Joseph O. Panugaling, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 12, 2009
0120090025 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 12, 2009)

0120090025

01-12-2009

Joseph O. Panugaling, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Joseph O. Panugaling,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120090025

Agency No. 4G-770-0378-07

Hearing No. 460-2008-00083X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's August 28, 2008 final decision concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq.

During the period at issue, complainant was employed as a City Carrier

at the agency's James Griffith Station in Houston, Texas.

On September 24, 2007, complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against him on

the bases of race (Filipino), national origin (Asian), sex (male), color

(brown), age (over 40), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

1. on October 1, 2007, he was called into the office for a 14-day

suspension1; and

2. on July 25, 2007, he was harassed when he was told carry another route

and was called into the office the next day and asked why he went into

penalty overtime when his route was under two hours;

On October 19, 2007, the agency issued a partial dismissal. The agency

accepted claim 1 for investigation. The agency dismissed claim 2 pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. 1614.107(a)(1), for failure to state a claim.

By letters dated November 11 and 13, 2007, complainant requested that

his formal complaint be amended to include the following claim that

he was discriminated against on the bases of race, national origin,

and color discrimination when:

3. on November 6, 2007, he was issued a Notice of Removal effective

December 14, 2007.2

The record further reflects that the agency granted complainant's request

to have his formal complaint amended to include claim 3.

At the conclusion of the investigation of claims 1 and 3, complainant

received a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On July 23, 2008, the AJ

issued an order, dismissing the formal complaint from the hearing process.

In her Order, the AJ concluded that because complainant failed to follow

her numerous discovery orders, she remanded the case to the agency for

issuance of a final decision. Therefore, the agency issued the instant

final decision on August 28, 2008.

In its August 28, 2008 final decision, the agency found no discrimination.

The agency concluded that complainant did not establish a prima facie case

of race, national origin, sex, color, age and reprisal discrimination.

The agency further found even assuming, for the sake of argument only,

complainant established a prima facie case of race, national origin,

sex, color, age and reprisal discrimination, management articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant

failed to show were a pretext.

Regarding claim 1, complainant's manager (M1) stated that she was the

deciding official to issue complainant a 14-day suspension for failure

to follow instructions and unauthorized overtime. M1 stated that

complainant had continued to go into unauthorized overtime regardless of

the instructions he was given. M1 stated that each route has a different

volume and every morning a supervisor would count the mail for the route.

M1 stated "a split is 15 minutes of delivery volume, so if, for example,

we take an hour away from a route, we give four splits to someone else."

M1 stated that the standard for casing is 18 letters and 8 flats per

minute, and a carrier's office time is calculated by how much mail there

is to case. M1 stated that complainant's base volume was "425 letters,

613 flats, 1038 pieces, and from that he's supposed to be in the office

from 7:30 to 9:38. He's supposed to be back in at 3:55 p.m., he has

five minutes to put his accountables away, then he clocks out at 4 p.m."

Further, M1 stated that complainant "stays too long casing, and doesn't

get to the street on time. Then he goes into unauthorized overtime,

he would call in the afternoon and say he still has too much left

to be back at 4. I would tell him to continue to deliver the mail,

and we'll deal it in the morning." M1 stated that on September 13,

2007, the day of an EEO mediation, she and complainant's supervisor

(S1) instructed complainant to deliver mail until the mediation started

at 11 a.m. M1 stated that she and S1 "pulled his scan points, from the

very beginning of the route, and he should have scanned at the beginning,

but he didn't scan until about 1 p.m., after the EEO [mediation]. He said

he was hungry and went to lunch, and we asked for how long, they only get

30 minutes for lunch. That made him go into unauthorized overtime, and

we took time off his route to compensate for the unauthorized overtime."

M1 stated that on August 31, 2007, she and S1 instructed all carriers,

including complainant, to hold to eight hours "so if a route is over

volume, then you have to add PS Form 1571 to cut the mail back to

the next day. But [complainant] was not over his reference volume,

and the variance to volume should show that. But he cut back, which

was unauthorized. I asked him what was on the floor, where he had

left mail, and said absolutely not, you will go and case that and be

back on time. He was already leaving late. His route was already not

at his reference count, he cut back on his own, and never submitted

the 1571." Furthermore, M1 stated that complainant's race, national

origin, sex, color, age and prior protected activity were not factors

in her determination to issue him a 14-day suspension.

S1 stated that on the day of the EEO mediation, she asked complainant if

he needed help, and "he repeatedly said he would do the best he could,

but he went into unauthorized overtime." S1 further stated she does

not recall what happened on August 31, 2007 concerning complainant

"but if he was told to hold his route to eight hours and he did not,

he failed to follow the instructions of his supervisor."

Regarding claim 3, M1 stated that she was the deciding official to

issue complainant a Notice of Removal dated October 30, 2007, for

unsatisfactory work performance and failure to follow instructions.

The record reflects that on October 3, 4 and 5, 2007, complainant worked

unauthorized overtime and failed to follow M1's instructions. M1 stated

that she took the following factors into consideration when issuing

complainant a Notice of Removal: complainant's Letter of Warning dated

April 13, 2006 for unsatisfactory work performance and failure to follow

instructions; and his Notice of 14-Day Suspension dated September 27, 2007

for failure to follow instructions and unsatisfactory work performance.

S1 stated that while she had no role with the issuance of the Notice of

Removal, M1 "did it, although I agreed with it, because of his usage

of unauthorized overtime." Furthermore, S1 stated that she did not

discriminate against complainant based on his race, national origin,

sex, color age or prior protected activity.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

The agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions which complainant did not prove were a pretext for discrimination,

and that complainant has not demonstrated that these reasons were a

pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision concerning

claims 1 and 3 because the preponderance of the evidence of record does

not establish that discrimination occurred.3

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29

U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the

sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the

Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the

request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as

stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 12, 2009

__________________

Date

1 The record reflects that complainant filed a grievance concerning his

14-day suspension. On December 6, 2007, complainant's grievance was

settled, and as a result the 14-day suspension was reduced to a 7-day

paper/no time served suspension.

2 The record reflects that complainant filed a grievance concerning

his Notice of Removal. On March 11, 2008, complainant's grievance

was settled, and as a result the Notice of Removal was reduced to a

Letter of Warning for Unsatisfactory Work Performance/Failure to Follow

Instructions/Unauthorized Overtime.

3 On appeal, complainant does not challenge the October 19, 2007 partial

dismissal issued by the agency regarding claim 2. Therefore, we have

not addressed this issue in our decision.

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0120090025

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120090025