Kenneth Bey, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 10, 2009
0120080211 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 10, 2009)

0120080211

09-10-2009

Kenneth Bey, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Kenneth Bey,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080211

Hearing No. 440-2006-00191X

Agency No. 200J05782006100488

DECISION

On October 12, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

September 17, 2007 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted for de novo review, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly granted summary

judgment in this case.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Housekeeping Aid, WG-2/5, at the Hines, Illinois VA Hospital.

On January 17, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

he was discriminated against on the bases of sex (male), disability

(back injury), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity [arising

under Title VII and Rehabilitation Act] when:

(1) on or about November 7, 2005, he was issued a blank performance

appraisal and instructed to sign it;

(2) on November 15, 2005, he was issued written notice that his

chain of command included two sections chiefs rather than a supervisor

and a section chief; and

(3) he was informed that if a suitable position could not be found

to accommodate his medical restrictions that he may be subjected to a

non-disciplinary separation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. When complainant did not specifically object to

the Motion, the AJ assigned to the case granted the agency's motion for

a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on

September 6, 2007.

AJ Decision

In his decision, the AJ first noted the following: by letter dated April

10, 2006, complainant was informed that the agency partially dismissed

his complaint of discrimination determining that his allegation that the

notice informing him of his possible separation was only a potential

action and thus did not demonstrate that complainant was aggrieved.

The AJ further noted that on April 12, 2006, complainant was actually

separated from the agency, and therefore, on April 14, 2006, complainant

filed an appeal of his termination with the Merit Systems Protection

Board (MSPB), i.e., issue (4). On May 18, 2006, the MSPB dismissed

complainant's appeal without prejudice based on an agreement by the

parties that complainant would apply for a disability retirement annuity

and if his application was accepted the MSPB appeal would be dismissed

with prejudice. If complainant's disability retirement application was

rejected complainant could re-file without prejudice. By letter dated

October 17, 2006, complainant's disability retirement application was

approved effective the first week after his separation from employment.

The AJ then explained that after the instant case had been assigned

to him, on October 3, 2006, complainant filed a motion to amend his

complaint to include his termination of April 12, 2006. The AJ concluded

however, that complainant had elected to pursue his eventual termination

through the MSPB, and therefore, he waived his right to raise the same

allegations through the EEO process. The AJ also found that based on

the evidence of record, including submission of the parties, the agency

properly dismissed complainant's allegation that he was discriminated

against when he was notified of a possible non-disciplinary termination.

The AJ then proceeded to address the two remaining allegations, issues

(1) and (2), as follows: complainant could not establish a prima facie

case of discrimination on any alleged basis because he did not show

that he suffered an adverse action as to either issue. As to issue

(1), the AJ explained that on November 7, 2005, complainant met with his

supervisor (the Housekeeping Section Chief) (S1) to discuss his overall

performance rating for the period April 1, through September 30, 2005.

The performance evaluation consists of evaluations on a Met/Not Met basis

in two areas; Medical Center Wide competencies and Position Specific

competencies, including use of equipment. S1 rated complainant only on

the Medical Center Wide competencies. In the section where complainant

should have been rated on position specific competencies, S1 wrote,

"Cannot rate employee has been on light duty since 3/05." The AJ noted

that this was the form that complainant alleged was blank. Thus, the

AJ found that the facts did not establish the underlying allegation

that complainant was issued a blank performance evaluation or that

the agency's actions were in any way adverse. The AJ further found

no evidence that the agency's motivation was influenced by prohibited

discriminatory animus.

The AJ then addressed complainant's allegation that he was discriminated

against when he was issued written notice that his chain of command

included two sections chiefs rather than a supervisor and a section

chief. The AJ found that complainant had been detailed numerous

times to accommodate him. As a result of these details, complainant

was reassigned to different areas within the Environmental Management

Division. During these temporary details complainant may have had a

section chief as his immediate supervisor; however, the AJ

found no evidence that these actions affected any tangible employment

right or had the effect of discouraging complainant from engaging in a

protected activity. The AJ concluded that complainant was not subjected

to discrimination when the agency reassigned him to accommodate his

medical restriction and such accommodation resulted in complainant having

two section chiefs within his rating chain. The agency subsequently

issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed

to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant makes no new arguments on appeal. The agency asks the

Commission to affirm the final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, we note that as complainant did not, on appeal, specifically

challenge the agency's dismissal of issues (3) and (4), we will presume

that he accepts the dismissals, and we shall limit our analysis to issues

(1) and (2) above. The dismissal of issues (3) and (4) is affirmed.

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and

factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .");

see also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9,

1999) (providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a

decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will

be reviewed de novo").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court

determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards

that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh

the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues

for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be

believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must

be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact

is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could

find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st

Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect

the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing

conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not

appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may

properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon

a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary

disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206

(July 11, 2003). After a careful review of the record, the Commission

finds that the AJ's decision referenced the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws. Moreover, we find that the AJ properly issued a

decision without a hearing because complainant failed to show that a

genuine issue of material fact exists or that there were any credibility

determinations such that a hearing on the merits is warranted.

The allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title

VII or Rehabilitation Act case alleging disparate treatment discrimination

is a three step procedure: complainant has the initial burden of proving,

by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination;

the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action; and complainant must

then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason

offered by the employer was not its true reason, but was a pretext for

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

We find that, assuming complainant is disabled under the Rehabilitation

Act, and that he could establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on all of his alleged bases, the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the record

indicates that, contrary to complainant's assertion otherwise, complainant

was not issued a blank performance evaluation. The performance evaluation

merely noted the fact that complainant's rater could not evaluate an

aspect of his performance. There is no persuasive evidence that this

action was either adverse or based on complainant's sex, disability or

previous EEO activity. Moreover, with respect to issue (2), the record

indicates that complainant was reassigned to different areas within

the Environmental Management Division due to the numerous times that he

was detailed. Although, as a result of these details, complainant may

have had two section chiefs in his chain of command, we agree with the

AJ that there is no evidence that these actions affected any tangible

employment right or had the effect of discouraging complainant from

engaging in a protected activity.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine issue of

material fact is in dispute. Therefore, we AFFIRM the agency's final

order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____9/10/09_____________

Date

2

0120080211

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

6

0120080211