Ken-Crest Services

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 777 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

KEN-CREST SERVICES 777
Ken-Crest Services and Pennsylvania Social Services
Union, Local 668 of Service Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, Petitioner. Case
4–RC–19759
August 27, 2001
DECISION, DIRECTION, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND TRUESDALE
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel, has considered objections to and determi-
native challenges in an election held on January 12 and
13, 2000, and the hearing officer’s report recommending
disposition of them. The election was conducted pursu-
ant to a Decision and Direction of Election.1 The tally of
ballots shows 55 for and 58 against the Petitioner, with
32 challenged ballots, a number sufficient to affect the
results of the election.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and briefs, and has decided to adopt the hearing
officer’s findings and recommendations.2
The Employer provides residential care to develop-
mentally disabled individuals at approximately 62 group
home settings located throughout southeastern Pennsyl-
vania and Delaware. The Employer’s Suburban Residen-
tial Division of Adult Services, also known as the “Sub-
urban Division,” the division at issue here, is comprised
of 35 group homes located in Chester, Montgomery, and
Berks Counties, Pennsylvania. Michael Walker, the Em-
ployer’s director of day-to-day operations for southeast-
ern Pennsylvania, oversees the Suburban Division. The
Employer employs two community living directors in the
Suburban Division who report to Walker. At full staffing
levels, eight project directors report to the community
living directors.3 The project directors are responsible
for several group homes that they visit one to three times
a week. Group homes are staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, by a program manager and a staff of two to five
resident advisors.

1 By order dated December 29, 1999, the Regional Director’s Deci-
sion was amended to permit the program managers to vote by chal-
lenged ballot.
2 The Employer has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties.
In the absence of exceptions, the Board adopts, pro forma, the hear-
ing officer’s recommendations to overrule the Petitioner’s Objections
2–4 and 7–8.
3 At the time of the preelection hearing, the Employer employed six
project directors.
The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of approxi-
mately 144 full-time and regular part-time employees
employed in the Suburban Division, including approxi-
mately 110 resident advisors, 33 program managers,4 and
1 assistant program manager.5
In his report,6 the hearing officer found that the Em-
ployer failed to meet its burden of proving that its pro-
gram managers are supervisors within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act. See NLRB v. Kentucky River
Community Care, 121 S.Ct. 1861, 1866–1867 (2001)
(holding that burden of proof is on party asserting super-
visory status). We agree. For the reasons set forth be-
low, contrary to our dissenting colleague, we find that
the Employer has failed to establish that the program
managers are statutory supervisors because they can is-
sue verbal (i.e., oral) warnings and adjust minor griev-
ances.
Verbal (Oral) Warnings
The Employer has a progressive disciplinary system
that commences with general counselings; progresses
through verbal warnings, written warnings, and suspen-
sions, with and without pay; and ends with termination.7
According to Lois Johnston, the Employer’s human re-
sources coordinator, program managers had until recent
years been authorized to issue written warnings to resi-
dent advisors. However, it is undisputed that program
managers are currently authorized by the Employer only
to issue general counselings and verbal warnings to resi-
dent advisors. They are not authorized to suspend or
discharge resident advisors.
In the case of both general counselings and verbal
warnings, the program manager speaks to the employee
about the identified deficiency. With respect to counsel-
ings, there is no formal documentation, and nothing goes
into the employee’s personnel file. An employee may
receive multiple counselings without any further disci-
plinary steps ever being imposed. According to Walker,
documentation of any verbal warning issued by a pro-
gram manager is maintained in the employee’s personnel
4 Two of the program manager positions were vacant at the time of
preelection hearing.
5 At the time of preelection hearing, the Employer was phasing out
the position of assistant program manager. There is no contention that
the assistant program manager is a statutory supervisor.
6 The hearing officer took administrative notice of the transcript re-
cord in the preelection hearing and of the Regional Director’s Decision
and Direction of Election, and the subsequent Board Order amending it.
7 The Employer’s progressive disciplinary system is found in its pol-
icy and procedures manual. In its written form, there is no mention of
general counselings.
335 NLRB No. 63
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 778
file.8 However, there is no standard form for the pro-
gram manager to fill out and Johnston, who maintains the
Employer’s personnel files, admitted that a verbal warn-
ing may not be noted in an employee’s personnel file.
According to Johnston, there is no formal policy con-
cerning how many verbal warnings will warrant an issu-
ance of a written warning. Thus, there is no automatic
progression from a verbal warning to a written warning.
In contrast, the Employer’s formal policy provides that
three written warnings within a year will result in an em-
ployee’s discharge. Written warnings can only be issued
with the explicit approval and signature of a project di-
rector or higher authority. Johnston, who types up the
written warnings, testified that a verbal warning will be
referenced in the written warning, if one preceded the
issuance of a written warning. None of the written warn-
ings introduced into evidence by the Employer refer-
enced a documented verbal warning.9
Based on these facts and consistent with the case law,
we agree with the hearing officer that the program man-
agers’ limited role in the disciplinary process is nothing
more than reportorial.10
In finding otherwise, our dissenting colleague cites
language appearing on the face of the documentation of
verbal warnings entered into evidence, which indicates
that any further violation of company rules will result in
further disciplinary action up to discharge. However, the
Employer has failed to demonstrate that any actual con-
sequences flow from the documented verbal warnings
issued by its program managers. As indicated above,
there is no automatic progression from a verbal warning
to a written warning, and no written warnings were
placed into evidence that even referred to previously
documented verbal warnings. Thus, we find that the
verbal warnings issued by the program managers here
have no clear connection of any kind to other discipli-

8 The record indicates that in the 2 years prior to the election four
verbal warnings issued by one program manager were documented and
placed in personnel files. Emp. Exhs. 12 and 17 (preelection hearing).
9 Emp. Exhs. 12, 14–19 (preelection hearing).
10 See Vencor Hospital-Los Angeles, 328 NLRB 1136 (1999) (ability
to issue oral warnings in itself does not demonstrate supervisory author-
ity); VIP Health Services v. NLRB, 164 F.3d 644, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(mere reporting is insufficient to establish that nurses effectively rec-
ommend discharge or discipline); Misericordia Hospital Medical Cen-
ter v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 817 fn. 20 (2d Cir. 1980) (authority to do no
more than orally counsel and reprimand employees is not supervisory).
Accord: Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care, 297 NLRB 390, 392
(1989), enfd. 933 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1991); and Ohio Masonic Home,
295 NLRB 390, 393–394 (1989). See also Lynwood Health Care Cen-
ter, Minnesota, v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 1998) (mere
authority to effectively recommend warnings that “have no tangible
effect on [an employee’s] job status . . . is not sufficient for supervisory
status”).
nary measures.11 Unlike our colleague, therefore, we
find that the program managers do not play an integral
role in the progressive disciplinary system simply be-
cause of their authority to issue general counselings and
verbal warnings.12
Adjusting Grievances
Our dissenting colleague also asserts that the program
managers possess Section 2(11) authority to adjust griev-
ances. We disagree. The Employer has a written griev-
ance procedure stating, that “prior to initiating the [griev-
ance] process,” employees are directed to discuss the
matter with “his or her immediate supervisor.” Under
the Employer’s policy, “if a discussion with an em-
ployee’s supervisor does not result in a satisfactory reso-
lution, the employee can file a written grievance with the
Division Director.” 13
As discussed by the hearing officer, the record reflects
little evidence of any actual adjustment of grievances by
the program managers. In the instances where program
managers have taken an active role in grievances raised
by resident advisors, their efforts have amounted to little
more than relaying, or offering assistance in relaying, the
grievances to upper management or simply offering ad-
vice or suggestions.
For example, in one case, Program Manager Dawn
Grunder testified that Shirley Henderson, a resident advi-
sor, complained about her low salary given her job re-
sponsibilities. Although Grunder explained that she had
no authority to grant Henderson a pay raise, Henderson
11 See Green Acres Country Care Center, 327 NLRB 257 (1999).
Under these circumstances, this case is distinguishable from NLRB v.
Attleboro Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
1999). The nurses in Attleboro had the authority to issue both verbal
(oral) and written warnings. Further, the warnings were part of a pro-
gressive disciplinary system that clearly led from verbal warnings to
higher levels of discipline.
12 As discussed, the program managers also have no authority to is-
sue written warnings or other forms of discipline. Although program
managers have recommended such discipline, the record demonstrates
that the Employer has either not adopted or ignored the program man-
ager’s recommendations. In this regard, Program Manager Donald
Hmble testified that he recommended that a resident advisor be dis-
charged, but the community living director disagreed, and gave the
employee another chance. Program Manager Melanie Reed testified
that she issued verbal warnings to an individual who was a resident
advisor. Later, she recommended to her project director that the indi-
vidual be discharged. The project director and Walker decided to issue
a written warning instead, and the individual remained in Reed’s group
home over her objection. At the time of the preelection hearing, the
individual was employed as a program manager at another group home.
Program Manager Sandy Millard testified that on two occasions she
recommended that employees be transferred after their unsatisfactory
behavior continued. Her recommendations were not followed in either
case.
13 The Employer’s grievance process is found in its policy and pro-
cedures manual.
KEN-CREST SERVICES 779
suggested that Grunder submit a letter to Walker on her
behalf. Grunder drafted the letter with Henderson’s as-
sistance. Nevertheless, Henderson did not get a raise.
In a second case, Sandy Millard, another program
manager, testified about a complaint Lloyd Campbell, a
resident advisor, had about restrictions imposed by
higher management on his work hours. Millard spoke to
her project director about the situation, who directed her
to tell Campbell to file a written grievance. The griev-
ance was resolved by the project director and the com-
munity living director. On another occasion, Campbell
called out sick, and the on-call supervisor criticized him
for calling in late. Campbell, upset by the on-call super-
visor’s tone, complained to Millard. She told him, how-
ever, that she could do nothing, and advised him to file a
written grievance, which he did not do.
The record also contains examples of how personality
conflicts between resident advisors are “handled” by
program managers. For instance, Program Manager
Melanie Reed testified about one occasion when two
resident advisors were stuck in a group home for an ex-
tended period of time because of a snowstorm and they
began to bicker. They contacted her by phone several
times and she offered them several suggestions, includ-
ing moving to different rooms of the home. The person-
ality conflict between the two resident advisors contin-
ued after the storm, and was subsequently brought to the
attention of the project director, who resolved the prob-
lem. No written grievance was ever filed.14
Based on these facts, we agree with the hearing officer
that the Employer did not carry its burden of establishing
that the program managers adjust grievances. As stated
by the hearing officer, the limited authority to resolve
minor disputes is insufficient to establish supervisory
status. See Riverchase Health Care Center, 304 NLRB
861, 865 (1991); Illinois Veterans Home at Anna, L.P.,
323 NLRB 890, 891 (1997); and Ohio Masonic Home,
supra, 295 NLRB at 394. Nor does the authority to re-
solve personality conflicts or “squabbles” between em-
ployees warrant an inference sufficient to establish su-
pervisory status. St. Francis Medical Center-West, 323
NLRB 1046, 1048 (1997). Contrary to our dissenting
colleague, we adhere to these principles.
Moreover, we find that the Employer failed to estab-
lish that the program managers actually “resolve” minor
grievances. Contrary to our colleague, we therefore find
distinguishable both Attleboro, supra, and Passavant
Retirement & Health Center v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243 (3d

14 Leigh Ann Kuvlesky, a resident advisor, also testified (based on
secondhand knowledge) that her program manager, Tara Simmons,
once had to resolve a disagreement between two of her fellow resident
advisors.
Cir. 1998). In Attleboro, the court conclusively found
that the nurses at issue had the authority to adjust minor
grievances and that the nurses had, in fact, resolved dis-
putes between employees involving the “specifics of
work assignments and whether they performed their
work satisfactorily.” Attleboro, supra, 176 F.3d at 166.
Likewise, in Passavant, supra, 149 F.3d at 247–248, the
court found that the nurses at issue had the authority to
adjust minor grievances regarding assignments, break-
times, and lunchtimes under a collective-bargaining
agreement that defined grievance very broadly. In con-
trast, the evidence here establishes only that the program
managers offer advice and suggestions regarding person-
ality conflicts and bring any minor grievances to the at-
tention of upper management for resolution.15 Accord-
ingly, we agree with the hearing officer that the program
managers do not possess authority under Section 2(11) to
adjust grievances.
Secondary Indicia
Finally, in finding the program managers to be statu-
tory supervisors, our dissenting colleague also relies on
secondary indicia of supervisory authority. When there
is no evidence presented that an individual possesses any
one of the several primary indicia of statutory supervi-
sory status enumerated in Section 2(11) of the Act, sec-
ondary indicia are insufficient by themselves to establish
supervisory status. General Security Services Corp., 326
NLRB 312 (1998), enfd. 187 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 1998);
Billows Electric Supply, 311 NLRB 878 fn. 2 (1993).
Thus, the factors cited by our dissenting colleague
(higher compensation, the perception of others, and the
supervisor/employee ratio) are not determinative in this
case.16
15 Compare Provident Nursing Home, 187 F.3d 133, 146–147 (1st
Cir. 1999) (employees not supervisors where they can resolve minor
disputes, but do not have authority to bind management); Northeast
Utilities Services Corp. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 621, 625 (1st Cir. 1994)
(employees not supervisors where they can moderate disputes, but do
not have ultimate responsibility for resolution of disputes).
16 In any event, we find that these factors do not cut so clearly in fa-
vor of supervisory status as our colleague suggests. For example, the
record establishes that several resident advisors earn more money than
the program managers. Further, while the Employer’s counsel elicited
testimony from one resident advisor that she viewed her program man-
ager as her supervisor, another resident advisor testified that he did not
view program managers as supervisors. Finally, nothing in the statu-
tory definition of “supervisor” implies that service as the highest rank-
ing employee on site requires finding that such an employee must be a
statutory supervisor. See Training School at Vineland, 332 NLRB No.
152, slip op. at 1 (2000). See also VIP Health Services, supra, 164 F.3d
at 649–650 (stating that if an employee “do[es] not possess Section
2(11) supervisory authority, then the absence of anyone else with such
authority does not then automatically confer it”); NLRB v. Res-Care,
Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1467 (7th Cir. 1983) (fact that nurses are highest
ranking employees on the premises during the evening and night shifts
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 780
For these reasons, and the reasons stated by the hear-
ing officer, we agree that that the programs managers are
not supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act, and thus we find that they are eligible to vote.
DIRECTION
IT IS DIRECTED that the Regional Director for Re-
gion 4, shall, within 14 days of this Decision and Direc-
tion, open and count the ballots of Patrick Bona, Mary
Butts, Melody Dever, Jane Gennaria, Peggy Gomez,
Julie Grebe, Dawn Grunder, Deborah Guy, Lis Harris,
Donald Hmble, Cheryl Hollins, Joseph Karpinski, Ed-
ward Lanyon, Virginia Merke, Sandra Millard, Ed Mul-
ready, Carla Murphy, Cynthia Noble, Lucy Pailen, John
Pearson, Brenda Poe-Montgomery, Wendie Price, Re-
gina Reber, Melanie Reed, Mark Schultz, Terri Shaner,
Tara Simmons, Sheila Smith, Lora Stull, Cynthia Thorn-
ton, Lana Toth, and Pamela Wetzel, and thereafter, pre-
pare and cause to be served on the parties a revised tally
of ballots. In the event that the revised tally of ballots
shows that the Petitioner has received a majority of the
valid ballots cast, the Petitioner’s objections will be moot
and the Regional Director shall issue a certification of
representative.
However, in the event that the revised tally of ballots
shows that the Petitioner has not received a majority of
ballots cast, the election conducted on January 12 and 13,
2000, will be set aside and the Regional Director will
direct a second election.

CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
I agree with the hearing officer and my colleagues that
the challenge to the ballot of Cynthia Thornton should be
overruled, and that Petitioner’s Objection 5 should be
sustained and a new election held. Contrary to the hear-
ing officer and my colleagues, however, I find that the
Employer’s program managers are statutory supervisors
and therefore I would sustain the challenges to their bal-
lots. Since I find that the program managers are statutory
supervisors, I would also overrule Petitioner’s Objection
1 which alleges that before and during the critical period
the Employer maintained a policy which prevented or
restrained program managers from expressing support for
the Petitioner.
The Employer provides social services to adults with
developmental disabilities at approximately 62 group
homes located in southeastern Pennsylvania and Dela-
ware. The Employer’s “Suburban division,” the division

“does not ipso facto make them supervisors”). Cf. Beverly Enterprises
v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1998) (where a statutory super-
visory is available by telephone or pager, “the highest ranking on-site
employee will not invariably be considered a supervisor”). Here, it is
undisputed that the on-call supervisor is available.
at issue here, includes 35 group homes located in Ches-
ter, Montgomery, and Berks Counties, Pennsylvania.
Michael Walker, the Employer’s director of day-to-day
operations for southeastern Pennsylvania, is in overall
charge of the group homes in the Suburban division.
Two community living directors report directly to him.
There are eight project directors who report to the com-
munity living directors. The project directors are each
responsible for several group homes. They visit their
group homes from one to three times a week and stay at
each home for at least an hour on each visit. Each group
home is staffed by a program manager and a staff of be-
tween two and five resident advisors. The group homes
are generally staffed 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.
The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of approxi-
mately 144 full-time and regular part-time employees
employed in the Suburban division, including approxi-
mately 110 resident advisors, 33 program managers,1 and
1 assistant program manager.2 Contrary to the hearing
officer and my colleagues, I find that the program man-
agers exercise independent judgment, in the interest of
the Employer, to discipline employees and to adjust their
grievances and that therefore they are supervisors within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
It is undisputed that the program managers have the
authority to issue verbal warnings to resident advisors
and that they have exercised that authority. It is also
undisputed that when a program manager issues a verbal
warning, he or she documents that warning and the docu-
mentation is included in the resident advisor’s personnel
file at the Employer’s main office. Further, a second
verbal warning can lead to a written warning. The
Employer maintains a progressive disciplinary system
under which three written warnings in a 12-month period
will result in discharge. Notwithstanding this, the hear-
ing officer found that the program managers’ role in the
Employer’s disciplinary system was only “reportorial”
because he found that no “necessary consequence”
flowed from the issuance of the verbal warnings. Hear-
ing officer’s report (HOR at 9–10). Thus, the hearing
officer found, in effect, that the authority to issue verbal
warnings did not come within the ambit of Section 2(11)
because there was an insufficient link between the initial
stages of the disciplinary system and the later stages
(suspension and discharge).
Contrary to the hearing officer, I find that there is a
link between the initial stages of discipline in a progres-
1 Two of the program manager positions were vacant at the time of
the hearing.
2 At the time of the hearing, the Employer was phasing out the posi-
tion of assistant program manager. There is no contention that the
assistant program manager is a statutory supervisor.
KEN-CREST SERVICES 781
sive disciplinary system and the later stages because “it
is clear that the initial stages of discipline pave the way
for later stages. Absent the initial stages, the more dra-
conian measures of suspension and discharge cannot
occur.”3 That this is true here is evidenced by the fact
that the verbal warning documentation notices in evi-
dence state on their face that “[a]ny further violation of
Ken-Crest policies or procedures will result in further
disciplinary action which may include discharge.” Fur-
ther, the four verbal warnings submitted into evidence
(see Emp. Exhs. 12 and 17) include, as part of the write-
ups, the fact that continued failure to take the action un-
der review “will result in further disciplinary action” or
“will result in progressive disciplinary action.” Finally,
one of the verbal warnings included in Employer Exhibit
12 states that failure to take the action under review “will
result in further disciplinary action, including suspension
without pay.” In my view, these verbal warnings clearly
establish that there is a linkage between the early stages
of the Employer’s progressive disciplinary system and
the later stages of that system, i.e., that the issuance of
the verbal warnings may result in job consequences. It is
no answer to say, as my colleagues assert, that not all
verbal warnings will necessarily lead to job conse-
quences. It is enough to say that verbal warnings can
lead to such consequences. In these circumstances, I find
that the program managers, who have the authority to
issue verbal warnings, are supervisors within the mean-
ing of Section 2(11) of the Act.
It is also undisputed that the program managers have
the authority to adjust grievances. While the Employer
has a written grievance procedure under which the writ-
ten grievances go directly to higher management officials
above the level of the program managers, the Employer’s
grievance procedure stipulates that “prior to initiating the
grievance process,” resident advisors are directed to dis-
cuss the matter with the program managers.
The hearing officer found that the program managers
have, in fact, resolved the grievances of resident advi-
sors. However, relying, inter alia, on Rivertrace Health
Care Center, 304 NLRB 861, 865 (1991), he found that
the resolution of such “minor” grievances was not suffi-
cient to establish supervisory status under the Act. The
hearing officer then went on to acknowledge that the
Third Circuit, the circuit in which this case arises, has
held that the authority to resolve minor disputes does, in
fact, evidence the possession of Section 2(11) supervi-
sory authority. However, he sought to distinguish the
court’s finding of supervisory authority in one of those

3 Green Acres Country Care Center, 327 NLRB 257, 258–259
(1998) (Chairman Hurtgen dissenting).
cases, NLRB v. Attleboro Nursing & Rehabilitation Cen-
ter, 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999), a case relied on by the
Employer. The hearing officer opined that the asserted
supervisors there had the “actual authority to adjust the
grievance” while here it was not clear “that the Program
Managers’ intervention involved any authority beyond
that of a mediator.” (HOR at 11.) The hearing officer
also sought to distinguish Attleboro, supra, on the ground
that while the grievances at issue in that case concerned
disputes that involved actual work duties and assign-
ments the disputes in issue here arose from personality
clashes. (HOR at 11.)
As an initial matter, I agree with the Third Circuit that
“the adjustment of even minor grievances is enough to
support a finding of supervisory authority.” Attleboro,
supra, 176 F.3d at 166, quoting Passavant Retirement &
Health Center v. NLRB, 149 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir.
1998). Section 2(11) does not distinguish between major
and minor grievances. Further, in resolving “minor”
grievances, the program managers must use independent
judgment to settle these grievances before they become
“major” grievances that are set out in writing and pass
through the Employer’s formal grievance process. In
addition, it is surely in the interest of the Employer to
have these minor grievances resolved as expeditiously as
possible by the program managers so that the morale of
the resident advisors and the smooth operation of the
group homes are not adversely affected by lingering per-
sonality clashes and disputes.
Contrary to my colleagues, I find that the Third Cir-
cuit’s analysis of this issue, as set out in its opinion in
Attleboro, supra, is applicable here. I disagree with the
hearing officer’s view that the fact situation here is dis-
tinguishable from that in Attleboro, supra, and therefore
requires a different result. The hearing officer found that
the program managers are “mediators.” However, a me-
diator is a person who tries to get two or more disputants
to resolve an issue between them. In the instant case, the
program managers, acting on behalf of management, can
themselves resolve the grievance against management.
Second, even if the dispute is between two employees,
the result is the same. The hearing officer attempted to
distinguish two types of minor grievances, i.e., those that
are work-related and those that are personal. I find that
the hearing officer did nothing more than create a false
dichotomy that has no support in fact or law. As a matter
of fact, since the personal disputes that may arise among
the resident advisors occur in the workplace, they are
work-related, and they do, in fact, affect the workplace.
Clearly, lingering personal disputes amongst the resident
advisors can adversely affect both their morale and the
smooth operation of the group homes. Therefore, such
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 782
grievances are just as work-related as disputes over work
assignments and work performance.
The court’s opinion in Passavant, supra, is consistent
with this view. It draws no distinction between the reso-
lution of personal disputes between employees and the
resolution of disputes between an employee and man-
agement. The court noted the Board’s view that the al-
leged supervisors sometimes use their personal relation-
ship with employees to resolve a dispute. However, in
the court’s view, this is insufficient to deny supervisory
status.
Finally, in finding that the program managers are statu-
tory supervisors, I also rely on secondary indicia of su-
pervisory authority. The highest paid program managers
make more than the highest paid resident advisors. The
resident advisors regard the program managers as their
supervisors. If the program managers were not supervi-
sors, the group homes, which, as noted above, are open
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, would be without direct
supervision except during the visits of the project direc-
tors, i.e., for all but a few hours each week.