KENEXA TECHNOLOGY, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 4, 202015137436 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 4, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/137,436 04/25/2016 David S. de Hilster CAM920125001US9_8150-0708 1551 112978 7590 05/04/2020 Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC 20283 State Road 7, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33498 EXAMINER RUIZ, ANGELICA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2158 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/04/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ibmptomail@iplawpro.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAVID S. DE HILSTER, ALAN G. PORTER, and JOHN REESE ____________ Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, MAHSHID D. SAADAT, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant states the real party in interest is Kenexa Technology NY, Inc. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s Specification is directed to “data processing systems for entering information into and accessing information from large structured databases and in particular to those systems which allow multiple independent users to enter information from nonuniformly formatted documents/files and to interact with the system to assure the accuracy of the database entries.” See Spec. p. 8. Exemplary claim 1 under appeal reads as follows; 1. A method for facilitating via an interactive path a transfer of resume data to a service provider, the method comprising: (a) receiving, by a service provider via an interactive path with a job applicant, digital data comprising a resume of the job applicant, the interactive path provided via a remote communication interface; (b) extracting, by the service provider, a plurality of data strings from the resume; (c) sending, by the service provider via the interactive path to the job applicant, an inquiry form asking the job applicant a supplemental question; (d) receiving, by the service provider via the interactive path from the job applicant, a data string responsive to the supplemental question; and (e) sending, by the service provider via the interactive path to the job applicant, a structured form comprising a plurality of fields, a first field of the plurality of fields accommodating an extracted data string from the resume and a second field of the plurality of fields accommodating the data string responsive to the supplemental question. Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 3 Rejection on Appeal Claims 1–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more. Ans. 3–8 (in “NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION” section of the Examiner’s Answer). Claims 1–24 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Taylor (US 5,832,497; iss. Nov. 3, 1998) and Sobotka (US 5,197,004; iss. Mar. 23, 1993). Final Act. 8–22. ANALYSIS “Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues Appellant identifies, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections.”). After considering the argued claims in light of the case law presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in rejecting claims 1, 4–11, and 14–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, however, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 4–11, and 14–23 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 4 REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection and Arguments The Examiner concludes Claim(s) 1 and 13 and respective dependent claims thereof, are directed to receiving information extracting and analyzing the mentioned information which is substantially similar to the court recognized abstract ideas such as collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, (Electric Power Group), Fundamental economic practices, processing an application for financing a purchase (Credit Acceptance), and/or Data recognition and storage (Content Extraction). The claim(s) do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception when considered individually and in combination because the additional elements, which are recited at a high level of generality, provide conventional functions that do not add meaningful limits to practicing the abstract idea. Ans. 3–4. The Examiner specifically finds the method steps recited in claims 1 and 13 claims “analyze and display the results of the collection of employee and employer information for further analysis similar to the collecting information, analyzing, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis, (Electric Power Group).” Ans. 4–5. The Examiner further finds “[t]he claims are similar to long-prevalent practices, such as an assistant entering raw information, seeking clarification on certain points, and then inputting that information into a standardized form” and cites “Credit Acceptance, being directed to a similar process in which loan applications were processed through an automated system to generate a loan package (like the automated processing of a resume) and Content Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 5 Extraction, being directed to recognizing information in one format and storing it in another (i.e., on disk).” Ans. 5. The Examiner also finds the additional elements are not sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Ans. 5–6. Appellant contends the invention addresses a specific problem related to entering and accessing information from large structured databases “using, in part, ‘a structured form comprising a plurality of fields, a first field of the plurality of fields accommodating an extracted data string from the resume and a second field of the plurality of fields accommodating the data string responsive to the supplemental question.’” Reply Br. 2. Appellant also argues that the claims are not directed to a judicial exception because the claims do not “recite ‘displaying certain results of the collection and analysis’” or “involve the processing of an application for financing a purchase nor are simply directed to data recognition and storage.” Reply Br. 5. Referring to the court decisions cited by the Examiner, Appellant argues the Examiner’s analysis is based on overbroad description of those cases and mischaracterization of the instant claims as a whole. Reply Br. 7–10. Further, Appellant contends, in asserting the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, the Examiner did not identify any additional elements in the claims. Reply Br. 11. With respect to “preemption,” Appellant argues “[e]ven assuming, for sake of argument, that the claimed invention is directed to the abstract idea of ‘collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,’ like the patent at issue in BASCOM,2 Appellants 2 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 6 are not looking to monopolize (or preempt) the alleged abstract idea.” Reply Br. 13. Legal Principles Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 7 mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 8 PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th ed. rev. 08.2017 Jan. 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.) See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56. Discussion Abstract Idea Turning to claim 1, we first note that the claim recites functions that fall within the process category of § 101. But despite falling within this statutory category, we must still determine whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. We therefore determine (1) whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception (Guidance Step 2A — Prong 1) and, if so, (2) whether the identified judicial exception is integrated into a practical application (Guidance Step 2A — Prong 2). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites limitations that are directed to analyzing and displaying the results of the collected employee and employer information that is further analyzed, similar to the claims determined to be directed to abstract ideas in Electric Power,3 and Credit 3 Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (where collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying results from certain results of the collection and analysis was held to be an abstract idea). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 9 Acceptance,4 and Content Extraction.5 Ans. 4–5. In other words, the recited method steps are directed to a judicial exception that can be categorized as mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human mind or using pen and paper (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion) under the Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. See also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”). The recited functions of “receiving, . . . a resume of the job applicant,” receiving “extracting, . . . a plurality of data strings from the resume,” “the measured number of minutes,” “sending, . . . an inquiry form asking the job applicant a supplemental question,” and “receiving, . . . a data string responsive to the supplemental question,” and “sending, . . ., a structured form” constitute mental processes or concepts performed in the human mind. People can determine the recited types of information by, for example, reading the resume data, supplemental question/response, and their related entries. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ((determining that a claim limitation “is so broadly worded” that the limitation “encompasses literally any method” for performing the limitation, including “even logical reasoning that can be performed entirely in the human mind”). 4 Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (where automation of manual processes using generic computers is abstract without improving the computer technology). 5 Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (where data recognition and storage of information, even if related to a particular content, is abstract). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 10 With respect to processing the type of resume information, a method recited in claim 1, as well as a system like the system of claim 13, which implement “a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.” See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Similarly, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015), tailoring content on a website based on a user’s location and time of day was held to be a fundamental economic practice and directed to an abstract idea. Thus, we determine that the claims relate to the judicial exception identified above. In a similar vein, we have treated analyzing information as steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category. See, e.g., TLI Commc’ns, 823 F.3d at 613; Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1351; SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012); SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1333; see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). That is, merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis. See, e.g., Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We also note the recited sending “a structured form comprising a plurality of fields, a first field of the plurality of fields accommodating an Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 11 extracted data string from the resume and a second field of the plurality of fields accommodating the data string responsive to the supplemental question” functions of claims 1 and 13 merely collect and present information. Courts have found such data gathering and presenting steps to be insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity). Integration of the Abstract Idea into a Practical Application — Step 2A, Prong Two Having determined that claims 1 and 13 recite abstract mental processes, we next look to determine whether the claims recite “additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–54. We specifically determine whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. We therefore (1) identify whether there are any additional recited elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. See id.6 6 Limitations that are indicative of “integration into a practical application” include: (1) improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (2) applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine (see id. § 2106.05(b)); (3) effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see id. § 2106.05(c)); and (4) applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 12 Here, the recited receiving/extracting/sending “by a service provider” and “via an interactive path” in claim 1 and “a remote communication interface of a service provider,” “an extractor,” and “a form generator” in claim 13 are the only recited elements beyond the abstract idea, but these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claims 1 and 13 as a whole. As discussed below, the additional elements do not improve computer capabilities or a technical field. Nor do they implement the abstract ideas on a particular machine that is integral to the claims or effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. They simply use computers and other components as tools to apply the abstract ideas. “[M]ere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent- ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223; see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335‒36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The above-mentioned elements employ generic components that perform generic functions of collecting, analyzing, and processing data linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (see id. § 2106.05(e)). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”). In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a practical application” include: (1) adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (see MPEP § 2106.05(f)); (2) adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception (see id. § 2106.05(g)); and (3) generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (see id. § 2106.05(h)). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 13 (digital data comprising a resume, a plurality of data strings from the resume, an inquiry form asking a supplemental question, and a structured form comprising a plurality of fields), which do not integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55, n.31. These recited functions are performed by processing components that are disclosed as a service provider (“provider site 42 (generally an automated service),” Spec. 8:18–19), a remote communication interface (“typically comprising a modem 48 and a web (Internet) browser 50, and the associated interconnections 52 between (typically phone lines and Internet Service Providers ( ISPs)),” Spec. 8:23–26 or “a local area network (LAN) or a direct modem to modem or serial port to serial port connections,” Spec. 8:26–29), a data extractor (“text data extraction software (e.g., the DEFT software developed by TRW as part of their InfoWeb™ system),” Spec. 6:11–13), and a form generator (“supplied to the user’s computer 40 as an applet or other self executing piece of software 69 by the database service provider,” Spec. 12:32–34). Based on the above description of the process and the system recited in claims 1 and 13, the job applicant information is collected and analyzed by components, such as computer 40, service provider site 42, communication interface 44, and a form generator that are described as generic components performing generic software instructions. Simply adding generic hardware and computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 14 It is well settled that “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to ‘implemen[t]’ an abstract idea ‘on ... a computer,’ . . . that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.”) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012)); see Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 & n.30. The lack of details about these elements also indicates that the above-mentioned elements are generic computer components. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”). Additionally, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention addresses the specific problem of extracting “information from large structured databases” or “information from nonuniformly formatted documents/files.” See Reply Br. 2. Likewise, the method steps of claim 1 do not improve the technology or the technical field of receiving resume information and merely use generic computer components and functions to perform the recited steps. Also, the recited method steps do not require a “particular machine” and can be utilized with a general purpose computer, and the steps performed are purely conventional. In this case, contrary to Appellant’s assertion that “the claimed invention is directed to an improvement to computer technology” (Reply Br. 3), the general purpose Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 15 computer and the related software components are merely objects on which the method operates in a conventional manner. Further, the claim as a whole fails to effect any particular transformation of an article to a different state. The recited steps, which are similarly recited in the system claim 13, fail to provide meaningful limitations to limit the judicial exception and rather are mere instructions to apply the method to a generic computer. In another words, unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed invention here merely uses generic computing components to collect and process a job applicant’s information for analysis. This generic computer implementation is not only directed to a mental process, but also does not improve the underlying technology, such as a display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”); see also SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing McRO). Thus, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Further, the claims do not (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic computer), (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 16 Inventive Concept — Step 2B Because we determine claims 1 and 13 are “directed to” an abstract idea, we consider whether the claims recite an “inventive concept.” Under the Guidance, if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. We agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s disclosure refers to the recited service provider, a remote communication interface, a data extractor, and a form generator, in general terms which amount to routine and conventional elements that perform a conventional data collection and analysis. See Ans. 5. As discussed above, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s contentions (Reply Br. 5–6) and find the additional elements perform the recited functions and include generic data collection and processing elements without requiring any specific functions other than the known functions associated with those components. See Spec. 8:18–19, 8:23–26, 8:26–29, 6:11–13. Using generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not provide the necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Contrary to Appellant’s argument that, in citing to Electric Power, Credit Acceptance, and Content Extraction, the Examiner “cites an overbroad description of the holdings of these cases, and declares (without analysis) Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 17 that they are ‘substantially similar’” (Reply Br. 7–10), we find Appellant’s Specification expressly describes well-known examples of collecting and analyzing job applicant’s information. Considering the elements of the claims both individually and as “an ordered combination” the functions performed by the computer system and other software components at each step of the process are purely conventional. Each step of the claimed method, or the functions recited in the system claim, does no more than require a generic computer to perform a generic computer function. Thus, these elements, taken individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the abstract ideas themselves. Moreover, we note the Examiner provides Berkheimer7 evidence in support of the “well-understood, routine, and conventional” fact findings in the form of citations to numerous Federal Circuit case authorities, which Appellant has not substantively and persuasively distinguished from the claims before us on appeal. See Ans. 3–6. In fact, the cited list of cases in the MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) supports the characterization of the recited receiving, extracting, and transmitting data over a network, e.g., using the Internet to gather data as “well-understood, routine, and conventional functions when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of generality).” See USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018). Consequently, we find that the above-identified claim elements, at the high level of generality recited in claims 1 and 13, constitute no more 7 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 18 than what would have been well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan. Preemption Appellant’s argument that the claims fail to preempt any particular technological field is also not persuasive. Reply Br. 12–13. While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility. . . . Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362– 63 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, lack of similarities between Appellant’s claims and those in BASCOM8 notwithstanding (see Reply Br. 13), Appellant wrongly relies on a lack of preemption to establish eligibility. While preemption may denote ineligibility, its absence does not establish eligibility. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 8 Holding eligible claims directed to a technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing problems with other Internet filtering systems by making a known filtering solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider (ISP)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized filtering at the ISP. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 19 Conclusion For at least the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claims 1 and 13 are “directed to” an abstract idea and does not recite an “inventive concept.” Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 13, as well as the remaining claims which fail to include additional elements that add significantly more to the abstract idea, under 35 U.S.C. § 101. REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds Taylor discloses all the recited method steps of the claim, but not the digital data representing “a source data stream” comprising a resume of the job applicant, that is included in the extracted data strings and is accommodated in a first field. Final Act. 8–9. The Examiner relies on Sobotka as disclosing the missing limitations. Final Act. 9–10 (citing Sobotka 3:38–60, 4:29–49). The Examiner finds it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the references in order to “classify an applicant according to his employment potential with a high degree of accuracy (col. 3, lines 35–40).” See Final Act. 10. Appellant contends the Examiner’s rejection is in error because the cited portion in column 4 of Taylor discusses presenting questions on a form that “is used by ‘an employer-user’ during the process of creating a new job record,” which is different from presenting a question to a job applicant, as required by claim 1. Appeal Br. 8.9 Appellant further argues the “prompt” 9 We do not address Appellant’s other contentions because this contention is dispositive of the issue on appeal. Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 20 mentioned in Taylor refers to prompts presented to the employer-user to fill different job record fields, and not to the job applicant. Appeal Br. 9. In response, the Examiner explains The Examiner’s interpretation regarding the “supplemental question” is that the “job applicant” is required to give information regarding his/her “Resume of the job applicant” and then continues giving information according to different “discipline fields” online, as claimed, that being also supplemental. There is an interaction with respect to the “employer-user” and the “job-applicant” within the “form to be filled out online” as also mentioned “from the response to the supplemental question”. The Examiner considers that the mentioned interaction provides supplemental questions and responses related to the online resume form. It could be any answer related to a job, included in the resume fields, specifically associated to the “job applicant” or “user” as previously stated. Ans. 10 (emphasis added.). Based on a review of the applied prior art references, and specifically Taylor, we are persuaded by Appellant’s contentions of Examiner error. The Examiner has not cited any specific teachings in column 4 of Taylor nor has explained how the actions performed by the employer-user may be attributed to the job applicant, as recited in claim 1. Taylor prompts the employer-user to fill the job record fields or enter narratives for a job description and search parameters. See Taylor 4:36–41. As argued by Appellant, the Examiner’s assertion “that ‘the mentioned interaction provides supplemental questions and responses related to the online resume form’ . . . does not map to the language of the claims.’” See Reply Br. 14. In other words, it is not clear how the teaching of presenting prompts to an employer-user in Taylor meets the above-mentioned disputed claim limitation. Appeal 2019-001571 Application 15/137,436 21 Therefore, Appellant’s arguments have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s position with respect to the rejections of independent claim 1, as well as independent claim 13 which recites similar limitations found to be missing in the proposed combination. We, therefore, do not sustain the rejections of claims 1 and 13, nor of claims 2–12, and 14–24 dependent therefrom. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–24 101 Eligibility 1–24 1–24 103(a) Taylor, Sobotka 1–24 Overall Outcome 1–24 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation