01972756
03-17-1999
Jovaunda L. Brown, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Areas) Agency.
Jovaunda L. Brown v. United States Postal Service
01972756
March 17, 1999
Jovaunda L. Brown, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01972756
) Agency No. 1G-754-1095-95
William J. Henderson, ) EEOC No. 310-96-5417X
Postmaster, )
United States Postal Service, )
(S.E./S.W. Areas) )
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision that it had not
discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The Commission accepts
the appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.
Appellant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging discrimination based
on race (Black), sex (female), national origin (African American) and
physical disability (injured knees) when, on May 18, 1995, she learned
another employee was allowed to continue a 204B assignment after an
accident, while she was not. Following the agency's investigation,
appellant requested a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge.
Finding that there were no material facts in dispute, on November
21, 1996, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision pursuant to 29
C.F.R. �1614.109(e)(3), finding no discrimination.
Specifically, the AJ found that appellant had failed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination on any bases in that she failed
to show that similarly situated individuals outside of her protected
class were treated better than she was. Appellant alleged that she
was removed from her 204B assignment after she incurred a second on
the job injury, despite her contention that other employees outside
of her protected classes were not removed after their second injury.
Additionally, the AJ found that the agency had articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically, the Manager of
Distribution Operations (MDO)(African American, disability) asserted that
if an individual incurs two injuries while in the 204B program, they are
removed from the program. The MDO asserted that Comparison 1 (Caucasian
male, injured right shoulder) was not removed because he incurred only one
injury while a 204B. The record reveals that Comparison 2 (Caucasian,
female, injured right elbow and knee) was injured on December 14, 1992,
and on April 17, 1995. She was removed from the program subsequent to her
second injury. The AJ found that appellant failed to present sufficient
evidence that rebutted the agency's assertions. Although appellant
argued that two other individuals were not removed from the 204B program
for violating agency procedures, the AJ found that the conduct engaged
in was not similar to that of appellant. For that reason, the AJ
found that appellant had failed to prove that the agency's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its action were pretext for discrimination.
On February 3, 1997, the agency issued its final decision, adopting
the AJ's finding of no discrimination. It is from this decision that
appellant now appeals.
As appellant's complaint constitutes a claim of disparate treatment, the
agency properly analyzed it under the three-tiered analytical framework
outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
See also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Prewitt
v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 305 n. 19 (5th Cir. 1981).
Applying this legal standard to appellant's complaint, the Commission
finds that the agency successfully rebutted any initial inference
of discrimination raised by appellant by articulating legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions at issue.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that appellant
failed to establish that the agency's reasons for its actions were pretext
for discrimination. We find that appellant's contentions on appeal
are without merit. Although appellant argued that the agency conducted
an inadequate investigation, we find she failed to provide sufficient
evidence which raised an inference of discrimination. We also find that
appellant failed to introduce evidence proving that the agency's reasons
for its actions were pretext for prohibited discrimination. Accordingly,
it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
AFFIRM the agency's final decision that it did not discriminate against
appellant.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 17, 1999
___________________ ____________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations