KIM, Phillip et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 9, 2020

14308268 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/308,268 06/18/2014 Phillip KIM 05793.3341-00000 6370
121629 7590 03/09/2020
Finnegan/Capital One
901 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
EXAMINER
WARDEN, MICHAEL J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
CapOne_USPTO@finnegan.com
lisa.tkach@finnegan.com
regional-desk@finnegan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PHILLIP KIM, ALEX HASHA,
JAIDEV SHERGILL, HOMIN LEE,
and SIMON FREEDMAN
____________

Appeal 2019-002839
Application 14/308,268
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU,
and SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF CASE1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–2, 5–9, 12–16, and 19–23, which are
all of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 This Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
Aug. 17, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 26, 2019), the
Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Oct. 19, 2017) and
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 26, 2018), and the original Specification
(“Spec.,” filed June 18, 2014).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Capital One Financial Corporation as
the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to providing business ratings based on
transactions with consumers. Spec. ¶¶ 4, 18.
Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A system for providing an overall business rating score for
a payee with respect to a plurality of payors, comprising:
one or more memory devices storing software instructions;
and
one or more processors configured to execute the software
instructions to:
access spending transaction data regarding a
plurality of consumer spending transactions, the spending
transaction data comprising:
a unique payor identifier,
a transaction amount,
a payee category code, and
a postal code;
when the spending transaction data for a first
consumer spending transaction does not include a unique
payee identifier, determine a payee identification for the
spending transaction data for the first consumer spending
transaction by:
comparing the spending transaction data for
the first consumer spending transaction to historical
spending transaction data of known payees having
the same payee category code as the spending
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transaction data for the first consumer spending
transaction;
determining match confidence for the known
payees by comparing the spending transaction data
for the first consumer spending transaction to a
range of spending transaction amounts for the
known payees; and
associating a unique payee identifier of a
known payee with the spending transaction data for
the first consumer spending transaction based on the
known payee having a match confidence that
exceeds a confidence threshold;
access spending transaction data for one or more historical
consumer spending transactions matching a payee category code
of a payee for which to provide the overall business rating score
with respect to the payors;
determine a plurality of ratios for the plurality of payors,
wherein a ratio determined for a payor from the plurality of
payors is based on the payor’s historical transactions with the
payee relative to the payor’s historical transactions associated
with the payee category code;
determine a plurality of individual business rating scores
for the payee with respect to the plurality of payors,
wherein an individual business rating score for the
payee with respect to a payor is based on the ratio
determined for the payor, and
wherein at least two of the plurality of individual
business rating scores are weighted differently based on a
location of the payee relative to a location of a first payor
of the plurality of payors and the location of the payee
relative to a location of a second payor of the plurality of
payors; and
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generate the overall business rating score for the payee
based on the plurality of individual business rating scores for
the payee with respect to the plurality of payors.
Appeal Br. 31–33 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejects claims 1–2, 5–9, 12–16, and 19–23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final
Act. 7–12.
ANALYSIS
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or [a] new and useful
improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has long interpreted § 101 to “contain[] an important implicit exception:
Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
In Alice, the Supreme Court reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012) “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first
step in this analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” e.g., to an abstract idea. Id.
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas include certain methods of
organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (id. at
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219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical formulas
(Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes
(Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). If it is determined that the
claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second step of the
analysis requires consideration of the elements of the claims “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). In other words, the claims must contain an
“inventive concept,” or some element or combination of elements “sufficient
to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
at 221.
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).3 “All

3 In October 2019, in response to received public comments, the PTO issued
a further memorandum clarifying the Revised Guidance. USPTO
Memorandum, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (Oct. 17,
2019), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October 2019 Update”)
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USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also
October 2019 Update at 1. Under that guidance, we first look to whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as fundamental economic
practices, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).4
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then (under “Step 2B”) look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, and conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determines that the claims “are directed to the abstract
idea of generating an overall business rating score for a payee” and recite a

4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (Section
III.A.2).
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fundamental economic practice and a certain method of organizing human
activity. Final Act. 7–9; see Ans. 4. The Examiner further determines that
the additional elements recited in the claims are well-understood, routine,
and conventional (Final Act. 7, 10–11; Ans. 11–13, 15) and that “[t]he
claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional
computer elements, which are recited at a high level of generality, provide
conventional computer functions that do not add meaningful limits to
practicing the abstract idea.” (Final Act. 8).
Appellant argues that the claims as a whole are not directed to a
judicial exception, but rather “describe a system directed to a specific
technological improvement of electronic business rating systems.” Appeal
Br. 12–13; see id. at 18–20; Reply Br. 8–11. According to Appellant,
current electronic business rating systems are limited because they rely on
subjective data submitted by customers, whereas the claimed invention
enables business rating systems to rely on objective data on spending
transactions in addition to subjective data. Appeal Br. 12, 20 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 3, 18); Reply Br. 9, 12. Appellant argues that the claimed invention
includes “technical details” that “amount to significantly more at least
because they are not found in the prior art.” Appeal Br. 27–28. Appellant
further argues that the claims “do not preempt all ways of performing the
alleged abstract ideas, but rather recite a specific, discrete method and
system for improving current business rating systems.” Id. at 22. Finally,
Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to demonstrate that any claim
elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional in accordance with
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the PTO’s “Berkheimer Memo”5 (Appeal Br. 24; see also Reply Br. 14–18),
and that the Examiner fails to properly analyze the dependent claims
(Appeal Br. 28–30).
Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the
Examiner that the claims recite a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea.
See Final Act. 7. Specifically, we agree with the Examiner that the claims
recite a fundamental economic practice – one of the certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance as a judicial
exception. See Final Act. 8–9; Ans. 4; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. We additionally determine that the claims recite concepts that may be
performed in the human mind, i.e., mental processes.
For example, independent claim 1 recites “determin[ing] a plurality of
individual business rating scores for the payee with respect to the plurality of
payors” and “generat[ing] the overall business rating score for the payee
based on the plurality of individual business rating scores for the payee with
respect to the plurality of payors.” In reciting that “business rating scores”
are determined/generated, claim 1 recites the fundamental economic practice
of rating or evaluating the quality of a business (as do independent claims 8
and 15 with corresponding limitations). See Spec. ¶ 2 (“When consumers
consider becoming customers of a business, they often research the quality
of the business.”). Notwithstanding Appellant’s argument that generating an

5 USPTO Memorandum, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to
Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
(Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (Apr. 19. 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF.
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overall business rating score for a payee is not a fundamental economic
practice (Appeal Br. 16–18), we have repeatedly found similar concepts to
be fundamental economic principles or practices. See, e.g., Ex parte Stibel,
Appeal No. 2016-005234, at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2018) (finding that
“producing a credibility score to quantifiably represent reputation of a
particular business” is a “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in
our system of commerce”); Ex parte Morton, Appeal No. 2017-001754, at 7
(PTAB July 31, 2018) (finding that “ratings and reviews . . . aggregated and
made available to other users to inform their decisions regarding whether to
purchase a particular book” is a fundamental economic principle); Ex parte
Marshall, Appeal No. 2016-008528, at 6 (PTAB Aug. 30, 2018) (finding
that “rating mutual funds . . . is a fundamental economic principle because
risk management is the bedrock of investing”); Ex parte Greenstein, Appeal
No. 2017-002346, at 4–5 (PTAB Apr. 30, 2018) (finding that “providing
recommendations for the purchase or lease of goods or services” is a
fundamental economic practice), aff’d, In re Greenstein, 778 Fed.Appx. 935
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (unpublished). Thus, these limitations in claim 1 of
determining and generating “business rating scores” recite certain methods
of organizing human activity. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52
(listing fundamental economic practices as one of certain methods of
organizing human activity identified as a judicial exception). Indeed,
independent claims 1, 8, and 15 as a whole recite a certain method of
organizing human activity in that the claimed invention is a system or
method for providing a business rating score, which is a fundamental
economic practice. See, e.g., claim 1 (preamble); Spec. ¶¶ 4–6.
With respect to mental processes, claim 1 recites, inter alia,
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when the spending transaction data for a first consumer
spending transaction does not include a unique payee identifier,
determine a payee identification for the spending transaction data
for the first consumer spending transaction by:
comparing the spending transaction data for the first
consumer spending transaction to historical spending
transaction data of known payees having the same payee
category code as the spending transaction data for the first
consumer spending transaction;
determining match confidence for the known
payees by comparing the spending transaction data for the
first consumer spending transaction to a range of spending
transaction amounts for the known payees; and
associating a unique payee identifier of a known
payee with the spending transaction data for the first
consumer spending transaction based on the known payee
having a match confidence that exceeds a confidence
threshold;
Under their broadest reasonable interpretation, the limitation of
“determin[ing] a payee identification” by way of the “comparing,”
“determining,” and “associating” limitations covers performance of the
limitations in the mind (as do corresponding limitations in independent
claims 8 and 15), but for the recitation of generic components. That is, other
than the “memory devices storing software instructions” and “processors
configured to execute the software instructions” recited in claim 1 (and,
likewise, the “processors” recited in claim 8 and “non-transitory computer
readable medium” and “processors” recited in claim 15) as performing the
recited steps, nothing in the claims precludes those steps from being
performed in the human mind. For example, but for the recitation of the
“memory devices” and “processors,” claim 1 encompasses mentally
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determining a payee identification for spending transaction data by mentally
comparing the spending transaction data to historical spending transaction
data of known payees, mentally determining match confidence for the
known payees by mentally comparing the spending transaction data to a
range of spending transaction amounts for the known payees, and mentally
associating a unique payee identifier of a known payee with the spending
transaction data based on the known payee’s match confidence exceeding a
threshold. Thus, these limitations recite mental processes, and thus an
abstract idea.
Claim 1 further recites, inter alia,
determine a plurality of ratios for the plurality of payors,
wherein a ratio determined for a payor from the plurality of
payors is based on the payor’s historical transactions with the
payee relative to the payor’s historical transactions associated
with the payee category code;
determine a plurality of individual business rating scores
for the payee with respect to the plurality of payors,
wherein an individual business rating score for the
payee with respect to a payor is based on the ratio
determined for the payor, and
wherein at least two of the plurality of individual
business rating scores are weighted differently based on a
location of the payee relative to a location of a first payor
of the plurality of payors and the location of the payee
relative to a location of a second payor of the plurality of
payors; and
generate the overall business rating score for the payee
based on the plurality of individual business rating scores for the
payee with respect to the plurality of payors.
Under their broadest reasonable interpretation, these limitations of
“determin[ing] . . . ratios,” “determin[ing] . . . individual business rating
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scores,” and “generat[ing] the overall business rating score” cover
performance of the limitations in the mind (as do corresponding limitations
in independent claims 8 and 15), but for the recitation of generic
components. That is, other than the “memory devices storing software
instructions” and “processors configured to execute the software
instructions” recited in claim 1 (and, likewise, the “processors” recited in
claim 8 and “non-transitory computer readable medium” and “processors”
recited in claim 15) as performing the recited steps, nothing in the claims
precludes those steps from being performed in the human mind. For
example, but for the recitation of the “memory devices” and “processors,”
claim 1 encompasses mentally determining ratios for payors based on the
payors’ historical transactions, mentally determining individual business
rating scores for the payee with respect to the payors based on the respective
payors’ ratios, mentally weighting individual business rating scores
differently based on relative payee and payor locations, and mentally
generating the overall business rating score for the payee based on the
individual business rating scores. Thus, these limitations also recite mental
processes, and thus an abstract idea.
Accordingly, the claims recite certain methods of organizing human
activity and mental processes as identified in the Revised Guidance and,
thus, an abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong 2
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we next look to whether the
claims recite additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Limitations
that indicate integration into a practical application include additional
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elements that reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at 55. When a claim
recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a
practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id. at
51.
We determine that the additional limitations recited in the claims on
appeal do not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application. For example, claim 1 additionally recites “access[ing] spending
transaction data regarding a plurality of consumer spending transactions, the
spending transaction data comprising: a unique payor identifier, a
transaction amount, a payee category code, and a postal code” and
“access[ing] spending transaction data for one or more historical consumer
spending transactions matching a payee category code of a payee for which
to provide the overall business rating score with respect to the payors.”
These steps of “access[ing] spending transaction data” are recited at a high
level of generality (i.e., as general means of gathering data used to generate
the business rating scores) and amount to insignificant pre-solution activity.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(g).
We agree with the Examiner that the claims otherwise merely recite
generic computer components that similarly fail to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Final Act. 10–11; Ans. 11. For
example, claim 1’s recited “memory devices storing software instructions”
and “processors configured to execute the software instructions,” claim 8’s
recited “processors,” and claim 15’s recited “non-transitory computer
readable medium” and “processors” are recited at a high level of generality,
i.e., as generic components performing generic computer functions of
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storing software and computer processing. These generic limitations merely
apply the abstract idea using generic computer components and indicate a
field of use or technological environment (i.e., computing systems (see Spec.
¶¶ 20–27)) for the economic activity. See Revised Guidance at 55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(f), (h). The claim limitations do not include any particular
machine that is integral to the claim. See Revised Guidance at 55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(b).
Appellant argues that the claims are “directed to a specific
technological improvement of electronic business rating systems” and “solve
problems related to ‘big data’ analysis by enabling these systems to rely on
objective data, such as spending transaction data associated with one or
more payors and one or more payor locations, in addition to subjective
data.” Appeal Br. 20 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3, 18). Specifically, Appellant
characterizes the recited steps of “access[ing] spending transaction data . . .
comprising: a unique payor identifier, a transaction amount, a payee
category code, and a postal code,” “determin[ing] a plurality of individual
business rating scores” that are “weighted differently” based on a location of
the payee relative to locations of first/second payors, and “generat[ing] the
overall business rating score . . . based on the plurality of individual business
rating scores . . .” as a “technical solution.” Id. at 26; see also id. at 12–13,
21–22; Reply Br. 9–10. As discussed above, those limitations recite an
abstract idea (“determin[ing]” and “generat[ing]” steps) or amount to
insignificant pre-solution activity (“access[ing]” step). Furthermore, we are
unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner that the
claims do not recite a technological improvement in addition to the abstract
idea, but rather a “business solution” to a “business problem.” Final Act. 6;
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see also id. at 12; Ans. 4, 8. For example, the claims “do not require an
arguably inventive set of components or methods, such as measurement
devices or techniques, that would generate new data. They do not invoke
any assertedly inventive programming.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That is, the claims do not reflect
an improvement in computer functionality, or to any other technology or
technical field. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(a).
Even in combination, the additional limitations do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea.
As such, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner fails to establish that the claims are directed to judicial exception.
See Appeal Br. 14–19, 22; Reply Br. 2–8. Rather, in view of the Examiner’s
rejection through the lens of the Revised Guidance, and for the reasons
above, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea.
Step 2B
Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the Examiner
that there are no specific limitations beyond the judicial exception, i.e., the
abstract idea, that are not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the
field. See MPEP § 2106.05(d). For example, we agree with the Examiner
that the additionally recited “memory devices,” “software instructions,”
“processors” and “non-transitory computer readable medium” (see claims 1,
8, and 15) are mere recitations of generic computer structures performing
generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and
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conventional, and thus do not amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea. See Final Act. 10–11; Ans. 11 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 30–34 (disclosing
known examples of processors and databases including memory devices));
see also Spec. ¶¶ 57 (listing “many types of tangible computer-readable
media”), 20 (“components of system 100 may include one or more
computing devices . . . , memory storing data and/or software instructions
(e.g., database(s), memory devices, etc.), and other known computing
components”). As discussed above, those additional elements amount to no
more than mere instructions to apply the abstract idea using generic
computer components. Mere instructions to apply an abstract idea on a
generic computer do not provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S.
at 223–24.
Appellant argues that “the Examiner has failed to provide express
support in writing to show that any of the ‘additional elements’ are ‘well-
understood, routine and conventional,’ as required by the Berkheimer
Memo.” Reply Br. 14. In determining that the additional elements are
“[g]eneric computer components recited as performing generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities,” the
Examiner cites the Specification. Ans. 11 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 30–34). As
indicated above, the Specification discloses known examples of processors
(¶ 31) and computer-readable media (¶ 57), and indicates that memory
devices and software instructions are “known computing components”
(¶ 20). We determine that the disclosure of the Specification supports, and
we thus find no error in, the Examiner’s determination that the additional
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elements recited in claims 1–2, 5–9, 12–16, and 19–23 are well-understood,
routine, and conventional.6
Reevaluating the extra-solution activity of “access[ing] spending
transaction data regarding a plurality of consumer spending transactions, the
spending transaction data comprising: a unique payor identifier, a
transaction amount, a payee category code, and a postal code” and
“access[ing] spending transaction data for one or more historical consumer
spending transactions matching a payee category code of a payee for which
to provide the overall business rating score with respect to the payors” (see
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (stating that a conclusion under Step
2A that an additional element is insignificant extra-solution activity should
be reevaluated in Step 2B)), we find nothing unconventional in these steps of
gathering data used to generate the business rating scores.
Appellant argues that the recited steps of “determin[ing] a plurality of
ratios . . . ,” “determin[ing] a plurality of individual business rating scores
. . . based on the ratio” that are “weighted differently” based on a location of

6 Appellant additionally argues that the Examiner’s citation of Kramer et al.
(US 2011/0022628 A1; pub. Jan. 27, 2011) (“Kramer”) and Grimes
(US 2010/0106568 A1; pub. Apr. 29, 2010) (“Grimes”) fails to demonstrate
that certain recited steps represent well-understood, routine, conventional
activity. Reply Br. 14–18; see Ans. 12–13 (Examiner citing Kramer ¶¶ 46–
47, 81 for “the spending transaction data comprising: a unique payor
identifier, a transaction amount, a payee category code, and a postal code”
and “determining . . . a payee identification” limitations, and citing Grimes
¶¶ 66, 81, 121, 168 for “determining match confidence” and “associating a
unique payee identifier . . . with the spending transaction data” limitations).
We need not reach this issue because, as discussed above, those limitations
recite mental processes, and thus an abstract idea, or amount to insignificant
pre-solution activity.
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the payee relative to locations of first/second payors, and “generat[ing] the
overall business rating score . . . based on the plurality of individual business
rating scores . . .” amount to significantly more than an abstract idea “at least
because they are not found in the prior art.” Appeal Br. 27–28. However,
those limitations cannot amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
because, as discussed above, they themselves recite mental processes, and
thus an abstract idea. Moreover, even if those steps are novel, that does not
affect our determination that they are a patent-ineligible abstract idea. As
the Examiner points out, novelty is irrelevant in determining § 101 patent
subject matter eligibility. See Ans. 14; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
176, 188–89 (1981).
Although Appellant argues that “the claim elements, at least as an
ordered combination, recite an inventive concept that solves problems
related to ‘big data’ analysis and improves the technology of business rating
in the electronic realm” (Reply Br. 12; see also Appeal Br. 28), Appellant
has not shown that the claims on appeal add any specific limitation beyond
the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional
in the field. Appellant also provides no evidence of how the ordered
combination is unconventional or amounts to significantly more than an
abstract idea.
Appellant further argues that the claims “provide a particular manner
of providing an overall business rating score” and “do not preempt all ways
of performing the alleged abstract ideas.” Reply Br. 10; Appeal Br. 22.
This argument is unpersuasive. As noted by the Examiner (Final Act. 5–6,
10; Ans. 10), the absence of complete preemption is not dispositive. See,
e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.
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Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility.”); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has stated that, even if a claim does not
wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it still will not be limited meaningfully if it
contains only insignificant or token pre- or post-solution activity—such as
identifying a relevant audience, a category of use, field of use, or
technological environment.”) (citations omitted), vacated and remanded,
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 573 U.S. 942 (2014) (remanding
for further consideration in light of Alice). Thus, even if the claims do not
preempt the abstract idea, that alone is insufficient to render the claims
patent-eligible.
Finally, Appellant argues that “the Examiner fails to analyze the
dependent claims separately from the independent claims in determining
whether the dependent claims provide an improvement to computer
functionality.” Appeal Br. 29. As discussed above, we are unpersuaded by
Appellant’s arguments that the independent claims reflect an improvement
in computer functionality, or to any other technology or technical field.
Appellant provides no examples of how any limitations in the dependent
claims recite such improvements, and our own review of the dependent
claims accords with the Examiner’s unrebutted determination that “[t]he
dependent claims recite additional limitations which either further narrow
the abstract idea, recite additional abstract ideas, or do not amount to
significantly more [than] the abstract idea.” See Final Act. 12; Ans. 15.
Accordingly, considering the claim elements individually and as an
ordered combination, we agree with the Examiner that there are no
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20
meaningful claim limitations that represent sufficiently inventive concepts to
transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of the
abstract idea.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–2, 5–9, 12–16, and 19–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–2, 5–9, 12–16, and 19–23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.

Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–2, 5–9, 12–16,
19–23
101 Eligibility 1–2, 5–9, 12–16,
19–23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED