Kevin A. George, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 18, 2006
01A52813 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 18, 2006)

01A52813

07-18-2006

Kevin A. George, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.


Kevin A. George,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Eastern Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A52813

Agency No. 4C-440-0146-04

DECISION

On March 7, 2005, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's February 8,

2005 final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C.

� 791 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final decision.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

a PS-05 General Clerk at the agency's Vehicle Maintenance Facility (VMF) in

Akron, Ohio ("facility"). The record indicates that complainant was

reassigned from the Carrier craft to a Modified Clerk rehabilitation

position in the facility's stockroom due to an on-the-job injury to his

back. The record establishes that due to his injury and physical

restrictions, the agency made complainant a rehabilitation job offer in

2001, for the Modified Clerk position at the VMF; complainant accepted the

job offer pursuant to a Settlement Agreement dated June 20, 2003. The

record further indicates that complainant and two co-workers at the

facility work in the stockroom and share responsibilities. Investigative

File (IF) at Exhibit 7. The record further indicates that for the quarter

between January 1, 2004 and March 31, 2004, complainant and a stockroom co-

worker (W1) signed the list to work overtime. IF at Exhibit 10. However,

the record establishes that W1 worked 52 hours of overtime during the

relevant quarter, while complainant worked 16 hours of overtime during the

same period.

On March 15, 2004, complainant contacted an EEO Counselor and filed a

formal EEO complaint on June 7, 2004, alleging that he was discriminated

against on the basis of disability (on-the-job back injury) when from

January 1, 2004 through March 31, 2004, he was not afforded the opportunity

to work overtime.

Believing he was the victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and filed the aforementioned formal EEO complaint. At the

conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a copy of

the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant did not request

a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the

agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b)

concluding that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to

discrimination as alleged.

The agency's final decision (FAD) considered complainant's allegation of

disability discrimination and noted that complainant stated that he suffers

from back pain due to an on-the-job injury. The FAD also noted that

complainant failed to submit documentation that his back condition

substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. Further,

the FAD noted that the evidence of record did not establish that

complainant is considered disabled by agency management. As such, the FAD

concluded that complainant was not covered by the provisions of the

Rehabilitation Act. In addition, the FAD found that complainant failed to

identify similarly situated employees outside his protected group who were

scheduled to work overtime during the relevant time period, or provide

information on the duties performed on overtime. As such, the FAD found

that it could not be determined if employees outside his protected groups

were treated more favorably under similar circumstances, and thus he failed

to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

The FAD then found that the evidence demonstrated that the agency

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The FAD

noted that the facility's Supervisor, Vehicle Supplies ("Supervisor"),

stated that while complainant was available to work overtime during the

period at issue, he was not assigned to perform overtime as it was not

needed from Clerks during the period between January and March of 2004.

Further, the FAD found that complainant did not hold a bid position within

the VMF, and the Supervisor stated that he was required to assign overtime

first to those with bid assignments. The FAD noted that complainant was on

the overtime desired list and worked 16 hours of overtime during the period

at issue, and that he was not restricted from working overtime due to his

back injury.

The FAD found that the preponderance of the evidence established that

complainant failed to proffer evidence that the agency's articulated

reasons for its actions were more likely than not a pretext for

discrimination. The FAD concluded that complainant failed to present

evidence which indicated that any agency official acted with discriminatory

animus toward him due to his alleged disability. On appeal, complainant

alleged that the fact he held a rehabilitation position with the agency is

proof that he is covered by the Rehabilitation Act. In addition,

complainant alleged that his rehabilitation position with the agency

evidences that he was regarded as being disabled by facility management,

and the facility's Stockroom Storekeeper worked 56 hours of overtime during

the period at issue while he worked only 16 hours of overtime. The agency

has responded to complainant's appeal, urging the Commission to affirm the

FAD.

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo review

by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management Directive

110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that the de novo

standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without

regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision

maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of

record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and .

. . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the

record and its interpretation of the law").

Generally, discrimination claims are examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567

(1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Dep't of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its

burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the

fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the

basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Cen. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502 (1993).

For the purpose of our analysis, we assume, without finding, that

complainant is an individual with a disability. In addition, the McDonnell

Douglas prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, because the

agency has articulated a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for its

conduct. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC

Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). The facility's Supervisor (who

was also complainant's Supervisor) stated that while complainant was on the

overtime desired list for the quarter at issue, he was not assigned as much

overtime as W1 as she had a bid position and union contracts required him

to assign overtime to those with bid positions first. Further, the

Supervisor stated that complainant was not assigned to work as much

overtime as W1 during the relevant quarter, as overtime was not needed

within complainant's job classification. The record indicates that

complainant had the classification of General Clerk, while W1 was

classified as a Storekeeper, Auto Parts, although they share

responsibilities.[1] To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext

for discrimination. Complainant has not shown that the agency's stated

reason(s), compliance with union agreements and lack of a need for overtime

within complainant's job classification, was a pretext. We also find that

W1 was given more overtime than complainant consistent with the union

agreements as she had a bid assignment at the VMF. Complainant failed to

present evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory

animus toward his alleged disability. Therefore, after a careful review of

the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case

if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29

C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and

arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C.

20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider

shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of

the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other

party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in

very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or

department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action

will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The

grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court.

Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within

the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil

Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__7-18-06________________

Date

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[1] We note that while complainant was classified as a Modified General

Clerk, due to his rehabilitation assignment, he had no bid assignment at

the facility.