Kem B. Hyche, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 30, 2005
01a41471 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 30, 2005)

01a41471

09-30-2005

Kem B. Hyche, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Kem B. Hyche v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A41471

September 30, 2005

.

Kem B. Hyche,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A41471

Agency No. 200L-0586-2003100529

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision dated

December 4, 2003, concerning her formal EEO complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a Respiratory

Therapist at the agency's Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi.

Complainant filed a formal complaint on December 9, 2002. Complainant

claimed discrimination on the bases of race (African-American) and

disability (blindness/bilateral post-corneal transplantation).<1> The

instant complaint was comprised of the following two claims:

(1) On November 3, 2002, the agency informed complainant that

no determination had been made on her request for a reasonable

accommodation to be removed from a rotating schedule and placed in a

permanent day schedule due to difficulties with night driving in her

commute to and from work; and

By letter dated June 4, 2003, the agency advised complainant that the

above referenced request for a reasonable accommodation was denied.

In her race discrimination claim, complainant claimed that the agency

allows a similarly situated white co-worker to work a permanent day shift,

but is denying the day shift to her as a reasonable accommodation for

her eye disorder. Complainant also claimed that her eyes constantly

itch, hurt, and water, and that she is bothered by the glare during

night driving. Complainant indicated that she is concerned about corneal

infection and rejection, and noted that there are problems in this regard

with her right eye.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.<2>

In its final decision, the agency viewed complainant's claims in the

context of disparate treatment, and found that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of race or disability discrimination,

but that even assuming that she did so, complainant was unable to show

that the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were a pretext

for discrimination. Regarding claim (1), the agency determined that

the delay identified therein was created by the need to request more

detailed medical information from complainant's physician, and that

complainant could not show that this reason was untrue or a pretext for

discrimination. Regarding claim (2), the agency found that management

denied complainant's request based on its interpretation of its personnel

guidance providing that a reasonable accommodation need only be granted

if it allows the employee to perform an essential function of their

position, and management's determination that commuting to work is not an

essential function of complainant's position. The agency determined

that complainant failed to show that this reason was a pretext for race

or disability discrimination.

In viewing complainant's claims as denial of a reasonable accommodation,

the agency determined that complainant failed to establish that she was

a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation

Act, and that it owed her no duty to provide a reasonable accommodation.

The agency found that even assuming that complainant established that

she was a qualified individual with a disability, commuting to work was

not an essential function of her position, and that it properly denied

her request for a schedule change to avoid night driving.<3>

On appeal, in pertinent part, complainant contends that the agency

improperly identified her eye impairment as strabismus. Complainant also

contends that the agency did not fully consider the implications of her

bilateral corneal transplant impairment. Additionally, complainant avers

that it is not only driving to work at night which causes her symptoms

(eye pain and dryness) to become worse, but also working at night as well.

In response, the agency states that whether complainant's eye ailment

is characterized as strabismus or bilateral corneal transplant, it duly

considered her actual limitations, consisting of itchy, painful, and

watery eyes. The agency notes that complainant changes her contentions

on appeal, namely that working at night, as well as driving at night,

increases her symptoms. However, the agency argues that complainant

presents no evidence to show how working during day hours would alleviate

her condition, given record evidence that once complainant is inside

the facility, her eyes are not affected by day or night conditions.

The agency found that the record showed that although complainant had a

certain degree of discomfort associated with her eye symptoms, it has not

interfered with her ability to perform the full functions of her position.

Disparate treatment claim

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy the

three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish

a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse

employment action under circumstances that would support an inference

of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,

576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case,

however, since the agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory

reasons for its conduct. See United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997).

To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097

(2000).

The Commission determines that the agency proffered a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason regarding claim (1); namely, that the delay was

caused by a need to acquire clarification from complainant's physician.

Additionally, the record reflects that complainant submits no evidence

to show that this reason is untrue or a pretext for race or disability

discrimination. As to claim (2), the agency's proffered legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason in its determination, based on its personnel

guidance, that complainant is not entitled to the accommodation she

requests, and its policy and practice to assign no one to a permanent day

shift.<4> Complainant produces no evidence that this reason is untrue

or a pretext for race or disability based discrimination. In fact,

contrary to complainant's contention, the record confirms that the white

comparative whom she identifies does not encumber a permanent day shift

position, which further belies her claim of disparate treatment based

on race.

Reasonable Accommodation

Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to reasonably

accommodate the known limitations of a qualified individual with a

disability, unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause

an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p); EEOC's Enforcement Guidance

on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (revised October 17, 2002) (Guidance). The Guidance

also provides that upon notice from a qualified individual with a

disability of the need for an accommodation, the agency has a duty

to engage in the interactive process. The Commission's regulations

contemplate the creation of an accommodation through modifications or

adjustment to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances

under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that

would enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the

essential functions of that position. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(o)(1). The

Guidance allows an agency to choose among reasonable accommodations as

long as the chosen accommodation is effective, and states that, while the

preference of the individual with a disability should be given primary

consideration, ...[the agency] has the ultimate discretion to choose

between effective accommodations. See Guidance, Question 9, pp. 8-9;

also see 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 app. 1630.9 (1997).

Here, despite complainant's contentions to the contrary, we find that

the record shows that upon learning of her request for a permanent day

schedule because of her vision problem, the agency complied with the

Commission's regulations and guidelines, as set forth above.

First, we find that the agency satisfied its duty under the Rehabilitation

Act to engage in the interactive process. Specifically, the record

reflects that the agency reviewed complainant's request for a permanent

day schedule, as well as her May 10, 2002 medical statement, and that

complainant's physician was contacted by telephone to discuss her needs.

The record contains a follow-up letter from complainant's physician,

dated May 22, 2002, as a result of the agency's inquiry, confirming

the content of the May 10, 2002 letter. Additionally, in response to

her request for a reasonable accommodation, we find that the record

reflects that complainant was offered a permanent evening shift (3:30

pm to midnight), which would require her to only drive home in the dark,

which she rejected.

Second, we find that the agency did not violate the Rehabilitation Act

when, after engaging in the interactive process, it declined to grant

complainant's request. EEOC regulations provide that �in general, an

accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way things

are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy

equal employment opportunities.� See Appendix to Part 1630, at Section

1630.2(o). Any reasonable accommodation �should provide the qualified

individual with a disability with an equal employment opportunity� meaning

�an opportunity to attain the same level of performance, or to enjoy the

same level of benefits and privileges of employment as are available to

the average similarly situated employee without a disability.� Id. at

Section 1630.9. This section further indicates that, �the reasonable

accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers

to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability

are removed or alleviated...�

However, after careful review of the record, the Commission determines

that the facts of this case fail to demonstrate that night driving

creates a �barrier� to complainant's employment. The record reflects

that complainant works eight straight weeks on the day schedule, followed

by two weeks on an evening or night schedule, and that night driving is

therefore limited to these two week periods. Complainant contends that

she requires the requested accommodation because the glare from night

driving causes her eyes to itch, water, and dry-out, which increases

the chance of corneal graft rejection. However, in her affidavit,

complainant stated that night driving is not actually the issue,

but rather the risk of graft rejection. The May 10, 2002 physician's

letter complainant submits indicates that �It is reasonable to expect

that night driving is difficult at present due to glare;� however,

there is nothing in the record supporting a finding that night driving

would further injure complainant's eyes or increase the risk of graft

rejection. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence to indicate

that complainant's vision precludes her from legally driving at night.

In her affidavit, complainant states that night driving �puts a little

strain on my eyes,� and indicates that they hurt more after driving

at night. Although complainant argues on appeal that working at night

is also detrimental to her vision, record evidence fails to support

this contention. Complainant's physician indicates that complainant's

vision would be unaffected by the time of day once she was working inside

the facility. We also note record evidence reflects that after arriving

at the facility to work the night shift, complainant treats her eyes

with drops, which substantially corrects any ill-effect from the glare

experienced during her commute.

Under the circumstances of this case, where complainant's medical

documentation failed to confirm that driving to work at night (or working

the night shift) would result in an injury to her eyes, or increase the

risk of graft rejection, or that driving at night was unduly dangerous

or difficult, we find that the agency did not violate the Rehabilitation

Act when it denied complainant's request for a permanent daylight shift

as a reasonable accommodation for her vision impairment.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 30, 2005

__________________

Date

1The record reflects that complainant received a corneal transplant in

June 1998; and that complainant is �legally blind,� but has essentially

normal vision with the aid of specially fitted contact lens.

2On appeal, complainant contends that she requested a hearing, not a

final agency decision. However, the record contains documentation that

complainant requested a final agency decision on September 23, 2003.

3For the purposes of analysis only, the Commission will assume without

so finding, that complainant is a qualified individual with a disability.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g); 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m).

4The agency acknowledges three exceptions: a named manager and two

respiratory therapists working in the Intensive Care Unit under a separate

union agreement.