Jun Zeng et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 18, 2019

14354714 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/354,714 04/28/2014 Jun Zeng 83931733 1566
22879 7590 11/18/2019
HP Inc.
3390 E. Harmony Road
Mail Stop 35
FORT COLLINS, CO 80528-9544
EXAMINER
WALKER III, GEORGE H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/18/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
barbl@hp.com
ipa.mail@hp.com
yvonne.bailey@hp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte JUN ZENG and HAMID REZA MOTAHARI NEZHAD
________________

Appeal 2018-008982
Application 14/354,714
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CASS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–3, 5–14, and 16–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which
constitute all the pending claims. Appeal Br. 4, 12.2 The Examiner’s
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 have been withdrawn. Ans. 3. Claims 4

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant lists Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP as the
real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed May 24, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 2.
2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s contentions in
their entirety, we refer to the above mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the
following documents for their respective details: the Final Action mailed
January 8, 2018 (“Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed July 23, 2018
(“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed September 19, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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and 15 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 25, 29. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
The present invention relates to a method of recommending a
production plan. Abstr. Appellant’s Specification explains that production
environments exist in which the fulfillment of new customer orders can
involve the use of both pre-existing and newly-developed production plans
or templates, such as in the commercial print industry, where many different
print products are available through diverse manufacturing processes. Spec.
¶ 1. According to the Specification, in the commercial print industry,
production planning is therefore often done by veteran managers having
significant experience and extensive knowledge of print products, as well as
the machines, tools and outsourcing options available to produce those
products. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14. However, the Specification explains, print order
types are becoming more diverse, and employees are less likely to remain
with the same company for long periods of time. Id. ¶ 14.
According to the Specification, the invention seeks to improve upon
prior methods of production planning by using a self-learning software-
based system that automates production planning for any type of incoming
order. Id. ¶ 16. The system includes a production planning recommender
that uses a similarity algorithm to compare an incoming order with a
historical order database and calculate a similarity score for the incoming
order with respect to each order that has been fulfilled successfully in the
past. Id. The system generates a list of the most similar historical orders
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that have the highest similarity scores, and the system reports this list to the
production manager, who can elect to fulfill the incoming order using the
highest scored production plan, or another production plan on the list. Id.
When the production manager approves the production plan of a historical
order, that production plan is admitted as the production plan to be released
to the factory floor for fulfillment of the incoming order. Id. In situations
where an incoming order is a new order (for example, has new print
production types, unusual customization requirements, etc.) that does not
have an ideal match to one of the orders on the list of most similar historical
orders, the production planning recommender guides the production
manager through a customization process to customize one of the production
plans on the list. Id. ¶ 17.
Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below with numerals added at
the beginning of each limitation, so that it may be referred to more clearly
throughout this Opinion:
l. A method of recommending a production plan comprising:
[i] calculating a similarity score between an incoming
order and each historical order in a historical order database;
[ii] providing a list of most similar historical orders and
corresponding historical production plans ranked according to
highest similarity scores;
[iii] receiving an election indicating a historical
production plan as a selected production plan;
[iv] admitting the selected historical production plan to
fulfill the incoming order; and
[v] customizing the selected production plan before
admitting the selected production plan wherein customizing the
selected production plan comprises, at least, receiving input
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from a user indicating a request to change a step in the selected
production plan.
Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix).

II. PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO PATENT ELIGIBILITY
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–
77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
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omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January of 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101,
which was updated in October 2019. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Guidance”); October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84
Fed. Reg. 55942 (available at the USPTO’s website) (“October 2019 PEG
Update”). Under the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

III. ANALYSIS
A. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Contentions
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 5–14, and
16–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Final Act. 8. The Examiner determines, inter alia, that claims 1–3, 5, 6, 9–
14, and 16–20 are directed to “selecting and customizing a production plan,”
which involves mental processes because “there is nothing in the claimed
steps themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.” Id. at 9–10. The Examiner reaches a
similar conclusion for claims 7, 8, and 21–22, which the Examiner
determines to be directed to “generating a production plan.” Id.
The Examiner further determines that the claims either do not recite
any physical or system elements (claims 1–3 and 5–8) or recite merely
generic computer components that perform generic computer functions
(claims 9–14 and 16–22), and therefore do not improve the functioning of a
computer or improve any other technology. Id. at 11. Thus, the Examiner
concludes, the claims do not include additional elements, taken individually
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or as an ordered combination, that amount to significantly more than the
judicial exception itself. Id. at 11–12.
Appellant argues that the claims are not mental processes because
they include computer-based limitations to implement the claimed ordering
processes over a network, and, therefore, are “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant also argues that “the
claims add specific limitations other than what is well-understood, routine
and conventional in the field, and add unconventional steps that confine the
claim to a particular application.” Appeal Br. 13 (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted). In this regard, Appellant argues that the claim
includes steps that are “novel and non-obvious,” and that the claims are
directed to an improvement to a technology or technical field. Id. at 13–14.
B. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance
Under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first must
determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the
claim. The 2019 Guidance identifies three judicially excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices and managing interactions between
people, and (3) mental processes. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53.
Based on existing Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, the
2019 Guidance has identified “mental processes” as including “concepts
performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion).” Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). The “mental processes”
judicial exception also includes concepts that can be performed by a human
with a pen and paper as well as those that can be performed entirely in the
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mind. See October 2019 PEG Update at 9 (“a claim that encompasses a
human performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen and paper
recites a mental process”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims to be patent ineligible
because “with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is
nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed
by a human, mentally or with pen and paper”).
Claim 1, as drafted, recites generalized steps for creating a production
plan that can be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and
paper without the use of computers or other technological elements. These
steps will be discussed in more detail below.
Claim 1, limitation [i], recites the step of “calculating a similarity
score between an incoming order and each historical order.” This step can
be performed by a human who reviews an incoming order and historical
orders and then determines the orders’ similarity according to a variety of
metrics using mental calculations or calculations made using pen and paper.
For example, a human could take certain key words in the incoming order
and count how many of those words appear in each of the historical orders.
The human could then determine a “similarity score” for each historical
order equal to the number of times the key words appear in that historical
order.
Additionally, paragraph 42 of Appellant’s Specification provides an
equation for calculating similarity scores of different production plans.
Spec. ¶ 42. A human could make use of this equation to calculate similarity
scores using pen and paper, particularly where the number of historical
orders and attributes over which attribute similarity scores are computed is
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small. Appellant does not contend that calculation using this equation is
incapable of being performed by a human, much less provide a basis for
such a conclusion.
Claim 1, limitation [ii], recites the step of “providing a list of most
similar historical orders and corresponding historical production plans
ranked according to highest similarity scores.” A human can perform this
step by examining the similarity score for each historical production plan
and making a list in the mind or on a piece of paper ranking the most similar
historical orders and corresponding historical production plans according to
highest similarity scores.
Claim 1, limitation [iii], recites “receiving an election indicating a
historical production plan as a selected production plan.” That is,
limitation [iii] does not recite a step of actually selecting a production plan.
Rather, the limitation instead recites a step of receiving an indication of
which plan was selected after a non-claimed selection process is completed.
A human can perform this step by receiving an election of a historical
production plan as the selected production plan. The election can be
received either verbally from another human, or by having another human
provide a list of the plans on a piece of paper with one selected using a pen,
such as by circling the plan or placing a check box next to it. This step also
involves managing interactions between people (the person making the
selection and a person receiving the selection). The 2019 Guidance
recognizes managing interactions between people as one of the “certain
methods of organizing human activity” included within the abstract idea
exception. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
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Claim 1, limitation [iv], recites “admitting the selected historical
production plan to fulfill the incoming order.” “Admitting” is a broad term
that does not require the use of computers or technology. Therefore,
“admitting the selected historical production plan to fulfill the incoming
order” can be interpreted to include a human approving the plan. The act of
a human approving a plan reasonably can be characterized as a mental
judgment performed by the human mind.
Claim 1, limitation [v], recites “customizing the selected production
plan before admitting the selected production plan wherein customizing the
selected production plan comprises, at least, receiving input from a user
indicating a request to change a step in the selected production plan.” We
understand the language “receiving input from a user indicating a request to
change a step in the selected production plan” to be the only affirmatively
recited action of limitation. We understand the language “customizing the
selected production plan before admitting the selected production plan” to be
merely a recitation of the intended goal or purpose for why the input
concerning the change request is received.
The step of receiving input reasonably can be characterized as a
method of managing interactions between people. For example, one person
receiving information from a second person regarding such a requested
change reasonably can be characterized as learning or teaching. The 2019
Guidance recognizes teaching, and more generally managing interactions
between people, as one of the certain methods of organizing human activity
that constitutes a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52.
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Furthermore, even if the remaining language of limitation [v]—
“customizing the selected production plan before admitting the selected
production plan”—were interpreted as constituting an affirmative action,
such an interpretation would not change our conclusion that limitation [v]
recites one or more abstract ideas. A human can carry out a step of
customizing a production plan by reviewing a paper version of the selected
production plan and using a pen to edit it, such as by crossing out items that
are not needed, adding new items, or changing existing items. Under this
interpretation, then, limitation [v] reasonably could be characterized as
reciting a patent-ineligible mental process.
For these reasons, we determine that claim 1 recites recognized
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52–53. Independent claims 7, 9, and 21 include similar limitations, and
therefore also recite judicial exceptions to patent eligibility.
C. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance
Having determined that the claims recite judicial exceptions, we next
consider whether the claims recite “additional elements that integrate the
[judicial] exception into a practical application.” See 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We determine that
they do not do so.
Aside from the steps discussed above that can be performed by a
human in the mind or with pen and paper or through interactions between
people, the only computer or technological limitation that Appellant has
included in claim 1 is the use of a “historical order database” for the
historical orders. Claims 9 and 21 additionally recite a “non-transitory
processor-readable medium storing code representing instructions that when
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executed by a processor cause the processor to” carry out the claimed steps.
Appeal Br. 27, 31–32 (Claims Appendix). These limitations are generic
computer components that perform generic computer functions. For
example, the Specification states that “[t]he historical order database . . . can
be built based on software components, such as from Lucene, an open
source software package,” and shows the “historical order database 330” as
generic cylinder in Figure 3. Spec. ¶ 39, Fig. 3. Technical details of the
database structure and operation are not provided in the Specification. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶ 26–29 (explaining that the system may include “processor-
readable media that generally provide storage of computer/processor-
readable instructions, data structures, program modules, and other data”
including “various application programs or other instructions stored in
memory”).
The inclusion of these generic computer components does not take the
claims out of the mental process category of abstract ideas. As the 2019
Guidance explains, “[i]f a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation,
covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52 n.14. See also October 2019 PEG Update at 8 (“The courts have found
claims requiring a generic computer or nominally reciting a generic
computer may still recite a mental process even though the claim limitations
are not performed entirely in the human mind.”).
Federal Circuit precedent is in accord. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v.
First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that computer-implemented method for “anonymous loan
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shopping” was an abstract idea because it could be “performed by humans
without a computer”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the
use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible
invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”);
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of “computer” or “computer
readable medium” does not make a claim otherwise directed to process that
“can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and
paper” patent eligible). As discussed above with respect to Step 2A,
Prong 1, there is no basis in the claims or Specification to conclude that the
claim limitations identified as mental processes cannot practically be
performed in the human mind or with pen and paper, or through interactions
between people.
Appellant argues that claim 1 is not directed to a mental process
because it “recites ‘calculating a similarity score between an incoming order
and each historical order in a historical order database’ over ‘a corporate
network, a home network, or the Internet, as well as one or more local area
networks (LANs) and/or wide area networks (WANs) and combinations
thereof.’” Appeal Br. 15 (emphasis omitted) (citing claim 1, Spec. ¶ 23).
We disagree. As discussed immediately above, the “historical order
database” is claimed and described in the Specification as a generic database
and, as such, does not take the claim out of the mental process category. As
to the use of a corporate network, home network, the Internet, or one or
more LANs or WANs, none of those limitations is recited in claim 1. We
agree with the Examiner that it would be improper to read these limitations
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from the Specification into the claim, which is especially true here because
the Specification in paragraph 24 refers to an alternative embodiment that
does not include such networks. Ans. 6 (citing In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d
1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Spec. ¶ 24 (discussing an alternative
production environment in which multiple print factories are managed by a
single, centralized production server).
Appellant further argues that claim 1 is “directed to an improvement
to another technology or technical field” because it “claim[s] a novel process
of customizing an ordering process that determines a historic order that
closely matches an incoming order and receiving further input from a user
on that customization” and “a user may be allowed to customize a portion
rather than an entirety of the plan.” Appeal Br. 14.
This argument is unpersuasive. As the 2019 Guidance explains, an
additional element may integrate a judicial exception into a practical
application if it “reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer,
or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 55; see October 2019 PEG Update at 11. However, the steps
that Appellant identifies (customizing an ordering process, determining a
historic order that closely matches an incoming order, and receiving input
from a user on that customization for all or part of the plan) are not
improvements to the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other
technology or a technical field. To the contrary, as discussed with respect to
Step 2A, Prong 1, above, these steps are mental processes and interactions
between people because they do not require technology at all (computer or
otherwise) and some of the steps can be performed by a human in the mind
or with pen and paper. Therefore, the improvement identified by Appellant
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is simply an improvement in the judicial exception itself, which is
insufficient to render the judicial exception patent eligible. See October
2019 PEG Update at 13 (“it is important to keep in mind that an
improvement in the judicial exception itself . . . is not an improvement in
technology”); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093–
94 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (determining that a claim that provided a trader with
more information to facilitate market trades improved the business process
of market trading but did not improve computers or technology).
Consequently, the additional limitations in claim 1 beyond the judicial
exception do not serve to integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application within the meaning of step 2A, prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance.
D. Analysis under Step 2B
Under Step 2B, we determine whether claim 1 includes additional
elements individually or in combination that provide an inventive concept
and, therefore, amount to significantly more than the exception itself. See
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We agree with
the Examiner that claim 1 does not include additional elements that provide
any such “inventive concept,” and that claim 1 does not add limitations
beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, [or]
conventional” in the field. See MPEP § 2106.05(d).
As discussed above with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2, the only
additional element in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea is the use of a
“historical order database” for the historical orders, and claims 9 and 21
additionally recite a “non-transitory processor-readable medium storing code
representing instructions that when executed by a processor cause the
processor to” carry out the claimed mental process steps. Appeal Br. 27,
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31–32 (Claims Appendix). However, as discussed above, these are simply
generic computer elements. See Spec. ¶ 39, Fig. 3 (stating that “[t]he
historical order database . . . can be built based on software components,
such as from Lucene, an open source software package” and showing the
“historical order database 330” as generic cylinder in Figure 3); id. ¶¶ 26–29
(explaining that the system may include “processor-readable media that
generally provide storage of computer/processor-readable instructions, data
structures, program modules, and other data” including “various application
programs or other instructions stored in memory”). As such, we agree with
the Examiner that they are well-understood, routine, and conventional and
are therefore insufficient to provide an “inventive concept” that amounts to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Final Act. 11; Ans. 6;
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”).
Appellant contends that claim 1 passes Step 2B because the steps of
“receiving an election indicating a historical production plan as a selected
production plan” and then “customizing the selected production plan before
admitting the selected production plan wherein customizing the selected
production plan comprises, at least, receiving input from a user indicating a
request to change a step in the selected production plan” are not well-
understood, routine and conventional in the field. Appeal Br. 13. However,
as discussed above with respect to Step 2A, Prong 1, these limitations relate
to either (1) mental processes that can be performed by a human in the mind
or with pen and paper, and/or (2) certain methods of organizing human
activity, and, therefore, these steps relate to the abstract ideas, themselves.
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Thus, they are not “additional elements” sufficient to provide an inventive
concept that provides “significantly more” than the abstract ideas.
Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. The same is true of independent claim 7
which includes similar limitations as claim 1. We reach the same conclusion
as to independent claims 9 and 21, which additionally recite the generic
element of a “non-transitory processor-readable medium storing code
representing instructions that when executed by a processor cause the
processor to” perform the claimed functions. We, therefore, sustain the
rejection of independent claims 1, 7, 9, and 21, as well as the rejection of
dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10–14, 16–20, and 22, which are not argued
separately.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–3, 5–14, and 16–22
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5–14,
16–22
101 Eligibility 1–3, 5–14,
16–22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED