Keith Brooks, Petitioner,v.Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 27, 2006
04a60001 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 27, 2006)

04a60001

01-27-2006

Keith Brooks, Petitioner, v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency.


Keith Brooks v. Department of Homeland Security

04A60001, 04A60002

January 27, 2006

.

Keith Brooks,

Petitioner,

v.

Michael Chertoff,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

Agency.

Petition Nos. 04A60001; 04A60002

Appeal Nos. 07A10052; 07A10027; 01A12425

Agency No. 98-3077

Hearing No. 160-98-8492X

DECISION ON A PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT

On December 5, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or

Commission) docketed a petition for enforcement to examine the enforcement

of an order set forth in Keith R. Brooks and Orlando V. Jackson

v. Department of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal No. 07A10051 et. al

(August 14, 2002). This petition for enforcement is accepted by the

Commission pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503. Petitioner alleged that the

agency failed to fully comply with the Commission's order, specifically,

he contends the agency failed to pay the full amount of compensatory

damages ordered and failed to place him in a position as Senior Customs

Inspector in the Toronto Pre-clearance location. Petitioner also contends

he is owed additional interest on the compensatory damage award and his

attorney's fees from the time of the decision of the EEOC Administrative

Judge's in order to compensate him for the delay in payment.

Petitioner filed a complaint in which he alleged that the agency

discriminated against him on the bases of his race (African-American),

sex (Male), when it did not select him for the position of Senior Customs

Inspector. An EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) found that the agency had

discriminated against petitioner and awarded him retroactive promotion,

back pay, compensatory damages and attorney's fees. The agency refused

to implement the decision of the AJ and filed an appeal. Additionally,

the agency appealed the AJ's decision on attorney's fees and costs.

Petitioner, in turn, filed a cross- appeal of the AJ's decision regarding

attorney's fees and costs.

The Commission reversed the agency's final order and affirmed the AJ's

decision which found discrimination. As relief, the Commission ordered

the agency to offer petitioner the position of Senior Customs Inspector

in the Toronto Pre-clearance location retroactive to September 14, 1997

together with back pay and interest, compensatory damages in the amount

ordered by the AJ and attorney's fees. The matter was assigned to a

Compliance Officer and docketed as Compliance Nos. 06A30473 and 06A30470

on February 13, 2003. Thereafter, the agency submitted documentation

purportedly in support of its contention that it fully complied with

the Commission's order.

On September 21, 2005, petitioner submitted the petition for enforcement

here at issue. The agency has submitted no additional comments in

opposition or in response to this petition.

Position as Senior Customs Inspector

Petitioner contends that the agency failed to place him in the position

of Senior Customs Inspector in the Toronto location as specified in the

Commission's Order and instead placed him in positions in Maryland and

North Carolina. The record reflects that the agency issued a Standard

Form (SF) 50 which stated that petitioner had been promoted to Senior

Customs Inspector GS-11 with a duty station of Toronto, Ontario as

of September 14, 1997. However, the agency also issued another SF 50

indicating that petitioner was being reassigned to the duty station of

Baltimore, Maryland effective March 28, 1999. Thus, although the agency's

documentation indicates initial placement of petitioner in Toronto,

this was merely a paper transaction since it applied to a time period

in the past and was later changed to reflect petitioner's reassignment

to the Baltimore location. There is no indication that petitioner was

ever physically assigned to the duty station of Toronto as ordered by

the Commission.

The agency did not submit comments in response to this petition and so

we must rely on their representations in correspondence submitted during

the compliance phase of the proceedings. In its correspondence to the

Commission on August 26, 2003, the agency stated that it did not perceive

the Commission's order as requiring the physical transfer of petitioner

to Toronto. The agency believed this to be true because it stated that

the vacancy announcement at issue did not specify any particular location

but only created an opportunity for the applicants to be promoted.

Moreover, the agency contended in this correspondence that the

Commission's Order to physically place petitioner Brooks in Toronto would

violate its Collective Bargaining Agreement and would subject the agency

to an unfair labor practice charge by the National Treasury Employees

Union. The agency argues that assignment to a location in Canada is a

foreign assignment governed by 19C of the Agreement which limits the

�Preclearance tour of duty to a two-year initial assignment with the

possibility of two additional two-year extensions� i.e. a maximum of

six years in pre-clearance. The agency contends that once the six year

maximum assignment is satisfied, the CBA dictates that the employee may

not be selected for Pre-clearance again for another 10 years �as long

as there are other qualified volunteers for the assignment.�<0>

The agency's documentation of the parties' CBA, however, is incomplete and

does not adequately support the agency's action. The document submitted

contains only certain provisions and gives no other indication that it

is the parties' actual agreement, nor does it document that it governs

the petitioner's assignment at the time in question. Additionally, the

agency's statement is not consistent with the language of the vacancy

announcement which specified particular locations where vacancies

existed at the time and which invited applicants to specify their

preference for assignment. The agency also has not raised until now,

the fact that petitioner could not be assigned to a post for which he had

applied because to do so would violate the terms of the CBA. Finally,

even assuming the agency's characterization of the CBA is correct, it

has not documented that complainant had reached the maximum assignment

limitation or that there were �other qualified volunteers� such that

complainant could not be considered.

Compensatory Damages

Petitioner contends that the agency failed to pay him the full amount of

compensatory damages the Commission awarded of $1,000.00 and instead paid

him only $695.50. This, he claims does not comply with the Commission's

Order and as a result, the agency should be ordered to pay him the full

amount. Petitioner thus claims that the agency erred by withholding

amounts for federal and state income taxes. The Commission is not

the proper forum for a determination as to whether the agency erred in

withholding income taxes from an award for compensatory damages and he

should bring this issue to the Internal Revenue Service for resolution.

However, the Commission is aware that at least one court has interpreted

the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. Section 104(a)(2)) to mean that

damage awards for emotional distress as opposed to physical injury or

sickness, are not excluded from gross income. See e.g. Rivera v. Baker

West, Inc. 430 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2005). We further note that the

Commission has not recognized any entitlement to awards to cover tax

liability for compensatory damages. Williams v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, Petition No. 04A40047 (June 30, 2005).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the agency was in compliance with

our decision and Order related to the payment of compensatory damages.

Having determined that the agency's payment was correct, the Commission

also concludes that petitioner has given no good reason for additional

interest to be paid on petitioner's compensatory damages award.

Attorney's Fees

Petitioner requests that he be awarded attorney's fees expended in

his pursuit of the agency's compliance with the Commission's Order.

Normally, Title VII authorizes the award of reasonable attorney's fees,

including amounts owed for an attorney's processing of a compensatory

damages claim. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). There is no question here

that complainant was a prevailing party which would entitle him to

reasonable attorney's fees. Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home Inc. v. West

Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001);Davis

v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05970101 (February

4, 1999) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 427, 433 (1983)).

Complainant was awarded attorney's fees in our previous order and there

is no dispute these amounts have been paid. The question before us is

whether petitioner should be awarded additional amounts.

The Commission recognizes that attorney's fees should be awarded for

work performed at the appeal stage provided that he prevails during

this phase of the proceedings. Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), ch.11-5 (November 9,

1999). In this regard, complainant was a prevailing party in that the

Commission upheld the AJ's finding of discrimination and affirmed the

award of compensatory damages and attorney's fees. However, there is

nothing in the record to indicate that complainant incurred any additional

attorney's fees, such as his attorney's verified statement of amounts

billed for services rendered. The attorney has the burden of submitting

detailed and contemporaneous time records to ensure that the time

spent was accurately recorded. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B);

Bernard v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861

(July 17, 1998).

As it relates to the Commission's Order at issue, there is no evidence

that the agency failed to comply with our directive to pay attorney's

fees related to the litigation of the complaint up to the appeal stage.

For amounts incurred thereafter, petitioner must first submit a verified

statement of any additional fees related to appeal stage to the agency

for consideration and a final decision.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, the Commission concludes that the

agency has not shown compliance with our order that petitioner be placed

in the position of Senior Customs Inspector in Toronto Pre-clearance.

Our review of the record supports that the agency has complied with our

directive to pay petitioner compensatory damages and attorney's fees

and consequently, he is not entitled to additional interest.

ORDER

The agency will physically assign complainant to the position of Senior

Customs Inspector in Toronto Pre-clearance within 30 days of the date

this decision becomes final and submit a Report of Compliance as directed

below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive

this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 27, 2006

__________________

Date

0 1Although we require the agency to submit its

Compliance Report to the petitioner, there is no indication that it did so

in this case and there is no response by petitioner to this statement.