Keith Alan. Rothschild et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 4, 2020

14218965 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/218,965 03/18/2014 Keith Alan Rothschild 24663-0170 2552
99612 7590 02/04/2020
Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP/Cox
999 Peachtree Street N.E.
Suite 2300
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
CORUM JR, WILLIAM A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2433
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocket@eversheds-sutherland.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KEITH ALAN ROTHSCHILD, EDGAR V. SHRUM,
MUHAMMAD ASIF RAZA, JR., and
RICHARD M. THOMAS
____________

Appeal 2018-006670
Application 14/218,965
Technology Center 2400
____________

BEFORE CARL L. SILVERMAN, MELISSA A. HAAPALA, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–6 and 8–17, which constitute all pending
claims.
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). Appellant identifies Cox
Communication, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal. Br. 2.

Appeal 2018-006670
Application 14/218,965
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to managing access to content or service,
utilizing tokens for authentication and authorization. Abstract; Spec., ¶¶ 10–
16, Figs. 1, 20, 21. Claim 1 reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject
matter on appeal (emphasis added):
1. A method, comprising:
receiving a token request for a network token via a
computing platform comprising at least one processor
functionally coupled to at least one memory device, the token
request comprising a logical address of first content;
generating, via the computing platform, the network token in
response to receiving the token request, the network token
comprising address information representative of the logical
address;
receiving a content request for the first content via the
computing platform, wherein the content request comprises a
second network token; and
validating a second network token.
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims Appendix).

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THE REJECTIONS2
Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–11, and 13–173 are rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by van Brandenburg et al. (US
2014/0115724 Al; published Apr. 24, 2014) (“van Brandenburg”). Non-
Final Act. 4–8.
Claims 4 and 12 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over van Brandenburg. Non-Final Act. 8–9.

ANALYSIS
The § 102 rejection
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding van Brandenburg
teaches the claim 14 limitations (also referred to as disputed limitations) set
forth below:
receiving a token request for a network token via a
computing platform comprising at least one processor
functionally coupled to at least one memory device, the token
request comprising a logical address of first content;
generating, via the computing platform, the network token in
response to receiving the token request, the network token
comprising address information representative of the logical
address;

2 The 35 U.S.C § 101 rejection is withdrawn. See Non-Final Act. 2.
3 Although the Examiner includes claims 7 and 19–21 in the Headings in this
rejection, these claims are canceled. See Non-Final Act. 2, 4; Appeal Br. 9.
We further note that the list of claims pending and rejected on the first page
of the Office Action incorrectly does not match the listing of claims
currently pending and rejected. See Non-Final Act. 1–2; Appeal Br. 9.
4 Appellant argue claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8–11, and 13–17 as a group, and we
choose claim 1 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Application 14/218,965
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receiving a content request for the first content via the
computing platform, wherein the content request comprises a
second network token.

Appeal Br. 9–12; Reply Br. 2–3 (Emphasis added).

In particular, Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding that the
van Brandenburg “GET request message including manifest.xml” in Figure
2 teaches “receiving a token request for a network token via a computing
platform comprising at least one processor functionally coupled to at least
one memory device, the token request comprising a logical address of first
content.” Appeal Br. 9–10. According to Appellant, van Brandenburg
teaches, at step 204, the delivery node receives a request for information
related to a manifest file which does not include the claimed “a token
request.” Id. at 10 (citing van Brandenburg, Fig. 2).
Regarding the second network token, Appellant argues the Examiner
errs in finding that the “segment request message comprising a segment
identifier and first validation information, taken together comprises a second
network token,” and therefore teaches “receiving a content request for the
first content via the computing platform, wherein the content request
comprises a second network token.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Non-Final Act. 5).
Appellant further argues the Examiner’s finding does not comport with the
operation of van Brandenburg. Id.
In the Non-Final Action, the Examiner initially refers to Appellant’s
arguments, filed 02/23/2017, and explains why these arguments are not
persuasive:
Applicant argues that that the definition for the term
‘token’ as applied to the claims is incorrect because of the
definition of the term in the applied prior art of van
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Brandenburg. The Examiner respectfully disagrees. As
previously pointed out, the van Brandenburg reference has
multiple definitions for the term ‘token’. Van Brandenburg
teaches that a string of characters and/or numbers may be used
as a token. (para. 60). As applicant points out, van
Brandenburg also teaches how its token may be formed through
the use of a one-way function wherein timing information and a
secret key are used as input parameters []. Applicant’s assertion
that the Examiner’s interpretation of “a segment identifier, first
validation information, timing information . . . taken together,”
cannot read on the “second network token” as recited in the
claims since that ‘token’ was not formed in the same manner as
van Brandenburg is incorrect. Applicant’s claims are silent as
to how [the] second network token [is] formed and what it is
comprised of, only that it is received and validated. The
teaching of van Brandenburg reads on the as claimed limitation
as shown and described in Fig. 2, step 214, especially in light
of van Brandenburg’s teaching that a token may[] be a string of
characters and/or numbers. (see para. 60, 68).

Non-Final Act. 3. (Emphasis added).

The Examiner finds van Brandenburg teaches receiving a token
request for a network token via a computing platform comprising at least
one processor functionally coupled to at least one memory device, the token
request comprising a logical address of first content. Non-Final Action 4
(citing van Brandenburg, Fig. 2; ¶ 56). The Examiner finds the van
Brandenburg “GET request message including manifest.xml . . .
manifest” file “comprises location information e.g.[,] URLs, associated
with a segment identifier for locating one or more network nodes, which
are configured to deliver the segments.” Id. (citing van Brandenburg ¶¶
47, 48).
The Examiner finds van Brandenburg teaches receiving a content
request for the first content via the computing platform, wherein the content
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request comprises a second network token. Id. at 5 (citing van Brandenburg,
Fig. 2, step 212; ¶¶ 65–66). According to the Examiner, van Brandenburg’s
“segment request message comprising a segment identifier and first
validation information, taken together comprises a second network
token, a string of characters and numbers.” Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds van Brandenburg teaches
that step 204 may be a request to obtain a manifest file, and para.
16 of van Brandenburg teaches that a manifest file may, in fact,
contain a token. (para. 16-Whenever the segment request
message is for retrieving a manifest file, there are large
advantages in providing at least part of the validation
information (e.g.[,] a token) in the manifest file). Secondly, as
shown in Fig. 2, step 20[8], that in response to the request in step
204, the media server responds with a token. Thus, it is
reasonable to interpret the request of step 204 as the recited
‘token request’ since the response to the request is indeed
‘a token’.
Ans. 11.
The Examiner additionally finds:
As to Appellant’s arguments regarding the limitation of
“receiving a content request for the first content . . . wherein the
content request comprises a second network token[.]” Van
Brandenburg teaches that a HTTP GET message is a request for
video content (para. 5[3]- requests the first segment of the video
from the location described in the manifest file by sending a
request message, e.g.[,] a HTTP GET request message,
comprising an segment identifier, e.g.[,] the segment file name).
Thus, step 212 of Fig. 2 which is a HTTP GET message is indeed
a request for content as recited in the claim.
Also disclosed in van Brandenburg is that HTTP GET
message is comprised of a segment identifier, first validation
information, timing information which taken together may
reasonably interpreted as ‘a second network token’. (para. 66-67
describe various ways in which the segment request message
maybe formed). van Brandenburg teaches that a token can be a
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string of characters and/or numbers. (para. 60)[.] Thus,
although, this segment request message may contain the first
validation information (token 1, i.e.[,] a first token), it also
includes timing information and a segment identifier which
would necessarily be a different string of characters and/or
numbers from the token 1 as can be seen in step 208. The
segment request message is used to identify and validate a
request for content which is the function of a network token and
this token (string of characters and/or numbers) sent in step 212
is different from that received in step 208. Thus, this string of
characters and/or numbers (token), different from the first token,
reads on the recited ‘second network token’.

Ans. 10–11.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues:
van Brandenburg clearly distinguishes between a token and a
segment identifier, validation information, and timing
information. van Brandenburg’s “token . . . may be generated on
the basis of a one-way function wherein timing information . . .
and a secret key are used as input parameters.” van
Brandenburg., ¶ [0061]. The “secret key [may be] . . . generated
by a pseudorandom number generator.” Id., ¶ [0059]. Thus, the
token is based on the output of a pseudorandom number
generator, and timing information, not the alleged combination
of the segment identifier and first validation information.
Furthermore, “[t]he first validation information [(e.g., the first
token) may] be inserted into the second segment request
message.” Id., ¶ [0065]. As noted above, the token is the output
of a function that uses timing information and a secret key as the
inputs. The second segment request message does not include a
token that is different than the first token, and no portion of van
Brandenburg indicates that “a segment identifier, first validation
information, timing information . . . taken together may
reasonably [be] interpreted as ‘a second network token.’”
Examiner’s Answer, p. 11. The Examiner’s interpretation of “a
segment identifier, first validation information, timing
information . . . taken together,” constituting “a second network
token,” as recited in amended independent claim 1 is incorrect.
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The combination of a segment identifier, first validation
information, and timing information does not teach or suggest
“receiving a content request for the first content via the
computing platform, wherein the content request comprises a
second network token,” as recited in amended independent
claims 1, 9, and 17.

Reply Br. 2–3.
A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art
reference, and arranged as required by the claim. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v.
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret
claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless
must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court
states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). However, the broadest reasonable
interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith
Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in
giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the
inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation
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that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382–83 (quoting In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Appellant’s arguments are premised on a claim interpretation of the
disputed limitations that is unreasonably narrow. Here, the disputed
limitations “the network token” and “the second network token” are broadly
recited. We agree with the Examiner’s statement that “Applicant’s claims
are silent as to how [the] second network [is] formed and what it is
comprised of, only that it is received and validated.” See Non-Final Act. 3.
Similarly, the Specification broadly employs the term, “token.” See Spec.,
¶¶ 15, 16, and ¶¶ 10–16.
Van Brandenburg describes a GET request message that includes a
content file name associated with a manifest file (manifest.xml) and the
manifest files includes location information, e.g., URLs, associated with a
segment identifier for locating one or more network nodes, which are
configured to deliver the segments. See Non-Final Act. 4, van Brandenburg,
Fig 2, ¶ 56. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that under the broadest
reasonable interpretation of “network token,” van Brandenburg discloses
“receiving a token request for a network token” through its description of a
GET request. Van Brandenburg also describes generating “the network
token” wherein the media server generates validation information, including
a token, and also including location information comprising a reference, e.g.,
an URL, where the content (the first segment) is stored. Id., see also van
Brandenburg ¶ 65. As described in van Brandenburg, the request for a
manifest file may include a token, and the media server responds with a
token. Id., see also Ans. 11, van Brandenburg Fig. 2, steps 204, 206, 208; ¶
16.
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Regarding “the second network token,” we agree with the Examiner
that van Brandenburg’s GET message includes a segment identifier, first
validation information, and timing information. See van Brandenburg, Fig.
2, step 212; ¶¶ 65, 66. We also agree that, although this GET message may
include the first validation information (first token), it also includes timing
information and a segment identifier. Id. The GET message (second token)
of step 212 is different from the token received in step 208. Van
Brandenburg teaches that a token can be a string of characters and/or
numbers, and here, the timing information and a segment identifier would be
different from the token of step 208. Id., see van Brandenburg ¶ 60.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that van
Brandenburg’s token is generated in a specific manner and that van
Brandenburg does not describe a second token that is different from the first
token. As discussed, supra, the claims do not recite the manner in which the
tokens are formed and the Specification does not define or use the term
“token” narrowly. To the contrary, the term “token” is used broadly, and
may, for example, comprise a string of characters and/or numbers may be
used as a token. See van Brandenburg ¶¶ 60, 47, 48, 50, 51. Applying a
broad, but reasonable, interpretation as discussed, supra, van Brandenburg’s
second network token is different from the (first) network token.
We note much of Appellant’s arguments are unsupported by factual
evidence. Mere attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. See In
re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d
699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ex parte Belinne, Appeal 2009-004693, 2009 WL
2477843, at *3–4 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative).
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In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of representative claim
1, independent claims 9 and 17, and dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8–11, and
13–16 as these claims are not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

The § 103 rejections
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in rejecting dependent claims 4
and 12 over van Brandenburg because of their dependency from “allowable”
claims 1 and 9 and “further due to additional elements recited therein.”
Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 4.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Appellant’s
arguments amount to no more than generally alleging that the cited prior art
reference is deficient. Merely asserting that the cited prior art reference does
not teach or suggest “additional elements” recited in a claim is not a separate
patentability argument. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“A statement which
merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument
for separate patentability of the claim.”).Our discussion of claim 1, supra, is
applicable and the Examiner has presented sufficient evidence to support
obviousness of dependent claims 4 and 12. See Non-Final Act. 8–9.
Because Appellant has not sufficiently addressed the Examiner’s findings
and conclusions, we sustain the rejection of claims 4 and 12.

CONCLUSION
In summary:

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Application 14/218,965
12
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5, 6, 8–
11, 13–17
102(e) van Brandenburg 1–3, 5, 6, 8–
11, 13–17

4, 12 103(a) van Brandenburg 4, 12
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–17

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED