01984215
01-19-2000
Joseph E. Garst, Complainant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
Joseph E. Garst v. Department of Veterans Affairs
01984215
January 19, 2000
Joseph E. Garst, )
Complainant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01984215
) Agency Nos. 97-1433
Togo D. West, Jr., ) 97-1695
Secretary, )
Department of Veterans Affairs, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision of
the agency concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.<1> Complainant received the final agency
decision on April 7, 1998. The appeal was postmarked April 29, 1998.
Accordingly, the appeal is timely (see 29 C.F.R. �1614.402(a)), and is
accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. The first issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed all
but one of the claims of the complaint (Agency No. 97-1433) on the grounds
that complainant failed to contact an EEO Counselor in a timely manner.
2. The second issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed
the remaining claim of the complaint (Agency No. 97-1433) on the grounds
of failure to state a claim.
3. The third issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed one
claim of the complaint (Agency No. 97-1695) on the grounds that it was
the basis of a civil action decided by a United States District Court
in which complainant was a party.
4. The fourth issue on appeal is whether the agency properly dismissed
the remaining claim of the complaint (Agency No. 97-1695) on the grounds
of failure to state a claim.
BACKGROUND
Agency No. 97-1433
Complainant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on March 18, 1997.
In a formal EEO complaint dated October 17, 1997, complainant claimed
that he was discriminated against on the bases of his race (white) and
in reprisal for his previous EEO activity with regard to the following
employment matters:
1. Assignment of duties on November 19, 1996, and continuing.
2. His performance appraisal on May 29, 1996, and December 20, 1996,
and continuing.
3. Reassignments on October 24, 1996, and November 19, 1996, and
continuing.
4. Training on October 30, 1996, and continuing.
5. Harassment on December 6, 1996, and continuing.
6. Hostile working conditions on August 5, 1994, and continuing.
7. Reverse discrimination on October 24, 1996, and continuing.
8. Retaliation on August 5, 1994, and continuing.
With regard to the specific incidents of his complaint, complainant
states that he was targeted for retirement in a memorandum that was widely
distributed; he was arbitrarily demoted from Chief, ADP Systems Support
Division to Supervisory Computer Specialist, then to Team Leader, and
then to Computer Specialist; he was forced to purchase and use inferior
personal computers for his network workstations; the Director of the
Pharmaceutical Service fragmented the department by directly assigning
tasks to complainant's subordinates, by not informing complainant
of current developments within the ADP section, and by suggesting to
complainant's subordinates that their team leader is not doing his job by
not keeping them informed. Complainant also claims that 2 individuals
were detailed out of his supervisory authority in order to make his
job more difficult; a planning retreat was held on February 17, 1997,
and he was the only manager not invited to participate, and he was not
informed about what occurred at the planning session; the Director of
the Pharmaceutical Service told him that he would the supervisor of ADP,
but a few weeks later the Director told him that he would be a team leader
instead; an individual lacking sufficient experience to lead an automated
systems development team was placed "in charge" of him; his request for
training of his staff was denied/delayed because he did not use the
preferred training source; he has been repeatedly denied sufficient
resources to efficiently operate the ADP department despite the fact
that all other departments have been allowed to increase their staffs
and fill their vacancies; and he was required to combine two networks.
By letter dated May 28, 1997, the agency submitted to complainant a
request for additional information. Complainant was requested to
provided the following information: 1. State in what manner your
assigned duties were altered or changed on November 19, 1996; 2.
State the specific incident of harassment which occurred on December
6, 1996, and in what respect that harassment has continued; 3. With
respect to your performance appraisal, state what occurred on May 29,
1996 and December 20, 1996, and in what manner you were aggrieved; 4.
Explain the issue of reassignment that allegedly arose on October 24,
1996 and November 19, 1996, and continuing; 5. State the specific
incident relating to training that occurred on October 30, 1996, and
continuing, and in what manner you were aggrieved; and 6. Clarify the
specific incident which arose on October 24, 1996, and resulted in alleged
reverse discrimination. Complainant was informed that his complaint
lacked the required specificity and detail with respect to these issues.
The agency informed complainant that he must provide this information
within 15 calendar days of his receipt of the letter, and that failure
to provide the information requested or failure to respond at all within
that time limit may cause the dismissal of his complaint.
In its final decision, the agency dismissed the entire complaint except
for one claim on the grounds of untimely EEO contact. The agency
determined that complainant failed to respond to the request for
additional information. The agency noted that regardless of the lack
of specificity of some of the claims, that all of the cited incidents,
except one, occurred more than 45 days before complainant initiated
contact with an EEO Counselor. The claims of reprisal which were also
raised in complainant's civil action, identified as Civil Action No. 95
C 3925, in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois Eastern Division, were dismissed on the grounds of untimely
EEO contact, and also on the grounds of res judicata. According to the
agency, these matters were settled by complainant's acceptance of an
offer of judgment dated April 25, 1996, and therefore, the doctrine of
res judicata barred these claims from being raised in the EEO complaint
process. The remaining claim was dismissed on the grounds of failure to
state a claim. This claim involved complainant being the only manager
who was not invited to participate in a planning retreat held on February
17, 1997. The agency determined that complainant was not invited because
he is a GS-13, Computer Specialist (Team Leader) and the meeting was
limited to GS-14 supervisors. The agency concluded that complainant's
absence from the meeting did not cause him to suffer loss or harm with
respect to a term, condition, or privilege of his employment. Further,
the agency determined that there was no connection between this isolated
incident and any of the other employment matters raised in the complaint.
Agency No. 97-1695
Complainant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on May 7, 1997.
On June 16, 1997, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint wherein he
claimed that he was discriminated against on the basis of his previous
EEO activity when management solicited the filing of a false EEO complaint
against him by a subordinate employee, and when management required that
he participate as a witness in the EEO investigation of that complaint
during the week of May 5-9, 1997.
In its final decision, the agency dismissed the claim concerning the
solicitation of a complaint against complainant on the grounds of res
judicata. The agency determined that complainant was barred from raising
this claim in the EEO complaint process based on his acceptance of the
offer of judgment in the civil action. The agency also dismissed the
claim involving complainant's required participation as a witness in an
EEO investigation on the grounds of failure to state a claim. The agency
determined that it was required to make complainant available and it
was complainant's duty to participate as a witness in the investigation
of an EEO complaint. Further, the agency determined that complainant
failed to establish that he was injured by the requirement that he submit
himself for interrogation by the EEO Investigator as a witness in the
EEO complaint filed against him by a subordinate employee.
In the aforementioned civil action, complainant set forth claims
concerning being the object of unwelcome sexual harassment at a sexual
harassment workshop; being subjected to a hostile work environment; the
Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary filed a report against him that
stated he was unstable and a threat to her and other employees; that
a proposed suspension was issued to him for incidents that occurred in
August 1994; that in August 1994, he was no longer Chief of a Division
of NAC, but rather Chief of a staff component; in September 1994,
his performance appraisal was downgraded by two levels without any
justification; that two of his subordinates were solicited to file EEO
complaints against him; that in October 1994, he was verbally castigated
in front of his peers without justification; in October 1994, he was
removed from his position as Chief of the ADP Division and was detailed to
another division; that in November 1994, a Administrative Board of Inquiry
was appointed to investigate charges against him; in December 1994, he
was excluded from meetings about ADP projects for which he was directly
responsible; in December 1994, an Inspector General investigation was
reopened and expanded in an effort to discredit him; that the Associate
Deputy Assistant Secretary harassed him over an extended period of time
with threatening and sometimes incomprehensible memos; that the Associate
Deputy Assistant Secretary has made numerous false allegations concerning
his competence, ability, and stability to other agency employees and
personnel and contractors outside the agency; that the Associate Deputy
Assistance Secretary repeatedly attempted to solicit information from
outside agencies and contractors in order to establish security violations
on his part; that in December 1994, the Acting Division Chief was asked
to move him out of the ADP Division; and that an agency attorney and
two non-government attorneys were utilized for the principal purpose of
assisting the Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary in getting rid of him.
The civil action was settled by a judgment order dated April 25, 1996.
Complainant accepted the agency's offer of judgment for $7,600 plus costs.
On appeal of both final decisions, complainant states that the agency
has continued to harass him. Complainant references several incidents
that occurred after the instant complaints were filed. With regard to
the agency's dismissal of those claims where he did not respond to the
agency's request for additional information, complainant contends that he
failed to respond because the agency's request was further harassment.
According to complainant, the agency knew that his claims were true and
it did not need additional documentation.
In response, the agency asserts that on appeal, complainant addressed
matters which occurred after the filing dates of the complaints or
involve matters not at issue in the complaints. The agency reiterates
that complainant was afforded an opportunity to provide additional
clarifying information concerning Agency No. 97-1433, but he failed to
respond to the request for such information.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Agency No. 97-1433
Volume 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter
cited as 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a)(1)) provides, in relevant part, that
an agency shall dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that fails to
state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved
employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been
discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,
37,656 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29
C.F.R. �1614.103); �1614.106(a). The Commission's federal sector case
precedent has long defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a
present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of
employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air
Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 22, 1994).
The agency dismissed complainant's claim that he was not invited to a
managerial planning retreat on the grounds of failure to state a claim.
The agency determined that complainant failed to establish that he
suffered personal harm to a term, condition, or privilege of his
employment as a result of not being invited to the planning retreat.
After a review of the agency's final decision, it seems that the agency
has addressed the merits of the claim without a proper investigation
as required by the regulations. We find that the agency's articulated
reason for the action in question, i.e., that complainant was not invited
because he is a GS-13 Computer Specialist (Team Leader) and the meeting
was limited to GS-14 supervisors, goes to the merits of the complaint,
and is irrelevant to the procedural issue of whether he has stated
a justiciable claim under the regulations. See Ferrazzoli v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910642 (August 15, 1991).
The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long defined an
"aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss with
respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which
there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request
No. 05931049 (April 22, 1994). In the present case, complainant alleged
that he was not able to attend a managerial retreat is an adverse
action affecting a term, condition, or privilege of his employment.
Since complainant alleged that this action was due to his race and in
reprisal for his prior protected activity, he has stated a claim under
the regulations. Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of this claim was
improper and is REVERSED.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of
discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the
matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel
action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.
The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed
to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45)
day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy,
EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation
is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination,
but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have
become apparent.
EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend
the time limits when the individual shows that she was not notified of the
time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that she did not know
and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or
personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence she was prevented
by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the Counselor within
the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency
or the Commission.
The Commission has held that the time requirements for initiating EEO
counseling could be waived as to certain claims within a complaint when
the complainant alleged a continuing violation; that is, a series of
related discriminatory acts, one of which fell within the time period
for contacting an EEO Counselor. See Reid v. Department of Commerce,
EEOC Request No. 05970705 (April 22, 1999); McGivern v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05901150 (December 28, 1990).
A determination of whether a series of discrete acts constitutes a
continuing violation depends on the interrelatedness of the past and
present acts. Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ.,
715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986).
It is necessary to determine whether the acts are interrelated by a
common nexus or theme. See Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC
Request No. 05890308 (June 13, 1989); Verkennes v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05900700 (September 21, 1990); Maldonado v. Department of
the Interior, EEOC Request No. 05900937 (October 31, 1990). Should such
a nexus exist, complainant will have established a continuing violation
and the agency would be obligated to "overlook the untimeliness of the
complaint with respect to some of the acts" challenged by complainant.
Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1978).
Relevant to the determination are whether the acts were recurring or were
more in the nature of isolated employment decisions; whether an untimely
discrete act had the degree of permanence which should have triggered an
employee's awareness and duty to assert his or her rights; and whether the
same agency officials were involved. Woljan v. Environmental Protection
Agency, EEOC Request No. 05950361 (October 5, 1995).
The record reveals that complainant initiated contact with an EEO
Counselor on March 18, 1997. Complainant claimed in his complaint
that he has been subjected to discrimination on a continuing basis.
However, the specific incident dates referenced by complainant reflect
events that occurred more than 45 days before complainant initiated
contact with an EEO Counselor. Complainant referred to an assignment
of duties on November 19, 1996; performance appraisals on May 29,
1996, and December 20, 1996; reassignments on October 24, 1996,
and November 19, 1996; training on October 30, 1996; harassment on
December 6, 1996; hostile working conditions on August 5, 1994; reverse
discrimination on October 24, 1996; and retaliation on August 5, 1994.
Complainant described the discrimination as continuing, but except for
the managerial planning retreat discussed above, complainant failed
to identify a specific incident that occurred 45 days or less before
he initiated contact with an EEO Counselor. We note that complainant
was requested by the agency to clarify his complaint with regard to the
specific incidents at issue and the dates of the alleged discrimination.
On appeal, complainant acknowledges that he failed to respond to the
agency's request. Complainant states that he declined to respond because
the agency's request was further harassment, and that the agency knew
that his claims were true and it did not need additional documentation.
Upon review, we find that complainant did not contact an EEO Counselor
within 45 days of when the alleged acts of discrimination occurred.
Further, we find that the complaint does not set forth a continuing
violation as the incidents that occurred more than 45 days before
complainant's EEO contact are not related to the timely incident involving
complainant not being invited to the managerial planning retreat.
Complainant did not establish a nexus or common theme to link these
incidents. Moreover, the matters involving performance appraisals and
reassignments were separate and discrete actions that have a degree
of permanence which should have triggered complainant's awareness and
duty to assert his rights pursuant to the EEO process. Therefore, the
record does not support complainant's claim of a continuing violation.
Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of these claims of the complaint on
the grounds of untimely EEO contact was proper and is AFFIRMED.<2>
Agency No. 97-1695
The agency dismissed complainant's claim that management solicited the
filing of a false EEO complaint against him by a subordinate employee
on the grounds that the claim is res judicata. Under the doctrine
of res judicata, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits of a claim is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties and constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
153 (1979). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "once an
issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based
on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation."
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 153 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co.,
Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979)). Upon review of the civil
action filed by complainant, we note that complainant claimed that two
of his subordinates were solicited to file EEO complaints against him.
The civil action was settled on April 25, 1996, by a judgment order
in favor of complainant for $7,600 plus costs. We find in light of
the judgment order issued in the civil action that complainant was
barred under the doctrine of res judicata from pursuing the issue of
management soliciting the filing of a false EEO complaint against him
by a subordinate employee. Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of this
claim was proper and is AFFIRMED.
The agency dismissed the matter concerning complainant being required
to participate as a witness in the EEO investigation of the subordinate
employee's complaint against him on the grounds of failure to state
a claim. We note that it is the agency's responsibility, under Title
VII and the EEOC Regulations, to develop a complete and impartial
record upon which to make findings on the matters raised in written
complaints of discrimination. It is noted that complainant was named
as a responsible party in the subordinate employee's complaint, and,
as such, the requirement that complainant participate as a witness in
the EEO investigation was proper. Thus, we find that complainant is
not aggrieved with regard to this matter. Accordingly, the agency's
decision to dismiss this claim was proper and is AFFIRMED.
Finally, we note that on appeal, complainant raises incidents of alleged
harassment that occurred after the filing of the instant complaints.
Complainant is advised that if he wishes to pursue, through the EEO
process, the additional claims he raised for the first time on appeal,
he should promptly notify the agency that he wishes to amend the instant
complaint by the addition of these claims. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37, 644,
37, 656 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �
1614.106(d)).
ORDER (E1199)
The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded claim in accordance with
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656-7 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108). The agency shall acknowledge to
the complainant that it has received the remanded claim within thirty (30)
calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall
issue to complainant a copy of the investigative file and also shall
notify complainant of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty
(150) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless the
matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the complainant
requests a final decision without a hearing, the agency shall issue a
final decision within sixty (60) days of receipt of complainant's request.
A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to complainant and an
copy of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of
rights must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,
the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a
civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior
to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a
civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph
below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407
and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the
underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �
2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T1199)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR
DAYS from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion
of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion
of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you filed your
complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until
such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.
If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE
COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD,
IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
January 19, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_______________ __________________________
Date Equal Employment Assistant
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2In light of our affirmance of the agency's dismissal of these claims
on the grounds of untimely EEO contact, we need not address the agency's
alternative grounds for dismissal.