01A11556
08-08-2002
Kathy V. Williams, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency.
Kathy V. Williams v. United States Postal Service (Western Area)
01A11556
August 8, 2002
.
Kathy V. Williams,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Western Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A11556
Agency Nos. 4-I-640-0092-97; 4-I-640-0013-98; 4-I-640-0015-98;
4-I-641-0059-97;
4-I-640-0014-98; 1-I-643-0016-98; and 1-I-643-0006-99
Hearing Nos. 280-98-4120x; 280-98-4321x; 280-98-4322x; 280-98-4336x;
280-98-4337x; 280-99-4035x; and 280-A0-4023x
DECISION
This appeal involves seven separate equal employment opportunity
(�EEO�) complaints filed by Kathy V. Williams (�complainant�) against
her employer, the United States Postal Service (Western Area)
(�the agency�). In these complaints, complainant alleged that
the agency had discriminated against her on the bases of her race
(African American), sex (female), religion (�Baptist�), disability
(damaged nerve), and/or prior EEO activity by (among other things) (1)
failing to select her for the agency's Associate Supervisor Program; (2)
failing to select her for the position of Supervisor-Customer Services
at the agency's Olathe, Kansas facility; (3) failing to select her for
the position of Supervisor-Customer Services at the agency's Shawnee
Mission, Kansas facility; (4) failing to select her for the position of
Supervisor-Customer Services at the agency's Kansas City, Kansas facility;
(5) failing to reply promptly to her request for corrections to her
leave records; (6) allowing her supervisor to yell at and demean her
and to discuss �confidential information� with others; (7) rating her
as ineligible for a clerk-stenographer position; (8) abolishing her job
(and thus requiring her to become an unassigned regular employee); (9)
changing her reporting times and days off and failing to promptly advise
her of the changes; (10) harassing her regarding leave usage and breaks
in work; (11) issuing her a letter of warning regarding an attendance
incident; (12) preventing her from coming to work for a period while she
was temporarily disabled; and (13) reducing her pay grade from Level 6
to Level 5. With these complaints, complainant was essentially claiming
that the agency had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(�Title VII�), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq, and/or Section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (�the Rehabilitation Act�), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1>
The agency investigated complainant's complaints, and issued relevant
reports of investigation. After reviewing these reports, complainant
requested a hearing before an administrative judge (�the AJ�) of the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (�EEOC� or �this
Commission�). The AJ consolidated all seven of complainant's complaints,
and held a hearing on these combined matters in July 2000, at which
over thirty witnesses (but not complainant) testified. On October 17,
2000, the AJ issued a ruling recounting the myriad facts underlying
complainant's various complaints, detailing their procedural histories,
and analyzing the relevant EEO law. In this decision, the AJ ultimately
concluded that complainant had not proven any of her allegations by
a preponderance of the evidence and, thus, that the agency had not
subjected complainant to discrimination.
In a final order (�FAO�) issued on or around November 21, 2000, the agency
informed complainant that it intended to fully implement this AJ ruling.
Complainant then promptly filed multiple notices challenging this FAO
(and, by implication, the AJ's decision finding no discrimination).
We docketed complainant's notices as this appeal. After a consideration
of the complete record before us (including the investigative files,
the hearing transcript, and the AJ's ruling), we are now issuing a
decision on this matter pursuant to the authority granted to us by 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
We are charged here with reviewing any legal conclusions reached by the
AJ de novo (or �anew�). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). This essentially
means that we may freely accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous)
the interpretation and application of the federal law relevant to
complainant's claims. However, we must uphold any post-hearing factual
findings by the AJ if they are supported by a substantial amount of
evidence from the record. Id.; see also Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (rev. Nov. 9, 1999)
(�EEO MD-110�), at 9-16. �Substantial evidence� means �such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) [citation omitted].<2> Any finding on whether or
not discriminatory intent existed �will be treated as a factual finding
subject to the substantial evidence review standard.� EEO MD-110,
at 9-16; see also Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).
Thus, on appeal to this Commission, �the burden is squarely on the
party challenging the [AJ's] decision to demonstrate that the [AJ's]
factual determinations are not supported by substantial evidence.� EEO
MD-110, at 9-17. In this case, this means that complainant has the
burden of pointing out to us where and why the AJ's findings (that no
discriminatory intent by agency officials existed) are not supported
by substantial evidence. Cf. id. (pointing out that �[t]he appeals
statements of the parties, both supporting and opposing the [AJ's]
decision, are vital in focusing the inquiry on appeal so that it can
be determined whether the [AJ's] factual determinations are supported
by substantial evidence�). Complainant has not done that. To be sure,
in her voluminous appeal brief complainant does argue why she believes
the AJ made erroneous conclusions of fact and law on various counts.
We do not find her appeal arguments persuasive however. Indeed, our
independent review of the entire record convinces us that there is
substantial evidence to support the AJ's factual conclusions and that
the AJ referenced the appropriate statutes, regulations, and case law.
We discern no legal error in the AJ's decision. Consequently, we see
no reason to disturb the AJ's opinion or the FAO implementing it, and
these rulings are affirmed.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations within thirty (30) calendar days of
receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt
of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. �
1614.405; see also EEO MD-110, at 9-18. All requests and arguments
must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.
In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be
deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the
expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of the
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
Complainant has the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that
complainant receives this decision. If complainant files a civil action,
complainant must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is
the official agency head or department head, identifying that person by
his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of complainant's case in court. �Agency� or �department�
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which complainant works. If complainant files a request
to reconsider and also files a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of the complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If complainant decides to file a civil action, and if complainant does
not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, complainant may
request that the Court appoint an attorney to represent complainant and
that the Court permit complainant to file the action without payment of
fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial
of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a
request for an attorney does not extend complainant's time in which
to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above entitled
�Right to File A Civil Action.�
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
August 8, 2002
__________________
Date
1The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards
in the Americans with Disabilities Act (�the ADA�) to complaints of
discrimination by federal employees or applicants for federal employment.
2The United States Supreme Court has explained that �substantial
evidence� is �more than a mere scintilla . . . . It �must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.
[I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to
direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one
of fact for the jury . . . .'� Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 477
[citations omitted].