Kenneth Pittman, Jr., Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 30, 2000
01993970 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 30, 2000)

01993970

03-30-2000

Kenneth Pittman, Jr., Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Kenneth Pittman, Jr., )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01993970

v. ) Agency No. 1J608102896

) Hearing No. 210-98-6538X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the agency concerning

his allegation that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. on the basis of sex (male)

and in reprisal for prior EEO activity. <1> The appeal is accepted by the

Commission in accordance with the provisions of to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

On March 3, 1997 complainant filed a complaint of discrimination.

The agency accepted the complaint for investigation. The complainant

alleged discrimination when he was issued an eight- day suspension and

placed in emergency off-duty status. After a hearing on the record,

an Administrative Judge (AJ), issued a recommended decision finding

no discrimination. On March 18, 1999 the complainant received the

final agency decision (FAD) wherein the agency agreed to implement the

AJ's decision. Complainant now appeals the FAD. We affirm the FAD

as clarified. Neither party has supplemented the record by comment or

brief.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether appellant has established that

he was discriminated against based upon sex and/or in retaliation for

prior protected EEO activity.

BACKGROUND

During the relevant time complainant was employed as a distribution

clerk at the agency's Irving Park facility. A supervisor (RMO: female),

but not the complainant's supervisor, issued complainant an eight-day

suspension on May 24, 1996. Complainant maintains that the suspension

was based on sex and in reprisal for prior EEO activity. The AJ found

that complainant did not sustain his burden of proof.

Following a meeting with RMO on May 15, 1996, complainant was placed on

emergency off-duty status and subsequently issued an eight-day suspension.

The agency maintains that during the meeting complainant displayed

unacceptable conduct when, he stood up, leaned over RMO's desk, shouted at

RMO, threatened to file a complaint, and referred to RMO as a �...silly

a-- b--ch.� Complainant denied threatening RMO but admits telling RMO

that he would file a grievance and an EEO complaint if she prevented

him from taking care of his family and furthering his education.

Without a comparison employee or other means of establishing an

inference of discrimination, the AJ found that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. However,

the AJ found that complainant did establish a prima facie case of

retaliation. The agency met its burden of production by articulating

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for complainant's suspension,

namely complainant's threatening conduct.

The AJ found that RMO was a more credible witness than the complainant,

that she was seemingly truthful, that her demeanor and testimony

was consistent and that the totality of the surrounding circumstances

supported RMO's version of the facts. The AJ found that the complainant

failed to sustain his burden of persuasion. With respect to the

complainant's retaliation claim, the AJ found that the complainant has

established a prima facie case but failed to establish that the agency's

articulated reason was a pretext for retaliation.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As the AJ correctly noted, this complaint constitutes a claim of

disparate treatment which is properly analyzed under the tripartite

analytical framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973). See also, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,

467 U.S. 867 (1984) ; U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983); and Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981). The Commission subjects the

factual findings in a decision by an administrative judge issued pursuant

to 64 Fed. Reg 37,657 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �1614.109(i))

to a substantial evidence standard of review<2>. 64 Fed. Reg 37,659

(1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �1614.405(a).

Applying this legal standard, we find no reason to disturb the factual

findings of the AJ. We find that the AJ applied the correct law

to each of the complainant's claims. The AJ properly concluded that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Despite the complainant's contention that he reacted calmly, the AJ found

that RMO reasonably felt threatened by complainant's conduct. We further

determine that the AJ properly concluded that complainant established a

prima facie case of reprisal, and that the agency produced a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the eight-day suspension and the emergency

off-duty placement. While complainant maintains that he was suspended

because of his sex and in retaliation for prior protected activity,

the AJ found that the agency's legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons

were not rebutted by complainant.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to AFFIRM agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

3/30/2000 ____________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________ __________________________

Date Equal Employment Assistant 1 On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,

477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding that discriminatory intent

did not exist is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).