01970573
09-22-2000
Julia Pruden, Complainant, v. Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.
Julia Pruden v. Department of the Army
01970573
September 22, 2000
Julia Pruden, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01970573
v. ) Agency No. AMBSF09411E050
)
Louis Caldera, )
Secretary, )
Department of the Army, )
Agency. )
)
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision
concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on
the bases of race (White), sex (female), and reprisal (prior EEO
activity) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant
to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �
1614.405).<1> For the following reasons, the agency's decision is
REVERSED.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established that
she was discriminated against when she was (1) the victim of sexual
harassment and subjected to a hostile working environment when the
agency refused to take appropriate action (sex); (2) denied reassignment
to the Supply Clerk position on the Hazard Material Team (race); and (3)
reassigned from her permanent position of Tools and Parts Attendant to
lesser paying temporary details (reprisal).
BACKGROUND
Complainant, a WG-6904-06 Tools and Parts Attendant, filed a formal
complaint on November 23, 1994, in which she raised what has been
identified as issue presented. The agency accepted the complaint for
processing and, at the conclusion of the investigation, issued a final
decision finding no discrimination. This appeal followed.
The evidenced contained within the investigative file reveals that,
according to complainant, she was subjected to sexual harassment on
May 10, 1994. Complainant alleges that, on that date, she entered a
cubicle in order to conduct inventory. Three male employees were also
in the cubicle. One of them, the alleged harassing employee (AHE),
instructed the other two to leave. When the two of them (complainant
and AHE) were alone, the AHE walked up behind complainant and placed his
hands on her buttocks and made suggestive noises in her ear. According to
complainant, she asked him to stop and proceeded to another cubicle to
continue her inventory. She turned around to find AHE standing behind
her at which point he placed his hands on her buttocks and thigh area
and tried to touch between her legs. She begged and pleaded for him to
stop and told him that he was making her very uncomfortable. When he
finally stepped away, he asked her if she wanted him to expose himself.
She left the cubicle as soon as she could.
Once leaving the cubicle, complainant immediately notified an agency
official who referred her to another official. Upon doing so,
complainant was informed that the matter would be handled the next
day. She went back to work and told a co-worker about the incident.
He instructed her to report the matter to her supervisor. She did.
After hearing the story, her supervisor called the Acting Chief and the
Supervisory General Engineer (SGE). Complainant told them what happened.
During this time, the AHE was brought in for questioning and confirmed
complainant's story. The questioning officials (complainant's supervisor,
the Acting Chief, and the SGE) informed complainant that the AHE wanted
to make a formal apology and wanted to know if she was willing to accept
this as punishment. The Acting Chief asked complainant if she thought
the formal apology was substantial punishment. According to complainant,
she was in no condition at the time to make that judgment, nor should she
have put in that position. After the AHE issued his apology, complainant
was instructed to leave and informed that the agency would handle the
situation from that point. The AHE was given a three day suspension from
duty.
On May 23, 1994, complainant approached her supervisor and informed
him that she was uncomfortable working in the area to which she was
assigned. She indicated that she was mentally stressed. She was told by
her supervisor that there was nothing he could do. Complainant went
to her supervisor several times thereafter but each time, she was met
with the same response. After complainant was involved in a verbal
altercation with a co-worker on July 14, 1994, her supervisor asked her
if she was having problems at home or if it was her time of the month.
On July 18, 1994, complainant called the SGE and informed him that she
was not comfortable in the working environment to which she was assigned.
He asked her if she felt physically threatened. She told him that since
the incident of sexual harassment she felt that her safety and
sanity could be threatened. She also told him that she felt alienated
and had lost camaraderie with her co-workers and friends. The SGE told
her that he would see what he could do to help her.
On July 26, 1994, complainant was informed by a co-worker that he was
being trained and transferred to the Hazardous Material Team (HMT)
that was being organized. Upon receiving this information, complainant
asked the SGE if anything was being done to transfer her to the newly
formed HMT since she had indicated that she was uncomfortable working
in her current area. He informed her that she was not being considered
for a transfer because she was not Black. He indicated that he tried
to convince the Director of the HMT to consider complainant but she
refused because complainant was White. Complainant took this information
to her supervisor. Her supervisor called the SGE who confirmed that
complainant was not being considered because of race. After receiving
the confirmation, the supervisor warned complainant that if she wanted to
do anything about the race factor, she needed to remember that he was a
management official; and therefore would have to take management's side.
On August 2, 1994, complainant was informed, by an EAP counselor she had
been seeing, that the Commander was under the impression that she had been
transferred. Upon being told that that was not the case, the Commander
called the SGE and instructed him to transfer complainant immediately. The
next day, the SGE informed complainant that he would be transferring her
to an unofficial temporary detail in the Directorate of Manufacturing
Operations (DMO) Plans and Programs division. Complainant, who by this
time was receiving counseling provided by the agency's health clinic,
informed her counselor that she wanted to be transferred completely
out of DMO because, as long as she was there, she would be reminded of
the situation and labeled the troublemaker.<2> The counselor relayed
this information to the SGE. A few days later, on August 11, 1994,
the SGE reassigned complainant to another unofficial temporary detail,
this time in the Army Communities of Excellence Office. In September,
1994, complainant, for unrelated reasons, requested another transfer
and was placed on an unofficial temporary detail in the Directorate of
Resource Management Suggestion Office. Throughout all of the details,
complainant retained the position title, series and grade of Tool and
Parts Attendant, WG-6904-06.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Sexual Harassment/Hostile Work Environment
Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's
race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is
unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. McKinney v. Dole,
765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A single incident or group
of isolated incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment
unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355,
1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to
trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all of
the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,
its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
In order to establish a prima facie case of such harassment, the
complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence
of five elements: (1) that she is a member of a statutorily protected
group; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;
(3) that the harassment of which she complained is based on sex; and
(4) that the harassment affected a term or condition of employment
and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment; and (5) that there is a basis for imputing liability
to the employer. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 987, 903-05
(11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's situation.
Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., EEOC Notice
No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994).
In the present case, complainant alleged only one incident of sexual
harassment. However, we find that the incident (i.e., the AHE confined
complainant in a cubicle, grabbed her buttocks, made suggestive noises in
her ear, tried to touch between her legs, and suggested that he expose
himself) was severe. We also find that complainant has succeeded in
establishing a prima facie case of harassment. From the information
contained in the file, it is apparent that she (1) is a member of
a statutorily protected group, (2) was subjected to unwelcome sexual
advances,<3> (3) the harassment of which she complained was based on sex,
and (4) that the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering
with her work environment and created an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment.<4>
Regarding the fifth element, where, as here, the harassment is perpetrated
by co-workers, an employer is liable if it knew or should have known of
the misconduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual
Harassment, EEOC Notice No. N-915-050 at 29-30 (March 19, 1990); Owens
v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05940824 (September 5,
1996). What is appropriate action will necessarily depend on the facts of
the particular case and the severity and persistence of the harassment,
and the effectiveness of any initial remedial step. Owens, supra.
The employer should make follow-up inquiries to make certain that the
harassment has not resumed and the victim has not suffered retaliation.
EEOC Notice No. N-915-050 at 30 (March 19, 1990).
In this case, the agency took prompt actions (i.e., ordered an immediate
investigation, suspended the AHE from duty for three days and required him
to issue a formal apology to complainant). We find, however, that those
actions were not totally sufficient, i.e., appropriate. While the AHE
never harassed complainant again, complainant was required to continue
working in the same department where she was frequently questioned and
criticized by other employees. These frequent questions and criticisms
constantly reminded her of the incident, caused her to become mentally
depressed, and alienated her from her co-workers. After informing her
supervisors, on several occasions, that she was not comfortable working
in her assigned area, she was denied the opportunity to transfer based
on race, discussed infra. When she was finally transferred on August
3, 1994, she had already endured almost three months of a hostile work
environment. Further, the evidence does not suggest that, notwithstanding
complainant's constant pleas, the agency moved to prevent or stop her
co-workers from harassing her about the incident. Even the agency's
Commander stated that he would have reassigned complainant earlier had
he been informed in a more timely manner of her desire to be moved.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the agency is liable to the
complainant for sexual harassment and hostile work environment.
Race
Any written or verbal policy or statement made by an agency or agency
official that on its face demonstrates a bias against a protected group
and is the �but for� cause of the adverse action of which complainant
complained may be direct evidence of discriminatory motive. Thomas
v. Department of State, EEOC Appeal No. 01932717 (June 10, 1994), request
for reconsideration denied EEOC Request No. 05940792 (May 25, 1995);
EEOC Policy Guidance on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment
Theory, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 16 (July 14, 1992).
In the present case, complainant has produced credible evidence indicating
that she was not transferred to the HMT because she was White. The SGE
confirmed that he informed complainant that he could not offer her a
transfer because of race. In a sworn statement, he testified that he
was told this information by the HMT Director, the person responsible
for filling the HMT vacancies.
In its final decision, the agency found that complainant had not proved
discrimination based on race because the Director denied having made the
statement credited to her. The agency argued further that even if the
statement was made, complainant could not prevail because she failed to
establish a prima facie case.
Because the investigative file does not contain an affidavit or sworn
statement from the Director, we find the agency's argument that
the Director denied the statement does not constitute evidence, and
therefore, holds no weight. Accordingly, we also find that complainant
has produced direct evidence that discrimination was a motive for
the adverse employment action, i.e., denial of transfer to the HMT.
The agency's argument that complainant failed to establish a prima
facie case is irrelevant because in cases involving direct evidence,
a complainant is not required to proceed through the prima facie/pretext
steps articulated in McDonnell Douglas, infra. Based on the foregoing,
we find that complainant was discriminated against because of race when
she was not transferred to the HMT.
Reprisal
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation
of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case
alleging discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973). See, Hochstadt
v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318
(D. Mass. 1976), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell
Douglas to retaliation cases). First, complainant must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the agency must articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency
is successful, then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the legitimate reason proffered by the agency was a
pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an
allegation of reprisal, complainant must show: (1) that she engaged
in protected activity, e.g., participated in a Title VII proceeding;
(2) that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the protected
activity; (3) that she was disadvantaged by an action of the agency
contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and (4)
that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action. Hochstadt, supra; see also Mitchell
v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burris v. United Telephone
Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
Complainant alleges that, after she was sexually harassed, she was
retaliated against when she was reassigned<5> to lesser paying temporary
details. To support this claim, complainant has demonstrated that she
had engaged previously in protected activity (i.e., complaining about
being sexually harassed). She has also demonstrated that the persons
responsible for the reassignments were aware of the protected activity.
By demonstrating that she was assigned to temporary details, complainant
has shown that she was disadvantaged by an agency action subsequent
to engaging in the protected activity. Finally, complainant has shown
that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the employment action. It is apparent that complainant's report of
sexual harassment resulted in gossip among and criticism from co-workers
regarding the incident, thereby requiring the agency to relocate her
to another area. Because complainant has shown the existence of all
four elements, we find that she has established a prima facie case of
reprisal.
Now that the complainant has met her burden of establishing a prima
facie case, the agency has to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. In this case, agency officials maintained that
complainant was assigned to temporary details because they were unable to
secure a permanent transfer for which she qualified. Agency officials
further maintained that throughout the various details, each of which
occurred at complainant's request, she retained the same title, salary,
grade, and series at which she was employed before the details.
Because the agency has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the alleged discriminatory events, complainant now bears
the burden of establishing that the agency's stated reason is merely a
pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this
by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.
Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
In this case, complainant has met that burden. When examining this issue
in conjunction with the first one (i.e., sexual harassment/hostile work
environment), it is clear that the temporary details constitute reprisal.
After complainant reported the incident of sexual harassment (i.e., the
prior EEO activity), her co-workers created a hostile working environment,
which the agency largely ignored, thereby making her uncomfortable in
her permanent work area. It is this uncomfortableness that caused her
to be transferred to a series of temporary and undesirable details.
Also, complainant submitted evidence which disproved that the agency's
contention that a permanent transfer for which she qualified could
not be secured (i.e., the vacancy on the HMT). As such, we find that
complainant succeeded in proving that the reasons proffered by the agency
were a pretext for reprisal discrimination.
We further note that management's failure to take prompt action to
transfer complainant, notwithstanding its knowledge of the hostile work
environment, also constitutes reprisal discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we hereby REVERSE the final
agency decision regarding complainant's sexual harassment/hostile work
environment, race discrimination, and reprisal claims.
ORDER
The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:
(1) The agency shall assign the complainant to the Hazardous Material
Team or to a position similar in duties and status as well as title,
salary, grade, and series.
(2) The agency shall restore any leave used by the complainant as a
result of the hostile work environment.
(3) The agency shall train all employees, including supervisors and
managers, at the Directorate of Manufacturing Operations, Pine Bluff
Arsenal, Arkansas facility regarding harassment under Title VII, and how
to avoid perpetrating such harassment. In addition, the agency shall
train all supervisors and managers regarding how to recognize and prevent
harassment/hostile work environment and steps that should be taken when
an employee complains of such harassment.
(4) The agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation regarding
compensatory damages for mental anguish, medical expenses and
any other losses incurred as a result of the harassment found in
this decision.<6> The complainant is ordered to cooperate with the
supplemental investigation by providing all necessary information that
the agency requests to help it determine any damages and or awards due.
After conducting the supplemental investigation, the agency shall give
the complainant a copy of the investigative report and provide her, in
writing, an opportunity to submit additional information to be included in
the investigation. If there is a dispute about the amount of compensatory
damages, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant for the
undisputed amount. The complainant may file a petition for enforcement
or clarification of the disputed amount with the Compliance Officer,
Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036.
(5) The agency shall complete all the above actions within ninety (90)
calendar days after this decision becomes final.
(6) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance,
as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying
that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G1092)
The agency is ORDERED to post at its Directorate of Manufacturing
Operations, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas facility copies of the attached
notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the agency's duly
authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency within thirty
(30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall
remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed
notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited
in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision,"
within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the
complaint. 29 C.F.R. �1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall
be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of
fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The complainant also has
the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the
Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition
for enforcement. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be
codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. ��1614.407, 1614.408),
and 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the
right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance
with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action."
29 C.F.R. ��1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or
a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline
stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant
files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint,
including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.409).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0800)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN
THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
September 22, 2000
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dated which found that
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., has occurred at this facility.
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee
or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,
SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL DISABILITY with respect
to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions
or privileges of employment. The Directorate Manufacturing Operations,
Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas facility confirms its commitment to comply
with these statutory provisions.
The Directorate Manufacturing Operations, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas
facility supports and will comply with such Federal law and will not
take action against individuals because they have exercised their rights
under law. The Directorate Manufacturing Operations, Pine Bluff Arsenal,
Arkansas facility has been found to have discriminated on the basis
of race, sex, and reprisal when an employee was subjected to sexual
harassment/hostile work environment and denied reassignment. The
Directorate Manufacturing Operations, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas
facility has been ordered to take corrective action in the form of
reassigning the aggrieved individual; giving the aggrieved individual an
opportunity to present evidence of compensatory damages and compensating
her for any such damages; and training all employees, including
supervisors and managers, regarding sexual harassment under Title VII.
The Directorate Manufacturing Operations, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas
facility will ensure that officials responsible for personnel decisions
and the terms and conditions of employment will abide by the requirements
of all federal equal employment opportunity laws and will not retaliate
against employees who file EEO complaints.
The Directorate Manufacturing Operations, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas
facility will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate
against any individual who exercises his or her right to oppose practices
made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings pursuant to,
Federal equal employment opportunity law.
_______________________________
Date Posted: ____________________
Posting Expires: ________________
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's
federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations
apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in
the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply
the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2 For example, other employees constantly asked her about the situation,
some going so far as to ask how the AHE's male genitals looked and saying
that they do not understand how the AHE looks at her everyday after what
she had done to him.
3 The AHE confirmed complainant's version of events.
4 The file contains several medical reports which indicate clearly that
from May 10, 1994 (the date of the sexual harassment) to October 19,
1994, complainant was unable to perform in a work capacity (emphasis
added). The reports also indicates that complainant suffered from frequent
periods of uncontrollable crying, hopelessness, feelings of betrayal,
shame and extreme fear of returning to work.
5 After she was sexually harassed, complainant requested reassignment in
an effort to escape a hostile work environment. In this case, reassigning
the AHE was not an issue because he was not the direct source of the
hostile environment. According to the complainant, the hostile work
environment stemmed from continuous reminders from her co-workers about
the incident.
6 For guidance on investigating compensatory damages, see Carle
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993)
and Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 (July 14, 1992).