01980848
02-11-2000
Karl A. Wooten, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (S.E/S.W. Region), Agency.
Karl A. Wooten v. United States Postal Service
01980848
February 11, 2000
Karl A. Wooten, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01980848
v. ) Agency No. 4G730118395
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service )
(S.E/S.W. Region), )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Karl A. Wooten (complainant) timely initiated an appeal of a final
agency decision (FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination on the basis of religion (Seventh-Day Adventist), in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC
Order No. 960.001. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the FAD.
Issue Presented
The issue on appeal is whether complainant has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to unlawful
employment discrimination on the above-cited basis when he received a
14-day suspension on July 6, 1995.
Background
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed
as a PS-05 Distribution Clerk, at the agency's Bethany, Oklahoma facility.
Complainant alleged that he was denied a religious accommodation and
treated differently than similarly situated individuals when he was
issued a 14-day suspension for being Absent Without Official Leave
(AWOL). The record establishes that complainant failed to report for
duty as scheduled on June 10, 1995 and on June 17, 1995, both Saturdays.
The agency noted, and complainant did not dispute, that complainant
did not request any type of leave or notify his immediate supervisor of
these absences, except to send a Routing Slip on June 16, 1995 noting
that he was exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of religion.
Because complainant had been disciplined in the past for being AWOL,
management issued a 14-day suspension for the June 10 and June 17 AWOLs.
Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO
counseling and, subsequently, filed a complaint on August 25, 1995. At
the conclusion of the investigation, complainant initially requested an
administrative hearing, but later rescinded that request and asked that
the agency issue a final decision.
The FAD concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of
religious discrimination when he demonstrated that he held a bona fide
religious belief, that compliance with an employment requirement would
violate this belief, that his employer was aware of this conflict,
and that he was adversely affected for refusing to comply with the
employment requirement. The FAD went on to conclude, however, that
the agency proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the action
at issue was not motivated by discriminatory animus and that management
provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action.
Complainant raises no contentions on appeal.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
In this case, complainant claimed discrimination due to a failure
to accommodate his religious beliefs/practices and due to disparate
treatment based on his religion.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to
accommodate religious practices or beliefs, complainant must demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he has a bona fide religious
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his
employer of this belief; and (3) he was disciplined for failing to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement. See Bishop v. Department
of the Air Force, EEOC Petition No. 03970085 (September 16, 1997).
Once complainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
agency to demonstrate that it cannot reasonably accommodate complainant's
religious beliefs without incurring an undue hardship upon its operation.
Undue hardship, as defined by the Supreme Court, is any accommodation
that would involve more than de minimis cost. See Trans World Airlines
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 135 (1977). The reasonableness of an employer's
attempts at accommodation must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Accommodation for religious practices includes, but is not limited
to, voluntary substitutions or swaps, flexible scheduling and lateral
transfers and job changes. See 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(d). With regard to
voluntary substitutions or swaps, the Commission believes the obligation
to accommodate requires employers to facilitate the securing of a
voluntary substitution. Id. Any reasonable accommodation proffered
by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.
See Bishop v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Petition No. 03970085
(September 16, 1997).
In regard to a claim of religious discrimination due to disparate
treatment, the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof
in a Title VII case is a three-step process. McDonnell-Douglas Corp
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Complainant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. A prima facie case of discrimination based on religion
is established where complainant has produced sufficient evidence to show
that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to an
adverse employment action; and (3) similarly situated employees outside
his protected class were treated more favorably in like circumstances.
Complainant may also meet this burden by presenting other evidence which
raises an inference of discrimination. Potter v. Goodwill Industries
of Cleveland, 518 F. 2d 864 (6th Cir. 1975); Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
If complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden
of production shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
If the agency articulates a reason for its actions, the burden of
production then shifts back to complainant to establish that the
agency's proffered explanation is pretextual, and that the real reason is
discrimination or retaliation. Throughout, complainant retains the burden
of proof to establish discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
It is not sufficient "to disbelieve the employer; the fact finder must
believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination."
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (emphasis
in original).
Here, the agency found that complainant had established a prima facie
case of discrimination based on failure to accommodate. It is clear
that complainant is a Seventh Day Adventist and that his church's
policy against work on the Sabbath (Saturday) constitutes a firmly
held religious belief. The agency was aware of these beliefs, as
evidenced by the accommodations management provided complainant in
the past. The 14-day suspension was issued when complainant failed on
two occasions to report for duty according to his normal schedule, which
required him to work on Saturdays. We note, however, that complainant
did not attempt to receive an accommodation for the days in question.
He did not ask management for leave of any type, but merely neglected to
come to work with no explanation on one occasion, and with a note citing
the First Amendment on the next. We fail to see how the agency could
have accommodated complainant on these occasions when he requested no
accommodation. We also note that the record establishes that the agency
did accommodate complainant when he requested accommodation. For example,
he was allowed temporary schedule changes from June 1994 through April
21, 1995 when a coworker was on extended leave. Moreover, the agency
repeatedly advised complainant, who had a great deal of seniority,
to bid on one of the numerous positions that did not include Saturday
as a regular workday.<2> But rather than request an accommodation on
June 10 and June 17, 1995, complainant simply failed to report for work.
Accordingly, we find that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination based on failure to accommodate.<3>
Complainant also appears to have claimed that he was treated less
favorably than similarly situated coworkers due to his religion.
We find, however, that complainant has not established a prima
facie case. He has failed to establish that any similarly situated
employees of a different religion were treated more favorably. In fact,
he noted that other Seventh-Day Adventists were accommodated, casting
doubt on his own assertion that his religion motivated discrimination.
Moreover, he offered no other evidence raising an inference of religious
discrimination.
Even assuming complainant did establish a prima facie case, management
articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action.
Specifically, the official who requested the 14-day suspension (RO:
Baptist) testified that he did so because complainant was AWOL and had
been previously disciplined for the same behavior. The record supports
this testimony. Furthermore, the investigative report establishes
that RO had requested similar discipline for non-Seventh Day Adventist
employees who were AWOL. Complainant offered no evidence of pretext
and no evidence that religious discrimination motivated his suspension.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments and
evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and
not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
2/11/00
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_____________
Date
__________________________
Equal Employment Assistant
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to
all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the
administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the
revised regulations found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable,
in deciding the present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be
found at the Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2 The record establishes that complainant felt he was unfairly denied
a bid job which included Saturday as a normally scheduled off day.
This perceived unfair loss appears to have led to complainant's decision
to stop reporting for duty on Saturdays without requesting leave or other
accommodation. We note, however, that complainant does not allege that
his failed attempt to receive the bid job was due to discrimination.
Rather, he claims that the coworker who received the job had a break in
seniority which should have made complainant the eligible bidder, but for
a mistake on the agency's part. Allegations of unfair treatment that do
not involve discrimination are not within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Nor does complainant's failure to successfully bid on one job with
Saturday off explain his failure to bid on the numerous other such jobs,
especially given his high seniority.
3 We note that the agency went on to conclude that management had
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The
law is clear, however, that once a prima facie case of failure to
accommodate is found, the agency must demonstrate that it cannot
reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs at issue without incurring
an undue hardship. The articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason has no place in a religious accommodation case.