0120140934
11-16-2016
Kellye B.,1 Complainant, v. Robert McDonald, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Kellye B.,1
Complainant,
v.
Robert McDonald,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120140934
Hearing No. 450-2012-00260X
Agency No. 200P-0519-2012100310
DECISION
On December 23, 2013, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's November 27, 2013, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are (1) whether there are genuine issues of material fact that require a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ); and (2) whether the AJ properly found that Complainant did not establish that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when it issued her discipline and when it allegedly subjected her to a hostile work environment.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Staff Nuclear Medical Technologist at the West Texas VA Healthcare System in Big Spring, Texas. On January 23, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of sex (female) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when:
1. on August 26, 2010, the Supervisory Radiology Technologist (S1) issued Complainant a written counseling;
2. on December 1, 2010, S1 issued Complainant a written admonishment;
3. on July 27, 2011, S1 issued Complainant a written reprimand;
4. on October 24, 2011, S1 issued Complainant a five-day suspension, effective November 7 - 11, 2011;
5. on November 3, 2011, S1 rated Complainant unsatisfactory on her annual performance appraisal; and
6. on December 2, 2011, S1 denied Complainant's request to change her assignment of duties by lowering her workload to four patients per day.
In addition to accepting Complainant's harassment claim for investigation, the Agency accepted allegations 4, 5, and 6 as independent claims of discrimination. The Agency accepted allegations 1, 2, and 3 as part of the harassment claim but dismissed them as independent claims because Complainant did not raise the matters with an EEO Counselor in a timely manner. Complainant has not appealed the dismissal of these allegations as independent claims.
In March or April 2010, Complainant told S1 that she had gone into the break room when some other employees, including S1's husband and another individual (CW1), were watching television and that she had seen a sexually explicit image on the television. S1 stated in her affidavit that she notified the Chief of Diagnostic and Ancillary Services/Acting Chief of Staff (S2) of Complainant's allegation and spoke to CW1. According to S1, CW1 told her that a commercial had shown a blurred-out image of a naked man running and that S1's husband had left the break room before the commercial aired. S1 told CW1 to keep the television tuned to a news station.
On August 26, 2010, S1 issued a Written Counseling to Complainant for failure to carry out instructions regarding patient safety and for making false statements. S1 stated in the Memorandum that she had told Complainant "multiple times" that leaving a patient unattended during a procedure created a patient-safety issue; that Complainant had left a patient alone on a scanning table on August 25, 2010; and that Complainant had told S1 on August 25 that the Cardiopulmonary Supervisor (S3) had approved the over-booking of patients, but that S3 had denied doing so. In her affidavit, Complainant stated that she left the patient for a short time to seek assistance from a Cardiopulmonary Technician.
On October 12, 2010, Complainant injected a patient with a radioactive isotope and brought the patient to the Radiology waiting room. Complainant noticed that the patient was leaking blood, which was radioactive, from an IV onto the floor. She brought the patient to the restroom to get some towels and helped him to stop the bleeding. A housekeeper cleaned up the floor. S1 issued Complainant a December 1, 2010, Admonishment for failure to follow established procedures and failure to observe precaution for personal safety and/or use protective clothing or equipment. With respect to the October 12, 2010, blood spill, S1 stated that Complainant did not "follow established guidelines in isolating and decontaminating the contaminated area with radioactive material" and did not contact the Radiation Safety Officer. In addition, S1 stated that Complainant had not worn safety attire and had not washed her hands or used alcohol foam "after handling isotopes or patients" on October 22, 2010.
In June 2011, a clerk told Complainant that she smelled alcohol on a patient's breath. Complainant asked the patient questions in preparation for a stress test, and the patient stated that he had been to a late-night party. Complainant stated in her affidavit that the patient did not seem unstable and was not having any problems. She also stated that she started the patient's IV, escorted him to another room, and handed him a cup of water, which he "just spilled a little bit." Complainant acknowledged that she told an employee in the room that the patient was "tipsy," but she asserted that she was referring to the water spill. Other employees cancelled the patient's test. On July 27, 2011, S1 issued Complainant a Reprimand for lack of candor and failure to observe precaution for patient safety. According to the Reprimand, Complainant informed a coworker that the patient was "tipsy" but told her supervisor that the patient had not appeared to be intoxicated. In addition, the Reprimand stated that Complainant did not report the patient's state to a supervisor or physician on duty.
On August 30, 2011, Complainant prepared a patient for a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI). The patient had a carotid stent but did not have a device identification card for the stent. Complainant stated in her affidavit that she called a radiologist (D1) for advice, wrote down what he told her, and then told S1 what D1 said. S1 stated that Complainant told her that D1 said that the device was safe and that the patient could have the MRI. S1 told Complainant to check again with D1 and to note in the patient's chart that she had cleared the matter with D1. According to S1, D1 subsequently called her and informed her that he had told Complainant that the device may or may not be safe and that Complainant should consult S1. According to a Report of Contact that D1 completed, D1 told Complainant that stents are usually safe for MRIs but there was a protocol in place for dealing with such matters and Complainant should ask S1 about the protocol.
On October 21, 2011, S1 issued Complainant a Five-Day Suspension for negligent workmanship (patient safety) regarding the August 30, 2011, MRI matter. The suspension decision stated that Complainant failed to ensure a patient's safety by not following policy and instructions. In her affidavit, S1 stated that she issued the suspension because of the severity of Complainant's actions, which could have been fatal to a patient. She also stated that S2 and Human Resources personnel agreed with her decision. S2 stated in his affidavit that Complainant received the suspension because she had not followed protocol regarding a safety issue. He noted that Complainant had improved "tremendously" since then.
Complainant received her performance evaluation for the period October 1, 2010, to September 30, 2011, on November 2, 2011. S1 gave Complainant an overall "Unsatisfactory" rating. She rated Complainant "Exceptional" in two categories, "Fully Successful" in three categories, and "Less than Fully Successful" in one category: Safety. In the narrative portion of the evaluation, S1 stated that Complainant's "inappropriate variations from policies, procedures, and instructions" interfered with the completion of work and posed "potential risks to patients." In her affidavit, S1 noted that all of the discipline that Complainant received during the rating period concerned patient-safety issues.
In a September 29, 2011, e-mail to S1 and S2, Complainant expressed concern about her daily patient load and stated that she did not have any time to take breaks when she was responsible for procedures involving IVs. S1 replied that she would discuss the matter with S2 and another individual. In a subsequent reply, S1 stated that she had spoken with a named employee about not scheduling five patients routinely, that there were five patients scheduled for the following work day, that she would speak with someone about having Cardiology-Department employees start IVs, and that this should give Complainant time to take her breaks.
According to Complainant, she and S1 had other communications about the schedule. Complainant stated that she did not object to handling five patients when necessary but she did not want to have that workload routinely. Complainant also stated that S1 sent her a December 2, 2011, e-mail that inaccurately indicated that S1 and Complainant had spoken about the matter. S1 stated that S2 had wanted to increase the Nuclear Medicine Department's workload because the Department's productivity was below its target level. In addition, S1 stated that two Nuclear Medicine technicians who had worked in the Department before Complainant had not experienced problems handling five patients per day. S1 remembered talking with Complainant about finding ways to work the schedule, but she did not remember Complainant specifically asking her to reduce the number of patients to four. S1 asserted that they did not need to lower Complainant's workload because the solution was a matter of rearranging the types of studies that were scheduled at different times and working on Complainant's efficiency.
Complainant further alleged that the Agency subjected her to a pattern of harassment in retaliation for reporting the Spring 2010 television incident. S1 and S2, who acknowledged that they were aware of Complainant's complaint about the incident, denied that they took the actions at issue in retaliation for the complaint.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the Report of Investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. In an August 14, 2012, Acknowledgement and Order, the AJ informed the parties that either party could file a motion for summary judgment within fifteen days of the close of discovery and that the opposing party would have fifteen days from receipt of the motion within which to file a response. The Agency filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 30, 2012. Complainant did not file a response to the Agency's Motion.2 The AJ issued a Summary Decision in favor of the Agency on October 22, 2013.
In her decision, the AJ concluded that summary judgment was appropriate in this case. The AJ found that the evidence did not establish that the actions at issue occurred because of Complainant's sex or protected EEO activity. She also found that they did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment. In addition, the AJ found that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Complainant's suspension, performance appraisal, and workload. The AJ concluded that Complainant did not identify any material facts to dispute the articulated reasons or to show that the reasons were a pretext for discrimination.
The Agency issued a final order fully implementing the AJ's finding that Complainant did not prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. This appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant encloses a copy of her Pre-Hearing Report and states that she did not know that she needed to respond to the Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment. She alleges that S1 issued progressive discipline to her in retaliation for her complaint regarding the television incident. In addition, Complaint asserts that the Agency does not have a policy regarding patients who have consumed alcohol, that she did not receive training on MRI procedures, and that her workload was excessive. She also argues that S1 violated the collective bargaining agreement by not showing supervisory notes to Complainant and by not implementing progressive discipline in accordance with the agreement. Complainant contends that discipline should be corrective rather than punitive.
In response, the Agency argues that the AJ's decision was correct and should be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapt. 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Decision without a Hearing
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).
In this case, we find that the AJ's decision to issue a decision without a hearing was appropriate. The record has been adequately developed, and Complainant was given notice of the Agency's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although Complainant was not required to file a response to the Agency's Motion, she had an opportunity to do so. To the extent that Complainant argues that she was unaware of her right to reply to the Agency's Motion, we note that the AJ's Acknowledgement and Order expressly stated that a party would have fifteen days within which to file a response to a motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even assuming all facts in the light most favorable to Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor. There being no genuine issue of material fact, nor need for credibility determinations, a decision without a hearing was appropriate.
Disparate Treatment and Hostile Work Environment
Legal Standards
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant generally must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Complainant can do this by showing that the proffered explanations are unworthy of credence or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the Agency. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep't of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [a complainant's] employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment." The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive" and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at 23.
To establish a claim of harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she is a member of a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the protected class; (4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11. The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994) (Enforcement Guidance on Harris). The evaluation "requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
The statutory anti-retaliation provisions prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). Although petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable, adverse actions such as reprimands, threats, negative evaluations, and harassment are actionable. Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, EEOC Notice No. 915.004 (Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation), at � II.B (Aug. 25, 2016). Retaliatory harassing conduct is actionable if it is sufficiently material to deter protected activity, even if it is insufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. Id. at II.B.3.
Findings
We find that the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. According to the August 26, 2010, Written Counseling, S1 issued the counseling because Complainant left a patient alone on a scanning table. S1 stated in the December 1, 2010, Admonishment that Complainant had not followed established guidelines for decontaminating an area on October 12, 2010, and had not worn safety attire or used alcohol foam on October 22, 2010. She stated in the July 27, 2011, Reprimand that Complainant did not report a patient's intoxicated state to a supervisor or physician, and she explained in her affidavit that she issued the October 21, 2011, Five-Day Suspension because Complainant's actions could have been fatal to a patient. Similarly, S1 explained that Complainant received a "Less than Fully Successful" rating in Safety and an overall "Unsatisfactory" rating in her performance evaluation because all of the discipline that Complainant received during the rating period concerned patient-safety issues. Finally, noting that S2 had wanted to increase the Nuclear Medicine Department's workload, S1 asserted that the Agency did not need to reduce Complainant's workload because it could solve the problem by rearranging studies and working on Complainant's efficiency.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, we find that Complainant has not established that the articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Complainant has not shown that the Agency's explanations are unworthy of credence. For example, she has acknowledged that she left a patient unattended on a scanning table and that she used the word "tipsy" when referring to another patient. Although Complainant asserts that she did not receive training on MRI procedures and that a housekeeper cleaned up the spilled contaminated blood, she has not shown that her actions complied with Agency guidelines. Similarly, she has not shown that her safety record merited a higher rating on her performance evaluation or that S1 erroneously stated that the Agency could address Complainant's workload by rearranging the types of studies that were scheduled at different times. Complainant's claims that the Agency's actions violated the collective bargaining agreement do not establish a violation here, where there is no evidence that other employees engaged in conduct similar to hers but were not disciplined.
Further, Complainant has not shown that discriminatory animus more likely motivated the Agency's actions. Although Complainant has alleged that S1 took the actions at issue because of her complaint about the television matter, the evidence does not support that allegation. The time period between the March or April 2010 complaint and the challenged disciplinary actions is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact here, where the evidence clearly establishes that the Agency took the actions because of Complainant's safety record. Complainant has explained the reasons for her conduct, but she has not created a genuine issue of fact concerning the Agency's explanations for its actions.
Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, we find that the evidence does not establish that the Agency took the actions at issue because of Complainant's sex or prior protected EEO activity. A finding of discriminatory harassment is precluded based on our determination that Complainant did not show that the Agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not demonstrated that the Agency subjected her to a hostile work environment based sex or in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that this case presented no genuine issues of material fact, such that summary judgment was appropriate, and that Complainant has not established that the Agency subjected her to harassment or discrimination on the basis of sex or in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
_11/16/16_________________
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
2 In a December 5, 2012, Order Regarding Accepted Issues, the AJ noted that Complainant had submitted an e-mail request to amend her complaint to include an incident that occurred on December 3, 2012. The AJ denied Complainant's request and advised Complainant to file a new EEO complaint with the Agency.
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