Kathy S. Jones, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 18, 2009
0120090048 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 18, 2009)

0120090048

02-18-2009

Kathy S. Jones, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Kathy S. Jones,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120090048

Agency No. 1F-901-0073-07

Hearing No. 480-2007-00669X

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from the agency's August

26, 2008 final action which implemented the August 20, 2008 decision of

the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) who found no discrimination.

Complainant alleges employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Specifically, complainant alleged that the

agency discriminated against her on the bases of sex (female), color

(dark-skinned African-American), and in reprisal for prior protected

EEO activity when from April 1, 2007, through June 3, 2007, she was not

scheduled to work overtime at the Los Angeles Production and Distribution

Center, Florence Dock.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and requested a hearing before

an AJ. Over the objection of complainant, the AJ issued a decision

without a hearing (summary judgment).

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when the AJ finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy

the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must

initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that complainant

was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with where the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct.

See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983).

Upon review, the Commission finds that the AJ's grant of summary judgment

was appropriate because there exists no genuine issue of material fact

that would warrant a hearing. In his decision, the AJ concluded that

because the agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for not providing complainant with overtime at the Florence Dock, he

was not required to address whether complainant had established a prima

facie case on each basis. In finding that the agency had articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the AJ noted that

the male (Person A) who was assigned overtime at the Florence Dock was

assigned overtime because the collective bargaining agreement provided

that overtime was to be scheduled among qualified employees performing

similar work in the work location where the employees regularly worked;

that complainant was regularly assigned to the Pau Dock; and that

complainant's Supervisor and the Acting Manager of Distribution Operations

(MDO) believed that Pau Dock was complainant's regular assignment based

on her pay location and that the two also believed that Florence Dock, to

which Person A was regularly assigned, was Person A's regular assignment,

based on his pay location. The AJ also found that complainant failed

to present evidence that the agency's articulated reason was pretext

to mask unlawful discrimination, reasoning that demonstrating that

the agency acted upon incorrect information was not sufficient to

demonstrate discrimination. The AJ also noted that sometime in May

2007, when the overtime matter was brought to the attention of the

MDO by complainant's union representative, both complainant's work

assignments and Person A's assignments were changed, assigning them both

to the Florence/Pau Docks. The AJ further noted that beginning June 3,

2007, complainant's Supervisor regularly rotated Sunday overtime at the

Florence Dock between complainant and Person A. The AJ noted also that

complainant's Supervisor had approved complainant to work 87.81 hours of

overtime from April through June 2007 and had allotted Person A 80.02

hours of overtime during the same period of time, notwithstanding that

complainant had less seniority than Person A.

The agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its action in not granting complainant overtime at the Florence Dock from

April to May 2007. Complainant has failed to establish that the agency's

reasons were mere pretext to hide prohibited discrimination. Further,

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to complainant,

complainant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus towards her.

At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with complainant

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

reasons were pretextual or motivated by intentional discrimination.

Complainant has failed to carry this burden.

The agency's final action finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court

that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court

also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs,

or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request

is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 18, 2009

__________________

Date

5

0120090048

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013