Joseph Milder, Complainant,v.Hershel W. Gober, Acting Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 11, 2000
01995242 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 11, 2000)

01995242

10-11-2000

Joseph Milder, Complainant, v. Hershel W. Gober, Acting Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Joseph Milder v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01995254

October 11, 2000

.

Joseph Milder,

Complainant,

v.

Hershel W. Gober,

Acting Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01995254

Agency No. 95-1671

Hearing No. 260-96-8043X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning his compensatory damages claim in relation to a complaint

of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 701

et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

On January 15, 1999, the Commission found that complainant was subjected

to reprisal for a grievance that raised claims of discrimination in

connection with denial of advanced sick leave in December, 1992, a

progress review in February, 1993 and non-selection for hiring in May,

1995.<2>

The complainant asserts that he is entitled to compensatory damages in

an unspecified amount due to the agency's retaliatory conduct.

Background

Complainant worked at the Department of Veterans Affairs, Police

and Security Department (agency) as a Police and Security Officer,

GS-4, from September 20, 1981 until March, 1993. From March, 1993 to

November 5, 1993, complainant worked in a Housekeeping position in the

Environmental Service Section (EMS). Prior to his employment with the

agency, complainant was a military Police Officer serving in the United

States Air Force.

Since 1989, complainant's first-line supervisor (S1) was in charge

of scheduling shifts which were rotated among the Police Officers. In

1991, complainant filed a union grievance complaining of the alleged

unfair treatment complainant received in the scheduling of shifts

by S1. Complainant complained that he was taken out of the scheduled

rotation and given less desirable shifts. The complaint was resolved by

the agency allowing the senior officer to pick the shifts. Complainant

was the senior officer at the time.

In October, 1992, S1 again changed complainant's work schedule and took

him out of the scheduled rotation. Complainant consequently filed a second

grievance on this matter. Also in October, 1992, shortly following the

filing of the grievance, complainant suffered a �nervous breakdown� as a

result of the alleged stress caused by his supervisors. He was diagnosed

as suffering from clinical depression and went on medical leave because

he could not perform his job duties.

In November, 1992, complainant gave his second-line supervisor (S2)

a letter from his psychiatrist (P1), which stated that complainant

was being treated for depression and may be able to return to work in

mid-December, 1992. On November 25, 1992, complainant submitted to S2,

the Chief of Police, a request for advanced sick leave. In his request,

complainant stated that he was requesting 92 � hours advanced sick leave

and that he should be able to return to work by mid-December, 1992.

On December 8, 1992, P1 wrote to S2 advising him that complainant was

recovering from depression and, additionally, had a learning disability.

It was P1's opinion that complainant should not return to the highly

stressful situation associated with his previous job placement.

The agency denied complainant's sick leave on December 14, 1992.

Complainant returned to work in January, 1993.

On or about February 3, 1993, S1 wrote out a negative Progress Review and

indicated that complainant �needs improvement.� Prior to this incident,

complainant had always been rated �Fully Successful.� Complainant spoke

with his Union Representative who was able to get the Progress Review

removed from his Personnel file.

The record also shows that in February, 1993, S1 publicly shouted at

complainant in front of his fellow officers during a staff meeting.

Complainant was extremely upset by the incident and went to see the

agency's staff psychologist (P2). Just prior to complainant filing

a formal complaint, the Union President called complainant to resolve

the matter. The matter was resolved by complainant being reassigned to

the EMS Section. Complainant believed this assignment was temporary

while he was recovering from his depression. However, a few agency

witnesses understood that it was a permanent reassignment. On March 4,

1993, complainant began his Housekeeping position.

In July, 1993, P1 sent a letter to Personnel stating that complainant was

able to return to his Police Officer duties, his depression was treated

and over, and he had a learning disability for which he took Retilin.

Complainant was advised by Personnel that he had to apply for a Police

Officer position which was vacant. Complainant submitted an application.

Complainant was one of four candidates qualified for the Police Officer

position, however the position was never filled and eventually canceled.

In April or May, 1995, the Police Officer position was re-posted as

a permanent part-time position and a permanent full-time position.

Complainant applied for both positions. The full-time position was

subsequently canceled. Complainant and Candidate 1 (C1) were the only

candidates for the part-time position. C1 was selected.

The Commission found reprisal with respect to the denial of advanced

sick leave in December, 1992, the negative Progress Review in February,

1992 and the non-selection in May, 1995 and ordered the agency to (1)

retroactively promote petitioner to the position of Police Officer

GS-5, or a substantially similar position, retroactive to May 11, 1995;

(2) determine the appropriate amount of back pay, interest, and other

benefits due petitioner; (3) conduct a supplemental investigation into

what compensatory damages petitioner may be entitled to as a result of

the reprisal discrimination; (4) award attorney's fees; and (5) take

corrective, curative and preventive action to ensure that reprisal

discrimination does not recur, including training to the responsible

management officials. In an effort to comply with our order, the agency,

inter alia, conducted a supplemental investigation into the issue of

compensatory damages. Following an investigation, the agency issued an

FAD which determined that complainant was not entitled to compensatory

damages. It is this decision from which complainant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Section 102(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act authorizes an award

of compensatory damages for all post-Act pecuniary losses, and for

non-pecuniary losses, such as, but not limited to, emotional pain,

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

injury to character and reputation, and loss of health. In this regard,

the Commission has authority to award such damages in the administrative

process. See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999). Compensatory damages

do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other type of

equitable relief authorized by Title VII. To receive an award of

compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate that he has been

harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory action; the extent,

nature and severity of the harm; and the duration or expected duration

of the harm. Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01934157

(July 22, 1994), req. for reconsid. denied, EEOC Request No. 05940927

(December 11, 1995); Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under

Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at

11-12, 14 (July 14, 1992). A complainant is required to provide evidence

that will allow an agency to assess the merits of a complainant's request

for compensatory damages. See Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal

No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993). In addition, compensatory damages may

be only be awarded for past pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses,

and non-pecuniary losses which are directly or proximately caused by the

agency's discriminatory conduct. Rountree v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC Appeal No. 01941906 (July 7, 1995).

The record indicates that complainant, complainant's wife, complainant's

daughters, two of complainant's former co-workers in the Police and

Security Department, two of complainant's former supervisors in the EMS

Section, a former EEO counselor, an employee relations specialist, and

the agency attorney who represented the agency at the hearing provided

affidavits on the issue of compensatory damages.

In the FAD, the agency denies any award of compensatory damages because

complainant failed to prove that his damages were proximately caused by

the agency's retaliatory conduct.<3> Specifically, the agency found

that complainant's medical/psychological problems antedated December,

1992 (the date of the first incident of discrimination). The agency

notes that the only affidavits that date the changes in complainant's

personality are those of complainant and his wife. Both individuals

state that the emotional problems began before December, 1992 and even

as far back as 1991. The agency psychologist compared complainant as he

had examined him in 1989 with complainant as he examined him in October,

1992, with a later contact on November 30, 1992.<4> Thus, the agency

found that complainant's psychological problems were not caused by its

retaliatory actions.

In addition, the agency determined that complainant failed to produce

evidence that his pre-existing medical/psychological problems were

exacerbated by the denial of sick leave, the progress review or the

non-selection. The agency notes that complainant was represented by

an attorney who was notified in writing that �if the medical condition

existed prior to the discrimination, [complainant] must submit medical or

other credible evidence indicating whether or not the condition worsened

as a result of the discrimination, the length of time he had the condition

prior to the discrimination, and the type of medical treatment received

for the condition, and who provided the treatment.� The agency also

noted that testimony, mainly from complainant and his wife, indicated

that complainant suffered from embarrassment and mental distress over

not having a job. However, the agency found that the evidence indicates

that such embarrassment and distress was the result of complainant's

voluntary resignation in November, 1993, rather than any retaliatory

action by the agency.

The agency also found that there was no pecuniary loss suffered due to the

retaliatory conduct and that complainant's financial and credit problems

were the result of his voluntary resignation (not at issue herein).

In addition, even if the complainant had successfully proven that

his financial difficulties were the proximate cause of the retaliatory

conduct of the agency rather than his voluntary resignation, the agency,

nevertheless, found that complainant failed to present evidence supporting

a specific value of such loss. For example, the complainant failed to

present a value of the alleged deterioration of his home,<5> or the value

of the damaged pipes<6> that were caused by the failure of complainant

to afford propane for his central heating.

For the reasons set forth above, the agency determined that complainant

failed to prove entitlement to any compensatory damages.

After a review of the record in its entirety, the Commission finds that

the agency's decision summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Accordingly, it is the

decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the

agency's final decision finding complainant not entitled to compensatory

damages because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not

establish that complainant's damages were proximately caused by the

retaliatory conduct of the agency.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

October 11, 2000

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 The Commission did not find disability discrimination.

3 In addition, the agency noted that much of complainant's evidence

deals with compliance and new reprisal issues (i.e., claims about

actions, failure to act or other incidents which allegedly occurred

after complainant was placed back into his position as ordered by the

Commission), rather than issues relevant to his compensatory damages

claim.

4 The only medical/psychological evidence in the record that post-dates

the initial retaliatory act (December, 1992) shows complainant's mental

health improving.

5 The agency suggested that this could have been done by providing copies

of the tax assessments on the house.

6 The agency suggested that this could have been done by providing repair

bills or estimates.