Juan R. Daly, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Headquarters), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 14, 2002
01A04444 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 14, 2002)

01A04444

03-14-2002

Juan R. Daly, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Headquarters), Agency.


Juan R. Daly v. United States Postal Service

01A04444

March 14, 2002

.

Juan R. Daly,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Headquarters),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A04444

Agency No. HO-0166-96 and HO-0224-96

Hearing No. 210-99-6425X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

(FAD), dated April 4, 2000, concerning his two equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaints of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the Administrative Judge (AJ) erred when she entered Findings

and Conclusions, without a hearing, finding in favor of the agency and

granting summary judgment that complainant failed to prove discrimination

or reprisal as to all allegations.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that complainant, a Purchasing Specialist, EAS-24, at

the agency's Purchasing/Procurement Department at the Main Post Office,

Chicago, IL facility, filed formal EEO complaint No. HO-0166-96 on May

13, 1996, and filed formal EEO complaint No. HO-0224-96 on August 16,

1996, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the

bases of race (Hispanic), national origin (Puerto Rican), sex (male),

age (D.O.B. 12/26/35), and reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

(1) He was issued a Letter of Warning (LOW) dated November 14, 1995;

He was issued a Notice of Suspension dated January 9, 1996;

He was harassed by his supervisor;

He was not allowed to perform a First Article Test on Clothing Locker

on February 19, 1996;

He was not allowed to wear a bolo tie and was sent to the Employees'

Assistance Program (EAP) on February 28, 1996; and

He was issued a Notice of Proposed Removal dated May 13, 1996

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of

the investigative reports and requested a hearing before an EEOC AJ.

The AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

Claim 1

Concerning the LOW, dated November 14, 1995, the AJ concluded that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race, national

origin and sex discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that

complainant failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees

not in complainant's protected classes were treated differently under

similar circumstances when complainant was issued the LOW for failing

to follow instructions to comply with the dress requirement of wearing

a traditional tie. Complainant failed to submit any evidence in support

of his claim.

Further, the AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of age discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that

complainant failed to present comparative data or other evidence which

would create an inference of age discrimination. Also, the AJ found

that the record did not contain any evidence that would establish a

causal connection between complainant's age and the issuance of the LOW.

Concerning complainant's allegation of retaliation, the AJ found that

the complainant's initial contact with the EEO counselor was January 11,

1996, and the complainant's most recent prior activity was on September

14, 1995. And, although the AJ found that the alleged discriminating

officials were aware of complainant's prior EEO activity, the AJ concluded

complainant offered nothing more than the officials' knowledge of his

prior protected activity to prove his retaliation claim. The AJ found

that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

Claim 2

Concerning the Notice of Suspension dated January 9, 1996, the AJ

concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of

race, national origin, age, and sex discrimination and retaliation.

Specifically, the AJ found that complainant failed to demonstrate that

similarly situated employees (males) not in complainant's protected

classes were treated differently under similar circumstances when

complainant was issued the suspension for failing to follow instructions

to comply with the dress requirement to wear business attire. Complainant

failed to submit any additional evidence in support of his claim.

Claim 3

Concerning complainant's allegation that he was harassed by his

supervisor, the AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case of race, national origin, age and sex discrimination

and retaliation. Complainant contended that his team leader (TL)

and the manager (M) of the agency's purchasing and materials service

center harassed him about his dress attire. Complainant believed that

management acted in a discriminatory and retaliatory manner by refusing

to allow him to wear a bolo tie. The AJ found that complainant failed

to submit substantive evidence that other male employees in the division

failed to wear the required professional attire. The AJ found that

although TL and M communicated with complainant on several occasions

regarding the dress code, these attempts to resolve the situation did

not rise to the level of harassment. Furthermore, the AJ found that

management's discussions with or correspondence to complainant, were

not taken because of discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

Claim 4

Concerning complainant's allegation that he was discriminated against

on the bases of race, national origin, age and sex discrimination and

retaliation when he was not allowed to perform a First Article Test on

a Clothing Locker on February 19, 1996, the AJ found that complainant

failed to establish that he suffered a tangible harm.

M explained that a First Article Test is used by the division to determine

if a mass-produced article meets the agency's specification requirements.

The test is initiated at the request of the buyer. The AJ found that

complainant was not at work when the test was scheduled to be performed.

Complainant contended that a co-worker made critical notes of his work

in the course of performing the test. The AJ found that the record

did not contain evidence that the co-worker made notations critical

of complainant's performance. Further, the AJ found that there was no

evidence that such comments, if they did exist, would have negatively

affected complainant's employment. The AJ noted that even complainant

did not allege that the comments were used by management to adversely

affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment. Also,

the AJ found that there is no likelihood that the actions would recur

because complainant retired from the agency effective July 20, 1996.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish that he was harmed

in regard to this matter.

Claim 5

Concerning complainant's allegation that he was not allowed to wear a

bolo tie and was sent to the EAP on February 28, 1996, the AJ concluded

that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race, national

origin, age, and sex discrimination and retaliation. The AJ found that

there was no evidence that the requirement that men wear �tie-in-hand

neckties� without holding women to the same standard placed a heavier

burden on the male employees. There was testimony that all employees were

to wear business attire befitting an administrative type office. Further,

the AJ found that the requirement for men to wear a traditional necktie

did not relate to the ability of the male employees to perform their job.

Also, the AJ concluded that different dress requirements for men and

women are not a per se violation of Title VII when the requirements are

equally enforced and equivalent with respect to the burden imposed.

Concerning complainant's allegation that he was sent to the EAP on

February 28, 1996, the AJ found that complainant failed to establish that

he was aggrieved by this recommendation. Although complainant contends he

was ordered to attend, the letter from M stated that he �recommend[s] that

you attend an EAP counseling session.� While complainant was subsequently

admonished concerning the EAP session, it was for not reporting whether

he attended the session, and not for his failure to attend.

Claim 6

Concerning complainant's allegation that he was issued a Notice of

Proposed Removal, dated May 13, 1996, the AJ found that complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of race, national origin, age and

sex discrimination and retaliation. Complainant had raised allegations

of ongoing harassment and involuntary retirement. The AJ found that

complainant failed to establish that there was ongoing harassment or that

his retirement was involuntary. Further, the AJ found that TL's and M's

actions in counseling, disciplining, or discussing with complainant, on

several occasions, the need for him to comply with dress code requirements

did not rise to the level of harassment.

Concerning being forced to retire, the AJ found that complainant's

retirement did not constitute a constructive discharge. Although

complainant was issued a notice of proposed removal, the notice was held

in abeyance pending the outcome of settlement discussions between the

agency and complainant's attorney. Complainant had the option after

the unsuccessful settlement negotiations to fight his proposed removal.

The AJ found that complainant chose to retire to avoid termination for

legitimate reasons.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal, and the agency requests

that we affirm its final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Concerning complainant's claims of reprisal, the Commission has stated

that adverse actions need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions" or

materially affect the terms and conditions of employment to constitute

retaliation. Lindsey v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request

No. 05980410 (Nov. 4, 1999) (citing EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003

(May 20, 1998)). Instead, the statutory retaliation clauses prohibit

any adverse treatment that is based upon a retaliatory motive and is

reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging

in protected activity. Id.

The Commission finds that the AJ's decision properly summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,

and laws. We note that complainant failed to present evidence that any

of the agency's actions were in retaliation for complainant's prior EEO

activity or were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's

race, national origin, age, and sex. We discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we affirm the agency's final order.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, and arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the

agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 14, 2002

Date