K. D. Hughes, Petitioner,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 21, 2005
04a40020 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 21, 2005)

04a40020

01-21-2005

K. D. Hughes, Petitioner, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


K. D. Hughes v. United States Postal Service

04A40020

January 21, 2005

.

K. D. Hughes,

Petitioner,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Petition No. 04A40020

Appeal No. 01996035

Agency No. 4E-852-1266-95

Hearing No. 350-97-8077X

DECISION ON A PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT

On May 17, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC

or Commission) docketed a petition for enforcement to examine

the enforcement of an order set forth in K. D. Hughes v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01996035 (September 26, 2002).

This petition for enforcement is accepted by the Commission pursuant to

29 C.F.R. Sec. 1614.503. Petitioner alleged that the agency failed to

fully comply with the Commission's order with respect to backpay.

Petitioner filed a complaint in which she alleged that the agency

discriminated against her on the basis of disability (left shoulder

injury). A hearing was held before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)

at which the AJ found that complainant was entitled to the protections of

the Rehabilitation Act and had improperly had her hours of work reduced

during the period from February 6, 1996 to August 1, 1997. The agency

declined to implement the AJ's decision and petitioner appealed to

the Commission. In EEOC Appeal No. 01996035, the Commission found

that the AJ had correctly decided the case and remanded the matter

to agency. In addition to other relief, the Commission ordered the

agency to calculate any backpay due to complainant and pay it to her.

The matter was assigned to a Compliance Officer and docketed as Compliance

No. 06A30121.

The agency determined that complainant was not entitled to any net backpay

because she had received payments from the Office of Workers Compensation

Programs (OWCP) for the period in question which exceeded the amount of

backpay she would have been due under the Commission's order. On August

25, 2003, petitioner submitted the petition for enforcement at issue here.

Petitioner contends that the agency's backpay calculation is defective

in several respects. First she contends that the agency's assumptions

about the number of hours she would have worked during the period from

February 6, 1996 to August 1, 1997 were mistaken. The agency assumed

that complainant would have worked 31.13 hours per week, basing its

calculation on the number of hours complainant worked in the period

immediately preceding February 6, 1996. Complainant argues that the

backpay calculation should be based on the 35.25 hour workweek that

had been the basis of OWCP's compensation award.

In our view, both parties are mistaken on this point. In his ruling

in this case, the AJ found that complainant would have worked 32 hours

per week during the period from February 6, 1996 to August 1, 1997 if

she had been afforded a reasonable accommodation. This finding was

affirmed on appeal and is now binding on both parties. The agency

will be ordered to recalculate its backpay determination based on the

assumption that complainant would have worked 32 hours per week during

the relevant period.

Complainant also argues that the agency erred in calculating the setoff to

which it was entitled because of the OWCP payments complainant received.

Those payments totaled $16,619.95 for the period from December 21,

1995 to August 1, 1997. According to complainant, the agency mistakenly

setoff the entire amount of the OWCP payments against her backpay award

despite the fact that the OWCP payments covered a longer period than

did the backpay award. Complainant's position is not well taken.

The record contains an email printout dated March 7, 2003 in which

an agency employee details the agency's backpay calculation. It show

that the amount of the OWCP was adjusted downward to compensate for the

longer period during which OWCP payments were received. This resulted

in a set off of $15,432.08.

For the foregoing reasons, in addition to the obligations imposed on it

by the previous order in this matter, the agency is directed to comply

with the order below.

ORDER (D0403)

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial action:

recalculate the backpay to which complainant is entitled based on the

assumption that complainant would have worked 32 hours per week during

the period February 6, 1996 to August 1, 1997.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. Sec. 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. Sec. 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. Secs. 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. Secs. 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1614.409.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive

this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 21, 2005

__________________

Date