Julie A. Ragsdale, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 14, 2004
01A33871 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 14, 2004)

01A33871

09-14-2004

Julie A. Ragsdale, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Eastern Area), Agency.


Julie A. Ragsdale v. United States Postal Service

01A33871

September 14, 2004

.

Julie A. Ragsdale,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Eastern Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A33871

Agency Nos. 4D-290-0056-00;

4D-290-0077-00;

4D-290-0010-01;

4D-290-0071-01

Hearing No. 140-A1-8123X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts the complainant's

appeal from the agency's final order in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant filed several complaints, which were subsequently

consolidated, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her on

the bases of race (Caucasian) and sex (female), in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq., on the basis of disability, in violation of Section 501

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29

U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and in reprisal for prior EEO activity [arising

under Title VII and Rehabilitation Act] when:

(1) she was subjected to harassment;<1>

complainant was denied details, assignments, and promotions;

complainant was involuntarily assigned to the Mauldin, South Carolina

Post Office as a Customer Service Supervisor;

on July 26, 2000, and ongoing, complainant was denied reasonable

accommodation;

on July 26, 2000, complainant submitted PS Form 3971 for administrative

leave and her request was denied;

on March 12, 2001, and ongoing, complainant learned that three supervisor

replacements were handpicked, and were all promoted; and

on March 5, 2001, complainant learned that another employee was

accommodated with relocation due to a hostile work environment.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no

discrimination on any basis, concerning the claims of disparate treatment,

harassment and denial of reasonable accommodation. The agency's final

order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ's partial consolidation

of her hearing with that of another employee at the same location, was

prejudicial to her.<2> Complainant expresses numerous other concerns

about the AJ's conduct of the hearing, and disagrees with several of

the AJ's interpretations of the facts. Complainant also contends she

has been subjected to retaliation since the filing of her complaints.

The agency requests that we affirm its final order.

As to complainant's assertion that she has been subjected to additional

discriminatory actions, we note that the Commission's regulations allow

a complainant to amend a complaint at any time prior to the conclusion

of the investigation to include issues or claims like or related to

those raised in the complaint. Additionally, after requesting a hearing,

complainant may file a motion with the EEOC Administrative Judge to amend

a complaint to include issues or claims like or related to those raised

in the complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.106(d). However, the regulations

do not permit a complainant to raise a new claim on appeal. Therefore,

even assuming arguendo that complainant's allegations are related to this

instant claim, it would be inappropriate for the Commission to address

the allegation on appeal. Singleton v. Social Security Administration,

EEOC Appeal No. 01984784 (April 13, 2001).

Addressing complainant's concern raised on appeal, we note that we

discern no basis upon which to conclude that the AJ's consolidation of

complainant's case with that of another individual at the same facility,

was prejudicial to complainant. We further discern no abuse of discretion

by the AJ. Administrative Judges have broad discretion in the conduct

of hearings. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e); Equal Employment Opportunity

Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO- MD-110) at 7-8 to

7-14 (revised November 9, 1999); Bennett v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05980746 (September 19, 2000).

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

Harassment

Based on the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17 (1993), in order to prevail on a claim of harassment,

complainant must prove that: (1) she was subjected to harassment that

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions

of employment and create an abusive or hostile environment; and (2)

the harassment was based on her membership in a protected class.

See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 6; Cobb v. Department of the

Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). The evidence in

the record is insufficient to support a finding that management's actions

towards complainant were based on her membership in a protected group.

See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 6.

Reasonable Accommodation

Assuming, arguendo, that complainant is an individual with a disability

pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, the finding that complainant was not

denied a reasonable accommodation within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act, is supported by substantial evidence of record.

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Again, assuming, arguendo, that complainant is an individual with a

disability pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, we find that the agency

has nevertheless articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

all of its actions. The AJ's finding that complainant has not shown, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that these articulated reasons were pretext

for discrimination, is supported by substantial evidence of record.

Accordingly, after a review of the record in its entirety, including

consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision

of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the final

agency order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 14, 2004

__________________

Date

1 This alleged harassment included the following: denials of details,

promotions and assignments; the disclosure to the unions at Anderson that

the supervisors were being reassigned; the failure for a period of time,

of a manager to respond to complainant's letters alleging that he was

assigning her to a hostile work environment; complainant's receipt of

a letter advising her that her medical documentation was insufficient

to support her sick leave; and, the fact that complainant was sent to

a class entitled �Fundamentals of Supervision.�

2 The record indicates that complainant's hearing was partially

consolidated with the hearing of Adele Striss, Agency no. 4D-290-0063-01.

The Commission has previously issued a decision finding no discrimination

in 4D-290-0063-01. See Adele Striss v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A33479 (May 20, 2004).