Keith N. Collins, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 9, 2010
0120091676 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 9, 2010)

0120091676

06-09-2010

Keith N. Collins, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.


Keith N. Collins,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southwest Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091676

Hearing No. 451-2008-00219X

Agency No. 4G-780-0073-08

DECISION

On March 10, 2009, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's February

20, 2009 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether substantial evidence in the record supports the finding that

complainant was not subjected to age or race-based discrimination

regarding two termination actions.

BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2008, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he

was discriminated against on the bases of race (African-American) and age

(57) when:

1. on December 8, 2007, he was terminated from his Transitional

Employee position at the Frank Tejeda Post Office, Texas, for failure

to meet expectations as a letter carrier; and

2. on January 5, 2008, he was terminated as a casual clerk from

the South Texas Medical Center (STMC) Post Office.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on January 29, 2009 and

issued a bench decision the same day, January 29, 2009.

AJ Decision

The AJ found, as to the first termination action, that complainant did

not identify comparators who were similarly-situated, and outside of his

protected groups, who were treated more favorably. While recognizing

that complainant may have received inadequate training, the AJ noted that

the agency made a decision to terminate complainant early in the process

before having to send him to additional training and incur the additional

expense of said training. The AJ noted that this was a valid exercise

of management's discretionary authority. The AJ found no persuasive

evidence of pretext.

The AJ then noted that after the first termination, complainant exercised

initiative to find a new job, which unfortunately, led to the second

termination action. As to this action, the AJ found that the agency

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Specifically, the manager, who was responsible for the operation of that

post office, made a determination based on her personal observation

and reports from other employees and supervisors that complainant

was not performing up to her expectations. The AJ noted that she had

discretionary authority, because complainant was a casual clerk employee,

to terminate him. The AJ concluded that there was no evidence of pretext

presented. The AJ found no discrimination. The agency subsequently

issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed

to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant asserts that he is qualified for the job and that

his work performance was improving. He maintains that he was mistreated.

The agency asks the Commission to affirm the final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's

credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the

tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other

objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming complainant could establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on the alleged bases, the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, as to issue (1),

management stated that complainant was terminated due to the fact that

he was not performing up to the expectations set for him by management.

Management further indicated that after two weeks of carrying the same

route, complainant showed no signs of improvement in his performance.

We find that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the

AJ's conclusion that complainant was not subjected to age or race-based

discrimination when he was terminated in December 2007.

As to issue (2), management stated that the circumstances leading to

complainant's termination were his inability to retain information

regarding his daily clerk duties and assignments. His manager stated,

for example, that complainant did not remember the dispatch schedules,

the collection times or the scanning procedures of the collection points,

and he struggled with the proper and timely sorting of the FSM No Linear

Mail (NLM) for the carriers. Again, we find that there is substantial

evidence in the record to support the AJ's conclusion that complainant was

not subjected to age or race-based discrimination when he was terminated

in January 2008.1

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final

order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____06/09/10______________

Date

1 Complainant's contention on appeal that his performance was improving

does not refute management's reasons for his terminations nor does it

indicate that his race or age played a role.

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0120091676

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120091676