Kimberly G. Benton, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 17, 2000
01974614 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 17, 2000)

01974614

08-17-2000

Kimberly G. Benton, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Kimberly G. Benton v. United States Postal Service

01974614

August 17, 2000

Kimberly G. Benton, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01974614

) Agency No.4H-350-1206-95

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning his

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

� 2000e et seq.,<1> and � 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<2> Accordingly, the appeal is accepted

in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether the agency discriminated against

complainant on the bases of sex (female) and physical disability

(herniated disc) when, on January 27, 1995, the supervisor gave her an

official discussion regarding attendance deficiencies,<3> and subsequently

issued her a Letter of Warning (LOW) on March 7, 1995, for failure to

be regular in attendance.<4>

BACKGROUND

Complainant was a Distribution Window Clerk at the Carolyn Station Post

Office, Montgomery, Alabama. Complainant claimed that the supervisor

discriminated against her based on her sex and physical disability

because she used leave for prenatal care, maternity leave,<5> and

medical treatments for her herniated disc. Complainant suffered an

on-the-job injury in May 1988, which partially disabled her from May 5

to 30, 1988. Complainant was released back to full duty on May 30, 1988.

Complainant averred that during the discussion for failure to be regular

in attendance held January 27, 1995, the supervisor informed her that

her leave usage was out of compliance. Complainant averred both that

the supervisor did not specifically cite any dates in the discussion and

that the leave record presented to her included days on which complainant

was on leave for prenatal care, maternity leave and back treatments.

Complainant averred that the agency was aware of her back injury

because she filed an Office of Workers' Compensation Program (OWCP)

claim in 1988. The record contains an OWCP form, dated August 23, 1988,

specifying that complainant could resume work within the limitation of

lifting up to 30 pounds. Complainant claimed that a comparison employee

with asthma was allowed to frequently use leave, whereas she was not.

The supervisor, assigned to Carolyn Station in October 1994, averred

that she reviewed all of the employees leave records, and issued

discipline to another employee for failure to be regular in attendance.

She averred that she relied on information in the National Agreement, the

Division Manager's Guide to Attendance Control, and Management Instruction

EL-510839 to issue discipline to complainant. The supervisor averred that

complainant was on maternity leave prior to the supervisor's assignment,

and that she scheduled the discussion with complainant only after

complainant incurred numerous unscheduled absences after October 1994.

The supervisor averred that no dates occurring prior to October 1994,

were cited in the discussion. She stated that complainant's attendance

continued to be unsatisfactory and further action became necessary.

The supervisor averred that she was unaware that complainant had any

disability, and that complainant never filed any requests for job

modification or light duty.

The record indicates that six employees, five females and one male,

worked for the supervisor. The supervisor issued discipline to

Comparison Employee A for failure to be regular in attendance on August

9, and 31, 1995, and September 1, 6, 7, 12, 14, 22, 26, and 27, 1995.

Comparison Employee B had approximately 11 sick leave absences for

1995; attendance records for Comparison Employee C could not be found;

Comparison Employee D, male, had one sick leave absence; Comparison

Employee E had 2 sick leave absences and Comparison Employee F had 3

sick leave absences. Complainant and Comparison A both received LOWs.

Comparisons B, C, D, E, and F did not receive any discipline.

In its final decision, the agency found that complainant failed to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex because she

failed to show that she was treated differently than similarly situated

individuals outside of her protected group. The agency noted that

complainant failed to show that any employee with an attendance record

similar to hers did not receive the same discipline. The agency noted

that complainant's pregnancy related absences could not have been a factor

in the actions taken because the supervisor did not know complainant at

that time, and only considered absences occurring after October 1994.

The LOW was issued when complainant's attendance failed to improve after

the January 27, 1995, discussion.

The agency further found that complainant failed to establish that she

was a qualified individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation

Act. The agency noted that complainant failed to demonstrate that she

had an impairment which substantially limited one or more major life

activities, had a record of such impairment, or was regarded as having

an impairment.

On appeal, complainant argues that the supervisor gave her a copy

of her 1994 Attendance Record during the Official Discussion, which

included the dates of her pregnancy related absences. She states that in

November 1993, she gave her station manager her doctor's October 21, 1993

letter notifying the agency that she was at risk for pregnancy-related

complications. She also states that the doctor treating her herniated

disc gave her a letter which she provided to the agency, recommending

a weigh-lifting restriction of 30 pounds.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Complainant's claim of discrimination based on sex presents the issue of

whether the agency subjected her to disparate treatment on this basis.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), provides an

analytical framework for proving employment discrimination in cases in

which disparate treatment is alleged. First, complainant must establish

a prima facie case by presenting enough evidence to raise an inference

of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. The agency may

rebut complainant's prima facie case by articulating legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, and if the agency does so,

complainant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

agency's reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Id.

The Commission notes that the McDonnell Douglas analysis need not be

adhered to in all cases. Where the agency has established legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision, the trier of fact

may dispense with the prima facie inquiry and proceed to the ultimate

stage of the analysis, that is, whether the complainant has proven by a

preponderance of evidence that the agency's explanations were a pretext

for actions motivated by prohibited discriminatory animus. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).

The Commission finds that the agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the Official Discussion and the LOW.

The supervisor stated that she only considered absences occurring after

she became the supervisor in October 1994. The record indicates that

complainant incurred numerous absences between October 1994, and January

27, 1995, and between January 27, and March 7, 1995. The Commission

notes that the supervisor issued a LOW to another employee with similar

irregular attendance. Complainant failed to show that she was treated

differently than similarly situated employees or that the reason cited

by the supervisor was a pretext for discrimination.

To bring a claim of disability discrimination, complainant must

first establish that she has a disability within the meaning of

the Rehabilitation Act. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527

U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999);

Albertsons, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Cook v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960015 (June 21, 1996)

(To merit the protection of the Rehabilitation Act, it is not enough

to have a particular medical condition that carries the potential for

substantial limitations).

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, complainant

must show that:(1) she is an individual with a disability as defined

in 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g); (2) she is a "qualified" individual with

a disability as defined in 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency

took an adverse action against her. See Prewitt v. United States Postal

Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). Complainant also must demonstrate

a causal relationship between her disabling condition and the agency's

reasons for the adverse action.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g) defines an individual with a

disability as one who: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of that person's major life activities;

(2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an

impairment. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(h)(2)(i) defines "major

life activities" as including the functions of caring for one's self,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working. A "qualified individual with a disability�

within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m) is defined as, with respect

to employment, a disabled person who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in

question.

The Commission has considered the severity and duration of complainant's

condition and finds that complainant is not an individual with a

disability within the meaning of the regulations. The record indicates

that complainant was unable to work from May 5, to May 30, 1988, and was

returned to full duty on May 30, 1988, with the limitation of lighting

only up to 30 pounds and using proper lifting techniques. The OWCP

form indicated no permanent effects from the injury. Complainant fails

to show that her herniated disc substantially limited one or more of

her major life activities. Even with a weight restriction on lifting,

complainant was not limited in her ability to perform her job, a range

of jobs, or other life functions.

There is no evidence that complainant had a record of a disability,

or was regarded by the agency as having a disability. Complainant had

a record of filing an OWCP claim in 1988. However, she never filed

any requests for a job modification or light duty with or subsequent to

that claim. The supervisor averred that she did not consider complainant

to be disabled.

Assuming, arguendo, that complainant established that she is an

�individual with a disability,� she has not demonstrated that there

is a connection between her alleged disability and the challenged

action. There is no evidence that the supervisor gave complainant the

official discussion or issued the LOW because of her herniated disc.

The supervisor averred that she counseled complainant because of

complainant's failure to be regular in attendance after October 1994,

after complainant's pregnancy-related absences. The supervisor stated

that she issued the LOW because complainant continued to fail to be

regular in attendance after the discussion.

In summary, while some of the leave considered was attributed to

complainant's requests for FMLA for her daughter's illness, there is

no evidence that the supervisor's actions were related to complainant's

herniated disc or pregnancy.

CONCLUSION

Based on a review of the record and for the reasons cited above, it is

the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION

August 17, 2000 ______________________________

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________________ __________________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to

all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: www.eeoc.gov.

3The record indicates that complainant used either sick leave, emergency

annual leave, or leave without pay on October 13 and 21, 1994, November

1, 2, 21 and 23, 1994, and January 5, 6, 9, 20, 23, and 26, 1995.

Complainant specified FMLA leave on her leave requests for November 1,

1994, and January 9, 1995.

4The LOW cited February 10, 13, 14, and 17, 1995, as dates on which

complainant was not regular in attendance. Complainant filed a grievance

and the LOW was subsequently removed from her file on August 1, 1995.

5Nothing in the record indicates when and how much FMLA leave complainant

used in 1994, or when complainant was on maternity leave. A Doctor's

letter dated October 21, 1993, indicates that complainant was experiencing

pregnancy-related complications in the Fall of 1993. It appears from

the record that complainant returned to work prior to October 1994.