Jose F. Torres, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 7, 2009
0120081124 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 7, 2009)

0120081124

12-07-2009

Jose F. Torres, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Jose F. Torres,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120081124

Agency No. 2004-0565-2007100844

DECISION

On December 29, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

November 30, 2007 final action concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final action.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Prosthetic Support Clerk, GS-0303-4, in the Prosthetic & Sensory Aids

Service at the agency's work facility in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

On January 25, 2007, complainant filed an EEO complaint wherein he claimed

that he was subjected to discriminatory harassment on the bases of his

disability (carpal tunnel syndrome) and in reprisal for his prior EEO

activity under the Rehabilitation Act when:

1. On December 13, 2006, the Chief, Prosthetic & Sensory Aids Service,

telephoned complainant at his residence.

2. On December 20, 2006, the Chief, Prosthetic & Sensory Aids Service,

telephoned complainant at his residence and asked him when he would be

returning to work.

3. On January 12, 2007, complainant received a letter from the Chief,

Prosthetic & Sensory Aids Service, advising him that he was in an AWOL

status.

4. On January 23, 2007, complainant provided the Chief, Prosthetic &

Sensory Aids Service, medical documentation and she asked him, "Is this

a hostile environment paper that you are giving me?"

The record reveals that complainant was diagnosed with bilateral carpal

tunnel syndrome in 1993. Complainant retired on partial disability in

1999 and underwent surgery in 2000 and 2001. Complainant's condition

involves permanent restrictions on his ability to work, including

a restriction against repetitive use of his hands. Complainant has a

lifting restriction of five pounds. Complainant is not a candidate for

further surgery and his prognosis is poor.

Complainant began working at his current position in 2002 and was able to

perform his duties except for typing. However, complainant experienced

increased hand pain and numbness and was absent from work continually

beginning October 3, 2006. Complainant's absence was authorized until

December 2006 as he was on leave without pay.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant

did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.108(f), the agency issued a final action pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110(b).

The agency determined that complainant failed to prove that he

was subjected to discrimination as alleged. The agency stated that

complainant was not subjected to conduct that constituted harassment.

According to the agency, the telephone calls and the letter were within

the normal range of events which might reasonably be expected to occur

in a typical workplace. The agency concluded that given complainant's

prolonged absence from work, it was appropriate for management to

call and write him. The agency determined that complainant failed to

establish that he was subjected to conduct that was personally insulting

or denigrating in nature, he failed to show for the most part that it was

based on his disability or prior EEO activity, and he failed to prove

the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile

work environment. Thereafter, complainant filed the instant appeal.

In response, the agency asserts that the allegations in the complaint

in no way rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment.

The agency maintains that the Chief was simply performing her duties

within the scope of her position.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant

must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He

must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to

an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal

claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),

and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of

reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;

(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,

he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a

nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.

Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340

(September 25, 2000).

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is

unlawful. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

A single incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded

as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct is severe. Walker

v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the

harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII

[and the Rehabilitation Act] must be determined by looking at all the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,

its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or

a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17

(1993).

To establish a claim of harassment, complainant must show that: (1) he

is a member of the statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to

harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving

the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the

statutorily protected class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or

condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably

interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive work environment. Humphrey v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11.

The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of

a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance

on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March

8, 1994). Further, the incidents must have been "sufficiently severe

and pervasive to alter the conditions of complainant's employment and

create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,

Inc., 23 U.S. 75 (1998). In the case of harassment by a supervisor,

complainant must also show that there is a basis for imputing liability

to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th

Cir. 1982).

In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,

where the agency denies that its decisions were motivated by complainant's

disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply

the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village

Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68

(2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999).

Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, complainant

must demonstrate that: (1) he is an "individual with a disability"; (2)

he is "qualified" for the position held or desired; (3) he was subjected

to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding

the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). The burden

of production then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In order

to satisfy his burden of proof, complainant must then demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's proffered reason is a

pretext for disability discrimination. Id.

Initially, we will assume, arguendo, that complainant established a prima

facie case under the alleged bases.1 We find that there is no evidence

to support complainant's contention that the alleged actions constituted

harassment. The relevant incidents include the Chief telephoning

complainant at his residence on two occasions during his absence from

work, the Chief sending complainant a letter advising him that he was in

an AWOL status, and the Chief commenting to complainant upon receiving

medical documentation from him "Is this a hostile environment paper that

you are giving me?"

We find that the incidents at issue are not sufficiently severe or

pervasive to constitute harassment. The telephone calls to complainant

were appropriate management actions on the part of the Chief given

complainant's prolonged absence from work and the uncertainty as to

when he would be returning to work. As for the letter to complainant

concerning him being in an AWOL status, the record reveals that

complainant needed to submit a written request with medical documentation

for additional leave without pay. Complainant was advised that failure

to submit such documentation by close of business January 12, 2007,

would result in him being carried in an AWOL status.2 We note that the

Human Resources Specialist stated that a letter such as this was routine

in these cases. She stated that she regularly advised all supervisors

to remind employees that they must request leave for any absence or they

will be considered in an AWOL status. We find that the letter at issue

was sent to complainant not as an act of discriminatory harassment but

rather as part of the routine manner in which the agency handled such

matters. As for the comment uttered by the Chief upon receiving medical

documentation from complainant, we find this remark by itself or in

combination with the other alleged incidents is insufficient to constitute

a hostile work environment. Accordingly, the agency's final action

finding no discrimination is hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 7, 2009

__________________

Date

1 We do not decide whether complainant was an individual with a

disability.

2 Complainant's time and attendance records indicate that he was never

placed in an AWOL status. Complainant acknowledged that this was the case.

Subsequent to submitting the required medical documentation, complainant

requested 288 hours of leave without pay retroactive to November 30,

2006. The request was approved.

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0120081124

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120081124