Karla Deering - Benford, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 31, 2000
01994500 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 31, 2000)

01994500

10-31-2000

Karla Deering - Benford, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W Areas), Agency.


Karla Deering - Benford, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01994500

v. ) Agency No. 1H-322-1025-94

) 4H-320-1220-94

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(S.E./S.W Areas), )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the agency's final decision that found complainant was not

entitled to an award of compensatory damages was correct.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was an

applicant for hire at the agency's Bulk Mail Facility in Jacksonville,

Florida. Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant

sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed formal EEO complaints on

May 17, 1994, and August 31, 1994. In her first complaint, complainant

alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of reprisal (prior EEO

activity), when on March 24, 1994, a memo was placed in her file stating

not to hire her. In her second complaint, she alleged discrimination

on the bases of sex (female) and reprisal (prior EEO activity), when

on June 6, 1994, she was not hired as a Transitional Employee (TE),

and was told it took three months to process applications.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ

issued a recommended decision finding complainant was discriminated

against on the bases of reprisal when a memo was placed in her file

stating not to hire her. As relief, the AJ recommended that the agency

expunge all derogatory statements from complainant's personnel file,

appoint her to a casual position with back pay<2>, and pay her reasonable

expenses for her attendance at the hearing. The AJ also recommended that

complainant be awarded $1,000 in non pecuniary compensatory damages.

In fashioning complainant's compensatory damage award, the AJ noted

that the particular circumstances in this case presented an �egregious

situation where it is very clear that a former employee with an otherwise

clean record was penalized for having exercised her rights under the

law.� RD at 29.

As for complainant's second complaint, the AJ found complainant was

not discriminated against when she was not hired for a TE position,

and when she was told it took three months to process applications.

The AJ found that at the time complainant applied for a TE position

in March 1994, there were no new TE position available since the TE

positions were being eliminated completely by the agency.

In its FAD, the agency adopted the AJ's finding of discrimination and

recommended relief, as clarified. Complainant thereafter filed an appeal

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO). See Karla Deering v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01973389 (January 15, 1999).

On appeal, complainant submitted evidence that showed, despite agency

testimony at the hearing to the contrary, that TE appointments were

available after March 1994. The document, which was dated February 2,

1996 (five and a half months before the hearing) revealed that other

TE appointments were made after March 1994. In our prior decision, we

found that the agency was aware of the TE information at the time of

the hearing, but made no effort to explain its actions. In light of

this, we determined that complainant was in fact discriminated against

on the basis of reprisal when, as she alleged in her second complaint,

she was denied a TE appointment in March 1994.

As such, we ordered the agency to offer complainant a TE appointment,

and award her back pay and all benefits. The agency was also ordered

to implement its final decision to the extent that it had already not

done so. Finally, we ordered the agency to conduct a supplementary

investigation into complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages.

On April 22, 1999, the agency issued another final decision. Therein,

the agency determined complainant was not entitled to an award of

compensatory damages. As reason, the agency found complainant did not

provide any medical documentation that showed complainant's alleged

condition was due to the discrimination. In addition, the agency noted

complainant stated �she was not treated by a health care provider, nor

[was she] confined to a bed during the period in question.� FAD at 2.

Complainant appealed the agency's final decision regarding her award of

compensatory damages. On appeal, she submits the statement she provided

to the agency in response to its inquiry regarding her emotional distress.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Section 102(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act ("CRA") authorizes an

award of compensatory damages for all post-Act pecuniary losses, and

for nonpecuniary losses, such as, but not limited to, emotional pain,

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

injury to character and reputation, and loss of health. In West

v. Gibson, 119 S.Ct. 1906 (1999), the United States Supreme Court

found that Congress afforded the Commission the authority to award such

damages in the administrative process. The CRA authorizes an award of

compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for discrimination.

Section 1981a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory damages

that may be awarded each complaining party for future pecuniary

losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,

loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, according to

the number of individuals employed by the respondent. The limit for a

respondent who has more than 500 employees is $300,000.

To receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant must

demonstrate that she has been

harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory action; the extent,

nature and severity of the harm; and the duration or expected duration of

the harm. Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157

(July 22, 1994), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request

No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Lawrence v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996). Compensatory and

Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of

1991, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992).

The Commission's July 1992 notice set forth guidelines for use in

establishing entitlement to compensatory damages. See id. at 8-14.

Such damages may be awarded for past pecuniary losses, future pecuniary

losses, and nonpecuniary losses directly or proximately caused by the

agency's discriminatory conduct.

Pecuniary Damages

Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of

the employer's unlawful action, including job-hunting expenses, moving

expenses, medical expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical therapy

expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Complainant did

not request, nor provide any evidence of pecuniary damages. As such,

she has not proved her entitlement to such damages.

Non-Pecuniary Damages

Nonpecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise

quantification, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental

anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing,

injury to character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss

of health.

In Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5,

1993), the Commission described the type of objective evidence that an

agency may obtain when assessing the merits of a complainant's request

for emotional distress damages:

[E]vidence should have taken the form of a statement by [complainant]

describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both

on and off the job, describing the distress. To properly explain the

emotional distress, such statements should include detailed information

on physical or behavioral manifestations of the distress, information on

the duration of the distress, and examples of how the distress affected

[complainant] day to day, both on and off the job. In addition, the

agency should have asked [complainant] to provide objective and other

evidence linking...the distress to the unlawful discrimination....

Evidence may include statements from the complainant concerning his/her

emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of

enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character

or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other

nonpecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory

conduct. Statements from others, including family members, friends, and

health care providers could address the outward manifestations or physical

consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety,

stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress,

loss of self-esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Objective

evidence also may include documents indicating a complainant's actual

out-of-pocket expenses related to medical treatment, counseling, and

so forth, related to the injury allegedly caused by discrimination. In

determining damages, the agency is only responsible for those damages

that are clearly shown to be caused by the alleged discriminatory conduct,

not for any and all damages in general.

The Commission notes that damage awards for emotional harm are difficult

to determine and that there are no definitive rules governing the amount

to be awarded in given cases. In this regard, a proper award must meet

two goals: that it not be "monstrously excessive" standing alone and

that it be consistent with awards made in similar cases. See Cygnar

v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989).

Applying the above legal standards, we agree with the AJ that complainant

provided sufficient unrebutted testimony to establish that she suffered

emotional harm as a result of the agency's discrimination. The AJ's RD

cites several instances in the record where complainant testified as to

the effect the discrimination had on her mental health. Specifically,

complainant testified at the hearing regarding the anguish she felt

over not having a job. We find that this uncontroverted evidence

establishes appellant's entitlement to compensatory damages. See Sinott

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01952872 (September 19, 1996)

(stating that an appellant's own testimony, along with the circumstances

of a particular case, can establish mental or emotional harm).

In response to the agency's inquiry, complainant submitted a statement

regarding emotional distress she suffered when she was denied a

position with the agency. She states she suffered from stress, migraine

headaches and insomnia. While unemployed, she felt tremendous stress

due to financial insecurity and out of concern for her newborn child.

Complainant also stated that she suffered from emotional distress that

impacted on her new marriage. As a result, she and her husband suffered

marital strain.

Although complainant has not submitted any medical evidence in

support of her claim, we note that such evidence is not mandatory to

establish entitlement to damages. Id. In this regard, the Commission

has awarded damages in cases where there was no medical evidence.

See Pailin v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01954350 (January

26, 1998) ($2,500 in damages where complainant testified that she

experienced tension, depression, and withdrawal from co-workers);

Demeuse v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01950324 (May 22, 1997)

($1,500 in damages where complainant testified as to exacerbation of

post-traumatic stress disorder); Lawrence v. U. S. Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01952288 (April 18, 1996) ($3,000 in damages where complainant

presented primarily non-medical evidence that she was irritable,

experienced anxiety attacks, and was shunned by her co-workers).

After a review of the record, we find the agency's decision to

deny complainant non-pecuniary compensatory damages was not correct.

Complainant established she suffered emotional distress as a result of

the agency's discriminatory actions. Despite the agency's position to

the contrary, complainant need not show she was �confined to a bed�

during the relevant time in order to have proven an entitlement to

compensatory damages. See FAD at 2. Taking into account Commission

precedent, complainant's evidence of emotional distress, as well as her

lack of evidence regarding the length of time she would suffer the effects

of the discrimination, we find that an award of $3,000 is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we REVERSE the agency's final

decision and direct the agency to take remedial actions in accordance

with this decision and ORDER below.

ORDER (C1199)

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

Within thirty days from the date this decision becomes final, the

agency shall give complainant a check in the amount of $3,000 for her

non-pecuniary damages.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0900)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order

prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29

C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action

for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the

complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

October 31, 2000

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2The AJ found that, but for the recommendation not to hire complainant,

the complainant would have been rehired at least as a causal employee

during the relevant time.