–3; 8:7–23).
Appellant does not address column 8, lines 7–23 of Gunter. Absent
persuasive rebuttal or technical reasoning to the contrary, we agree with the
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Examiner’s findings. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claim 6.

Dependent Claim 7
Merely reciting the language of the claims and asserting that the cited
prior art reference does not teach or suggest each claim limitation is
insufficient. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points
out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate
patentability of the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art.”). Because Appellant reiterates the same
argument for dependent claim 7 as presented for claim 1, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 7.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
# 1, 2, 6 § 103 # 1, 2, 6
# 3 § 103 # 3
# 7 § 103 # 7
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FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED