Joseph A. Ortiz, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 16, 1998
05960270 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 16, 1998)

05960270

10-16-1998

Joseph A. Ortiz, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Joseph A. Ortiz v. United States Postal Service

05960270

October 16, 1998

Joseph A. Ortiz, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Request No. 05960270

) Appeal Nos. 01950773

William J. Henderson, ) 01942886

Postmaster General, ) Agency Nos. 1-B-1395-93

United States Postal Service, ) 1-B-1540-93

Agency. ) Hearing No. 160-94-8110X

______________________________ ) (on 1-B-1395-93 only)

GRANTING OF REQUEST TO RECONSIDER

On January 29, 1996, Joseph A. Ortiz, (hereinafter referred to as the

appellant) timely initiated a request to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) to reconsider the decision in Joseph A. Ortiz

v. Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., Postmaster General, United States Postal

Service, (N.E./N.Y.), EEOC Appeal Nos. 01950773 and 01942886 (December

11, 1995) received on January 4, 1996. EEOC Regulations provide that the

Commissioners may, in their discretion, reconsider any previous Commission

decision. 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting reconsideration

must submit written argument or evidence that tends to establish one

or more of the following three criteria: new and material evidence is

available that was not readily available when the previous decision

was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved

an erroneous interpretation of law, regulation, or material fact,

or a misapplication of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2);

and the decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons

set forth herein, appellant's request is GRANTED.

ISSUE PRESENTED

(1) Whether the previous decision properly concurred with the decision

of the Administrative Judge (AJ) that appellant was not aggrieved with

respect to his allegation that the agency discriminated against him on

the basis of physical disability by failing to provide an interpreter as

an accommodation to his disability (deafness) at meetings, most recently

on March 23, 1993 when a safety talk was conducted without an interpreter

for the hearing impaired.

(2) Whether the previous decision properly affirmed the agency's decision

that it did not discriminate against appellant on the basis of physical

disability by failing to provide an interpreter as an accommodation to

his disability, most recently at a Memorial Day Service Talk on May 28,

1993.

BACKGROUND

Complaint No. 1

The first of the two complaints (EEOC Appeal No. 01950773, agency

no. 1-B-1395-93; hereinafter, Complaint 1), was filed on May 14, 1993 and

charged the agency with failure to provide reasonable accommodations or

special assistance to deaf employees on "numerous occasions." Appellant

identified a safety talk on March 23, 1993, stating that he received

no benefit from the safety talk, and as corrective action requested

that a certified interpreter be available, with no exceptions,

for all important postal sponsored events and meetings. The agency

initially defined the issue as the March 23 safety talk. In response to

appellant's disagreement, the issue was redefined as failure to provide an

interpreter as an accommodation at meetings, most recently on March 23,

1993. Following the agency's investigation of the complaint, appellant

requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The

AJ issued a decision without a hearing recommending a finding of no

discrimination, which the agency adopted as its final agency decision

(FAD) on October 12, 1994.

The AJ found that appellant was a qualified individual with a

disability. With respect to appellant's allegation that the agency had a

duty to provide an interpreter at the March 23, 1993 safety talk, the AJ

viewed the critical threshold issue to be appellant's nonattendance at

the talk, and made a specific finding on the issue. The AJ reasoned that

appellant voluntarily elected not to attend, and to attend a personal

function on his own time instead. The AJ also considered record evidence

regarding the number of Tour 3 employees and the agency's reason for

refusing to reschedule the talk. The AJ noted that because of the number

of employees on Tour 3, approximately 321, there was no agency history of

postponing employee safety meetings because one employee would be absent

from work. Based on these facts, and noting also that appellant did

not dispute the agency's reason for refusing to reschedule the meeting,

the AJ found that appellant failed to prove that the agency's refusal

to postpone the safety talk was discriminatory.

The AJ viewed the question of whether or not an interpreter was required

at the safety meeting to be a merely abstract question and not specific

to appellant. The AJ concluded that since appellant did not attend the

safety talk, he was not an "aggrieved" person within the meaning of 29

C.F.R. �1614.105(a), and failed to state a claim. The AJ specifically

noted that appellant had identified six other instances of alleged failure

to accommodate, but addressed them only by stating that all were formally

settled in the labor-management negotiation context and that there was

no record that appellant filed an EEO complaint on them.

Complaint No. 2

The second complaint (EEOC Appeal No. 01942886, agency no. I-B1450-93;

hereinafter, Complaint 2), filed on August 10, 1993, also charged

the agency with failure to provide an interpreter as a reasonable

accommodation. Appellant alleged that the agency failed to provide an

interpreter for a Memorial Day service talk on May 28, 1993, and also

alleged that an interpreter was not provided on numerous occasions. The

agency ultimately defined the issue as failure to provide an interpreter,

most recently at a Memorial Day Service Talk on May 28, 1993. Following

investigation of the complaint, the agency in accordance with EEOC

regulations provided appellant with a copy of the investigative file

and a notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ. The

FAD on Complaint 2 states that appellant requested a decision without

a hearing. A FAD was issued on March 7, 1994 finding no discrimination.

The agency, in its FAD, relied on the Plant Manager's investigative

affidavit indicating that nonveteran employees who were on-the-clock, such

as appellant, were not intended to attend the Memorial Day service. In

addition, the agency noted that an interpreter was provided for the

subsequent 1993 Veterans Day ceremony. Therefore, the agency found no

evidence of an intent to discriminate against appellant because of his

disability. The FAD made no determination regarding whether or not the

agency had a duty to provide an interpreter at the service, other than

to state that the interpreter would have interpreted had she been at

work that day.

On appeal, appellant argued that later, similar incidents showed that

the agency continued in its failure to provide an interpreter. Appellant

submitted several letters and statements from Rochester employees dated

in September of 1992, and October and November of 1993, corroborating his

assertions that the agency had continued to fail to provide interpreters

at safety and work related meetings, that the coworker interpreter

frequently was unavailable to interpret at such meetings, and that deaf

workers were being separated and excluded from safety meetings conducted

for hearing employees.

The Previous Decision

The previous decision consolidated Complaint Nos. 1 and 2 for

decision. With respect to Complaint 1, the previous decision found that

the AJ was correct in ruling that appellant was not aggrieved and in

the reasoning which led to this ruling. Therefore, it did not reach an

inquiry into the agency's admitted failure to provide an interpreter for

the safety talk on March 23, 1993. The decision noted that with respect

to Complaint 2, appellant alleged that the agency failed to provide an

interpreter at the May 28, 1993 Memorial Day service, as well as on

"numerous occasions." It found that while the agency's FAD did not

address the allegation regarding "numerous occasions," the claim was

not an adequate allegation requiring agency investigation or further

discussion. The decision noted that the AJ had determined the same

allegations in Complaint No. 1 had already been resolved.

Therefore, the decision only addressed the narrow question of whether

appellant's attendance at the Memorial Day service was the type of

situation triggering the agency's duty to provide him with reasonable

accommodation. On this point, the previous decision found that the agency

did not have to provide such services in this instance since appellant

attended the ceremony only by mistake. The decision found that the

agency did not contemplate the provision of such services since only

veterans were intended to be permitted to leave the work room floor

for the ceremony and none of the veterans at the subject facility had

hearing impairments.

Arguments on Reconsideration

On reconsideration, appellant submits documentation of previously

enumerated 1992 and 1993 incidents in which the agency allegedly failed

to provide reasonable accommodation through an interpreter.<1> Appellant

asserts that these incidents indicate that the Rochester facility has

failed to provide this reasonable accommodation continually in the

past. He indicates that he has been trying to show the Commission all

of the incidents where agency management said that they would provide

an interpreter when necessary, but did not do so. He claims all of

the incidents caused him to become more frustrated and forced him to

transfer to a different postal facility. He asserts that the agency's

inaction caused him mental anguish. With his request for reconsideration,

appellant also submits, inter alia, letters from three of his hearing

impaired former coworkers<2> to further corroborate his allegations that

the agency has repeatedly failed to provide interpretive services for

safety and other work related meetings at the Rochester facility, and

that when such services were provided, they were given by a coworker

interpreter who was not certified or well trained in American Sign

Language (ASL) and was frequently unavailable when needed.

In response, the agency argues that it has not been provided with copies

of appellant's enclosures and that appellant's complaint is now moot

due to his transfer to another facility.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that

appellant's request for reconsideration meets the regulatory criteria

of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2). Specifically, our review of the record

herein indicates that the previous decision erroneously affirmed the

AJ's unduly narrow definition of appellant's complaint No. 1, and

limited the issue in appellant's complaints to consideration of only

two specific incidents of alleged denial of interpretive services,

when the record clearly indicates that appellant repeatedly raised

numerous such incidents, which were supported by corroborating evidence

in the report of investigation for Complaint No. 1 and in documentation

appellant previously submitted on appeal. While the AJ indicated that the

cited incidents were resolved within the grievance process, there is no

indication from the record that appellant agreed not to raise any of the

incidents within the EEO process. The mere fact that the allegations were

addressed in the grievance forum cannot be used to prevent appellant from

relying upon such incidents to prove the agency's continuing failure to

provide adequate interpretive services to its hearing impaired employees

herein. Moreover, although the AJ and the previous decision noted that

appellant failed to file separate EEO complaints on these incidents,

appellant's complaints herein, as clarified by appellant and accepted

by the agency for investigation, clearly indicated that appellant was

raising an ongoing series of denials of interpretive services by the

agency on "numerous occasions" which included, in each complaint, a

specific most recent designated incident. Appellant furnished sufficient

corroborating information concerning these allegations and the agency

never specifically rejected any such incidents as untimely filed.

Based on the foregoing, we find the previous decision's affirmance of

the AJ's ruling, which effectively narrowed the scope of appellant's

Complaint No. 1 to the single incident on which the AJ found appellant

not to be aggrieved, to be erroneous. Our present review of the record

herein also indicates that it contains sufficient information on which

to base a decision on the merits of the expanded issue in appellant's

Complaint No. 1.<3> Further, with regard to Complaint No. 2, we find

that appellant's reference to prior occasions would appear again to

indicate that appellant styled both his complaints to cover the agency's

continuing failure to accommodate over a sustained time period. On appeal

previously before the Commission, appellant also submitted additional

corroborative documentation which we consider herein.

Appellant's status as a "qualified individual with a disability" entitled

to reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, has never

been disputed herein, and therefore, we need not revisit this issue.

Under the Rehabilitation Act, the agency's obligation to reasonably

accommodate hearing impaired employees includes providing effective

interpreter services during work-related activities where they are

expected to be present, so that hearing impaired employees can understand

what is going on at any time. Feris v. Environmental Protection Agency,

EEOC Appeal No. 01934828 (August 10, 1995), Request for Reconsideration

Denied, EEOC Request No. 05950936 (July 19, 1996). Selective written

summaries or ineffective or unreliable interpretive services will not

suffice to satisfy this obligation.

The additional safety, affirmative action, restructuring and service

related talks and meetings cited above are clear examples of work related

events for which the agency was obligated under the Rehabilitation Act

to secure reliable interpretive services on an ongoing basis. Appellant

has repeatedly submitted substantial corroborative evidence from other

hearing impaired coworkers which establishes that the agency failed to

meet the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act on an ongoing basis at

its Rochester, New York facility. This evidence indicated that such

services were frequently not provided because the agency relied upon

a coworker interpreter who was often unavailable. It also disclosed

that the agency apparently resorted to, on occasion, requiring hearing

impaired employees to attend separate meetings at which inadequate written

summaries were provided.<4> Appellant cited specific instances of such

denials in the grievances he filed between 1988 and September 1992.<5>

He provided such documentation to the agency investigator. The agency did

not present evidence to rebut appellant's account of these incidents.

The agency argues, on reconsideration, that appellant's allegations of

a continuing failure to provide adequate interpretive services at the

Rochester facility are now "moot" because appellant has transferred

to another facility. Appellant, however, asserts that his transfer was

caused, at least in part, by the agency's continuing Rehabilitation Act

violations herein, which also caused him considerable mental anguish. In

light of these representations and the evidence noted above, we find the

agency's mootness argument to be unpersuasive. We will not permit the

ongoing noncompliance indicated by the record herein to pass unremedied

and unacknowledged before this Commission.

Based on the foregoing, it is the decision of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission to REVERSE the agency's determination, in part,

and find that it discriminated against appellant based on his disability

when it failed to provide him with a qualified sign language interpreter

at work related meetings.

CONCLUSION

After a review of appellant's request for reconsideration, the agency's

response thereto, the previous decision, and the entire record, the

Commission finds that appellant's request meets the criteria of 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2), and it is the decision of the Commission to

grant appellant's request. The decision in EEOC Appeal Nos. 01950773 and

01942886 (December 11, 1995) and the agency's final decision are REVERSED

in part, as discussed above, and the agency is directed to comply with

the Commission's Order, set forth below. Since this is the Commission's

first determination on the merits of the additional allegations set forth

in Complaint Nos. 1 and 2, the parties are afforded reconsideration

rights on this aspect of the Commission's decision as set forth below

(Paragraphs MO795 and SO993).

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions:

(1) The agency shall afford appellant the opportunity to transfer back

to his former position at the Rochester, New York, facility as soon as

an opening becomes available.

(2) The agency shall provide appellant and all of its hearing impaired

employees who can sign, with a qualified interpreter at important work

related staff meetings, training sessions, safety talks, discussions

on work procedures, policies or assignments, and for every disciplinary

action so that the employee can understand what is occurring at any and

every crucial time in his (her) employment career, whether or not s/he

asks for an interpreter. The agency is ordered to retain, at all times,

the services of qualified interpreters as needed in order to fully meet

this reasonable accommodation obligation.<6>

(3) The agency shall provide the managers and supervisors at

its Rochester, New York, facility, with training regarding their

responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act to provide reasonable

accommodation to qualified agency employees with disabilities. Specific

attention shall be paid during this training concerning the agency's

obligation to be responsive to the work-related needs of its hearing

impaired employees.

(4) The agency is directed to consider any claim appellant raises for

compensatory damages incurred as a result of the agency's continuing

failure to accommodate appellant, covering the time period from

November 21, 1991 until the date of appellant's transfer to another

facility. Within 10 days of the date this decision becomes final,

the agency shall advise appellant that he may submit his claim for

compensatory damages to the agency with supporting documentation

establishing the amount of the compensatory damages and that the damages

in question were the result of the agency's discrimination. Appellant

shall be advised that he must submit his claim within 45 days of his

receipt of the agency's letter. The agency shall issue a final decision

on appellant's claim for compensatory damages within 45 days of its

receipt of appellant's claim and supporting documentation.

(5) The agency is ORDERED to post at its Rochester, New York, facility,

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

(6) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance,

as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include evidence that the corrective action

has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the

agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the

agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of

Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision

becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's

fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report

shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the

appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29

C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil

action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or

following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. ��

1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the appellant has the

right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance

with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29

C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil

action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in

42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil

action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any

petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

The following are appeal rights on the merits of Complaint Nos. 1 and 2

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for

reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

The following are the appeal rights on the procedural issues for Complaint

Nos. 1 and 2

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work.

Applicable to both procedural and merits determinations

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

OCT 16, 1998

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

1One of the documents submitted appears to be appellant's affidavit from

the agency's investigation of his third complaint.

2The record already contains corroborative evidence from two of these

individuals.

3We specifically decline, however, to revisit the previous decision's

holdings concerning the specifics of the March 23 and May 28, 1993

incidents, as we deem these rulings to be well supported by the record

herein. We note that much of the documentation appellant submits with

his request for reconsideration is already a part of the record. To the

extent that appellant has submitted new documentation which he has not

submitted to the agency, our decision will not rely upon it to reach

our holding herein.

4In grievances and other attached documentation submitted by appellant,

he and other hearing impaired agency employees asserted that the agency

failed on a constant and continuing basis from approximately October of

1988 until the time of the subject investigation, to provide interpreters

at safety, service talks, and other work related meetings. This

documentation also corroborates his assertion that agency management

scheduled separate safety talks for hearing impaired individuals at

which those individuals were given written copies of the information

that non hearing impaired employees had received orally at previous

meetings. It further indicates that agency management held meetings

on all tours (in August 1992) to inform Mail Processing employees of a

nationwide restructuring plan, without providing deaf employees with a

certified/qualified interpreter.

5For example, a copy of one of the grievances in the investigative report

for complaint 1 cites a service talk delivered on June 18, 1992 at which

appellant claimed, without rebuttal from the agency, that no interpreter

was provided for him.

6Since appellant is still employed by the agency, albeit at a different

facility, and will also have the opportunity to return to the Rochester

facility, this aspect of our order remains applicable.