Kelly Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 12, 2019

368 N.L.R.B. 130 (N.L.R.B. 2019)

368 NLRB No. 130
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Kelly Services, Inc. and T. Jason Noye. Case 04–CA–
171036
December 12, 2019
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN,
EMANUEL, AND KAPLAN
On May 23, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Robert
A. Giannasi issued the attached decision. The Respond-
ent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs,
and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions1 only to the extent consistent with
this Decision and Order.2
On March 30, 2017, pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(9)
of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the parties submit-
ted a joint motion and stipulation of facts, in which they
jointly moved to waive a hearing and authorize the judge
to issue a decision based on the stipulation of facts and
the parties’ briefs. By order dated March 31, 2017,
Judge Giannasi granted the parties’ joint motion. Based

1 Applying the Board’s decisions in D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB
2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013),
and Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB 774 (2014), enf. denied in rele-
vant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), the judge found that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing
a mandatory arbitration policy that requires employees, as a condition
of employment, to waive their rights to pursue class or collective ac-
tions involving employment-related claims in all forums, whether arbi-
tral or judicial. On May 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a decision
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612, a consol-
idated proceeding including review of court decisions below in Lewis v.
Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), Morris v. Ernst &
Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.
NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015). Epic Systems concerned the
issue, common to all three cases, whether employer-employee agree-
ments that contain class- and collective-action waivers and require
individualized arbitration violate the Act. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1619–
1621, 1632. The Supreme Court held that such employment agree-
ments do not violate the Act and that the agreements must be enforced
as written pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Id. at 1619,
1632. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems, which
overrules the Board’s holding in Murphy Oil USA, Inc., we conclude
that the complaint allegation that the arbitration agreement is unlawful
based on Murphy Oil must be dismissed.
2 We shall modify the recommended Order to conform to the viola-
tions found and in accordance with Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB
17 (1997). We shall substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as
modified.
on the factual stipulations, the parties agreed that the
legal issue to be resolved was, in relevant part, whether
the Respondent’s maintenance of a mandatory arbitration
agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it
“interferes with and restricts employee[s’] access to
Board processes by prohibiting [them] from receiving
backpay or other monetary compensation through Board
proceedings.” The judge answered that question in the
affirmative, and we agree for the reasons set forth be-
low.3
Since on or about September 5, 2015, the Respondent
has maintained, as a condition of employment for all
employees, a corporate-wide policy called the Dispute
Resolution and Mutual Agreement to Binding Arbitration
(“arbitration agreement” or “agreement”). In pertinent
part, the agreement contains the following provisions:
1. Agreement to Arbitrate. Kelly Services, Inc.
(“Kelly Services”) and I agree to use binding arbitra-
tion, instead of going to court, for any “Covered
Claims” that arise between me and Kelly Services, its
related and affiliated companies, and/or any current or
former employee of Kelly Services or any related or af-
filiated company.
2. Claims Subject to Agreement. The “Covered
Claims” under this Agreement shall include all com-
mon-law and statutory claims relating to my employ-
ment, including, but not limited to, any claim for
breach of contract, unpaid wages, wrongful termina-

3 The judge also found that the agreement violated Sec. 8(a)(1) be-
cause it was ambiguous as to whether employees retained the right to
file charges with the Board. In our view, that finding is outside the
scope of the stipulated issue; therefore, we do not pass on it. We ex-
press no opinion whether Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363 NLRB No. 128
(2016), on which the judge and our colleague rely, was correctly decid-
ed, but we note that the parties in that case broadly stipulated that the
issue to be decided was whether the employer’s maintenance of the
arbitration agreement “violate[d] . . . the Act because employees would
reasonably conclude that [its] provisions . . . preclude them from filing
unfair labor practice charges with the Board . . . .” Id., slip op. at 8 fn.
20 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Here, in contrast, the stipulated issue is much narrower: whether the
arbitration agreement interferes with employees’ access to the Board in
a particular way.
Member McFerran would affirm the judge’s finding on this point.
In her view, the stipulation fairly encompasses the question whether the
arbitration policy interfered with employees’ right to file charges. As
her colleagues recognize, an express limit on employees’ ability to
obtain a Board remedy reasonably inhibits those employees from filing
charges at all. See, e.g., Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363 NLRB No. 128, slip
op. at 2 (2016) (policy language stating that arbitration was the “sole
and exclusive remedy” for covered disputes reasonably cast doubt on
employees’ ability to file unfair labor practice charges, notwithstanding
additional policy language purporting to preserve access to the Board).
That connection suffices both to bring the charge-filing issue within the
scope of the stipulated issue and to affirm the judge’s finding.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
tion, unfair competition, and for violation of laws for-
bidding discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on
the basis of race, color, religion, gender, age, national
origin, disability, and any other protected status. I un-
derstand and agree that arbitration is the only fo-
rum for resolving Covered Claims, and that both
Kelly Services and I hereby waive the right to a trial
before a judge or jury in federal or state court in fa-
vor of arbitration for Covered Claims. [Emphasis in
original.]
3. Exclusions from Agreement. The Covered Claims
under this Agreement do not include claims for em-
ployee benefits pursuant to Kelly Services’ ERISA
plans, worker’s compensation claims, unemployment
compensation claims, unfair competition claims, and
solicitation claims. Any claim that cannot be required
to be arbitrated as a matter of law also is not a Covered
Claim under this Agreement. Furthermore, nothing in
this Agreement prohibits me or Kelly Services from
seeking emergency or temporary injunctive relief in a
court of law in accordance with applicable law (how-
ever, after the court has issued a ruling concerning the
emergency or temporary injunctive relief, both I and
Kelly Services are required to submit the dispute to ar-
bitration pursuant to this Agreement). I also understand
that I am not barred from filing an administrative
charge with such governmental agencies as the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), the Department of
Labor ("DOL"), and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") or similar state agencies,
but I understand that I am giving up the opportunity to
recover monetary amounts from such charges (e.g.,
NLRB or EEOC). In other words, I must pursue any
claim for monetary relief through arbitration under this
Agreement. [Italics added.]
The Judge’s Findings
The judge found, in relevant part, that the agreement’s
restriction on monetary relief violated Section 8(a)(1) by
precluding full recourse to the Board. He reasoned that it
was difficult to envision how the Board could be pre-
cluded from exercising its full statutory powers, includ-
ing its remedial authority, once its processes have been
invoked. The judge noted that the Board’s remedies of-
ten provide for backpay to make employees whole, and
that backpay is “a specific statutory remedy set forth in
Section 10(c) of the Act.” The judge also observed that
“[b]ecause the Board enforces public, not private, rights,
it is doubtful that any private rule could preclude the
Board from providing a monetary remedy authorized by
a statute of the United States.”
The Parties’ Arguments
The Respondent argues that the section of the agree-
ment’s Exclusions paragraph that prohibits employees
from recovering backpay or other monetary compensa-
tion through Board proceedings is lawful because (1)
although Board law prohibits restricting access to the
Board’s processes, backpay is a remedy, not a process;
(2) claims arising under a statute can be resolved through
arbitration; (3) Section 10(a) of the Act recognizes the
existence of agreed-upon methods of resolving unfair
labor practices, and Section 9(a) preserves employees’
right, as individuals, to present and adjust grievances at
any time; (4) Board precedent embraces deferral to arbi-
tration; and (5) Board practices allow for Board and non-
Board settlements, which are the outcome of negotiations
and which often result in discriminatees’ receiving less
than full backpay.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party argue
that the waiver of the right to a monetary recovery
through Board proceedings and the requirement that em-
ployees “pursue any claim for monetary relief through
arbitration under this Agreement” would lead reasonable
employees to believe that filing unfair labor practice
charges with the Board is futile. They further argue that
the Board’s remedies for unfair labor practices are not
separate from, but are part and parcel of, the Board’s
processes. Finally, they dispute the Respondent’s con-
tentions that the Board’s deferral and settlement policies
support a finding that the Exclusions paragraph is lawful.
Applicable Law
The judge analyzed the arbitration agreement under
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646
(2004), which was extant law at the time the judge issued
his decision. However, in Boeing Co., 365 NLRB No.
154 (2017), the Board overruled the “reasonably con-
strue” prong of Lutheran Heritage and held that in con-
sidering whether an employer has lawfully maintained a
facially neutral policy, rule, or handbook provision, the
Board will evaluate (1) the nature and extent of the rule’s
potential impact on NLRA rights, and (2) legitimate jus-
tifications associated with the rule. Id., slip op. 3. In so
doing, the Board will “‘strike the proper balance between
. . . asserted business justifications and the invasion of
employee rights in light of the Act and its policy,’” view-
ing the rule from the employees’ perspective. Id. (quot-
ing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33–
34 (1967) (emphasis omitted). “As the result of this bal-
ancing, . . . the Board will delineate three categories” of
work rules:
 Category I will include rules that the Board des-
ignates as lawful to maintain, either because (i)
KELLY SERVICES INC. 3
the rule, when reasonably interpreted, does not
prohibit or interfere with the exercise of NLRA
rights; or (ii) the potential adverse impact on
protected rights is outweighed by justifications
associated with the rule . . . .
 Category 2 will include rules that warrant indi-
vidualized scrutiny in each case as to whether
the rule would prohibit or interfere with NLRA
rights, and if so, whether any adverse impact on
NLRA-protected conduct is outweighed by le-
gitimate justifications.
 Category 3 will include rules that the Board will
designate as unlawful to maintain because they
would prohibit or limit NLRA-protected con-
duct, and the adverse impact on NLRA rights is
not outweighed by justifications associated with
the rule.
Id., slip op. at 3–4 (emphasis in original).
Recently, in Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley, LLC,
368 NLRB No. 10 (2019), the Board applied Boeing and
found that although the arbitration agreement at issue did
not explicitly prohibit the filing of a charge, “when rea-
sonably interpreted, [it] interfere[d] with the exercise of
the right to file charges with the Board.” Id., slip op. at
6. Further, the Board concluded that “as a matter of law,
there is not and cannot be any legitimate justification for
provisions, in an arbitration agreement or otherwise, that
restrict employees’ access to the Board or its processes.”
Id. Finally, the Board placed provisions that restrict em-
ployees’ access to the Board by making arbitration the
exclusive forum for the resolution of all claims in Boeing
Category 3, which designates rules and policies that are
unlawful to maintain. Id. at 7.
Analysis
We find that the Respondent’s arbitration agreement is
unlawful on two grounds. First, applying Boeing and
Prime Healthcare, we find that the agreement restricts
access to the Board and its processes by prohibiting em-
ployees from receiving backpay or other monetary com-
pensation through Board proceedings.4 For this reason,
the agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) as alleged. Sec-
ond, the agreement is contrary to policies embedded in
Section 10 of the Act. It impermissibly seeks to limit the
Board in effectuating the policies of the Act, in the pub-
lic interest, through the exercise of its remedial powers
under Section 10(c). Moreover, because the agreement
seeks to limit the Board’s exercise of its remedial powers

4 Member McFerran acknowledges that Boeing is currently govern-
ing law and joins the majority for institutional reasons, but she adheres
to and reiterates her dissent in that case.
and those powers are part of the Board’s broader power
to prevent unfair labor practices, the agreement is also
contrary to Section 10(a) of the Act. We consider these
grounds in turn.
Preliminarily, we recognize that the Respondent’s
agreement differs from the arbitration agreement at issue
in Prime Healthcare, which, when reasonably interpret-
ed, restricted the filing of charges with the Board by
making arbitration the exclusive forum for claims arising
under the NLRA. In contrast, the agreement at issue here
expressly allows employees to file charges with the
Board.5 Recently, we found lawful an arbitration agree-
ment that contained a sufficiently prominent “savings
clause” preserving employees’ rights to file a Board
charge or participate in any Board investigation or pro-
ceeding. Briad Wenco, LLC d/b/a Wendy’s Restaurant,
368 NLRB No. 72 (2019). We need not determine, how-
ever, whether the “savings clause” in the instant case
passes muster under Briad Wenco because the agreement
at issue here contains other language that renders it mate-
rially different from the arbitration agreement in that
case.
The Respondent’s agreement requires employees to
“giv[e] up the opportunity to recover monetary amounts
from [unfair labor practice] charges . . . . In other words,
[they] must pursue any claim for monetary relief through
arbitration under this Agreement.” Under the agreement,
the Respondent’s employees are prohibited from recover-
ing backpay or other monetary remedies ordered by the
Board. In Prime Healthcare, however, we held that
“Section 7 of the Act protects the right of employees to
utilize the Board’s processes,” 368 NLRB No. 10, slip
op. at 4, and the right to utilize those processes includes
the right to invoke the exercise of the Board’s statutory
powers under Section 10 of the Act, including its power
to determine appropriate relief for violations found. Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act grants the Board “broad, discretion-
ary” authority to order remedies that will “effectuate the
policies” of the Act, including backpay. See 29 U.S.C.
§160(c); NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S.
258, 262–263 (1969) (citing Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964)). By making it
impossible to receive Board-ordered backpay, the
agreement interferes with employees’ access to this as-
pect of the Board’s processes.
Moreover, we agree with the General Counsel and
Charging Party that because the agreement makes it im-
possible to obtain a monetary remedy from the Board, it
undermines the incentive to file a charge in the first

5 On the other hand, by prohibiting employees from securing any
monetary remedy from the Board, the agreement removes much of the
incentive to file a charge in the first place.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
place, notwithstanding language in the agreement that
employees are not barred from doing so. And for the
reasons we explained in Prime Healthcare, any interfer-
ence with Board charge filing is unacceptable because
without a charge, the Board is powerless to issue com-
plaint. See 368 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 4-5; Nash v.
Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 238
(1967) (“Implementation of the Act is dependent upon
the initiative of individual persons who must . . . invoke
its sanctions through filing an unfair labor practice
charge.”); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Ship-
building Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968) (“The policy
of keeping people ‘completely free from coercion’ []
against making complaints to the Board is . . . important
in the functioning of the Act as an organic whole.”)
(quoting Nash, 389 U.S. at 238). For this reason as well,
we find that the agreement interferes with employees’
access to the Board and its processes.
Even assuming that under the Respondent’s agree-
ment, arbitrators would invariably award employees the
same compensation the Board would order,6 employees’
right to utilize the Board’s processes would still be im-
paired. A Board order awarding backpay is enforceable
in the Federal courts of appeals, and a court-enforced
Board order may furnish the basis for a petition to hold a
noncomplying employer in civil contempt. Under the
Respondent’s agreement, employees would not have the
benefit of these further processes.
For these reasons, the language in the Exclusions para-
graph at issue here belongs squarely within Category 3 of
Boeing because, as we stated in Prime Healthcare, “it
significantly impair[s] employee rights, the free exercise
of which is vital to the implementation of the statutory
scheme established by Congress in the National Labor
Relations Act[, and n]o legitimate justification out-
weighs, or could outweigh, the adverse impact of such
provisions on employee rights and the administration of
the Act.” Id., slip op. at 7.
Additionally, the agreement’s prohibition on employ-
ees receiving Board-ordered remedies also carries with it
a reciprocal limitation on the Board’s exercise of its
power to award those remedies: even if the filing of a

6 The arbitration agreement does not state that the remedies availa-
ble under that agreement would differ from those available pursuant to
the statutes under which claims submitted to arbitration would arise,
including the NLRA, and we do not assume that such statutory reme-
dies are unavailable in the Respondent’s arbitral forum. We do note,
however, that if and to the extent they are, the arbitration agreement
would present another difficulty, since the Federal Arbitration Act does
not compel enforcement of arbitration agreements that require a pro-
spective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies. See
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 235-
236 (2013) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 fn. 19 (1985)).
charge ultimately resulted in a Board-ordered backpay
remedy, the Board would order that remedy in vain if the
charging party cannot accept it. Further, this limitation is
not a merely private matter affecting only the private
rights of the Respondent’s employees. Although a back-
pay remedy compensates employees for losses caused by
unfair labor practices, Board-awarded backpay is unlike
court-awarded damages in litigation. In the latter, plain-
tiffs seek to vindicate private rights by securing compen-
sation for their injuries, including lost income resulting
from employment discrimination. In contrast, Board
proceedings, and Board-ordered remedies, serve a public
purpose. Section 10(c) of the Act empowers the Board,
among other things, to require violators “to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with . . . backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this
Act” (emphasis added). In turn, Section 1 of the Act de-
clares it “to be the policy of the United States to elimi-
nate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred . . . by pro-
tecting the exercise by workers” of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act. Consistent with these statutory
provisions, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“[m]aking . . . workers whole for losses suffered on ac-
count of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication
of the public policy which the Board enforces.” Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941); see
also NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175
(2d Cir. 1965) (stating that Board-ordered backpay “has
the twofold purpose of reimbursing employees for actual
losses suffered as a result of a discriminatory discharge
and of furthering the public interest in deterring such
discharges”).7 And the Board itself has long recognized
that it performs its function “in the public interest and not
in vindication of private rights.” Robinson Freight Lines,
117 NLRB 1483, 1485 (1957). It is therefore apparent
that the Exclusions paragraph of the Respondent’s arbi-
tration agreement does not merely entail loss of access
by employees to Board-ordered monetary remedies. It
also constitutes an attempt to limit the Board’s exercise
of its powers in the public interest under Section 10(c) of
the Act.8

7 See also Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York, 309 U.S. 261, 265 (1940) (“The Board as a public agency
acting in the public interest, not any private person or group, not any
employee or group of employees, is chosen as the instrument to assure
protection from the described unfair conduct in order to remove ob-
structions to interstate commerce.”).
8 We are aware that arbitration agreements often contain provisions,
like the one at issue here, that make damages recoverable in the arbitral
forum only. But such a provision as applied to the Board raises issues
that do not arise with respect to other Federal agencies, such as the
KELLY SERVICES INC. 5
Moreover, the Board’s remedial powers are an aspect
of its broader power to prevent unfair labor practices, and
Congress has provided that this broader power “shall not
be affected by any other means of adjustment or preven-
tion that has been or may be established by agreement,
law, or otherwise.” Sec. 10(a) of the Act (emphasis add-
ed). Accordingly, the portion of the Exclusions para-
graph at issue here contravenes Section 10(a) as well as
Section 10(c).
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Exclusions
paragraph of the Respondent’s arbitration agreement is
unlawful because it restricts employees’ access to the
Board and its processes, it purports to circumscribe the
exercise of the Board’s remedial powers in the public
interest under Section 10(c) of the Act, and it seeks to
limit the Board’s power to prevent unfair labor practices
contrary to Section 10(a) of the Act. Inherent in these
findings are both our rejection of the Respondent’s ar-
guments that backpay is a “remedy, not a Board pro-
cess,” and our understanding that Section 10(a) of the
Act recognizes the existence of agreed-upon methods of
resolving unfair labor practices. Indeed, as shown, Sec-
tion 10(a) militates against the Respondent’s position.9
We find equally unavailing the Respondent’s reliance
on Section 9(a) of the Act. That section preserves the
individual right of an employee to present a grievance
directly to the employer despite being represented by an
exclusive collective-bargaining representative and de-

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor (WHD). This stems from
the fact that laws administered by these agencies (such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act) provide ag-
grieved individuals a private right of action and vindicate private rights
in addition to public rights; whereas there is no private right of action
under the NLRA, and the General Counsel litigates a charging party’s
claim—if he deems it to have merit—“in the public interest and not in
vindication of private rights.” Robinson Freight Lines, supra. Thus, as
applied to claims within the purview of the EEOC or WHD, a provision
like the one at issue here merely substitutes an arbitral for a judicial
forum as the venue within which to seek a private monetary remedy.
But as applied to claims arising under the NLRA, the Respondent’s
agreement substitutes a private remedy for one that Congress intended
would primarily serve the public interest, and an arbitral remedy for
one ordered by the Board as the “instrument” created by Congress “to
assure protection from . . . unfair conduct in order to remove obstruc-
tions to interstate commerce.” Amalgamated Utility Workers, supra.
9 We have no quarrel with the Respondent’s contention that claims
arising under a statute can be resolved through arbitration. It is not the
fact that the Respondent’s agreement requires claims arising under the
Act to be arbitrated that renders it unlawful. The arbitration agreement
at issue in Briad Wenco, supra, also required as much, but that agree-
ment was found lawful based on a sufficiently prominent “savings
clause” that preserved employees’ rights to file a Board charge or par-
ticipate in any Board investigation or proceeding. The Respondent’s
agreement also contains a savings clause, which is not at issue. Never-
theless, for the reasons explained above, we have found that the agree-
ment as currently drafted may not be lawfully maintained.
spite the existence of a collectively-bargained agreement,
so long as certain conditions are met. It has nothing to
do with an arbitration agreement between an employer
and its unrepresented employees and is therefore inappo-
site to the Exclusions paragraph.
Finally, we reject the Respondent’s attempts to justify
the Exclusions paragraph based on the Board’s discre-
tionary practice of deferring to arbitration10 and its prac-
tice of permitting parties to settle unfair labor practice
charges. Nothing in that paragraph or elsewhere in the
arbitration agreement allows for Board review of an arbi-
tral decision; to the contrary, the agreement provides for
“binding” arbitration. In contrast, under its deferral
precedent, the Board has long and consistently reserved
to itself the right to review arbitral decisions to ensure
certain criteria have been met. See Babcock & Wilcox
Construction Co., 361 NLRB 1127 (2014) (postarbitral
deferral); Olin Corp., 268 NLRB 573 (1984) (same);
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955) (same); Col-
lyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971) (providing
for pre-arbitral deferral but retaining jurisdiction to en-
sure conformity with the standards set forth in Spiel-
berg).11 In the case of settlements, the settling parties
effectively negotiate a resolution, but the Board retains
jurisdiction and applies a reasonableness standard to en-
sure the vindication of Section 7 rights. See Independent
Stave, 287 NLRB 740 (1987). The procedures set forth
in the Respondent’s arbitration agreement, and imposed
as a condition of employment, are not analogous.12
Accordingly, we find that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining the arbitration
agreement.

10 The Board’s policy of deferring to certain labor arbitration deci-
sions is informed by Section 203(d) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act, which states that “[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement.” 29 U.S.C. §173(d). Here,
there is no collective-bargaining agreement to apply or interpret.
11 In Babcock & Wilcox the Board changed the standards under
which arbitral decisions are reviewed and shifted the burden of proof
from the opponent to the proponent of deferral, overruling Olin and
Spielberg. We are willing to reconsider Babcock & Wilcox in a future
appropriate case.
12 The Respondent’s observation that particular backpay amounts
may be “subject to negotiation” both inside and outside of the Board’s
processes misses the point. The Respondent’s agreement is unlawful
because it restricts employees’ access to the Board’s processes, includ-
ing Board-ordered monetary remedies, and in doing so, effectively
restricts the Board’s remedial authority. That negotiation of specific
remedial amounts may occur in settlement discussions once the Board’s
processes have been engaged plainly does not justify precluding em-
ployees’ full access to those processes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by maintaining a mandatory arbitration policy that bars
or restricts the right of employees to obtain remedies,
including backpay where appropriate, from the National
Labor Relations Board.
2. The above violation constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of the Act.
ORDER
The Respondent, Kelly Services, Inc., East Brunswick,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration policy that
bars or restricts the right of employees to recover back-
pay or other monetary remedies from the National Labor
Relations Board.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the Dispute Resolution and Mutual
Agreement to Binding Arbitration, or revise it to make it
clear to employees that the Agreement does not consti-
tute a waiver of their right to recover backpay or other
monetary remedies from the National Labor Relations
Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign or otherwise became bound to the Dis-
pute Resolution and Mutual Agreement to Binding Arbi-
tration in any form that it has been rescinded or revised
and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised
agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
all facilities where the Dispute Resolution and Mutual
Agreement to Binding Arbitration applies copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an in-

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
ternet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respond-
ent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. If the Respond-
ent has gone out of business or closed any facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall dupli-
cate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at the closed facility or facilities at
any time since September 5, 2015.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 4 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 12, 2019
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
________________________________________
William J. Emanuel Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
KELLY SERVICES INC. 7
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration policy
that bars or restricts your right to recover backpay or
other monetary remedies from the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain or coerce you in the exercise or the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the Dispute Resolution and Mutual
Agreement to Binding Arbitration, or revise it to make
clear to all employees that the agreement does not restrict
their right to recover backpay or other monetary reme-
dies from the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign or otherwise became bound to the
Dispute Resolution and Mutual Agreement to Binding
Arbitration in any form that it has been rescinded or re-
vised and, if revised, WE WILL provide them a copy of the
revised agreement.
KELLY SERVICES, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-171036 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Lea Alvo-Sadiky, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Esq. (Seyfarth Shaw LLP), for the
Respondent.
Marielle Macher, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was submitted to me by virtue of a joint motion and stipulation
pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(9) of the Board’s Rules and Reg-
ulations. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining as a condition of em-
ployment for all employees an arbitration agreement that (1)
requires employees to waive their right to maintain class or
collective actions in all forums, whether arbitrator or judicial,
with respect to their wages, hours or other terms and conditions
of employment; and (2) restricts employee access to Board
processes by prohibiting employees from receiving back pay or
other monetary compensation through Board proceedings.
Respondent filed an answer denying the essential allegations in
the complaint. All parties filed briefs in support of their posi-
tions.1
Based on the stipulation and the stipulated record, as well as
the briefs of the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a corporation with facilities located through-
out the United States, including an office and place of business
in East Brunswick, New Jersey, and has been engaged in
providing temporary staffing to employers. In conducting its
operations during the past 12-month period, Respondent pro-
vided services valued in excess of $50,000 to customers located
outside the State of New Jersey. At all times, Respondent has
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Since at least September 5, 2015, Respondent, on a corpo-
rate-wide basis, has maintained as a condition of employment
for all employees a “Dispute Resolution and Mutual Agreement
to Binding Arbitration” (herein Arbitration Agreement, and in
the record as Joint Exhibit 6) which includes, inter alia, the
following provisions:
1. Agreement to Arbitrate. Kelly Services, Inc. (“Kelly
Services”) and I agree to use binding arbitration instead of go-
ing to court, for any “Covered claims that arise between me
and Kelly Services, its related and affiliated companies,
and/or any current or former employee of Kelly Services or
any related or affiliated company.
2. Claims Subject to Agreement. The “Covered Claims”
under this Agreement shall include all common-law and statu-
tory claims relating to my employment, including, but not
limited to, any claim for breach of contract, unpaid wages,
wrongful termination, unfair competition, and for violation of
laws forbidding discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on
the basis of race, color, religion, gender, age, national origin,
disability, and any other protected status. I understand and
agree that arbitration is the only forum for resolving Cov-
ered Claims, and that both Kelly Services and I hereby
waive the right to a trial before a judge or jury in federal
or state court in favor of arbitration for Covered Claims.
(Emphasis in original)
3. Exclusions from Agreement. The Covered Claims under
this Agreement do not include claims for employee benefits
pursuant to Kelly Services’ ERISA plans, workers’ compen-
sation claims, unemployment compensation claims, unfair

1 The parties agreed that their Stipulation of Facts, with attached ex-
hibits, constitutes the entire record in this case and that no oral testimo-
ny is necessary or desired.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
competition claims, and solicitation claims. Any claim that
cannot be required to be arbitrated as a matter of law also is
not a Covered Claim under this Agreement. Furthermore,
nothing in this Agreement prohibits me or Kelly Services
from seeking emergency or temporary injunctive relief in a
court of law in accordance with applicable law (however, af-
ter the court has issued a ruling concerning the emergency or
temporary injunctive relief, both I and Kelly Services are re-
quired to submit the dispute to arbitration pursuant to this
Agreement). I also understand that I am not barred from fil-
ing an administrative charge with such governmental agencies
as the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), the De-
partment of Labor (“DOL”) and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (“EEOC”) or similar state agencies,
but I understand that I am giving up the opportunity to recover
monetary amounts from such charges (e.g., NLRB or EEOC).
In other words, I must pursue any claim for monetary relief
through arbitration under this Agreement.
8. Waiver of Class and Collective Claims. Both Kelly Ser-
vices and I also agree that all claims subject to this agreement
will be arbitrated only on an individual basis, and that both
Kelly Services and I waive the right to participate in or re-
ceive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or
representative proceeding. No party may bring a claim on
behalf of other individuals, and no Arbitrator hearing any
claim under this agreement may: (i) combine more than one
individual’s claim or claims into a single case; (ii) order, re-
quire, participate in or facilitate production of class-wide con-
tact information or notification of others of potential claims;
or (iii) arbitrate any form of class, collective, or representative
proceeding.
16. Savings Clause & Conformity Clause. If any provision
of this Agreement is determined to be unenforceable or in
conflict with a mandatory provision of applicable law, it shall
be construed to incorporate any mandatory provision and/or
the unenforceable or conflicting provision shall be automati-
cally severed and the remainder of the Agreement shall not be
affected. Provided, however, that if the Waiver of Class and
Collective Claims is found to be unenforceable, then any
claim brought on a class, collective or representative action
basis must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
such court shall be the exclusive form for such claims.
All documents attached as exhibits are true and correct cop-
ies of the documents described. The parties agree to the au-
thenticity of the exhibits.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Based on the above factual stipulations, the parties agree that
the legal issues to be resolved in this matter are whether Re-
spondent’s maintenance of the Arbitration Agreement de-
scribed above violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it (i)
interferes with Respondent’s employees’ rights to engage in
protected concerted activity by requiring them to waive their
right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial, with respect to their wages, hours
or other terms and conditions of employment; and (ii) interferes
with and restricts employees access to Board processes by pro-
hibiting Respondent’s employees from receiving backpay or
other monetary compensation through Board proceedings.
ANALYSIS
Waiver of Collective Actions
The Board has held that employer rules prohibiting employ-
ees, as a condition of employment, from pursuing collective
actions in arbitrations or law suits violate Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act because they interfere with collective rights set forth in
Section 7 of the Act. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277
(2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F. 3d 344 (5th Cir.
2013); and Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014)
enf. denied 808 F. 3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted 137
S.Ct. 809 (2017). See also Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted 137 U.S. 809 (2017).
Paragraph 8 of the Arbitration Agreement, which is a condi-
tion of employment, clearly precludes employees from pursu-
ing employment-related class or collective actions both in arbi-
trations and in court proceedings. Thus, the Board’s rulings in
D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil require me to find that the Arbi-
tration Agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.2
Restriction Against Filing Board Charges That Could Provide
Monetary Remedies
The Board has held that a mandatory arbitration policy such
as the one in this case discussed above also violates Section
8(a)(1) if employees “would reasonably believe that the policy
interferes with their ability to file a Board charge or otherwise
access the Board’s processes.” Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363
NLRB No. 128, slip op. 1 (2016). In that case, the employer
argued, as Respondent does here, that another part of the policy
provided an adequate defense to the alleged violation because it
permitted employees to file charges with the Board. But the
Board rejected that defense because, overall, the policy broadly
required arbitration for all employment-related disputes, and
the reference to filing charges made the policy ambiguous. The
Board noted that any ambiguity had to be construed against the
promulgator of the policy, particularly because employees read-
ing the policy are lay people, not lawyers able to make sophis-
ticated distinctions such as those set forth in the policy. Thus,
in finding a violation, the Board concluded that employees
could reasonably read the retention of the right to file Board
charges as “illusory.” Id. slip op. 2. As the Board further stat-
ed (Id. slip op. 3):
To be meaningful, the right to file charges with the Board
must entail the rights to have the Board exercise its statutory
powers under Section 10 of the Act: i.e., to investigate the
charge, to determine its merits, and to pursue appropriate re-
lief through the Act’s procedures. An employer may not law-
fully require individual employees to arbitrate unfair labor

2 I am bound by existing Board law unless reversed by the Board it-
self or by the Supreme Court. See Pathmark Stores, 342 NLRB 378 fn.
1 (2004). I am also bound by the Board’s rejection, in Murphy Oil and
D.R. Horton of the arguments made in Respondent’s brief to me in
support of the dismissal of this aspect of the complaint.
KELLY SERVICES INC. 9
practice claims that would otherwise be resolved by the Board
under the Act’s procedures. To do so necessarily interferes
with employee’s statutory right of access to the Board.
Ralph’s Grocery governs this case. Here, as in Ralph’s Gro-
cery, the sweep of the broad mandatory arbitration language
trumps any preservation of the right to file Board charges. The
mandatory arbitration language is set off in bold type, unlike
the rest of the policy. The ambiguity in the reading of the
broad overall policy by the lay person employees here is the
same as it was in Ralph’s Grocery. Thus, here, as in Ralph’s
Grocery, the Arbitration Agreement’s token recognition of the
right to file Board charges is “illusory.” And the overall
Agreement can reasonably be read to inhibit the filing of Board
charges. See also Lincoln Eastern Management, 364 NLRB
No. 16, slip op. 2-3 (2016).
This is an even stronger case for a violation than Ralph’s
Grocery. Paragraph 3 of the Arbitration Agreement permits
employees to file Board charges, as it did in Ralph’s Grocery,
but it also explicitly prohibits them from recovering money
damages in a Board proceeding, a restriction that was not pre-
sent in Ralph’s Grocery. It is difficult to envision how, once
the Board’s processes have been invoked, the Arbitration
Agreement could preclude the Board from exercising its full
statutory powers, including its remedial authority. The Board’s
remedies, of course, often provide for back pay to make em-
ployees whole for discrimination and other unfair labor practic-
es found by the Board. Back pay is a specific statutory remedy
set forth in Section 10(c) of the Act. Because the Board en-
forces public, not private, rights, it is doubtful that any private
rule could preclude the Board from providing a monetary rem-
edy authorized by a statute of the United States. But the bottom
line here is that a reasonable reading of the Arbitration Agree-
ment’s prohibition against monetary remedies from the Board
is an added inhibition against the filing of charges. Why file a
charge in a case where back pay is the normal remedy if you
cannot get monetary relief? Accordingly, I find that the Arbi-
tration Agreement precludes full recourse to the Board and thus
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in this additional respect.
Although it lists four alleged reasons for the legality of the
Arbitration Agreement, Respondent’s brief does not provide a
persuasive defense to this part of the complaint. All of its rea-
sons run contrary to Ralph’s Grocery. Its first reason is hard to
understand, but, to the extent that it suggests that if “no back
pay is sought” in a Board proceeding the Arbitration Agree-
ment is “lawful” (Br. 11-12), it fails to account for the re-
striction of a full Board remedy in those cases where back pay
is a normal remedy. The second reason—that the Agreement
allows for the filing of charges (Br. 12-13)—is likewise contra-
ry to the rationale of Ralph’s Grocery that preservation of the
right to file charges is illusory where the thrust of the unlawful
policy is to require arbitration in all employment-related dis-
putes. The significance of Respondent’s third reason—that
denying statutory back pay relief to employees is permissible
because back pay is a remedy and not a procedure (Br. 13-
14)—escapes me. Respondent seems to allege that because a
backpay remedy is not guaranteed its denial to employees who
are nevertheless free to file charges does not interfere with
Board processes. But, although nothing in life is guaranteed, a
backpay remedy is the normal remedy where an appropriate
violation is found and circumstances warrant it. Nor is there
any distinction in Board jurisprudence that permits access to
Board processes and exclusion of Board remedies where ap-
propriate. This is made clear by the Board’s language in
Ralph’s Grocery, set forth above, that access to Board process-
es includes the right to ”pursue appropriate relief” through the
Board. A backpay remedy is thus part of Board processes.
Respondent final reason—that because deferral to arbitration is
permitted in some circumstances, it should be permitted here
(Br. 14-19) is without merit. As the Board made clear in
Ralph’s Grocery, deferral to arbitration is a discretionary policy
of the Board that has been used only when the arbitration provi-
sion has been the result of a collectively bargained agreement,
which is not the case here. 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. 3.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining and enforcing a mandatory and binding arbitration
policy which required employees to resolve employment-
related disputes exclusively through individual arbitration pro-
ceedings and to relinquish any right they have to resolve such
disputes through collective or class action.
2. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
maintaining a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that
employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right
to file charges and seek remedies, including back pay where
appropriate, before the National Labor Relations Board.
3. The above violations constitute unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and deist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. As I have concluded that the Arbitration
Agreement is unlawful, the recommended order requires that
the Respondent revise or rescind it, and advise its employees in
writing that said rule has been so revised or rescinded.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended3
ORDER
The Respondent, Kelly Services, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining or enforcing a mandatory arbitration policy
that waives the right of employees to maintain class or collec-
tive actions in all forms, whether arbitral or judicial.
(b) Maintaining or enforcing a mandatory arbitration policy
that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the
right of employees to file charges and seek remedies, including

3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
backpay where appropriate, before the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind or revise the Arbitration Agreement to make it
clear to employees that the agreement does not constitute a
waiver in all forums of their right to maintain employment-
related class or collective actions, or to file charges and seek
remedies, including backpay where appropriate, before the
National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Notify the employees of the rescinded or revised Arbi-
tration Agreement to include providing them a copy of the re-
vised agreement or specific notification that the agreement has
been rescinded.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all
facilities where the Dispute Resolution and Mutual Agreement
to Binding Arbitration applied copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed any facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since March 4, 2016.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 23, 2017
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.

4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a mandatory arbitration
policy that waives your right to maintain class or collective
actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration policy that
you reasonably could believe bars or restricts your right to file
charges and seek remedies, including back pay where appropri-
ate, before the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with,
restrain or coerce you in the exercise or the rights guaranteed
you by Federal labor law.
WE WILL rescind or revise the Dispute Resolution and Mutu-
al Agreement to Binding Arbitration to make it clear to all em-
ployees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver of their
right in all forums to maintain class or collective actions and
does not restrict their right to file charges and seek remedies
including back pay where appropriate, before the National La-
bor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all employees of the rescinded or revised
Dispute Resolution and Mutual Agreement to Binding Arbitra-
tion, and WE WILL provide them with a copy of the revised
agreement or specific notification that the agreement has been
rescinded.
KELLYSERVICES, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/18-CA-142795 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.