Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation Care Center

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 31, 2008

352 N.L.R.B. 6 (N.L.R.B. 2008)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
352 NLRB No. 5
6
Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation Care Center and
1199 SEIU, United Health Care Workers East.
Cases 2–CA–37660 and 2–CA–37898
January 31, 2008
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN AND SCHAUMBER
On July 9, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Mindy E.
Landow issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recom-
mended Order.2

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding that it violated Sec.
8(a)(1) through Assistant Administrator Rutenberg’s May 9, 2006
statement to employees—that they would not be able to return to work
for 3 weeks if they engaged in a 3-day strike—on the ground that the
statement was accurate when made because the Respondent had
reached a verbal agreement with employment agencies that required it
to hire temporary employees for 3 weeks. In finding this exception
without merit, we note that the lawfulness of the alleged agreement is
not presented. Rather, the record does not support the Respondent’s
assertion that such an agreement had been reached. In particular, we
note the absence of any corroborating documentary evidence as well as
Executive Director Sieger’s testimony that prior to the May 9 employee
meeting, she directed Rutenberg to tell employees that if there was a
strike, the Respondent “may” not be able to bring them back to work
for 3 weeks. As the individual who both initiated discussions with
temporary employment agencies regarding the hiring of replacements
and who negotiated with the agencies over the terms of their hire,
Sieger was in the best position to know the status of the negotiations.
The fact that Sieger told Rutenberg to tell employees that there was
only a possibility that the Respondent would not be able to bring them
back to work for 3 weeks indicates that the negotiations were ongoing
and that the Respondent’s plans to hire temporary replacements for 3
weeks in the event of a strike were not yet fixed. That this was, in fact,
the status of the negotiations as of May 9, is further evidenced by
Rutenberg’s subsequent statement to employees on May 12, as well as
by the Respondent’s letter to employees of the same date, that there
was, in effect, a possibility that the strikers would not be able to return
to work immediately after a 3-day strike. Thus, Sieger’s own testimony
establishes that as of May 9, the Respondent had no firm plans to hire
replacement employees for a 3-week period. Given this, we agree with
the judge that the Respondent lacked a substantial business justification
for Rutenberg’s May 9 statement to employees, which was an unquali-
fied assertion that they would be unable to return to work for 3 weeks if
they elected to strike.
No exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Respondent
did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees that it
would delay their reinstatement to work if they engaged in a strike and
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Kingsbridge Heights Reha-
bilitation Care Center, Bronx, New York, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order.

Nancy Slahetka, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joel E. Cohen, Esq. (McDermott, Will & Emery), of New York,
New York, for the Respondent.
Hanan B. Kolko, Esq. (Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, PC), of
New York, New York, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MINDY E. LANDOW, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon
charges filed on May 12 and September 25, 2006,1 In Cases 2–
CA–37660 and 2–CA–37898 by 1199 SEIU, United Health
Care Workers East (the Union), a consolidated complaint was
issued against Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation and Care
Center (Respondent) on November 30.
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by engaging in surveillance of employees
engaged in union activities by videotaping employees who
were engaged in informational picketing and by threatening to
delay employees’ reinstatement to work after they engaged in a
3-day strike and made an unconditional offer to return to work.
Respondent filed an answer denying the material allegations of
the complaint. On February 21, 2007, a hearing was held before
me in New York, New York.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses and resolution of other issues regard-
ing their credibility, as discussed below, and after considering
the briefs filed by counsels for the General Counsel and Re-
spondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a New York corporation, with an office and
place of business located at 3400–26 Cannon Place, Bronx,
New York, is engaged in the operation of a nursing home pro-
viding residential nursing care to patients. Annually, in the
course and conduct of its business operations, Respondent de-

then made an unconditional offer to return to work in its meeting with
employees on May 12, 2006, or in its letter to employees of the same
date.
2 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Members Liebman and Schaumber constitute a quorum of the three-
member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue decisions
and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. See Sec.
3(b) of the Act.
1 All dates herein are in 2006, unless otherwise specified.
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 7
rives gross revenues in excess of $100,000, and purchases and
receives at its Bronx, New York facility products, goods, and
materials valued in excess of $5000 from other enterprises lo-
cated within the State of New York, each of which enterprises
receives these products, goods, and materials directly from
points outside the State of New York. Respondent admits, and I
find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background to the Instant Dispute
The Union has represented Respondent’s employees for a
number of years. The most recent collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the parties (the agreement) expired on April 30,
2005, and has not been extended. As of the date of the hearing,
Respondent was abiding by the terms and conditions of this
expired Agreement, with the sole exception of the arbitration
provision.
It appears from the record that, commencing in about June
2005, Respondent failed to make timely or complete payments
to various benefit funds provided for in the agreement. On De-
cember 6, 2005, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board regarding this conduct. On January 1, 2006, the
Union notified employees that due to Respondent’s failure to
make payments to the benefit funds, their hospital, health, pre-
scription drug, dental, and related benefits would terminate.2
Sometime in early 2006, facility Operator Helen Sieger, to-
gether with Assistant Administrator Solomon Rutenberg, met
with union representatives, including Executive Vice President
Jay Sackman and Vice Presidents Neva Shillingford and Isaac
Nortey,3 to discuss these delinquencies. Sieger had asked for a
delinquency report and testified that this report showed that
Respondent was more current in its payments to the Union’s
funds than other facilities. She asked why the Union was pick-
eting Respondent but not other facilities more in arrears to the
union funds.4 According to Sieger, Sackman told her that it was
because Respondent had not executed a contract with the Un-
ion, while the other facilities had done so. Sackman stated that
there were contractual remedies for such delinquencies; how-
ever, as Respondent was not bound by any such agreement, the
Union’s only recourse was to picket and strike the facility. Ac-
cording to Sieger’s unrebutted testimony, Sackman also stated
that without a signed contract, the Union would have no rem-
edy but to continue to picket and strike the facility.
After an investigation of the unfair labor practice charges
filed by the Union, on May 1, a complaint was issued alleging
that Respondent violated the Act by failing and refusing to
make timely or complete payments to several contractual bene-
fit funds.5 At the inception of the hearing, the parties reached a

2 According to the letter, at the time Respondent was 4 months in ar-
rears in making payments to the Union’s benefit, pension, and educa-
tion funds and 37 months behind in payments to the child care and job
security funds. The total amounts owed to the funds were $854,542
with accrued interest of $59,337.
3 Nortey testified herein, Sackman and Shillingford did not.
4 The Union’s picketing activity is discussed below.
5 As counsel for Respondent noted during the development of this
evidence, I had previously been assigned to serve as a settlement judge
settlement of most of the issues raised by the complaint and
entered into a settlement agreement which was approved by
Administrative Law Judge Steven Fish on June 8.6 The remain-
der of the case was severed for hearing. The Union and Re-
spondent thereafter entered into a non-Board settlement of all
outstanding matters, and Judge Fish entered a final Order on
June 26.7
The Union’s Plan to Picket and Strike the Respondent
Prior to the effectuation of the above-described settlement, in
February 2006, employees took a strike vote. Shortly thereafter,
the Union’s executive council approved a 3-day strike, which
was scheduled to take place on May 16–19. The employees
further planned to engage in two instances of informational
picketing at Respondent’s facility, on March 15 and on May 15.
On February 27, Nortey sent Rutenberg a letter informing
him of the Union’s plan to engage in informational picketing on
March 15, from 2 to 5 p.m. The picketing took place as sched-
uled. The Union secured a police permit for the event, which
took place across the street from the nursing home.
The evidence establishes that Respondent maintains video
surveillance cameras throughout its facility which monitor the
entrances and exits and internal offices and corridors as well. It
is undisputed that, upon instructions from the Respondent, two
individuals made separate video tape recordings of the picket-
ing activity on March 15, throughout its duration. One individ-
ual stood outside the main entrance to the facility, at times
holding the camera and at others placing it on a tripod. Another
individual taped the event from a second-floor window. These
cameras were aimed at the picketing activity occurring across
the street, rather than at the entrances and sidewalk adjacent to
Respondent’s facility.
According to Sieger, all instances of union picketing and re-
lated activities at Respondent’s facility have been similarly and
openly videotaped for at least the last 15 years and there has
never been any objection from the Union; nor has there been
any allegation that participants in such activities have been
subject to retaliation. Upon cross-examination, Nortey ac-
knowledged that he had long known that Respondent had
videotaped the Union’s rallies and picketing, and the two em-
ployees who testified to this issue admitted that they were
aware of this, as well. Noeler Worrell testified that she had
observed videotaping at prior rallies and had concerns about it,
but acknowledged that she participated in the March 15 picket-
ing and had planned to attend the May 15 event as well. Fay
Whitter testified that the videotaping had dissuaded her from
taking part in a rally in 2002, before she had become a member
of the Union, but she had participated on March 15. She too,
expressed concern about the fact that the picketing was being
videotaped, but admitted that it did not stop her from going

in this matter. The parties were asked if they had any objection to my
continuing to hear the instant case. No party voiced an objection.
6 The settlement provided for, among other things, a schedule for
Respondent to make payments to the union funds in order to become
current as well as an undertaking that Respondent would make future
payments on a timely basis and post a notice to employees.
7 As a result of this settlement, the General Counsel requested that
the complaint be dismissed.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
forward on this occasion. Neither of these employees knew of
anyone who had been the subject of reprisals or disciplinary
action for their participation in picketing or other union activ-
ity.
Although Sieger testified that two recordings were made of
the 3-hour event, only one videotape, of approximately 30 min-
utes in length, was produced in response to a subpoena duces
tecum issued by counsel for the General Counsel, seeking all
such material. On cross-examination, Sieger testified that she
was certain that another tape existed, and that it would be pro-
duced if it could be found. From the exhibit which is in evi-
dence, it appears that there were various points in time when
the camera was turned off. The tape shows that, at the inception
of the 3-hour period, but apparently before any picketing has
begun, approximately 10 individuals are standing outside the
main entrance to the facility. They are then seen walking across
the street. Nortey is seen consulting with an individual who was
identified as Facility Administrator Lawrence Abrams and a
police officer stationed in a scooter. After some discussion,
Nortey and Abrams walk across the street together, toward the
facility. As they approach, Nortey is heard telling Abrams,
“You can’t tell us where the fuck to be. Only the police.”
Abrams’ reply is that he is not going to argue with him. Nortey
is then seen proceeding to the other side of the street, to join the
picketers. The participants are noisy, but contained. There ap-
pear to be approximately 50 individuals marching in a circle on
the sidewalk, holding signs and chanting slogans, some of
which contained ad hominem attacks against Sieger.8 Traffic
passes by, unimpeded. According to the testimony of General
Counsel’s witnesses, the rest of the picketing similarly pro-
ceeded without incident, and Respondent so stipulated.
Informational Picketing Prior to March 15, 2006
The Union had previously engaged in informational picket-
ing at Respondent’s facility. The last prior occasion occurred
on September 28, 2005, and also took place across the street
from Respondent’s facility. Employee Worrell testified that she
had participated in two previous union rallies, which were held
at the same location. Nortey and Worrell testified, without con-
tradiction, that the prior instances of picketing or other union
activity at Respondent’s facility in which they had participated
was peaceful and did not result in any arrests.
Other Incidents Cited by Respondent
In justifying its decision to record the picketing on March 15,
Respondent cites to two prior incidents allegedly involving
union agents or employees. Sieger testified that at some time in
2000, an unnamed union delegate requested to have a confer-
ence room made available for a meeting with the night staff,
and Respondent agreed. According to Sieger, “[w]hat they did
is they came into the building, stormed upstairs with camera-
men, started taking pictures and video tapes of residents that
objected . . . They went into a staff bathroom, threw paper all

8 Some of the picket signs said, “We are the care givers,” “We need
our contract,” “We need our benefits,” and “Children need medical
care.” The chants included “We are the Union, We cannot be deterred,”
“Insulin,” “What do you want? Benefits,” “No Justice, No Peace,” and
“Helen Sieger full of shit.”
over, took pictures of that and put it into a newspaper.” Sieger,
who was not present at the time, stated that she found out about
this incident when she saw a newspaper article and accompany-
ing photographs in the New York Daily News, and also re-
ceived a report from a nurse on the unit. In an article entitled
“Nursing Homes of Shame” the News profiled several local
nursing homes including Respondent. There is a photograph of
one unnamed resident, in bed, and of a bathroom littered with
what appears to be paper towels and toilet tissue. The article
also makes reference to the fact that, “[f]ollowing The News’
unannounced visit, seven workers were fired, including one
who helped The News get inside. Under pressure from Local
1199, Helen Sieger reinstated all but one.” The article further
reported that the same night the newspaper visited the Respon-
dent’s premises, the workers voted in favor of a protest. Sieger
did not testify as to the specific involvement of any union offi-
cial in this event, and Respondent offered no corroboration for
her assertion that the Union was responsible for bringing the
Daily News into the facility. Neither General Counsel nor the
Union offered any testimony regarding what involvement the
Union may have had in facilitating access to the facility for the
newspaper. According to Sieger’s account, residents were
frightened by the commotion, and required both individual and
group therapy to recover from this traumatizing event.
Sieger additionally testified that, also in 2000, a group of
about 30 union officials entered Respondent’s facility without
permission, proceeded to the office of Administrator Ernest
Regan without an appointment, threw items off his desk and sat
on it. Again, Sieger was not present at the facility, and failed to
name any specific agents of the Union who participated on this
occasion. According to Sieger’s testimony, the incident was
captured on Respondent’s internal security cameras. No such
evidence was offered by Respondent, and there was no further
evidence presented regarding this incident or supporting
Sieger’s assertions of union involvement on this occasion.
Sieger further stated that because of issues regarding union
representatives coming onto the premises and meeting with
employees without permission, an arbitration was held before
the impartial industry chairman regarding union access, which
resulted in an award on May 26, 2005, setting forth comprehen-
sive guidelines for the parties to abide by with regard to the
issue of union access to the facility. The arbitration decision
makes no reference to any particular dispute; nor does it men-
tion either of the above described incidents. There is no evi-
dence that either party has failed to comply with the terms of
this award.
On January 18, the Union held a demonstration at Resort
Nursing Home, located in Brooklyn, New York, a facility that
was, at the time, operated by Sieger. No notice of the demon-
stration was provided to the employer, and Resort filed an un-
fair labor practice charge regarding the incident with the
Boards’ Brooklyn office. Resort had videotaped the demonstra-
tion, and the Region asked to view the videotape to assist it in
determining whether there had been, in fact, a violation of Sec-
tion 8(g) of the Act.9 After conducting its investigation, includ-

9 Sec. 8(g) of the Act requires that when an employer is a health care
institution, a labor organization must provide the employer and the
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 9
ing viewing the videotape of the incident, the Region concluded
that the Union had not engaged in a strike or picketing as such
has been interpreted by the Board and the courts and dismissed
the charge.10
Sieger further testified that in May 2006, after the dates of
the strike which had been planned for earlier in the month (dis-
cussed below), employees came forward and complained that
they had been threatened and intimidated by three employees11
in the event they would have refused to participated in the
strike. Sieger discharged them. As a consequence, the Union
filed unfair labor practice charges regarding the terminations,
which were dismissed by the Region. The dismissal was upheld
on appeal. Although Sieger stated that the individuals who were
threatened filed police reports, she did not offer any testimony
regarding whether these reports resulted in any action being
taken by the police or other law enforcement officials.
The Alleged Threats to Delay Reinstatement
On April 27 and May 1, the Union provided Respondent
with written notice of its intention to conduct a rally, leaflet and
picket on May 15 and engage in a 3-day strike commencing on
6 a.m. Tuesday, May 16, and ending at 6 a.m. Friday, May 19.12
On the Tuesday during the week prior to the anticipated strike
(May 9), Respondent held a meeting with its employees on the
second floor in the East Wing of Respondent’s facility at about
1:45 p.m., which lasted approximately 20 minutes. Rutenberg
and Abrams were present, among others. According to Worrell,
at this meeting, “Mr. Solomon [Rutenberg] said that if we do go
on the strike for three days, we cannot come back in for the
next three weeks. Because he cannot hire workers to be there
for three days. So we will be off for three weeks.” Another
employee present, Evelyn Riley (who is Worrell’s sister) asked
Rutenberg to put his statement in writing, and he agreed to do
so.
Respondent subsequently held another meeting with em-
ployees on the Friday prior the strike (May 12), which Worrell
did not attend as she was not working on that date. Employee
Fay Whitter did attend, and testified that, “we were advised that
if we went out on strike we might not be able to return to work
when we think we could, within those three days. We were told
that we might have to stay out longer depending on what the
contract was that they got for the people to come and work.”

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) with at least 10
days written notice of its intent to engage in “any strike, picketing or
other concerted refusal to work.”
10 When cross-examined regarding this occurrence, Sieger claimed
she did not know when the action at Resort occurred and repeatedly
stated that she could not recall whether the Union had engaged in any
picketing at any of her facilities between that date and March 15; that it
would be “something she would have to look up.”
11 In questioning Sieger, Respondent’s counsel referred to these em-
ployees as “Union delegates.” Sieger, however, provided no testimony
to establish this fact. In its brief, Respondent characterizes these indi-
viduals alternatively as “employees,” “Unionized employees,” or “1199
employees.”
12 The strike notice stated, inter alia, “this strike is in protest of your
unfair labor practices which, among other things, have resulted in the
loss of the aforesaid employees’ healthcare benefits.”
At this meeting, Rutenberg also distributed a letter to employ-
ees. Dated May 12, the letter provides as follows:
The Union has called a 3-day strike for next week as you all
know. The strike is supposed to protest our “unfair labor prac-
tices.” For your information, the “unfair labor practices” are
close to being finally settled with the Labor Board and in-
cludes a payment schedule to pay off fund delinquencies, as
we have asked the Union for months. This will include pay-
ments to the benefit fund (for health benefits) which the Labor
Board says we are required to make. So exactly what “unfair
labor practices” are you striking for?
Also, you should know that because we have a duty to our pa-
tients, we will have to hire temporary replacements for you
and we probably will have to keep them on in the jobs of
those who strike until the Union agrees not to call further
strikes over the next few months or until a union contract is
signed. There are two reasons for this. First, it is hard to get
replacements for only a three day period. Second, since we
don’t know when you might strike again, we have to make
sure that we will have continuity of care for patients until
open issues with the Union are resolved. We hope you under-
stand why we have to protect our patients.
Sieger testified that, in anticipation of the strike she at-
tempted to find replacement employees for the approximately
250 unit employees and contacted several agencies, naming
three specifically: Town, Big Apple, and Juno. Sieger testified
that her discussions with these agencies revealed that, to re-
place the unit employees, Respondent would have to pay a
significantly higher rate than it typically pays for temporary
workers and that she would have to commit to hire such em-
ployees for a period of 5 weeks to cover the agencies’ expenses
in mass recruitment. Sieger further stated that she was able to
“negotiate it down to three weeks in exchange for having to pay
for orientation” for the replacements. Sieger then directed
Rutenberg to advise employees that if there was a strike, Re-
spondent may not be able to bring them back to work for 3
weeks, because she wanted employees to be apprised of every-
thing that was going on. Respondent presented no evidence
regarding any written agreement with any entity named by
Sieger.13
With employees gathered for the May 15 rally, Union Ex-
ecutive Vice President Sackman announced that due to Re-
spondent’s agreement to make payments to the union funds
both the rally and strike were cancelled. Union Vice President
Shillingford sent Abrams a letter to such effect on that date.
Counsel for the General Counsel’s Motion to Amend
the Complaint
After resting subject to rebuttal, but before Respondent pre-
sented its case, counsel for the General Counsel made a motion
to amend the complaint to add an allegation that, by distributing
the May 12 letter to employees, Respondent threatened to delay
the reinstatement of employees, thereby engaging in an addi-

13 At the hearing, Respondent stipulated that there was no written
contract between it and “Town” regarding replacements for the strike.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
tional, independent violation of Section 8(a)(1).14 Respondent
opposed the motion fundamentally due to what it contends is a
lack of adequate notice or opportunity to meaningfully litigate
the issue.
The issue of the letter was first raised in these proceedings
during Respondent’s opening statement, setting forth the theory
of its defense to the allegations of the complaint:
The Employer told—did not tell people that if you go on
strike you’re going to be out for three weeks. What the Em-
ployer said was “If you go out on strike and we have to hire
replacements, we may have to make a commitment to keep
them for three weeks. So we will not be able to return you to
your jobs until the replacements leave.
Moreover, since there was a history in this industry of 1199
calling two or three day strikes, which reek (sic) havoc on a
healthcare employer, the employees were also told that if
there is going to be continued two and three day strikes, the
Employer may, in essence, have to keep employees out until
the Union agrees not to strike again or agrees to sign a con-
tract. Again the only issue being who the Arbitrator is going
to be under the contract.
All of this that was said was not only said verbally but was
put out in a writing to employees that said exactly what was
said verbally and was distributed to employees. It was not
“we are punishing you because you’re going out on strike.” It
was “we are doing what we have to do to make sure we have
continuity of coverage.” No one was told that they were going
to be permanently replaced. Nobody was told that they were
going to be fired. It was only a question of these are the things
we may have to do –may have to do—in order to provide
continuing coverage for sick, elderly patients. And it was put
in writing.
Respondent then agreed to stipulate the letter into evidence.
Subsequently, Respondent reiterated that the letter had been
sent into the Region as part of its defense to the allegations of
the charge.
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Unlawful Videotaping of Employees—Applicable
Legal Standards
The complaint alleges that, by videotaping the March 15
picketing, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, a
contention Respondent denies. Respondent argues that its ac-
tions are lawful because it is a health care facility with a duty to
protect its residents; the surveillance is necessary due to the
Union’s alleged history of trespass and violent behavior; that in
taping the picketing it is merely lawfully seeking to preserve
evidence and, further, that there is no evidence that the video-

14 The relevant paragraph of the complaint (par. 6) originally alleged
that Respondent, by Solomon Rutenberg, at Respondent’s facility, on or
about the dates indicated below in 2006, threatened employees that
Respondent would delay their reinstatement to work if those employees
engaged in a strike and then made an unconditional offer to return to
work: (a) On various occasions in or around March and April. (b) On or
about May 11. In its brief, counsel for the General Counsel moved for
withdrawal of par. 6(a) of the complaint. This motion is hereby granted.
taping has chilled employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
In F. W. Woolworth Co., 310 NLRB 1197 (1993), the Board
reaffirmed the principle that observation of open, public union
activity on or near its property does not constitute unlawful
surveillance. The Board has also held that:
Photographing and videotaping such activity clearly constitute
more than mere observation, however, because such pictorial
recordkeeping tends to create fear among employees of future
reprisals. The Board in Woolworth reaffirmed the principle
that photographing in the mere belief that something might
happen does not justify the employer’s conduct when bal-
anced against the tendency of that conduct to interfere with
employees’ right to engage in concerted activity [internal cita-
tions omitted]. Rather, the Board requires an employer engag-
ing in such photographing or videotaping to demonstrate that
it had a reasonable basis to have anticipated misconduct by
the employees.
National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 NLRB 499 (1997),
enfd. 156 F.3d 1268 (3d Cir. 1998).
“[T]he inquiry is whether the photographing or videotaping
has a reasonable tendency to interfere with protected activity
under the circumstances;” Id; Trailmobile Trailer, LLC, 343
NLRB 95, 96 (2004).
Thus, “the Board may properly require a company to provide
a solid justification for its resort to anticipatory photographing.”
NLRB v. Colonial Haven Nursing Home, 542 F.2d 691, 701
(7th Cir. 1976). Although an employer has the right to maintain
security measures necessary to the furtherance of its legitimate
business objectives, an employer’s subjective, honest belief that
unprotected conduct may occur does not constitute proper justi-
fication for the recording of protected activity; rather, an em-
ployer must show that it had a reasonable, objective basis for
anticipating misconduct. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co.,
supra at 499 fn. 5; Trailmobile Trailer, supra at 96 (and cases
cited therein).
As noted above, Respondent maintains an extensive security
surveillance system at its facility. This is not alleged to be
unlawful. Rather, it is the discrete, separate video surveillance
and recording of the picketing activity which occurred across
the street from Respondent’s facility on March 15, which is the
subject of the complaint. In this case, Respondent has failed to
meet its burden of proof to establish that the separate video
recording of employees’ protected conduct was based upon any
legitimate security concern or to otherwise show that it had a
reasonable basis to anticipate misconduct by its employees.
Respondent as a Health Care Employer
As an initial matter, Respondent notes that it is a healthcare
facility, and has had a surveillance system in place for many
years, without any protest from the Union. In connection with
this argument, Respondent cites to Jewish Home for the Elderly
of Fairfield County, 343 NLRB 1069 (2004). Under the facts of
that case, which involved the installation of surveillance cam-
eras at entrances to the building, near the timeclocks, in eleva-
tors, and in designated smoking areas, the administrative law
judge found that that there was no evidence that the cameras
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 11
were being used to record employees engaged in protected
activity. Id at 1082. Such an instance is clearly distinguishable
from the instant case, where the surveillance at issue was pre-
cipitated by, and confined to, a specific instance of protected
conduct. In Jewish Home, supra, while finding that no unlawful
conduct had occurred, the administrative law judge specifically
drew that comparison: “The situation here is, thus, distinguish-
able from those cases where an employer has been found to
violate the Act by installing cameras directed at employee pick-
eting or other activity.” Id. (citations omitted).15 Respondent has
cited no authority for the proposition that, as a health care em-
ployer, it is generally exempt from the applicable legal stan-
dards regarding the video surveillance of employees’ protected
conduct.
Alleged Instances of Prior Union Misconduct
Respondent further relies upon evidence of what it character-
izes as “inappropriate and unlawful Union conduct” throughout
the course of its dealings with the Union and argues that the
Union’s history has “forced [Respondent] to protect its resi-
dents by videotaping Union activities in and around [its] prem-
ises” and further, to “take measures to document the activity
around the facility to ensure there is adequate evidence of mis-
conduct if any when resident health and wellness is disturbed.”
There are two issues raised by the evidence proffered by Re-
spondent in support of these contentions: (1) whether, in the
first instance, the evidence of purported instances of union
misconduct is reliable and otherwise probative of the assertions
put forth and (2) assuming the evidence shows what Respon-
dent suggests, whether Respondent has met its burden of estab-
lishing that there was a reasonable basis for its resort to the
anticipatory videotaping of protected conduct. Here, Respon-
dent has failed on both accounts. 16
With regard to the first issue, involving the sufficiency of the
evidence, I find as a general matter, that Sieger was neither a
reliable nor wholly credible witness with regard to her descrip-
tions of particular events. As noted above, at significant times,
Sieger’s testimony was not predicated upon first hand knowl-
edge or observation, was uncorroborated by other evidence and
was frequently nonspecific and conclusory. I also found her to
be an uncooperative and evasive witness on cross-examination,
in particular when questioned about the Union’s activities at
Resort Nursing Home. Thus, as discussed in further detail be-
low, while Sieger sought to blame the Union for various acts of
prior misconduct, I find that Respondent has generally failed to

15 Moreover, in that case, there were no exceptions filed to the ad-
ministrative law judge’s dismissal of the allegations relating to the
alleged unlawful surveillance. Id at fn. 1. It is well settled that the
Board’s adoption of a portion of a judge’s decision to which no excep-
tions are filed is not precedent for any other case. ESI, Inc., 296 NLRB
1319 fn. 3 (1989); Anniston Yarn Mills, 103 NLRB 1495 (1953).
16 Again, this argument fails to acknowledge that both the perimeter
and interior of Respondent’s facility are continually monitored by a
video surveillance system which would record and preserve evidence of
trespass or other instances of misconduct at any time, including those
times when its employees are engaged in protected conduct. In fact,
Sieger acknowledged that at least one of the instances cited by Respon-
dent (where union agents allegedly stormed the office of administrator
Regan), had been captured on videotape.
come forward with probative evidence or specific detail to es-
tablish union culpability or, alternatively, to explain why it
could not do so.
This is particularly apparent when considering the two oc-
currences which took place in 2000. In the first such instance,
personnel from the New York Daily News were escorted into
the nursing home and pictures were taken of at least one resi-
dent and elsewhere in the facility. The intrusion was then
documented in an article in the newspaper. Although Sieger
sought to place the blame on the Union, there is no probative
evidence that this is the case. In fact, the newspaper article
states that access was facilitated by an employee of the facility,
not by any agent or official of the Union.17 I further note that
Sieger testified that she first learned of this unauthorized visit
upon reading the article in the newspaper. I find it inherently
improbable that an act of trespass such as Sieger described
would not have been brought to her attention immediately and
in the first instance by a member of her staff,18 which leads me
to question whether Sieger has a reliable memory of this event,
to the extent she may have had knowledge of it at the time. I
further note that Respondent’s existing security system cameras
would have been in position to record at least some portion of
the incident, which clearly involved unauthorized entry to the
facility. Thus, there would be no logical reason for Respondent
to rely upon additional videotaping of events occurring outside
its facility to protect itself from an intrusion of this sort, or to
preserve evidence of what clearly was a circumstance of tres-
pass.
The second 2000 incident, by Sieger’s account, involved a
group of some 30 individuals who entered the nursing home
without an appointment, went to administrator Regan’s office
and threw items off his desk and sat on it. Again, Sieger was
not present during this incident, there was no testimony from
any individual who was or who witnessed what occurred. Fur-
ther, no specific details were offered to substantiate Respon-
dent’s claim that the Union was responsible for this act of tres-
pass. Moreover, the facility’s existing security system would
have, and in this case did, capture this occurrence. I note that
the tape of this episode would have provided direct evidence of
what had occurred. It was not produced herein, and no explana-
tion was proffered for Respondent’s failure to do so. I thus infer
that either it was not preserved (which, of course, undermines
Respondent’s assertion regarding its intention to preserve evi-
dence) or that it would have not corroborated Sieger’s testi-
mony regarding what actually took place on this occasion.
In any event, even if I were to assume that the Union, or its
employee agents, were involved in these two incidents, I find
that such events, which occurred 6 years prior to the videotap-

17 Although Sieger prefaced her testimony about this incident with a
reference to a delegate’s request for the use of a conference room to
meet with employees, she provided no evidence to link the two occur-
rences. Moreover, there was no evidence presented from which an
appropriate inference could be drawn that the two occurrences were
more than circumstantially related or that employee delegates or union
officials used the facility for anything more than their stated purpose.
18 Inasmuch as the article makes reference to employee discharges,
apparently in connection with the event, it appears as though Sieger did
have prior knowledge of the News’ unauthorized visit.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
ing in question, are too remote in time to provide a sufficient
justification for Respondent’s decision to record the protected
picketing activity of its employees. The Board has found an-
ticipatory videotaping to be lawful when there is some mean-
ingful temporal relationship between prior misconduct and the
acts being recorded. For example, in Smithfield Foods, 347
NLRB 1225, 1228 (2006), the Board concluded that the video-
taping of protected conduct was permissible after union organ-
izers engaged in repeated instances of trespass and the em-
ployer called the police who asked the handbillers to remain on
public property. The employer’s redirection of its security cam-
eras to monitor the union organizers outside the facility had a
reasonable basis, “in light of the physical proximity of the
handbilling to the Respondent’s property and the temporal
proximity of the previous trespassing incident.” By contrast, in
Trailmobile Trailer LLC, supra at 96, the Board found that an
employer’s security concern was not a sufficient justification
for videotaping employees where the employer did not install
surveillance cameras until 8 months after vandalism occurred. I
further note that there is no evidence that the police were called
to investigate either of the 2000 events, which has been a factor
duly considered by the Board in determining whether an em-
ployer has demonstrated sufficient justification for recording its
employees’ protected conduct. See Smithfield Foods, supra;
Saia Motor Freight Line, 333 NLRB 784 (2001) (employer
lawfully videotaped handbilling activity when it became dissat-
isfied with efforts of police to control situation). Berton Kir-
schner, 209 NLRB 1081 (1974), enfd. 523 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir.
1975) (discussed infra).19
Respondent additionally argues that it is aware of unlawful
disruptions that the Union has engaged in at other local health-
care institutions, notably at Staten Island University Hospital
(reported as Service Employees District 1199 (Staten Island
University Hospital), 339 NLRB 1059 (2003), where the Board
found that an admitted union agent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by subjecting employees to abusive tactics such as profanity,
racial and sexual slurs, and threats of physical harm). With
regard to this matter, Sieger testified only that the decision was
brought to her attention by counsel. She failed to testify how-
ever, as to any specific knowledge she might have had of acts
of union misconduct in connection with that matter, how that
might have some relevance to any event which has occurred at
Respondent’s facility or the picketing in question herein, or
how that may have influenced her decision to videotape the
March 15 picketing activity.
Respondent further relies upon the termination, in May 2006,
of three of Respondent’s employees allegedly for making in-
timidating threats made to employees who were not planning to
join the Union’s strike, characterizing this conduct as the “Un-
ion’s” threat, Respondent argues that the fact that the threats
postdated the specific videotaping at issue misses the point.

19 Moreover, as noted above, Respondent’s legitimate security con-
cerns regarding trespass protected by its existing system of video cam-
eras. See National Steel & Shipbuilding Co, 324 NLRB at 500–501
(employer’s installation of a tripod mounted video camera trained on
the situs of union rallies not justified by security concerns due, in part,
to continuing operation of existing security system).
Respondent notes that these threats occurred prior to the issu-
ance of the instant complaint and argues that they must be con-
sidered as part of a continuing pattern that impacts the propriety
of an order the General Counsel seeks in this case—one which
would prohibit future videotaping of union picketing and dem-
onstrations.20
As an initial matter, Respondent failed to identify the em-
ployees in question in this record, and further failed to show
their affiliation, if any, with the Union, other than presumed
union membership. There is no evidence, either direct or cir-
cumstantial, that the Union initiated, condoned, or ratified these
actions. Moreover, Respondent has failed to show how video-
taping union rallies or other activity would have conceivably
either prevented or captured evidence of such conduct. It ap-
pears, rather, that the matter was handled in an appropriate
manner—by contacting law enforcement personnel and taking
disciplinary action with regard to the employees in question.
Respondent’s Contentions Regarding the Preservation
of Evidence
In further defense to the allegations of the complaint, Re-
spondent points to the fact that the Board has asked for its
video evidence in its investigation of alleged picketing at Re-
sort Nursing Home and argues that an employer who is asked to
submit such evidence by the Board itself cannot then be ac-
cused of engaging in unlawful surveillance when it documents
evidence in an analogous situation.21
In support of the above contention, and more generally, Re-
spondent argues that by videotaping union picketing, it was
merely legitimately seeking to preserve evidence. Respondent
notes that the Board has upheld defenses to surveillance
charges based upon an employer’s need to preserve proof. In
Concord Metal, Inc., 295 NLRB 912 (1989), cited by Respon-
dent, the Board, agreeing with the administrative law judge,
found that limited photography of picketing was lawful where
(1) the union was picketing the employer at two locations; (2)
the signs did not identify the union by name; (3) there was a
common situs for the picketing; thus secondary boycott charges
were a “distinct possibility”; and (4) there was evidence that the

20 Respondent further argues that all the foregoing instances of union
misconduct occurred while the Union knew it was being videotaped
and invites me to speculate as to what sort of misconduct might occur if
the Union knew its conduct could not be established through video
evidence. This argument ignores the obvious fact that not one of the
above-cited instances of alleged misdeeds would have been depicted
and preserved by video cameras trained across the street from Respon-
dent’s facility.
21 To the extent Respondent appears to argue that it engages in
videotaping of union rallies and picketing to protect itself against viola-
tions of Sec. 8(g), the evidence demonstrates that the Union provided
Respondent with all required notices pursuant to Sec.8(g) of the Act
both before and after the informational picketing on March 15. Re-
spondent makes the point that the Union changed the location of the
May 15 planned demonstration. In fact, this change was minor and, in
any event, notification of such a change is not required by Sec. 8(g)
which requires notification only of the date and time that picketing will
commence; there is no requirement that a union provide notice of the
locations at which it intends to picket. Hospital Worker Local 250, 255
NLRB 502, 505 (1981).
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 13
picketers blocked an entrance to the employer’s facility thereby
delaying a delivery. Id. at 921. None of these circumstances
obtain in the instant case. Similarly, Karatjas Family Lockport
Corp., 292 NLRB 953, 956 (1989), also cited by Respondent, is
inapposite insofar as that case involved a situation where the
employer took photographs of nonemployee, paid pickets in
order to preserve evidence of alleged trespass.
Respondent additionally relies upon Roadway Express, 271
NLRB 1238 (1984), where the Board found that photography
of protected activity to preserve or collect evidence of illegal
picketing was lawful. In that instance the administrative law
judge, affirmed by the Board, based his decision in part on the
fact that employer proved a colorable basis for seeking injunc-
tive relief under Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970). The Respondent here, however, has not
claimed any colorable basis for the initiation of legal proceed-
ings against the Union, or the picketing employees, for which
the videotapes of picketing could or would have been evidence.
Furthermore, in Roadway Express the employer demonstrated
its intent to use those tapes for the purposes of litigation by
showing that it had catalogued and preserved its photographs.
Here, by contrast, in response to a subpoena seeking all video-
tapes of the event, Respondent could produce only 28 minutes
of videotape relating to the picketing, notwithstanding the fact
that it is undisputed that two video cameras were stationed to
record the entire 3-hour event. I find that Respondent’s unex-
plained failure to produce this subpoenaed material demon-
strates that it failed to preserve it and conclude that such a fail-
ure undermines its contention that it was legitimately seeking to
preserve evidence in the event of future litigation. Thus, Re-
spondent has failed to preserve and has not otherwise shown
that its videotapes could have been evidence in any litigation,
theoretical or real.
In Berton Kirschner, supra, also cited by Respondent, the
Board concluded that the photographing of union representa-
tives while handbilling employees did not violate the Act where
the union representatives had been asked to leave the em-
ployer’s property, and thereafter returned and where the police
were called because the union representatives continued to
engage in acts of trespass. The Board found that “[i]n these
circumstances, including the fact that Respondent promptly
called the police on this one date as well as the fact that there
were several later handbillings by the Union without incident,
we cannot conclude that respondent, by taking pictures of
handbillings which in part were on its property engaged in sur-
veillance, or engaged in conduct that would have created the
impression of surveillance.” 209 NLRB at 1081.
Thus, as Respondent correctly observes, an employer may
photograph handbillers or pickets to support a legal trespass
claim. 22 However, the Employer must have more than a mere
belief that something might happen; rather, an employer must

22 See, e.g., Washington Fruit & Produce Co., 343 NLRB 1215,
1217 (2004) (no violation where an employer monitors protected activ-
ity because of a reasonable concern about a recurrence of trespassing);
Cf. Snap-On Tools, Inc. 342 NLRB 5 (2004) (repositioning of security
camera to monitor handbilling violated Act where there were no previ-
ous incidents of trespassing); Robert-Orr Food Service, 334 NLRB 977
(2001) (same).
demonstrate a reasonable basis to expect misconduct. National
Steel & Shipbuilding Co., supra; Cf. Saia Motor Freight Line,
supra, where the Board found no violation in the employer’s
photographing of striking employees because the employer
showed that (1) those employees had actually impeded traffic;
(2) it did not begin photographing the employees until the im-
peding of traffic began; and (3) it photographed employees only
after failure of appeals to police to take action to minimize
dangerous traffic congestion (including at least one near-miss
of a rear end collision).
All of the foregoing only underscores Respondent’s failure
to adduce any evidence of violence, trespass, or the blocking of
ingress or egress during those instances where the Union has
picketed Respondent’s facility, all of which have been recorded
for at least the past 15 years. Further, there is no evidence of
misconduct as employees picketed on the sidewalk across the
street from Respondent’s facility on March 15. Rather, the only
probative evidence in this record is of peaceful and lawful con-
duct during picketing or other group activities. Thus, I conclude
that the forgoing instances of alleged union misconduct cited by
Respondent, either singly or in the aggregate, fail to meet Re-
spondent’s burden to establish a “solid justification” for its
resort to anticipatory videotaping of the March 15 informa-
tional picketing. See, e.g., National Steel & Shipbuilding Co.,
supra at 502 (even where there is a history of violence or mis-
conduct associated primarily with strikes at an employer’s fa-
cility, such history did not justify the surveillance of peaceful
union rallies conducted during nonstrike periods). Moreover, to
the extent Respondent is relying upon Sieger’s subjective reac-
tion to what she perceived as union transgressions, this does not
constitute sufficient cause to warrant the recording of protected
activity. Rather, Respondent is obliged to prove a reasonable,
objective basis for anticipating that misconduct will occur, id.
at 499 fn. 1. Here, Respondent has failed to prove that it video-
taped the March 15 informational picketing due to any legiti-
mate security concern or reasonable basis to conclude that the
Union would be engaging in unlawful or unprotected conduct.
The evidence rather, “establishes a clear connection between
union activity and the installation of the cameras, which would
have been apparent to employees.” Trailmobile Trailer, LLC,
supra at 96.
Respondent’s Contentions Regarding the Absence of a
Chilling Effect on Protected Conduct
Finally, Respondent argues that employees continue to en-
gage in protected activity despite their knowledge of the sur-
veillance. It is asserted that because Respondent’s unionized
employees do not fear reprisals for their union activity, the type
of surveillance engaged by Respondent is lawful. In support of
this argument, Respondent relies upon evidence that employees
continued to participate in protected activity notwithstanding
their knowledge that their activities were being videotaped.
Moreover, it is undisputed that there has been no allegation of
retaliation against employees for their participation in rallies or
picketing activities.
The standard for determining an 8(a)(1) violation is whether
the employer engaged in conduct that reasonably tends to inter-
fere with the free exercise of employees’ Section 7 rights. This
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
standard is objective; the subjective perceptions of individual
employees are not taken into account. Moreover, the test of
interference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act does not turn on an employer’s motive or on whether the
coercion actually succeeded or failed. American Freightways
Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959); Curwood, Inc., 339 NLRB
1137, 1140 (2003).
Thus, in the instant case the fact that employees continue to
engage in protected conduct notwithstanding Respondent’s
surveillance of their activities is not determinative of whether
there has been a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.23
Rather, the appropriate focus for inquiry is “whether the photo-
graphing or videotaping has a reasonable tendency to interfere
with protected activity under the circumstances of each case.”
Washington Fruit & Produce Co., supra at 1217 (quoting Na-
tional Steel & Shipbuilding Co., supra). Moreover, a lack of
retaliation against participants will not, in and of itself, mitigate
the reasonable tendency of an employer’s videotaping to inter-
fere, restrain, or coerce employee’s rights to engage in pro-
tected concerted activity. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co.,
supra at 502. Employees do not need to be actually intimidated
by videotaping for it to be unlawful. See Center Construction
Co., 345 NLRB 729, 744 (2005).
In summary, the Respondent has not met its burden of prov-
ing a “solid justification” for its videotaping of the peaceful
picketing of its employees. I therefore find and conclude that
by videotaping picketing employees, without proper justifica-
tion, thereby engaging in surveillance of employees engaged in
protected conduct, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.
The Threat to Delay Reinstatement
General Counsel’s Motion to Amend the Complaint
As noted above, after resting, but prior to the presentation of
Respondent’s case-in-chief, counsel for the General Counsel
moved to amend the complaint to add the allegation that, by
distributing the above-described May 12 letter to employees,
Respondent engaged in an independent violation of Section
8(a)(1). Respondent objected to the proposed amendment,
claiming a lack of notice and due process.24

23 Moreover, as counsel for the General Counsel argues, even though
Respondent had engaged in videotaping of employee demonstrations
for years and there was no evidence of retaliatory action, there is evi-
dence that employees did have concerns about being recorded while
engaging in protected conduct.
24 In particular, Respondent appears to argue that because I deferred
ruling on whether I would grant the motion to amend the complaint
until after the parties had briefed that issue, it was precluded from liti-
gating the issue on the merits. In its brief, Respondent cites several
transcript references in support of this argument. Most of them are
inapposite, dealing with other issues entirely. On one occasion cited by
Respondent there was, in fact, a discussion of my decision to defer
ruling on the General Counsel’s motion. As the transcript makes plain,
at that time the parties were cautioned that they were “on notice that
this is an issue.” At that time, there did not appear to be any misunder-
standing regarding the fact that, if I found it appropriate to grant the
General Counsel’s motion, I would proceed to consider the merits of
the proposed amendment to the complaint. To argue to the contrary
would suggest that I was contemplating reopening the record to con-
Rule 102.17 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations allows for
the amendment of a complaint before, during, or after a hearing
upon such terms as may be just. Folsom Ready Mix, Inc., 338
NLRB 1172 fn. 1 (2003). Whether it is just to grant such a mo-
tion depends upon whether the new allegations are closely re-
lated to the allegations of the complaint, and whether the
amendments are so late that the respondent will be prejudiced
by them. See Payless Drug Stores, 313 NLRB 1220, 1221
(1994); New York Post, 283 NLRB 430, 431 (1987).
In the instant case, I find that the new allegation proposed by
the General Counsel in her motion to amend the complaint
arises from the same factual circumstances and course of con-
duct that forms the basis for certain of the other allegations of
the complaint, and relies upon the same legal theory. I also
find that the motion was not too late as the issue was fully and
fairly litigated. At the hearing, Respondent was the first to raise
the issue of the letter, apparently citing it as part of its proffered
defense to the allegations the complaint. The letter was thereaf-
ter stipulated into evidence. The General Counsel then adduced
testimony regarding the context in which the letter was distrib-
uted to employees, and Respondent had the opportunity to
cross-examine her witnesses on such issues. Moreover, the
document speaks for itself. Further, the motion to amend the
complaint was made prior to the presentation of any evidence
by Respondent in its case-in chief and Respondent adduced
testimony regarding why it had been distributed to employees
from its own witness. In this regard, by Respondent’s own ad-
mission, the distribution of the letter is part and parcel of the
same course of conduct alleged to be unlawful, and Respon-
dent’s proffered defense to such allegations is predicated upon
the same legal theory. While it would have been preferable for
counsel for the General Counsel to have made the motion to
amend the complaint at an earlier point in these proceedings, I
find that the issue was fully and fairly litigated, and the Re-
spondent was not denied due process. I therefore grant counsel
for the General Counsel’s motion to amend the complaint.
The Unlawful Threat to Delay Reinstatement
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated the Act by
threatening employees that, Respondent would delay their rein-
statement if they went on strike and then made an unconditional
offer to return to work. Respondent asserts that employees
were informed that their reinstatement might be delayed for 3
weeks if they went out on strike and that this was due to the
difficulty of hiring replacements en masse for a period of 3
days. Respondent further contends that it had a legitimate busi-
ness justification for replacing the employees for this period of
time, and for explaining this to its employees.
Under Section 8(c) of the Act, an employer may lawfully
furnish accurate information, especially in response to employ-
ees’ questions, if it does so without making threats or promises
of benefits. Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp., 306 NLRB
408 (1992). See also Eagle Comtronics, 263 NLRB 515 (1982).
In Sutter Health Center, 348 NLRB 637 (2006), the Board,
affirming the administrative law judge, found among other

sider the issue on its merits, a request which was not made by any party
and under the circumstances of the case, a contention which cannot be
given serious credence.
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 15
things, that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1) by notify-
ing certain unit employees that their reinstatement to work after
a strike would be delayed. In that case, it was also found that
the respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by delaying the
reinstatement of those employees, and the administrative law
judge found that the independent 8(a)(1) violation was “entirely
derivative of and dependent on the allegation that the delayed
reinstatement was improper.” Id. at 647. In the instant case, of
course, there was no strike, and therefore no unconditional offer
to return to work or any delay in the reinstatement of striking
employees.
The Board has found that an employer’s communications to
employees which are not compatible with their legal rights and
remedies under the Act are independent violations of Section
8(a)(1). For example, as General Counsel notes, when an em-
ployer informs unfair labor strikers that they have been perma-
nently replaced, such a statement violates the Act. Grinnell Fire
Protection Systems, 328 NLRB 585 (1999). Similarly, it has
been held that, while an employer need not inform economic
strikers of the full scope of their legal entitlements under Laid-
law Corp. 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enfd. 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 920 (1969), it may not describe a
consequence of such a strike which is inconsistent with such
rights. In Eagle Comtronics, supra at 516, a situation involving
economic strikers, the Board stated:
[A]n employer may address the subject of striker replacement
without fully detailing the protections enumerated in Laidlaw
so long as it does not threaten that, as a result of a strike, em-
ployees will be deprived of their rights in a manner inconsis-
tent with those detailed in Laidlaw. . . [.] As long as an em-
ployer’s statement on job status after a strike are consistent
with the law, they cannot be characterized as restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under the
Act.
Similarly, the Board has found that, while an employer has a
right to permanently replace employees engaged in an eco-
nomic strike, in the event it fails to do so, its false communica-
tion to employees to such effect violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. See, e.g., Noel Corp., 315 NLRB 905, 907 (1994) (man-
ager’s statement to employees that striking employees would be
permanently replaced and that the respondent had hired such
replacements at a time when “the task of marshalling a meas-
urably complete replacement program was not yet even under
way” was an unlawful threat of termination).
Based upon the foregoing precedent, therefore, it would ap-
pear that the question of whether Respondent’s communica-
tions to its employees were violative of the Act or protected by
Section 8(c) hinges upon whether, at the time the statements
were made, they were an accurate (even if incomplete) reflec-
tion of employees’ legal rights and remedies given the extant
circumstances.
General Counsel presented evidence relating to three in-
stances where the issue of delayed reinstatement was presented
to employees. This evidence is wholly unrebutted. In the first,
occurring on or about May 9, employees were told, “[I]f we do
go on the strike for three days, we cannot come back in for the
next three weeks. Because he cannot hire workers to be there
for three days. So we will be off for three weeks.” Later that
week, on Friday, May 12, another meeting was held for em-
ployees and the message conveyed was, “we were advised that
if we went out on strike we might not be able to return to work
when we think we could, within those three days. We were told
that we might have to stay out longer depending on what the
contract was that they got for the people to come and work.”
On that date, Respondent additionally issued a letter to its em-
ployees, which in salient detail states:
Also, you should know that because we have a duty to our pa-
tients, we will have to hire temporary replacements for you
and we probably will have to keep them on the jobs of those
who strike until the Union agrees not to call further strikes
over the next few months or until a union contract is signed.
There are two reasons for this. First, it is hard to get replace-
ments for only a three day period. Second, since we don’t
know when you might strike again, we have to make sure that
we will have continuity of care for patients until open issues
with the Union are resolved. We hope you understand why
we have to protect our patients.
Thus, in meetings with employer representatives employees
were told, respectively, that they either “will” or “might” be out
for a 3-week period should they strike. In its letter, Respondent
goes further and states that employee reinstatement “probably
will” be delayed until the Union agrees not to call further
strikes or until a new agreement is reached.
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that the statements
made in the employee meetings and set forth in the letter to
employees are unlawful because they do not accurately reflect
the law. In this regard, counsel for the General Counsel argues
that the parties anticipated that the strike would have been an
unfair labor practice strike.25 In such an instance, it is con-
tended, the strikers would have been entitled to full reinstate-
ment upon an unconditional application, even if the employer
would have been required to dismiss other employees who were
hired as replacements. Relying upon Pennant Foods Co., 347
NLRB 460 (2006), Grinnell Fire Protection Systems Co., su-
pra, and Cagle’s Inc., 234 NLRB 1148 (1978), the General
Counsel argues that it is an unfair labor practice to tell unfair
labor practice strikers that their reinstatement will be delayed,
as that is an incorrect statement of an employer’s obligations
with regard to such employees.
In the alternative, counsel for the General Counsel argues
that even if the strike had been an economic strike, Rutenberg’s
statements were unlawful because Respondent has not pre-
sented evidence that it had a legitimate and substantial business

25 At the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel stated that she was
not intending to prove that the strike would have been an unfair labor
practice strike but, merely that the parties were anticipating that the
strike would have been an unfair labor practice strike. The General
Counsel further stated that she was putting forth this theory in response
to Respondent’s anticipated defense that it had a sufficient business
justification to delay reinstatement to employees. Respondent disputed
this characterization of the anticipated strike, asserting that the strike
was an economic strike in support of the Union’s demand that the Re-
spondent agree to the selection of the impartial chairman as the arbitra-
tor for disputes arising under the Agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
justification for delaying its employees’ reinstatement after the
strike and an unconditional offer to return to work; therefore
Respondent’s statement to such effect tended to interfere, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
Respondent contends that the evidence fails to support Gen-
eral Counsel’s assertion that employees were threatened with a
delay in reinstatement. Rather, it is asserted that the evidence
shows that Rutenberg “explained to Union members that, if the
Union went on strike, the Center may not be able to reinstate
them for three weeks because the temporary agencies would not
agree to send such a large number of employees for a shorter
period of time.” Thus, it is argued, Rutenberg simply explained
why reinstatement might have to be delayed due to Respon-
dent’s need to replace workers en masse. Relying upon So-
ciedad Espanola de Auxilo Mutuo y Beneficiencia, 342 NLRB
458 (2004), Respondent further argues that employers who
engage in defensive lockouts may utilize temporary employees
to replace striking workers where there is a legitimate or com-
pelling reason to do so. Respondent claims that, in making the
disputed statements to employees, it was providing its employ-
ees prior to the anticipated strike with information about why a
lockout might have to ensue based upon a legitimate need for
temporary workers to provide coverage during the strike. As
Respondent argues, its explanation (provided both verbally and
in the letter) demonstrates a legitimate business reason for the
delay of reinstatement at a healthcare institution because there
was no other way to bring in over 250 temporary employees
without a minimum term of 3 weeks. Thus, neither the state-
ments made at the meetings or in the letter constituted a threat
of reprisal for engaging in union activity.
As an initial matter, I make no finding about whether a strike
which never materialized would or would not have been an
unfair labor strike, especially in light of the fact that there is no
such allegation set forth in the complaint. Here, the General
Counsel has neither pled nor proven the existence of unfair
labor practices prior to the strike vote taken in February 2006,
and has further failed to meet its burden to show how any of the
subsequent unfair labor practices alleged and found herein
might have been a contributing cause for the decision to strike.
See Tufts Bros., 235 NLRB 808, 810–811 (1978).26
I assume, therefore, for purposes of the instant analysis, that
the strike, had it occurred, would have been an economic strike.
There is a separate issue of whether Rutenberg framed his dis-
cussion of the anticipated strike in any particular manner,
which might possibly have some arguable relevance in assess-
ing the legality of his statements. I find, however, that the evi-
dence is at best equivocal regarding this matter, and cannot
draw any particular conclusion about whether Rutenberg was
articulating his comments in the context of an anticipated unfair

26 To the extent the General Counsel is relying upon the fact that the
Regional Director for Region 29 had previously issued a complaint
against Respondent, such reliance is misplaced. The allegations con-
tained therein do not establish the existence of any unfair labor prac-
tices. Moreover, I note that pursuant to the parties’ settlement, the
General Counsel requested dismissal of the complaint.
labor practice or economic strike.27 Based upon the comments
attributed to Rutenberg by employee witnesses, I do find, how-
ever, that he was discussing their reinstatement under the as-
sumption that employees would have made an unconditional
offer to return to work, after the strike had concluded.
In any event, it is apparent from the record that Respondent
planned to temporarily, rather than permanently, replace its
striking employees. An employer may hire permanent replace-
ments for economic strikers. NLRB v. McKay Radio & Tele-
phone Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–346; NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967). However, where an employer
fails to show that economic strikers have been permanently
replaced prior to their unconditional offer to return to work, an
economic striker is entitled to immediate reinstatement, absent
a demonstrated business justification. Teledyne-Stillman, 298
NLRB 982, 985 (1990), enfd. 938 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1991),
Harvey Mfg., 309 NLRB 465, 470 (1992). The burden of proof
in this regard is on the employer. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., supra at 378; Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB at 1368. If an
employer fails to establish such a “legitimate and substantial
business justification” it violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act, regardless of intent. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., supra
at 380; see also Laidlaw Corp., supra at 1368.
In the present case, Respondent proffers two asserted busi-
ness justifications: (1) that it could not contract for temporary
employees for any period of time less than 3 weeks and (2) that
it was entitled to lock out its employees and utilize temporary
workers to continue operations.
Respondent’s contention that the exigencies of replacing ap-
proximately 250 employees on a temporary basis necessitated
contracting with agencies for a longer period than the antici-
pated 3-day strike is compelling; it is, however, not supported
by adequate evidence. It is apparent from the record that during
the week prior to the date of the strike, when the comments at
issue were made to employees, Respondent had not yet entered
into any agreement with any particular agency or group of
agencies to provide temporary workers during the anticipated
strike. Sieger’s testimony regarding her discussions with three
named replacement agencies was nonspecific, as if negotiations
with all three had been exactly the same, a situation which I
find to be highly improbable, absent some further explanation
or factual development. I further note that Sieger failed to tes-
tify that she agreed to such terms. Moreover, there is no evi-
dence of any written agreement, or proposal to such effect.
There is also a lack of evidence to show that, at any relevant
time, Respondent was under a binding commitment to pay for
such services.
Further, the statements made to employees during the meet-
ing held the Friday prior to the strike tend to show that Respon-
dent had no definite plans regarding replacement employees
(“we might not be able to return to work when we think we
could, within those three days . . . depending on the contact was
that they got for the people to come and work”). Similarly, the
assertions in the letter issued to employees fail to indicate the

27 While Rutenberg clearly made reference to (and disputed) the ex-
istence of unfair labor practices, he also addressed the fact that there
were “open issues” between the parties.
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 17
existence of a binding obligation, (“we will have to hire tempo-
rary replacements for you and we probably will have to keep
them on the jobs of those who strike . . .”) (Emphasis added).
The conditional nature of such communications to employees
tends to refute Respondent’s assertion that there was a plan, or
any commitment, based upon requirements from supplier agen-
cies, for temporary replacements to be hired for a defined pe-
riod of 3 weeks.
Therefore, while I credit Sieger’s testimony to the extent that
I find that she had discussions with various agencies to replace
striking employees, and that there was discussion of hiring
employees for a period of time exceeding that of the anticipated
strike, I find from the record that during the time Respondent
was issuing statements to employees regarding their reinstate-
ment after a strike, Respondent’s plans to replace its employees
in the event of a strike were inchoate. Sieger’s testimony is by
itself insufficient to prove the existence (or necessity) of a 3-
week commitment for replacement employees.28
Respondent has cited no authority to convince me that given
the incomplete evidence regarding the apparently undeveloped
nature of its plans as late as the Friday prior to the strike, it has
carried its burden of showing that it had a sufficient business
justification to assert its right to delay the reinstatement of em-
ployees after an unconditional offer to return to work had been
made.29 I find therefore, under the circumstances established by
the record herein, that when Rutenberg told employees that “if
[they] do go on strike for three days, [they] cannot come back
in for the next three weeks. Because he cannot hire workers to
be there for three days. So [they] will be off for three weeks,”
he was falsely communicating to employees that a delay in
their reinstatement was a fait accompli based upon contractual
arrangements which, at the time, failed to exist. Thus, by mak-
ing these statements to employees, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Eagle Comtronics, supra; Noel Corp., supra.

28 In this regard I note that the first thing Sieger mentioned when
asked about her discussions with temporary agencies was the fact that
the “rate we were paying for replacement people would be much
higher.” This testimony tends to show that, while it would have been
more costly to replace employees for a shorter period that remained an
option.
29 In those situations where the Board has concluded that a substan-
tial business justification existed for a delay in reinstatement, the quan-
tum of evidence has been more substantial than that proffered by the
Respondent herein. For example, in Pacific Mutual Door Co., 278
NLRB 854, 856 (1986), the employer lawfully delayed reinstating
strikers for 30 days pursuant to its contract with a company providing
strike replacements where the contract was in evidence and the record
showed that the 30-day cancellation provision was a necessary condi-
tion of the employer getting temporary employees from the referring
company. See also Encino-Tarzana Regional Medical Center, 332
NLRB 914 (2000), and Sutter Roseville Medical Center, supra at 646,
where it was specifically noted that the General Counsel had not al-
leged an unlawful delay in the reinstatement of economic strikers where
there were specific contractual obligations to guarantee temporary
replacements from staffing agencies a minimum period of employment.
Cf. Harvey Mfg., supra at 470 (employer’s private contractual arrange-
ment with an agency providing temporary strike replacements requiring
a 10-day termination notice did not privilege the employer to continue
hiring replacement employees after the union’s unconditional offer to
return to work).
By contrast, the unrebutted testimony is that by the following
Friday, Respondent couched its communication to employees
in significantly different terms, advising them that they might
not be able to return to work . . . depending on the contract
[that Respondent obtained for replacement workers]. Here, I
agree with Respondent that it was truthfully advising employ-
ees of a possible outcome of the strike and find its communica-
tions to employees were not inconsistent with their rights under
the Act and therefore not violative of the Act.
The letter distributed to employees states that the employer
“probably will” have to keep temporary replacement employees
on the job until the Union agrees not to call strikes or until a
contract is signed for two reasons: (1) the difficulty of obtain-
ing replacements for a 3-day period and (2) uncertainty over
when other strikes might be called. Thus, the letter goes beyond
what was verbally conveyed to employees and advises them
that their reinstatement may be delayed, not for a period of 3
weeks, but for some indefinite period either until the Union
agrees not to call further strikes or until an agreement is
reached.
The General Counsel contends that this statement is unlawful
because it does not furnish employees accurate information
about their reinstatement rights and because it threatens a lock-
out of employees. With regard to this latter contention, the
General Counsel argues that Respondent never informed the
Union that it intended to enforce its bargaining demands by
locking out employees, as the Board requires. In support of this
position, the General Counsel relies upon Eads Transfer, 304
NLRB 711 (1991), enfd. 989 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1993). In that
case, the Board found an employer’s claimed economic lockout
was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act because it
had not notified the union that its refusal to reinstate economic
strikers was in fact due to a lockout. Instead, the employer,
without making any reference to a lockout or to its bargaining
demands, refused without explanation to reinstate seven eco-
nomic strikers when they made an unconditional offer to return
to work. The Board held that if the employer wanted to invoke
its rights under Harter Equipment, 280 NLRB 597 (1986),
enfd. sub nom. Operating Engineers Local 825 v. NLRB, 829
F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987),30 it had to declare the lockout either
before or immediately after the strikers made their uncondi-
tional offers to return to work. Here, as noted above, there was
no strike or unconditional offer to return to work. Thus, Re-
spondent’s obligation to formally declare a lockout had not yet
matured.31
The General Counsel further argues that there is no evidence
that there were lawful reasons for an anticipated lockout. While
it would be unfounded, on this record, to assess whether a lock-
out, had it occurred, ultimately would have been lawful, in its
letter to employees Respondent posits two circumstances where
employer lockouts of striking employees have been found to be

30 In Harter Equipment, supra the Board held that an employer’s use
of temporary replacements during a lockout in support of its legitimate
bargaining demands does not violate the Act.
31 Nevertheless, an argument can be made that employees were so
informed. See Ancor Concepts, Inc., 323 NLRB 742, 744 (1997), enf.
denied on other ground 166 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999), discussed infra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
lawful: to secure a commitment from a union to refrain from
further strikes and in support of an employer’s bargaining de-
mands.
With regard to the former, Sieger testified, without contra-
diction, that in early 2006 she met with Union Representatives
Sackman, Shillingford, and Nortey. Her unrebutted testimony is
that, at this time, Sackman told her that, as it had no contractual
recourse for Respondent’s continuing fund delinquencies, the
Union would continue to engage in picketing and strikes unless
Respondent entered into a contract. The General Counsel urges
that I not credit Sieger in this regard. I find however, in contrast
to certain of her other testimony, discussed above, that Sieger’s
account of this meeting was presented with corroborating detail
and in a forthright manner. I further note that either the General
Counsel or the Union could have presented a witness to rebut
this testimony, including Nortey, who testified herein, and
failed to do so. I find therefore, that the Union informed Re-
spondent that it could anticipate further strikes and there is no
evidence that the Union ever retracted that statement, or pro-
vided Respondent with assurances to the contrary.
Under certain circumstances, the Board has held that where a
union would not agree to refrain from additional strike activity,
an employer has established that it possesses a substantial busi-
ness justification for a lockout and for placing restrictions on
the reinstatement of economic strikers. See Bali Blinds Mid-
west, 292 NLRB 243, 246 (1988) (partial lockout lawful where
in anticipation of possible repetition of strike); General Port-
land, Inc., 283 NLRB 826, 826 fn. 2, 838, 840 (1987) (partial
lockout lawful where employer reasonably feared and sought
assurances against “quickie strikes” and employees still on
strike failed to give such assurances).
Further, when Respondent alternatively informed employees
that their reinstatement would probably be delayed until the
parties reached agreement on a contract, Respondent was ar-
guably asserting its legal right to lock out its employees in sup-
port of its bargaining demands. See, e.g., Ancor Concepts, Inc.,
supra at 744, where the Board explained that an employer’s
timely announcement of a lockout does not depend on the use
of “formal words” to describe its bargaining tactics. The Board
thus held that the employer’s assertion that it would not rein-
state strikers until the parties reached a new agreement was
sufficient to inform striking employees that the employer had
locked them out in support of its bargaining position.
Respondent further argues that it could lawfully lock out its
employees due to its duty to care for the residents of the nurs-
ing home. In this regard, the Board has held that where a health
care employer has legitimate concerns about maintaining con-
tinuous quality patient care, it may be entitled to lock out its
regular employees and operate with replacements. See So-
ciedad Espanola de Auxillo de Puerto Rico, supra at 460–461.
In that case, the Board found that a hospital’s decision to lock
out employees following the union’s announcement that it in-
tended to conduct two 2-day strikes did not violate the Act,
even after the union cancelled the first planned strike, as the
hospital’s decision was based upon its legitimate concern that it
could not find enough replacements during the Christmas holi-
day season.
Again, while it is neither warranted nor possible for me to
assess whether, under any of the above cited theories, a lockout
of Respondent’s employees would have been deemed lawful
had it come to pass, I cannot conclude that Respondent’s state-
ments to employees in this regard were either false or inconsis-
tent with their rights under the law. I find therefore, that the
distribution of the May 12 letter to employees does not violate
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged. Accordingly, I shall rec-
ommend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is, and has been at all material times, an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. By engaging in surveillance of its employees by videotap-
ing employees who engaged in informational picketing, without
proper justification, and by threatening to delay the reinstate-
ment of employees after they engaged in a strike and made an
unconditional offer to return to work, Respondent has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Respondent has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in conduct viola-
tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1) engaging of surveil-
lance of employees by videotaping the picketing activities of its
employees without proper justification, and by (2) threatening
to delay the reinstatement of employees if they engage in a
strike and make an unconditional offer to return to work, I shall
recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist from such
behavior and to take certain affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act, including the posting of a no-
tice to employees assuring them it will not commit violations of
the type found herein or any like or related violations of the
Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended32
ORDER
The Respondent, Kingsbridge Heights Rehabilitation and
Care Center, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Engaging in surveillance of its employees union activities
with video cameras, without proper justification.
(b) Threatening to delay the reinstatement of employees if
they engage in a strike and make an unconditional offer to re-
turn to work.

32 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE CENTER 19
(c) In any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Bronx, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”33 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since March 15,
2006.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

33 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of you while engaged in
union activity by videotaping such activity without proper justi-
fication.
WE WILL NOT threaten to delay your reinstatement to work if
you engage in an strike and make an unconditional offer to
return to work.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
KINGSBRIDGE HEIGHTS REHABILITATION CARE
CENTER