Kennebec Mills Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 6, 1956

115 N.L.R.B. 1483 (N.L.R.B. 1956)

KENNEBEC MILLS CORPORATION 1483
gional Director points out (1) the voter here may have attempted to
erase the diagonal line but did not succeed in doing so because there
was no eraser on the pencil and (2) the smudge over the diagonal line
may have resulted from the use of the voter's finger when he found he
could not erase without an eraser. These circumstances, in our opin-
ion, show that the voter here did not intend to vote for "neither."
Hence we find his diagonal line in that box was not, as in the cited
.case, a valid marking.
In any event, even if there were no erasure or attempted erasure on
the challenged ballot, we would reach the same .result. On further
consideration of our decision in Bon Tool, we now believe that we
erroneously concluded in that case that an oblique line in one box
constituted a conflicting mark which canceled the effect of a clear
"X" in the remaining box and that such a ballot did not reveal a clear
intent of the voter. Accordingly, we hereby overrule Bon Tool.
As the voter in the instant case did not spoil his ballot, contrary to
the Acting Regional Director, there was no requirement that he re-
turn it to the Board agent for a new one.
The voter of the challenged ballot having cast a valid vote, the
results of the election now show that the IBT and Kramer received an
equal number of votes and that no votes were cast for "neither." All
eligible voters did not vote in the election. In view of the foregoing,
we shall direct a runoff election among the employees of the Company
in which they will be given an opportunity to decide whether they
desire to be represented by the IBT or by Kramer for the purposes of
collective bargaining.
:[Text of Direction of Runoff Election omitted from publication.]
CHAIRMAN LEEDOM and MEMBER PETERSON took no part in the con-
sideration of the above Supplemental Decision and Direction of Run-
off Election.
Kennebec Mills Corporation and Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, Petitioner . Case No. 1-RC-4415. June 6,
1956
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Robert S. Fuchs, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
115 NLRB No. 232.
1484 , DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.'
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9
(c)•(1) andSection 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
The Employer and Intervenor contend that their contract executed
February 7, 1956, to be effective for 3 years from November 1, 1955, is
a bar to the instant proceeding. The Petitioner contends, inter alia,
that under the General Electric X-Ray Corporation rule 2 the contract
is not a bar because it did not become effective until after the Peti-
tioner's demand for recognition on February 16, 1956. We agree.
The record shows that although the Intervenor's representatives were
given authority by the membership of the Intervenor to negotiate a
contract with the Employer, the contract negotiated was required by
the laws of the Intervenor to be ratified by the Intervenor' s member-
ship and during the negotiations herein the Employer was apprised
of this fact. Furthermore, an official of the Intervenor testified that
if the membership had refused to ratify the contract the contract
would have been "invalid." As we are satisfied by the evidence in
this case that ratification of the contract was contemplated as the
final step in the bargaining process, we find that the contract did
not become legally effective until ratified on February 19,3 3 days after
the Petitioner's demand for recognition had been received by the
Employer. The Board has held that under normal contract- bar rules,
where, as here, a demand for recognition is made between the date
of the execution of a contract requiring ratification and the date of its
ratification, a petition filed within 10 days after the demand for rec-
ognition is timely filed with respect to the ratification date.4 Ac-
cordingly, in these circumstances, as the Petitioner's demand for rec-
ognition antedated the ratification of the contract urged as a bar and
was followed 8 days later by the filing of the instant petition, we
find the contract is not a bar.5 In view of our decision herein we deem
1 Fairfield Independent Textile Workers Union, herein called Intervenor , was permitted
to intervene on the basis of its contractual interest . As the record shows that the
Intervenor was organized for the purpose of collective bargaining with the Employer
concerning wages, hours, and working conditions of the Employer 's employees we find,
contrary to the Petitioner , that the Intervenor is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act
2 67 NLRB 997.
a See Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 111 NLRB 497, 499 ; American Broadcasting
Company, 114 NLRB 7.
A General Electric Company, 110 NLRB 992, 994.
5 We find no merit in the Employer 's contention that as the contract herein is a mere
"re-negotiation" of an agreement consummated between it and the Intervenor 's organizers
prior to the formation of the Intervenor , the Board will not "look behind the authority
of the representatives to sign." The cases cited in support of this contention are not
apposite Furthermore, it is clear in the instant case that the mere execution of the
contract was not alone sufficient to make it effective, but, rather , ratification was essen-
tial. The record does not indicate that the agreement antedating the formation of the
Intervenor was ever ratified and the contract urged as a bar was not ratified until after
the Petitioner had made its demand for recognition.
HUMBLE OIL AND REFINING COMPANY 1485
it unnecessary to consider the other grounds advanced by the Peti-
tioner for holding the contract no bar.
4. In accordance with the agreement of the parties we find that the
following unit is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees, including section
hands,' but excluding office and plant clerical employees, professional
employees, guards, and supervisors' as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
MEMBER BEAN took no part in the consideration of the above Deci-
sion and Direction of Election.
. ? The parties agree that section hands are not supervisors within the meaning of the
Act and include them in the unit.
*The parties agree that the superintendent, foremen , and the second hand are super-
visors within the meaning of'the Act.
Humble Oil and Refining Company and Baytown Metal Trades
Council and Affiliated Organizations, AFL-CIO, Petitioner.
Case No. 39-RC-996. June 6, 1956
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Arthur S. Safos, hearing
officer . The hearing officer's rulings made at the.hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act .2
3 Baytown Employees Federation , herein called the Intervenor, was permitted to inter-
vene on the basis of its contractual interest . At the hearing the Intervenor moved to
dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) No question concerning representation
exists because the unit sought is inappropriate ; and (2 ) unreasonable delays in
scheduling -the hearing prejudiced the rights of the Intervenor . The hearing officer
referred this motion to the Board. The petition herein was Sled on January 17, 1956.
The hearing was originally scheduled for January 31, 1956, and after twice being re-
scheduled , was conducted on February 28 and 29, and March 1, 1956. The Intervenor
does not indicate how it has been prejudiced by this procedure. In view of the fore-
going, and for reasons stated in paragraph 4, infra, the Intervenor's motion to dismiss
is hereby denied.
9 The Employer refused to stipulate that a question affecting commerce exists. The
record shows that the Petitioner made demand for recognition on January 12, 1956,
and that the Employer refused recognition on January 17, 1956.
115 NLRB No. 240.