Karin L. Mason, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 30, 2002
01A23070_r (E.E.O.C. Dec. 30, 2002)

01A23070_r

12-30-2002

Karin L. Mason, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Karin Mason v. United States Postal Service

01A23070

December 30, 2002

.

Karin L. Mason,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23070

Agency Nos. 4I-530-1107-96

4I-530-0079-97

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

decision (FAD) by the agency dated April 23, 2002, finding that it was

in compliance with the terms of the March 3, 1998 settlement agreement

into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. �

1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

(1) There will be no retaliation for any prior EEO Activity.

(2) The complainant will be provided supervisory training when available

and opportunities to work as an acting supervisor.

(3) After completion of supervisory training details, the complainant

will be offered higher level detail, including that of auditor, on an

equitable basis with other bulk mail clerks.

By letter to the agency dated January 20, 2000, complainant alleged

that the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested

that the agency implement its terms. Complainant alleged that the agency

breached all three points of the settlement agreement mentioned above.

In its July 17, 2000 FAD, the agency found there was no breach of the

March 3, 1998 settlement agreement. On appeal, the Commission vacated

and remanded the matter after finding no signed or sworn affidavits

in the record from the involved officials and no documentation

indicating that complainant was offered the opportunity to train as

per the settlement agreement. On remand, the agency was specifically

ordered to supplement the record with a statement from all agency

individuals that have knowledge of whether the terms of the March 3,

1998 settlement were violated. Mason v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A05343 (July 19, 2001).

Following the Commission's July 19, 2001 decision, the agency supplemented

the record with supporting affidavits and documentation concerning

complainant's breach claims.

The agency issued a new final decision on April 23, 2002, which is the

subject of the present appeal, finding that it did not breach the March 3,

1998 settlement agreement.

On appeal, complainant argues that the supplemental investigation was

not impartial. Further, complainant argues that she was harassed by

a supervisor concerning the change of her starting time as a result of

the settlement agreement, and a manager was aware of the harassment.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

A review of the record persuades the Commission that the agency did not

breach the settlement agreement dated March 3, 1998. The Commission

notes in the Manager's affidavit dated January 10, 2002, the Manager

stated that complainant was offered training opportunities pursuant to

the agreement but she turned them down.

Complainant, on appeal, contends that she was harassed by a supervisor

concerning the change of her starting time, as a result of the

settlement agreement, and that the Manager was aware of the harassment.

The Commission has held that a claim of reprisal in violation of

a settlement agreement's no reprisal clause is to be processed as a

separate complaint rather than as a breach of the settlement agreement.

See Bindal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900225

(August 9, 1990). Additionally, 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(c) provides that

claims that subsequent acts of discrimination violate a settlement

agreement shall be processed as separate complaints. Therefore, if

complainant desires to pursue these separate claims through the EEO

process, she must initiate contact with an EEO Counselor.

Accordingly, the agency's finding no breach of the March 3, 1998

settlement agreement was proper and is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 30, 2002

__________________

Date