KAMEN, Ali et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 2, 2021

2020005534 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/442,517 05/13/2015 Ali Kamen 2012P26792WOUS 7962
28524 7590 11/02/2021
SIEMENS CORPORATION
IP Dept - Mail Code INT-244
3850 Quadrangle Blvd
Orlando, FL 32817
EXAMINER
LEE, TSU-CHANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2128
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALI KAMEN, MANEESH KUMAR SINGH,
SEBASTIAN POELSTERL, LANCE ANTHONY LADIC, and
DORIN COMANICIU
Appeal 2020-005534
Application 14/442,517
Technology Center 2100
Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, MINN CHUNG, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 8, 13, 20, 22–26, 28–30, and 32–34.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a).
Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Siemens Healthcare
Diagnostic Inc. and Siemens Healthcare GmbH. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method to identify optimum coronary
artery disease treatment. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method of identifying an optimum treatment for a
patient suffering from coronary artery disease, the method
comprising:
(i) providing one or more items of patient information
selected from:
(A) status in the patient of one or more biomarkers
associated with coronary heart disease;
(B) one or more items of medical history
information of the patient selected from prior condition
history, medical intervention history, and medication
history;
(C) one or more items of diagnostic history of the
patient; and
(D) one or more items of patient demographic data;
(ii) aggregating the patient information in at least one of:
(a) a Bayesian network;
(b) a machine learning and neural network;
(c) a rule-based system; or
(d) a regression-based system; and
(iii) determining a recommended intervention for the
patient using a cascaded series of tests based on the aggregated
patient information by:
deriving, using the at least one of the Bayesian
network, the machine learning and neural network, the
rule-based system, or the regression-based system based
on a first set of patient information input to the at least one
of the Bayesian network, the machine learning and neural
network, the rule-based system, or the regression-based
system, a predicted probability of target vessel
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revascularization (TVR) for a bare metal stent
percutaneous coronary intervention;
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of TVR for the bare metal stent percutaneous
coronary intervention is less than a first threshold,
determining the bare metal stent percutaneous coronary
intervention to be the recommended intervention for the
patient;
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of TVR for the bare metal stent percutaneous
coronary intervention is not less than the first threshold,
deriving, using the at least one of the Bayesian network,
the machine learning and neural network, the rule-based
system, or the regression-based system based on a second
set of patient information input to the at least one of the
Bayesian network, the machine learning and neural
network, the rule-based system, or the regression-based
system, a predicted probability of a major adverse cardiac
event (MACE) for a drug-eluting stent percutaneous
coronary intervention, wherein the second set of patient
information includes patient age, patient gender, diabetes
condition of the patient, diagnostic history information of
the patient, and CRP, CREA, DbTNT, parallel TNT,
HsTNT and NTproBNP biomarkers;
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of a MACE for the drug-eluting stent
percutaneous coronary intervention is not greater than a
second threshold, determining the drug-eluting stent
percutaneous coronary intervention to be the
recommended intervention for the patient; and
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of a MACE for the drug-eluting stent
percutaneous coronary intervention is greater than the
second threshold, determining a coronary artery bypass
grafting to be the recommended intervention for the
patient.
Appeal Br. 17–18 (Claims Appendix).
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 8, 13, 20, 22–26, 28–30, and 32–33 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–
5.
ANALYSIS
Standard for Patent Eligibility
In issues involving subject matter eligibility, our inquiry focuses on
whether the claims satisfy the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The Court instructs us
to “first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept,” id. at 218, and, in this case, the inquiry centers on
whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If the initial threshold is
met, we then move to the second step, in which we “consider the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). The Court
describes the second step as a search for “an ‘“inventive concept”’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The USPTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 consistent with Alice and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
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Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“October Update”).
Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (referred to Step 2A, prong 1 in
the Guidance); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020)) (referred to Step 2A, prong 2
in the Guidance).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then move to
Step 2B of the Guidance. There, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being directed to a judicial exception
without reciting significantly more under the Guidance. Final Act. 2–4.
Under Step 2A, prong 1, the Examiner determines that most of the
limitations of claim 1 recite an abstract idea of a mental process under the
Guidance. Final Act. 4; Ans. 4–6. The Examiner states that “these steps are
very similar to the thought process using logic rules performed in a
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physician’s mind while making recommended treatment based on
observation of information collected about a patient. Hence this limitation is
a mental process.” Final Act. 4.
Under Step 2A, prong 2, the Examiner determines the only steps that
do not recite a mental process involve “additional elements that collect
patient information, which add insignificant extra-solution activity to the
judicial exception.” Final Act. 4 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Under Step 2B, the Examiner determines that those same patient-
information-collection limitations do “not include additional elements that
are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception”
because they amount only to insignificant extra-solution activity. Final
Act. 4–5. The Examiner explains that “the nature of the recited elements are
directed to a process practiced in a medical doctor to predict failure
probability of medical treatments based on collected data about patients with
decision rules of his medical knowledge / training, hence the process
claimed is directed to a mental process which can be performed by human
mind.” Ans. 9.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant argues the claims do not recite an abstract idea under
Step 2A, prong 1, because the limitations in the claim cannot practically be
performed in the human mind. Appeal Br. 11–12. More specifically,
Appellant contends “[t]he claims explicitly require at least one of a Bayesian
network, a machine learning and neural network, a rule-based system, or a
regression-based system.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant further argues:
The “deriving” steps in the claims cannot practically be
performed in the human mind. For instance, a human would not
be able to derive a predicted probability of a major adverse
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cardiac event for a drug-eluting stent percutaneous coronary
intervention from such patient information as patient age, patient
gender, diabetes condition of the patient, diagnostic history
information of the patient, and CRP, CREA, DbTNT, parallel
TNT, HsTNT and NTproBNP biomarkers, as provided for in
claim 1. Such derivation of the predicted probability involves
aggregating such potentially large amounts of patient
information, which is a computationally difficult task that human
minds are not equipped to handle.
Appeal Br. 12–13.
Appellant also challenges the Examiner’s determination with respect
to Step 2A, prong 2. Appellant argues each of the claims “require[s]
‘determining a recommended intervention for the patient using a cascaded
series of tests based on the aggregated information,’” and “define[s] a
particular treatment or prophylaxis for the recommended intervention.”
Appeal Br. 14. Appellant asserts that “[t]hese explicit treatments or
prophylaxes are practical applications and the claims clearly do not
encompass all applications of a judicial exception.” Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant additionally asserts that independent claim 13 includes a
further requirement of “initiating treatment of the patient with the
recommended intervention determined for the patient,” which “is not an
extra-solution activity, but is the end result of independent claim 13.”
Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis omitted).
Under Step 2B, Appellant contends, “the claims recite significantly
more than the abstract idea itself.” Appeal Br. 15. Specifically, Appellant
argues that the claims require deriving a predicted probability based on
“patient age, patient gender, diabetes condition of the patient, diagnostic
history information of the patient, [and various biomarkers].” Appeal
Br. 15. Appellant contends that “[a]t least these limitations of independent
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claims 1, 13, and 24 are not well-understood, routine, or conventional.”
Appeal Br. 15.

Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 12
The Judicial Exception
Applying the Guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred
in determining that the claims recite a judicial exception to patent eligible
subject matter. The Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices and commercial interactions, and
(3) mental processes. We focus our analysis on the third grouping—mental
processes.3
We conclude claim 1 recites a mental process under the Guidance.
For example, claim 1 recites “(i) providing one or more items of patient
information selected from: (A) status in the patient of one or more
biomarkers associated with coronary heart disease; (B) one or more items of
medical history information of the patient selected from prior condition

2 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
3 With the exception of a particularized argument with respect to claim 13
made in connection with and addressed by us in Step 2A, prong 2,
Appellant’s arguments against the § 101 rejection are made to the claims
generally, and we treat claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground
of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal
as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the
basis of the selected claim alone.”).
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history, medical intervention history, and medication history; (C) one or
more items of diagnostic history of the patient; and (D) one or more items of
patient demographic data.” Appeal Br. 17 (Claims Appendix). We agree
with the Examiner that these limitations recite a mental process under the
Guidance because providing patient information can be performed by a
person by sharing the information verbally or writing down the patient
information on a piece of paper. Although the claim specifies four detailed
categories of information that may be provided (items (A) through (D)),
each of these categories of patient information remains just that—
information that can be shared.
Claim 1 also recites “(ii) aggregating the patient information in at
least one of: (a) A Bayesian network; (b) a machine learning and neural
network; (c) a rule-based system, or (d) a regression-based system.” Appeal
Br. 17 (Claims Appendix). Aggregating patient information in a rule-based
system falls within the mental process category of the Guidance. As we
noted above, the recited “patient information” may be provided verbally or
on a piece of paper. Aggregating this information can be accomplished by a
person using their mind to input the data into a series of judgments and
determinations that make up a “rule-based system,” as claimed.
Appellant argues that a person cannot practically perform such an
aggregation using their mind because of the large volume of information that
would need to be collected. However, this argument is not consistent with
the language of the claim. The claim requires that the patient information
include “one or more” items of each category of information. Thus, the
“patient information” that is aggregated may be as few as only four items of
information that need to be aggregated.
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Furthermore, even if the claimed information were to require the aid
of paper and pencil to accomplish the aggregation in a rule-based system, the
2019 Guidance expressly recognizes such aided mental processes as
constituting patent-ineligible abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52; see also October 2019 Guidance Update at 9 (“A claim that encompasses
a human performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen and paper
recites a mental process”) (emphasis omitted).
Claim 1 additionally recites “(iii) determining a recommended
intervention for the patient using a cascaded series of tests based on the
aggregated patient information.” This limitation also recites an abstract
mental process under the Guidance because it can be performed by a human
in their mind either through observation, evaluation, and judgment. See
October 2019 Guidance Update at 7 (“examples of mental processes include
observations, evaluations, judgments, and opinions”).
Claim 1 additionally specifies a series of actions that are used to
determine the recommended intervention:
deriving, using the at least one of the Bayesian network,
the machine learning and neural network, the rule-based system,
or the regression-based system based on a first set of patient
information input to the at least one of the Bayesian network, the
machine learning and neural network, the rule-based system, or
the regression-based system, a predicted probability of target
vessel revascularization (TVR) for a bare metal stent
percutaneous coronary intervention;
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of TVR for the bare metal stent percutaneous
coronary intervention is less than a first threshold, determining
the bare metal stent percutaneous coronary intervention to be the
recommended intervention for the patient;
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in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of TVR for the bare metal stent percutaneous
coronary intervention is not less than the first threshold, deriving,
using the at least one of the Bayesian network, the machine
learning and neural network, the rule-based system, or the
regression-based system based on a second set of patient
information input to the at least one of the Bayesian network, the
machine learning and neural network, the rule-based system, or
the regression-based system, a predicted probability of a major
adverse cardiac event (MACE) for a drug-eluting stent
percutaneous coronary intervention, wherein the second set of
patient information includes patient age, patient gender, diabetes
condition of the patient, diagnostic history information of the
patient, and CRP, CREA, DbTNT, parallel TNT, HsTNT and
NTproBNP biomarkers;
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of a MACE for the drug-eluting stent percutaneous
coronary intervention is not greater than a second threshold,
determining the drug-eluting stent percutaneous coronary
intervention to be the recommended intervention for the patient;
and
in response to a determination that the predicted
probability of a MACE for the drug-eluting stent percutaneous
coronary intervention is greater than the second threshold,
determining a coronary artery bypass grafting to be the
recommended intervention for the patient.
Appeal Br. 17–18 (Claims Appendix).
These limitations also encompass mental processes under the
Guidance. The first limitation recites “deriving . . . a predicted probability
of target vessel revascularization (TVR) for a bare metal stent percutaneous
coronary intervention.” We agree with the Examiner that deriving a
predicted probability can be performed by a person using their mind or with
the aid of pen and paper.
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Appellant argues the recited derivation requires “using the at least one
of the Bayesian network, the machine learning and neural network, the rule-
based system, or the regression-based system,” and cannot practically be
performed by a person because it “involves aggregating such potentially
large amounts of patient information, which is a computationally difficult
task that human minds are not equipped to handle.” Appeal Br. 12–13. We
disagree with Appellant. As noted above, as drafted, the aggregated patient
information may include as few as four items of information.
Moreover, the “deriving” limitation specifies that the recited
derivation requires “using at least one of” the four specified techniques.
However, as the Examiner correctly points out, the use of only one of those
four specified techniques is required for the recited derivation. Ans. 4. We
agree with the Examiner that deriving a predicted probability using a “rule-
based system” can be performed by a human applying a set of rules to
observe to data using their mind. We specifically agree with the Examiner
that the broad recitation of deriving a predicted probability using a “rule-
based system” encompasses a situation in which “a rule[-]based process is
used by a medical doctor to perform diagnosis and inference based on
collected data related to patients.” Ans. 4.
Appellant asserts the Examiner’s position is unsupported because a
“rule-based system” requires a computer and not merely the thought process
of a medical professional. We disagree because Appellant’s argument
confines the word “system” to an overly narrow meaning inconsistent with
its broadest reasonable interpretation and use in the Specification. For
example, the Specification described a rule-based system as “where the
knowledge of domain experts are captured and expressed using a set of rules
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which are chained based on the sequence of events to predict an outcome.”
Spec. 13, ll. 2–4. Thus, the Specification provides no indication that the
claimed “system” must be a computer-based system, as Appellant contends.
The remaining limitations have similar derivations of predicted
probabilities, and determinations of recommended interventions based on
those derived, predicted, probabilities. For the same reasons discussed
above, these limitations also are abstract mental processes under the
Guidance.
Accordingly, we conclude the claimed process set forth in claim 1
recites judicial exceptions of a mental process and a mathematical
calculation under the Guidance.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Having determined that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our
analysis under the Guidance turns now to determining whether claim 1
recites any additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Under the Guidance, limitations that are indicative of “integration into
a practical application” include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to
a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
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4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely include instructions to implement an
abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool
to perform an abstract idea — see MPEP § 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
As shown above, all limitations in claim 1 recite only abstract ideas.
As a result, there are no additional limitations in the claim to evaluate under
Step 2A, prong 2. As we noted above, Appellant asserts the claims are
eligible under Prong 2 because they “are integrated into the practical
application of treating, and identifying an optimum treatment for, a patient
suffering from coronary artery disease.” Appeal Br. 13. To that end,
Appellant argues each of the independent claims require “determining a
recommended intervention for the patient using a cascaded series of tests
based on the aggregated patient information,” and they identify “a particular
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treatment or prophylaxis for the recommended intervention.” Appeal Br. 14.
According to Appellant, “[t]hese explicit treatments or prophylaxes are
practical applications and the claims clearly do not encompass all
applications of a judicial exception.” Appeal Br. 14.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. Independent
claims 1 and 24 do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application
because they are limited to determining recommended interventions. These
claims do not recite any steps of actually administering any treatment or
prophylaxis. Thus, while various treatments may be determined, the mere
determination of those treatments is not sufficient to integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application.
Appellant asserts that claim 13 goes further than the other claims
because it “explicitly recites a ‘method of treating a patient suffering from
coronary artery disease’ requiring ‘initiating treatment of the patient with the
recommended intervention determined for the patient.’” Appeal Br. 14.
We are not persuaded that claim 13 requires a different result. The
October Update provides guidance on “applying or using [a] judicial
exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or
medical condition.” October Update 13. Specifically, the October Update
explains that “treatment or prophylaxis limitation must be ‘particular,’ i.e.,
specifically identified so that it does not encompass all applications of the
judicial exception(s).” October Update 14.
Claim 13 concludes with the limitation “initiating treatment of the
patient with the recommended intervention determined for the patient.”
Appeal Br. 20 (Claims Appendix). This limitation does not meet the
requirement that the treatment or prophylaxis limitation be particular.
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Rather, it is more akin to a recitation of a generalized instruction to
administer a suitable treatment to a patient.
Appellant argues that various specified treatment options are recited
in the claim. We disagree that merely specifying various treatment options
necessarily constitutes setting them forth in a specific and particularized
way. And in fact, the selection of the various treatment options, as claimed,
is not set forth in a specific and particularized way.
For example, the recommendation of a “drug-eluting stent
percutaneous coronary intervention” is made “in response to a determination
that the predicted probability . . . is not greater than a second threshold.”
Appeal Br. 20 (Claims Appendix). Thus, the claim does not identify with
specificity or particularity what this threshold is, and thus does not convey
with particularity when that particular treatment option is to be selected.
Instead it provides an unspecified threshold for selecting that particular
treatment option.
As such, the changed system design does not provide a sufficient basis
for integrating the abstract idea into a practical application, and we agree
with the Examiner that the claim is directed to a judicial exception.
The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Having determined the claim is directed to a judicial exception, we
proceed to evaluating whether claim 1 adds a specific limitation beyond the
judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the
field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 56. As we noted above, all of the limitations of claim 1 recite only
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abstract ideas. None of the limitations recite any additional elements beyond
the abstract idea. As such, there are no additional elements in the claim that
could be sufficient to supply an inventive concept.
Appellant argues it is not well understood, routine, or convention to
derive a predicted probability “based on ‘patient age, patient gender,
diabetes condition of the patient, diagnostic history information of the
patient, and CRP, CREA, DbTNT, parallel TNT, HsTNT and NTproBNP
biomarkers.’” Appeal Br. 18. This argument is not persuasive because these
limitations solely recite abstract ideas, as the recited “deriving” is a mental
process under the Guidance, as we explained above. As the Examiner
correctly explains, “the nature of the recited elements are directed to a
process practiced in a medical doctor to predict failure probability of
medical treatments based on collected data about patients with decision rules
of his medical knowledge / training.” Ans. 9.
Because the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception, and because Appellant does not identify any additional
elements beyond the noted abstract ideas, Appellant does not demonstrate
error in the Examiner’s determination under step 2B of the Guidance. We,
therefore, sustain the rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, as well as of the independent claim 24.
With respect to independent claim 13, we also do not find the
recitation of “initiating treatment of the patient with the recommended
intervention determined for the patient” sufficient to supply an inventive
concept. We first note that Appellant does not advance any argument that
the “initiating treatment” step supplies an inventive concept under Step 2B.
See Appeal Br. 18; Reply Br. 3–4. Second, the reasons that the “initiating
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treatment” step does not amount to a practical application under Step 2A,
prong 2 apply equally here. As explained above, the treatment step does not
identify with specificity or particularity what this threshold value for
selecting any particular treatment, and thus does not convey with
particularity when any particular treatment option is to be selected. As such,
we also sustain the rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Remaining Claims
Appellant presents no other arguments for separate patentability of
any other claims. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of
these claims for the reasons stated with respect to the independent claims
from which they depend. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject the claims.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 8, 13, 20,
22–26, 28–
30, 32–34
101 Eligibility 1, 8, 13, 20,
22–26, 28–
30, 32–34

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED