Joseph Eubanks, Jr., Complainant,v.Donald L. Evans, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 3, 2004
01A34175 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 3, 2004)

01A34175

06-03-2004

Joseph Eubanks, Jr., Complainant, v. Donald L. Evans, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.


Joseph Eubanks, Jr. v. Department of Commerce

01A34175

June 3, 2004

.

Joseph Eubanks, Jr.,

Complainant,

v.

Donald L. Evans,

Secretary,

Department of Commerce,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A34175

Agency No. 00-63-02125D

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission

affirms the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that complainant is a former Field Operations

Supervisor, at the Local Census Office #2119, Boston Regional Census

Center, located in Boston, Massachusetts. Complainant sought EEO

counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on July 18, 2000,

alleging that he was discriminated against and subjected to a hostile

work environment on the bases of race (Black), national origin (American),

and sex (male), when his employment was terminated on May 23, 2000.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. On August

28, 2001, complainant requested a hearing. On February 21, 2003, the AJ

issued complainant a �Show Cause Order,�<1> directing him to indicate his

intentions with respect to proceeding with his case. Complainant failed

to respond to the �Show Cause Order� and the AJ denied the hearing

request and remanded the case to the agency for issuance of a FAD.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that management articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action, namely, complainant's poor

performance. Specifically, the agency found that daily progress

reports showed that complainant's district was the least productive

of all the districts assigned to the Boston South Local Census Office

(LCO). The agency also found that complainant failed to adequately

train and supervise his Crew Leaders who, in turn, were responsible for

the performance and production of the Enumerators. The agency further

found that management discussed with complainant his deficiencies on

several occasions but that he did not improve his performance. Finally,

the agency found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of harassment. Specifically, the agency found that the conduct complained

of was not so severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.

The agency concluded that there is no evidence that complainant's

supervisor made the remarks complainant alleged.

On appeal complainant contends, among other things, that he was terminated

because he questioned management's personnel decisions which he believed

were racially motivated. Complainant makes no contentions about the

AJ's decision to deny his hearing request. The agency requests that we

affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the

tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the

agency is successful, the burden reverts back to the complainant

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

reasons were a pretext for discrimination. At all times, complainant

retains the burden of persuasion, and it is his obligation to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons were not true

and that it acted on the basis of a prohibited discriminatory reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which

the first step normally consists of determining the existence of

a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the

agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly

to the third step of McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Service

Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713-14; Hernandez v. Department

of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson

v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467

(June 8, 1990).

In response to complainant's claim, agency officials explained that since

May 2000, they had problems with complainant's job performance and with

the poor performance of District 6, the district for which complainant

was responsible. Management further explained that they compared

the performance of District 6 to District 1, because the workload of

the two districts was similar. After a comparison, management found

that District 6 had completed only forty-one cases while District 1

had completed four-hundred fifteen cases. The agency asserted that

complainant had several deficiencies in his performance. Specifically,

the agency found that complainant failed to adequately supervise the

Crew Leaders in District 6 who were responsible for the Enumerators'

production. The agency also found that binders of work from District

6 were frequently lost and were not submitted for processing by Crew

Leaders. The record reveals that complainant was not meeting with his

Crew Leaders on a daily basis as he had been directed. The record also

reveals through the Office Manager's testimony that complainant always

defended the Crew Leaders within District 6 rather than actively taking

steps to emphasize the importance of not falling behind in achieving goals

established for District 6. The agency asserts that complainant failed

to keep tight control over his subordinate personnel and their work.

We thus conclude that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for terminating complainant.

Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action, we move to the third step in the analysis. The burden

returns to complainant to establish that the agency's explanation was

a pretext for discrimination. Complainant must show that the agency's

action was more likely than not motivated by discrimination, that is,

that the action was influenced by legally impermissible criteria and

that its reasons for its action were not the true reasons. St Mary's

Honor Center v. Hicks, supra.

In an attempt to demonstrate pretext, complainant contended that he was

assigned to a district he was not familiar with; that other districts had

low numbers of cases; and that his district's performance was hampered

by a requirement that he hire college students who were not available

to work the hours needed. With regard to hiring college students, the

agency stated there was no such requirement. The only point that the

agency emphasized in recruiting and hiring personnel was that the staff

should live in the district in which they work. The agency also found

that it was up to complainant to hire and train the highest quality staff

possible. The record also reveals that other districts had similar number

of cases than complainant's district, and their performance was better.

We find that complainant has not refuted the agency's characterization of

his work, shown that the agency's reasons were untrue, or demonstrated

that his termination was motivated by race, national origin, or sex.

The record also reveals that two other individuals outside of

complainant's protected group were terminated for poor performance.

We find that the evidence of record is insufficient to establish pretext.

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment harassment,

complainant must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected

class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal

or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment

complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; and (4)

the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.

Humphrey v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965238

(October 16, 1998). Complainant argued that the former Local Census

Officer Manager (OM) made racially derogatory comments during their

meetings together, including comments that people of color were poor

performers and lazy and that more White people needed to be hired in

order to get the job done. We find that complainant has not presented

sufficient probative evidence, to prove, by a preponderance, that these

remarks were made. We also find that even assuming that the OM did make

the remarks as complainant alleges, they were isolated remarks and do

not appear to have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a

finding of a discriminatory hostile work environment. Therefore, after

a careful review of the record, the agency's response, and arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the

agency's finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 3, 2004

__________________

Date

1 The AJ issued a Show Cause Order, because complainant expressed

disagreement with her ruling on complainant's discovery motions. In her

order, the AJ advised complainant that if he did not respond within 15

days of receipt of the Order, his non-response would be considered a

withdrawal of his request for hearing.