Jos. T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 2, 1972

199 N.L.R.B. 461 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

JOS. T. RYERSON & SONS, INC. 461
Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc. and Local 2212,United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-
CA-5817
October 2, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 13, 1970, Trial Examiner Marion C.
Ladwig issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the record and the
Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions
and the brief and has decided to affirm the Trial
Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to
the extent consistent herewith.
1. Despite the now protracted litigation and de-
liberations, this is a simple dispute. Employee Beasley
is a long-service employee of the Respondent, and he
is recording secretary for his Union. His Employer
and his Union are parties to a contract which prohib-
its the conduct of union business on worktime:'
The Union agrees that neither it nor any of its
officers or members will ... engage in any Union
activity either (a) on Company time, or (b) on the
property of the Company in any manner which
shall interfere with the Company's operations.
This provision shall not be construed to prohibit
those meetings and activities specifically provid-
ed for herein concerning the adjustment of griev-
ances. [Article II, section 3.]
In March 1970, Beasley was given a written repri-
mand for an asserted breach of that contract commit-
ment. Beasley's supervisor resolutely maintains that
Beasley had been caught redhanded, as it were, work-
ing on union documents at his workbench at a time
when scheduled production work should have been
performed. Beasley stoutly denies the allegation. A
grievance was, of course, promptly filed by the Union.
It was denied at the first two steps, whereupon further
processing was held in abeyance, by mutual agree-
ment, for reasons having nothing to do with the merits
of the grievance. Meanwhile, the instant charge had
been filed. The General Counsel thereafter issued the
complaint alleging that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1).
This short and plain dispute emphasizes the fun-
' Our dissenting colleagues make the charge that an arbitrator will be
unable to determine whether this clause is, per se, an unlawfully broad
restriction of employees ' Sec. 7 rights. But neither can that issue be resolved
in this proceeding . The question was not raised by the charge , alleged in the
complaint, litigated by the parties , decided by the Trial Examiner, or pre-
sented to us by exception or brief . The question whether a contract clause
which, on its face , violates the Act may nevertheless serve as the predicate
for abstention pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150, is
simply not presented.
damental soundness of our growing practice to ab-
stain from action where grievance and arbitration
procedures are available to resolve a dispute equally
cognizable in either forum. Had the parties not been
diverted from the contractually agreed forum first in-
voked, this dispute would by now surely be not merely
resolved, but long since forgotten.
These parties have bargained and contracted,
fruitfully and amicably, for 30 years. No shred of
evidence in this record suggests that they are incapa-
ble of resolving this dispute, quickly and fairly, pur-
suant to their contractual undertakings which
culminate in binding arbitration. This allegation of
the complaint will be dismissed, subject to reservation
of appropriate jurisdiction, National Radio Company,
Inc., 198 NLRB No. 1.2
2. The remaining alleged violation of Section
8(a)(1) arises from an equally straightforward dispute.
About 2 weeks after the events described above, Beas-
ley conferred with Respondent's general manager,
Reiker, regarding the grievance of an employee, one
Chilcher. In the course of the discussion, according to
Beasley, Reiker stated that Beasley would "have a
hard time with the company and also the men in the
warehouse" if he pursued the grievance. Beasley's ac-
count is contraverted by Reiker, who denies that he
made any such statement.
The General Counsel contends, and the Trial Ex-
aminer found, that Beasley's version should be cred-
ited. The Examiner then concluded that Reiker's
statement constituted a threat of reprisal against
Beasley for his participation in the grievance proce-
dure. Despite the simplicity of the facts of the dispute,
the issue raised is both complex and difficult. For the
reasons set out below, we conclude that protection of
statutory rights requires that the Board exercise its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reject the Respondent
Employer's contention that we should abstain in def-
erence to the grievance and arbitration procedures
provided in the contract between the parties.
In our series of decisions adumbrating the
Board's policy to defer to a contractual forum where
a dispute might properly be resolved either by us or
under contract procedures, we have required as a con-
dition of such abstention that the dispute presented in
our proceeding be cognizable in the contractual fo-
rum. We stated in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB
No. 150, that:
Finally, here, as in Schlitz, the dispute is one
eminently well suited to resolution by arbitra-
tion. The contract and its meaning in present
2 We do not accept our dissenting colleagues ' characterization of the
positions we have taken in a variety of other cases in the area of accommodat-
ing our processes to those of arbitration We deem it inappropriate , however,
to utilize our opinion in this case as a vehicle for engaging in a further debate
on issues which were dealt with comprehensively in the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in each of such cases.
462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
circumstances he at the center of this dispute. In
contrast, the Act and its policies become in-
volved only if it is determined that the agreement
between the parties, examined in the light of its
negotiating history and the practices of the par-
ties thereunder, did not sanction Respondent's
right to make the disputed changes, subject to
review if sought by the Union, under the contrac-
tually prescribed procedure. That threshold de-
termination is clearly within the expertise of a
mutually agreed-upon arbitrator. In this regard
we note especially that here, as in Schlitz, the
dispute between these parties is the very stuff of
labor contract arbitration. The competence of a
mutually selected arbitrator to decide the issue
and fashion an appropriate remedy, if needed,
can no longer be gainsaid.
In National Radio Co., 198 NLRB No. 1, a similar
condition obtained. There, the question whether disci-
pline imposed by the employer had been for cause, or
for discriminatory reasons, had been presented to an
arbitrator and was subject to resolution by him. In
reliance on the Board's traditional practice to adopt
the findings of arbitrators under standards prescribed
in Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB
1080, we concluded that our remedial authority
should not be exercised prior to determination of the
dispute in the arbitral forum. Thereafter, action by the
Board would be appropriate on a showing that the
contractual proceeding had reached a result which
offened the Spielberg standards.
However, it has never been the practice of this
Board, and it is not now, to abstain from action in
cases which present issues which are irresolvable, in
conformity with Spielberg, in an alternative forum. It
is well settled, for example, that Board deference is
not owed to the result of an arbitration proceeding
where the grievant's claim of discriminatory treat-
ment was, in fact, not considered by the arbitrator.'
Similarly, where the grievant has been deprived of
basic procedural fairness, deference has been denied.4
The instant case poses an issue which, we con-
clude, is sufficiently unlike that in National Radio,
that effectuation of the statutory scheme requires the
exercise of our authority. There are two impediments
to the resolution of this dispute by any tribunal other
than this Board. First, it does not clearly appear that
the incident complained of, an asserted threat unac-
companied by any discipline or other change in
Beasley's employment status, could form the basis for
3 See, e.g, Raytheon Company, 140 NLRB 883.
Gateway Transportation Co, 137 NLRB 1763. More recently, after Cot-
/yer, the Board has relied on this foundation to hold that abstention is
inappropriate where the contracting parties appear to be aligned in interest
against the grievant . Kansas Meat Packers, Division of Ansto Foods, Inc., 198
NLRB No. 2.
a grievance cognizable under the contract. Second,
even if that hurdle be passed, there is no showing that
an arbitrator would have any authority, under the
contract, to consider or remedy company interference
with the performance of grievance functions by a
grievance committeeman. The contract contains a
clause which does prohibit employer interference with
employee rights, or discrimination against employees,
because of union membership, but it does not by its
terms expressly protect the kinds of activities in which
Beasley was engaged at the time the putative threat
was made. Neither has there been any showing, de-
spite this lacuna, that such grievances have in the past
been treated as the proper subjects of the grievance
and arbitration machinery. On the contrary, Respon-
dent makes the unchallenged assertion that there has
never before been any formal complaint, in any fo-
rum, based upon a claim of employer recriminations
against union officials engaged in grievance handling.
We are constrained to add that the violation with
which this Respondent is charged, if committed,
strikes at the foundation of that grievance and arbitra-
tion mechanism upon which we have relied in the
formulation of our Collyer doctrine. If we are to foster
the national policy favoring collective bargaining and
arbitration as a primary arena for the resolution of
industrial disputes, as we sought to do in Collyer, by
declining to intervene in disputes best settled else-
where, we must assure ourselves that those alternative
procedures are not only "fair and regular"5 but that
they are or were open, in fact, for use by the dispu-
tants. These considerations caution against our ab-
stention on a claim that a respondent has sought, by
prohibited means, to inhibit or preclude access to the
grievance procedures. It is this consideration which
persuades us that the issues of arbitrability and con-
tract coverage, discussed above, should not here be
left to resolution by the arbitrator as might be appro-
priate under other circumstances. See International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v.
Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487. We address, there-
fore, the merits of the statutory violation alleged.
Employee Beasley, the recording secretary of the
Union, has been employed by the Respondent for 19
years. At the time this dispute arose, Beasley also
served as employee advisor with respect to workmen's
compensation and insurance matters. He was not a
member of the shop grievance committee although he
usually attended grievance meetings for the purpose
of recording minutes.
On March 16, Beasley attended a grievance com-
mittee meeting, and, because of the absence of Union
President Branc, Beasley served as committee spokes-
man. The meeting was called for the discussion of two
5 Spielberg Mfg Co, supra
JOS. T. RYERSON & SONS, INC. 463
pending grievances from the shop. One of these, the
Chilcher grievance, arose from the termination of em-
ployee Chilcher for unexcused absences. Chilcher had
been reemployed as a new employee shortly after his
termination and the Union sought, by the grievance,
to preserve certain of Chilcher's insurance and other
benefits despite his break in employment. The second
grievance arose from a claim for call-in pay for em-
ployee Hovey .6 At the conclusion of the meeting, after
both grievances had been presented, Respondent's
general manager, Reiker, was asked how he was dis-
posed toward the grievances. He responded that the
Chilcher grievance appeared to have considerable
merit, but he characterized the Hovey grievance as
picayune?
On March 23, the final date provided in the con-
tract for Respondent's answer to the grievances, Gen-
eral Manager Reiker met briefly with Beasley
regarding the Chilcher grievance. Reiker had not then
determined Respondent's answer to the grievance and
he asked Beasley for additional time to make the re-
sponse. He also asked Beasley to supply additional
information concerning Chilcher's period of absence.
Beasley agreed to the requested extension and also
agreed to supply the additional information, subject
to Branc's agreement. Beasley also inquired regarding
the Hovey grievance and Riker responded that the
answer, a denial, was being typed and would be forth-
coming. There was no other discussion of the Hovey
grievance.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the disputed
incident occurred. According to Beasley, whom the
Trial Examiner credited, Reiker asked whether Beas-
ley intended to continue to urge the grievances. When
Beasley answered affirmatively, Reiker is said to have
responded, "If you continue to back these grievances
up you will have a hard time with the company and
also the men in the warehouse."
Reiker and General Foreman Lekan, the only
other person present, denied that the above statement
was made, and also elaborated upon a further discus-
sion which took place at the meeting. According to
Reiker, as corroborated by Lekan, Beasley asked
whether steps could be taken to make the grievance
handling procedures more amicable. Reiker re-
sponded that he was in favor of more amicable rela-
tions but that an improved atmosphere would require
that the Union file fewer frivolous grievances. The
meeting ended on that indeterminate note.
Two days later, Beasley submitted the additional
6 Some weeks earlier , late on a Sunday evening, three employees had been
called in outside normal working hours to perform a small emergency job at
the request of a customer . Hovey was not one of the employees called in and
asserted in his grievance that he should have been.
r He described the Union 's submission of the grievance as "picking fly shit
out of pepper "
information concerning the Chilcher grievance, and
again sought discussion of means to improve the tenor
of grievance handling procedures. The Company
shortly thereafter answered the grievance in favor of
the Union, granting the relief which had been sought.
The Hovey grievance had been denied.
The Trial Examiner credited the testimony of
Beasley as to the alleged threat, stating:
Having found Beasley to have been a con-
scientious and forthright witness, I do not believe
he would fabricate the threat if it had not been
made.
He did not, however, discredit Reiker's and Lekan's
testimony that the meeting ended with a general dis-
cussion of the atmosphere in which grievance han-
dling was taking place. Indeed, their testimony in this
respect is corroborated by Beasley himself, and con-
firmed by his later actions.
Respondent takes vigorous exception to the Trial
Examiner's resolution of credibility in favor of Beas-
ley, asserting that the Examiner's decision is so ill-
supported that it is vulnerable to reversal, even under
the standards of Universal Camera.8 Respondent as-
serts, in sum, that the decision to credit Beasley is
irreconcilable with a set of well-supported and com-
pelling inferences which must be drawn from the rest
of the record.' Respondent's exception is not without
substance, but in light of our disposition of the case,
we find it unnecessary to decide whether the
Examiner's credibility resolution is unsupportable.
We assume, as the Trial Examiner found, that at some
point during the consultation of March 23, Reiker did
make the statement described by Beasley.
The Trial Examiner seems to have assumed, al-
though his decision is silent on the point, that the
remark was made during Reiker's discussion of the
Chilcer and Hovey grievances. Our examination of
the record satisfies us that the remark was not uttered
in that context: it came, rather, during the more gen-
eral discussion not relating to any particular griev-
ance. In that context, the remark could not reasonably
have been construed to have any prohibited effect.
Only three persons-Beasley, Reiker, and Lek-
an-were present during the March 23 conference,
and each of the three testified that the conference was
addressed to two distinct topics: (1) A concededly
satisfactory discussion leading to a quick under-
standing as to purely procedural matters relating to
the Chilcher grievance, and (2) a candid discussion,
8 Universal Camera Corp v N.L.R.B, 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
9 "Although the Board may not overrule its Trial Examiner by discarding
the positive credible testimony of a witness in favor of an inference drawn
from tenuous circumstances ... it may refuse to follow its Trial Examiner
in crediting testimony where it conflicts with well supported and obvious
inferences from the rest of the record . Such refusal is particularly justified
when the testimony in question is given by an interested witness ... .
(N L.R B v. Pyne Molding Corporation, 226 F.2d 818 (C A 2, 1955) )
464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
thereafter, of the more generalized issue of how to
improve the atmosphere in which grievance handling
had been occurring. It seems, in sorting out the total
conversation, that the remark that Beasley would be
given "a hard time" clearly could not, as Beasley's
testimony suggests , and as the Trial Examiner appar-
ently found, have referred to the pending Chilcher
and Hovey grievances. As to Chilcher's, Beasley had
already responded favorably to Reiker's request for
an extension of time-a request grounded in Rieker's
favorable view of Chilcher' s case . And, as the record
shows, shortly thereafter the Company conceded the
merit of the Chilcher grievance. As to Hovey's, Reiker
had already dictated his answer when the meeting
took place. There was obviously nothing in the discus-
sion which would have inspired a company threat to
give Beasley a "hard time."
Thus, giving effect to the Trial Examiner's find-
ing that the remark was made, it could only have had
relevance to the more generalized discussion, wherein
Beasley appealed for a more amicable atmosphere for
grievance processing, and Reiker advised Beasley that
the Union ought to desist from filing frivolous griev-
ances . But in that context, the remark loses all ele-
ments of interference or coercion, for it would
doubtless be true that in the course of procession
picayune or frivolous grievances, the Union would
indeed be given a "hard time." The Company would,
we assume, defend itself vigorously against claims it
regarded as falling in this category and vigorously
resist the arguments of the proponents of such claims.
Moreover, only in this context does the ambig-
uous remark relating to the warehouse employees, if
made,10 make any sense at all. The credited version of
the statement by Reiker, on its face, seems to mean
that not only "the Company," but "also the men in the
warehouse" would give Beasley "a hard time." Howev-
er Beasley was permitted to testify that he interpreted
the remark to mean that the Company would give not
only Beasley, but also the warehouse employees, a hard
time. In this respect, Beasley's interpretation of the re-
mark is hopelessly at odds with well-established con-
trary facts. The warehouse employees had, so far as the
record shows, filed no grievances. On the contrary, em-
ployees from Span 7 of the production area had been
singularly active in filing grievances, leading to a com-
plaint by Superintendent Schrader, at a joint union-
'one first of Beasley 's two pretrial affidavits as to this conversation
includes no reference to any remarks about warehouse employees , thus gen-
erating considerable doubt whether this part of the statement was made at
all. while this inconsistency was pointed out to the Trial Examiner, his
decision includes no analysis or resolution thereof
company meeting on March 6, that union officers in
Span 7 were devoting excessive worktime to grievance
matters. It is entirely logical that Reiker would believe,
and say, that nonproduction employees shared
management's concern over that concentration of re-
sources on trivial or ill-supported complaints.
Thus, viewed in context, there is no basis on
which to find either that the remarks were coercive or
that they could reasonably have been regarded as
improper interference with Beasley's functions as a
union representative. Rather, if they were in fact
made, they could only have been uttered as expres-
sions of a permissible viewpoint in the context of a
general discussion of trivial, petty, or "frivolous"
grievances. This Board has often recognized that can-
did, even coarse, discourse is an expected, part of suc-
cessful grievance processing." We shall therefore
dismiss the complaint in this respect.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that the complaint herein
be, and it hereby is, dismissed; provided, however,
that: Jurisdiction of this proceeding is hereby retained
for the limited purpose of entertaining appropriate
and timely motions for further consideration upon a
proper showing, with respect to the disciplinary warn-
ing issued to employee Beasley, either (a) that the
dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the
issuance of this Decision, been resolved by amicable
settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted
promptly to arbitration, or (b) that the grievance or
arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular
or have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act.
MEMBERS FANNING AND JENKINS, dissenting:
When the majority began to defer to arbitration
cases involving violations of the statute, we warned,
and have repeated our warning since then, that this
ii See, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corporation , 177 NLRB 322. That
decision was enforced by the reviewing court , which noted, 430 F .2d 724:
Of central importance to our view of the case, is the nature of the
protected activity involved Hams and Gilliam were participating in a
grievance meeting, which by its very nature requires a free and frank
exchange of views, and where bruised sensibilities may be the price
exacted for industrial peace . As the Board noted, a grievance proceeding
is not an audience , conditionally granted by a master to his servants, but
a meeting of equals-advocates of their respective positions . Manly was
not assailed with abuse on the floor of the plant where he stood as a
symbol of the Company's authority, the characterization of the untruth
came while he was appearing as a Company advocate during a closed
meeting with Union representatives.
JOS. T. RYERSON & SONS, INC. 465
course would lead to the disappearance of the protec-
tion of the Act, and that employees would be left with
only such protection as they were accorded under the
collective-bargaining agreement-a protection de-
pendent on the relative strengths of the employer and
union, and upon the union's ability and willingness to
underwrite expensive arbitrations.
This predicted result has now been achieved in the
present case.
The contract here contains a provision that neither
the Union nor its members will "engage in any Union
activity either (a) on Company time, or (b) on the
property of the Company in any manner which shall
interfere with the Company's operations." In addi-
tion, the contract prohibits "discrimination, interfer-
ence, restraint or coercion by the Company against
any employee because of membership in the Union."
Such clauses which write into the contract a large
segment of the statute thereby, under the majority's
deferral to arbitration, reduce the protection of the
Act to a question of interpretation of the contract
clause. The result is to eliminate any independent
protection which the Act otherwise provides, and to
make the public interest in proper and uniform appli-
cation of the Act a plaything of private treaty and
interpretation.
Beasley was disciplined for allegedly violating the
clause restricting union activity on company time or
property. Because this provision apparently prohibits
nearly all concerted activity at the place of employ-
ment, there is a grave doubt as to its lawfulness under
the Act. Cf. The Magnavox Company of Tennessee, 195
NLRB No. 40. If it is unlawful, a discharge for violat-
ing it would also be unlawful. The arbitrator, howev-
er, cannot consider this issue, since his function is
limited to interpreting the contract and he must ac-
cept the contract provisions as they exist. Thus, a
portion of Beasley's protection provided by the stat-
ute is eliminated by the majority's deferral to arbitra-
tion, an example of the undermining of the Act
inherent in the deferral policy of the majority.
Together, the two contract clauses cover much,
perhaps most, of the concerted activity protected by
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. There is, how-
ever, no assurance the arbitrator will, or can, interpret
these clauses to conform precisely to the requirements
of the statute. If he interprets the clauses to prohibit
conduct which the Act permits and protects, or to
permit conduct which the Act proscribes, as the in-
stance given in the preceding paragraph indicates he
may well be compelled to do, then the statute is sub-
verted. Any such disparity between the arbitrator's
interpretation and the statutory requirements will not
be remedied by the majority so long as the words of
the contract provisions do not openly conflict with the
statute, and probably not even then.
The majority will not examine, pursuant to Spiel-
berg or otherwise, the arbitrator's interpretation of the
contract clauses to see whether his decision affords
less protection than the statute. Nor will the majority
examine the award to see whether the unfair labor
practice issue was even decided. Member Kennedy
will presume that the award did decide that issue, and
decide it correctly. Chairman Miller and Member Pe-
nello will so presume if there is evidence to show the
issue was presented to the arbitrator even though his
award contains no indication that he even considered
the issue; here, the fact that the contract incorporates
parts of the Act apparently would be sufficient evi-
dence. Thus, the Spielberg "string" on the Board's
deferral becomes meaningless.
This they have demonstrated by their unconcern
for the possible unlawfulness of clause 1, and by their
decisions in National Radio Company, Inc., 198 NLRB
No. 1, and Terminal Transport Company, Inc., 185
NLRB No. 96, refusing to consider alleged discrim-
ination if a "good cause" under the contract existed
which could justify the discharge, even though it may
have been union activity which caused the discharge.
Thus, under the majority's deferral to arbitration, the
only issue becomes the scope of the contract protec-
tion, and the decision of this issue then overrides the
Act if they do not coincide. Consequently, by incor-
porating Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act into
the contract and appending an arbitration clause, the
Union and Employer are enabled by the majority's
deferral to arbitration to escape the Board's and
courts' application of the Act to their violations, as we
have predicted would occur.
There is therefore no assurance that Beasley will
ever receive the decision on his statutory rights to
which he is entitled, for there is no assurance that the
466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
arbitrator will or can interpret the contract clause to
coincide with the reach of the statute, or that if he fails
to do so the majority will then review his action to
rectify such failure. Nor is there any assurance that,
lacking the government's resources, facilities, and
power, the facts concerning the alleged coercion, re-
straint, and discrimination against Beasley can be pre-
sented to the arbitrator, or the applicable principles
correctly elucidated to him. If, as the majority says,
Beasley had not brought his case to the Board this
dispute would have been "not merely resolved, but
long since forgotten," it would have been the result of
a corresponding submerging or forgetting of his stat-
utory protection, or perhaps the inability of Beasley
or his Union to last through the long and expensive
arbitration into which the majority forces him. The
final note of irony in the Kafkaesque scenario created
by the "fundamental soundness" of the majority's
Collyer principle is that Beasley is done in by that
same grievance-arbitration machinery which he was
endeavoring to employ and apply.
We welcome our colleagues' new-found percep-
tion that the Board and not an arbitrator should de-
termine the statutory issues and unfair labor practice
involved in Respondent's allegedly disciplining Beas-
ley for attempting to pursue grievances in accordance
with the union contract. In basing this conclusion in
part on the ground that there was no showing that the
arbitrator had authority to remedy unlawful interfer-
ence with the union representatives' performance of the
grievance function, the majority recognizes that an
effective decision (and remedy, if a violation is found)
requires the Board to determine the merits of the case;
the majority further recognizes that if the Board does
not decide the mertis, this statutory protection of the
right to the benefits of the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract may be subordinated to and
obliterated by the meaning given to the contract
clause.
The logic of our colleagues in not following their
Collyer decision and deferring to arbitration this alleg-
ed violation is, however, more than a little puzzling.
They reason that a threat to discipline a union repre-
sentative for filing grievances "strikes at the founda-
tion" of the grievance-arbitration process. Yet if the
contract provision prohibiting union activity "on
company time" or "on company premises" is unlaw-
fully broad, use of the clause to prohibit union repre-
sentatives' work on grievances shuts off access to and
subverts the grievance-arbitration process in exactly
the same way as the violation the majority considers
on the merits, and thus equally "strikes at the founda-
tion" of the process-but the majority refuses to con-
sider the merits of that alleged violation, and defers it
to arbitration.
Our colleagues also in part ground their conclu-
sion that they must decide the merits on their view
that it is not clear the' contract clause covers threats
unattended by discipline. But the majority has previ-
ously abandoned the requirement that there be a con-
tract clause covering the conduct involved in order to
defer to arbitration.12 At this point, it is becoming
difficult for others to divine what the majority does,
or does not, require in the way of contract coverage
in order to defer.
More important, however, there is nothing pe-
culiarly insidious about undermining the arbitration
process as compared to undermining other areas of
statutory protection. Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act
protects, e.g., the right of employees to engage in un-
ion or other concerted activities at the place of work,
and during the workday, and to be free of discrimina-
tion because of union membership, regardless of
whether the contract protects such rights or fails to do
so. In contrast, the arbitration process and the right
to use it can be established only by contract, and is
outside the specific protection of the statute unlike the
protection accorded concerted activities and union
membership under Section 8(a)(1) and (3). To one
attempting to see the statute steadily and see it whole,
it must appear that the majority's refusal to decide the
merits of alleged 8(a)(1) and (3) violations breaches
the foundations of the Act more widely than interfer-
ence with the purely contractual right of arbitration.
Indeed, the anomaly begins to boggle the mind when
it is remembered that the employer's abrogation of the
entire arbitration process would amount to no more
than a unilateral change in the contract. This is exact-
12 Cf. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp, 198 NLRB No 5, in which the majority
deferred to arbitration after conceding that (1) the only contract provision
which conceivably nught have been involved could not be stretched so far,
and (2) the employer's claim that it did apply was "nearly frivolous "
JOS. T. RYERSON & SONS, INC. 467
ly the type of change which our colleagues said in
Collyer, where the employer unilaterally abrogated
the contract wage provisions as to about a quarter of
the work force, is peculiarly suitable for arbitration.
We are unable to understand the logic of our col-
leagues in deferring the first alleged violation to arbi-
tration and not deferring the second. Their difficulty,
we think, lies in the lack of logic inherent in their
Collyer principle.
Collyer and subsequent decisions have drastically
reduced the statutory protection against unilateral re-
pudiation, abrogation, or modification of collective-
bargaining agreements, and the final elimination of
this protection seems to us the logical and inevitable
result of the majority's reasoning. In the present case
and in National Radio, supra, the majority has begun
to replace with arbitration the statutory protection
afforded by Section 8(a)(1) and (3), and their elimina-
tion from the protection of the Act, as in the case of
unilateral changes, can hardly be long delayed. In
what we consider the inevitable march of Collyer to-
ward the elimination of Section 8(a) from the Act, our
colleagues will bestir themselves only to protect the
purely contractual right to arbitrate. The upshot is, of
course, that contract rights-as contained in and lim-
ited by the contract-have superseded, displaced, and
indeed nullified the statutory protection. The
majority's willingness to permit-the arbitrator to de-
termine which issues are arbitrable, and to what ex-
tent, only emphasizes the majority's destruction of the
statutory protection.
We await with interest the next unfoldings of the
Collyer principle, which almost certainly, in those
cases where the parties choose to include an arbitra-
tion provision, will eliminate Section 8(a) of the Act
and substitute arbitration for it. The statute will then
operate only to protect access to the arbitration pro-
cess-and perhaps not even that, as the deferral to
arbitration of the first alleged violation here demon-
strates.
We cannot follow this downward and widening
spiral of the "fundamental soundness" of Collyer,
resulting in an ever-increasing destruction of the stat-
utory protection of employees. As we pointed out in
our dissent in National Radio, supra, Congress in en-
acting this statute explicitly disapproved precisely the
course of deferral the majority has now adopted."
because of the public interest in proper and uniform
interpretation of the Act. We perceive no authority in
the Board, and no reason apart from authority, to
override this action of the Congress. When this case,
and others like it, are brought to the Board, the Board
is obliged and required to determine them on the mer-
its, and we would do so.
As to the merits of the alleged violation which
our colleagues dismiss, we agree with the Trial Exam-
iner that Respondent violated the statute. The record
shows that Beasley had been asked by Union Presi-
dent Branc to substitute for him as committee spokes-
man in regard to two pending grievances involving
employees Chilcher and Hovey. Beasley, the re-
cording secretary of the Union, was a long time em-
ployee who worked only sporadically because of a
1967 industrial injury. He served as employee advisor
with respect to workmen's compensation and insur-
ance matters, and although he usually attended griev-
ance meetings when he was available, he was not a
member of the shop grievance committee and had not
previously handled grievances of this type. On March
16, Beasley attended the first-step grievance meeting
in regard to the matters involving Chilcher and Ho-
vey. At the conclusion of the meeting Reiker indica-
ted that he was favorably disposed toward Chilcher's
grievance, but characterized Hovey's grievance in un-
flattering terms.
On March 23, the final date provided in the con-
tract for Respondent's answer to the grievances, Reik-
er called Beasley to his office to ask for a verbal
extension of time for submitting an answer to the
unsettled grievance of Chilcher. Beasley inquired re-
13 As we there said
Since the original enactment of this statute in 1935, it has been con-
templated that the Government , with its resources , facilities , and power,
shall vindicate the rights protected by the Act. "No private right of
action is contemplated. Essentially the unfair labor practices listed are
matters of public concern , by their nature and consequence , present and
potential " See II Leg Hist . 2931, 2978, 3074 (1935). The original
Section 10(b) proposed by Senator Wagner, "father" of the statute,
contained a clause providing that the "Board may, in its discretion, defer
its exercise of junsdiction over any such unfair labor practice in any case
where there is another means of prevention provided for by agreement
" See I Leg . Hist. 1301 (1935), II Leg. Hist. 2430 (1935) This is
exactly what the majority does in this case . Yet this provision was struck
from the bill , II Leg Hist. 2351 (1935), a clear rejection of the "policy"
which the majority here and in Collyer have created
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
garding the Hovey grievance and Reiker responded
that the answer, a denial, was being typed and would
be forthcoming. At the conclusion of the meeting, as
the Trial Examiner found upon the basis of the credi-
ble testimony, Reiker asked Beasley if he intended to
continue backing up the grievances. Beasley replied
that as a union officer, he felt that "anyone that had
a complaint I would see that it be heard. I would back
them up if I could. If there is anything I could do."
Reiker responded, "If you continue to back these
grievances up you will have a hard time with the com-
pany and also the men in the warehouse."
The basic issue , and the only issue, is whether
Reiker's above remarks were a threat of management
reprisal and whether they had a coercive impact upon
Beasley's Section 7 rights. We think it plain that they
did.
The majority, in considering the "simplicity of
facts" of this dispute, constructs a lengthy and convo-
luted rationale to show that Reiker's clear and unam-
biguous remarks were made in a generalized
discussion involving the filing of frivolous or picayune
grievances, and that such context strips them of all
elements of interference and coercion. In arriving at
this conclusion our colleagues accept the Trial
Examiner's credibility findings, as indeed they must
on the basis of the record, and thus accept the Trial
Examiner's findings that Reiker made the above re-
marks as alleged. The majority's interpretation of
these events lacks both record and legal support.
The record shows that at no time did Reiker suggest
to Beasley that it would be wise to reduce the number
of grievances in the plant or otherwise discuss with
him the nature or the calibre of grievances in general.
Although the record does show that at the conclusion
of the March 23 conference and after Reiker's intim-
idating remarks had been made, Beasley attempted to
bring up the subject of improving relations between
the Union and management in regard to the proc-
essing of grievances, Reiker specifically told Beasley
that he would not discuss the subject of "unnecessary
grievances" further unless General Superintendent
Schrader were present. The record shows that there
was no further discussion among Beasley and
Respondent's officials on this subject. Thus, contrary
is abundantly clear that Beasley's bringing up the sub-
ject of a more amicable atmosphere for grievance
processing was not based upon any prior relevant dis-
cussion or concern on this subject by the Respondent,
but upon the insecurity and fear which Reiker's threat
of reprisal engendered. As the Trial Examiner points
out, Reiker's threats to Beasley if he continued to back
up grievances would tend to be particularly coercive
because of his physical condition which prevented his
working on a regular basis and the admitted "solic-
itude" with which the Respondent had been treating
him because of this condition.
Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, 177 NLRB
2321, and related cases cited by the majority do not
support their view. The factual and legal issues in-
volved in Crown Central related to what restraints, if
any, the Board would put on candid, earthy, and even
vulgar discourse, during grievance discussions be-
tween union and management. We agree that such
discussions should be frank and open, and that
"salty" language by union adherents in the cause of
advocacy should not be subject to management disci-
pline. This plainly is not the question here. Here the
issue is whether an employer can at a grievance pro-
ceeding through threat of reprisal discourage a union
representative from exercising his Section 7 rights. It
is hornbook clear that an employer's remarks of that
nature are violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
For the above reasons, we would find, in agree-
ment with the Trial Examiner, that Reiker's remarks
to Beasley at the March 23 meeting were calculated,
and would reasonably be so interpreted by Beasley, to
threaten him with reprisals because of his union activ-
ities in violation of the Act.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARION C. LADWIG, Trial Examiner : This case was tried
at Cleveland, Ohio , on July 8 , 1970,' pursuant to a charge
filed on April 3 by Local 2212, United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , and pursuant
to a complaint issued on May 19. The primary issues are
whether the Respondent, Joseph T . Ryerson & Sons, Inc.,
to the inferences which our colleagues would draw, it 1 All dates, unless otherwise indicated , are in 1970
JOS. T. RYERSON & SONS, INC. 469
herein called the Company, (a) threatened a union official,
employee James Beasley, with reprisal because of his union
activities, and (b) issued him a written warning because of,
and in order to discourage, his union activities, in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration
of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE UNION INYOLVEb
The Company is a Delaware corporation which operates
25 plants, one of which is located in Cleveland, Ohio, where
it is engaged in the storage, fabrication, and sale of metal
products and industrial plastics, and where it annually ships
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside
the State. The Company admits, and I find, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Employee James Beasley is a multiple torch operator, or
"burner," who was hired in 1950. In June 1967, he received
an industrial injury which has caused him to be "off and on
at work" since that time. Although the nature of his injury
was not disclosed at the trial, he was hospitalized at one time
in 1969, and was permitted to take a 13-week vacation (from
December 15, 1969, through March 13, 1970), in the hope
this "delicate" condition would improve. When he returned
to work on March 16, his "condition started reacting again."
(Since then, the injury has caused him to lose additional
days from work, and to be hospitalized for 10 days. At the
time of trial on July 8, he had been off work since May 13.)
Despite his industrial injury, Beasley continued to
serve as the Union's recording secretary, and also as com-
pensation committeeman. In the latter role, he gave advice
to members in the 145-employee bargaining unit who had
problems concerning workmen's compensation insurance
benefits, unemployment compensation, retirement, and
pensions. At the request of employees that he represent
them on such matters, he would "approach the Company"
and endeavor to settle the matters informally. He watched
the time limits for filing "insurance grievances" under the
collective-bargaining agreement. Although he did not have
authority to write grievances himself, he worked closely
with Union President Joseph Branc (who put the grievances
in writing),. and was "in on" all grievances "pertaining to
compensation."
Even while Beasley was on the extended vacation (from
the middle of December to the middle of March), he contin-
ued to work as compensation committeeman, investigating
the claim of an employee, John Chilcher, for insurance
benefits and hospitalization.
On March 15, his first day back on the job after the
3-month absence, Beasley became personally involved in
the formal processing of two grievances through the griev-
ance procedure. At the request of President Branc (who was
to be absent that day), Beasley became the union spokes-
man at a grievance meeting. (Previously, when Beasley was
requested as recording secretary to attend grievance meet-
ings, he merely took notes.) In this meeting, General Man-
ager Homer E. Rieker indicated that he was giving favorable
consideration to the Chilcher grievance, but indicated some
irritation with the other grievance, involving employee Har-
vey Hovey. Concerning the Hovey grievance, Rieker admit-
tedly stated that he felt this was "picking fly s- out of the
pepper."
The next day, March 16, Beasley complained to Gener-
al Superintendent Paul R. Schrader and Area Foreman
Russell B. Herdman that Herdman was doing bargaining
unit work, for which Beasley (as the senior employee)
should be paid at the overtime rate.
It was in this context that Beasley was allegedly given
a discriminatory warning (being accused by Superintendent
Schrader and Foreman Herdman of working the next day,
March 18, on union papers during worktime), and threat-
ened by General Manager Rieker with reprisal the following
week.
Before discussing these incidents, I note that there is
some undisputed evidence, indicating resentment concern-
ing Beasley's union activity. After Beasley testified about
his duties as compensation committeeman (when asked by
the company counsel about "some source of friction or
irritation between you and Mr. Rieker"), the counsel then
asked Beasley:
Q. (By Mr. Luksch) Can you give us any specific
instances where the Company indicated that they re-
sented your participation?
A. In most of them when I approach the foreman,
any one of the foremen, before I got to them I am just
about cussed out.
Q. You are just about what, sir?
TRIAL ExAMINER Cussed out.
THE WITNESS Yes, your Honor. I was working on
the plates, burning. I could have used short pieces and
saved stock pieces. [General Foreman] Lekan and
[Area Foreman] Russell Herdman were standing out in
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the aisle , so I went to get permission if I could use the
shorts and work on those. Before I said anything Mr.
Herdman said , "What the f- do you want?"
TwAL EXAMINER: When was this?
THE WITNESS: It was ... the early part of May. I
looked at Mr. Herdman and-
Q. (By Mr. Luksch) And what did you say to him?
A. I turned around and walked away. I went back
to my work area.
B. Discriminatory Warning
Recording Secretary Beasley (who impressed me as a
conscientious, forthright witness) testified that on March
18, his third day back after the extended vacation, he went
to work at 8 a.m., and proceeded to cleaning off his burning
machine and making preparations to "bum" the plate steel.
(He described this preparatory work as involving the secur-
ing of an air hose and blowing off the machine, checking to
see if he had on the table the stock which the order requires,
checking the temps for different size plates, checking the gas
preheat and high pressure, setting the speed on the machine,
lighting the torches, and having the plate preheated.) There
was a sufficient amount of stock plate already on the table,
but the night burner had not weighed another order of steel
pieces burned on the night shift. Sometime between 8:30
and 9 o'clock, while he was waiting for the plate to preheat,
Beasley weighed these steel pieces, and was figuring their
weights on the reverse side of an order sheet: There was no
room on the table to write, and his locker was covered with
burning dust, so he had placed his "suitcase" on the locker
and was using the side of the case as a writing surface. (The
case, which was closed, was used to carry writing paper for
taking minutes at meetings, and books to sell steel-toed
shoes-outside the plant-as authorized by the Company.
He never carried a notebook or any grievance forms, and
had no paperwork to perform for the Union.)
About 8:45 a.m., as Beasley was figuring the weights,
Superintendent Schrader "walked by and saw the torches lit
and I had my back turned and he came by and he just
glanced and he said, `Are you doing company business?'
And I said, `Yes: He smiled and kept going," speaking to
Beasley "less than a minute." Beasley did not see Foreman
Herdman in the area at the time. More than a week later,
Herdman brought Beasley a written warning for "working
on union papers instead of burning" at 9 a.m., on March 18,
and stating that "Future occurrences will result in time off."
Under the words on the warning form, "Names of witness-
es," was written only Schrader's name (not Herdman's), and
under the question, "Does this employee have a previous
record of ... censure and if so, when and to what extent,"
was written the single word, "Yes." The warning was dated
March 18. (Beasley's version of what happened on March
18 is corroborated by Union President Branc, who operates
an overhead crane in the same area. Branc recalled the
occasion when Superintendent Schrader went up and spoke
to Beasley. At the time, Branc was looking down from his
crane, waiting for material to be moved. He saw that
Beasley's torches were burning. He confirms that Beasley's
worktable did not need stock, and did not remember seeing
Foreman Herdman at the time. Herdman supervises three
different areas, or "spans.")
In sharp contrast, Superintendent Schrader and Fore-
man Herdman gave a far different account. Schrader testi-
fied that about 9 a.m. on March 18, as he was going through
span 7, he saw Herdman who turned toward Beasley. He
saw that Beasley was doing some paperwork and asked
Herdman, "Union business?" Herdman nodded. Schrader
said he would take a look, and walked up behind Beasley,
who was facing in the opposite direction. "What I observed
was that Mr. Beasley had his case opened and was in fact
reading and writing in a notebook adjacent to his case."
Schrader observed that the torches on the machine were not
lit. After a few seconds, when Beasley noticed him, he
asked, "Is this union business or company business that you
are doing?" Beasley replied, "I am waiting for stock."
Schrader testified, "I then told him that there is no stock-
man in that span and there has not been and there was no
one to bring in the stock except himself and he was to stop
what he was doing and go get his stock." (Not only does this
conflict with Beasley's and Branc's testimony that there was
already stock at the machine, but the Company offers no
explanation why Beasley would make such a comment
about waiting for stock. It was necessary for the burner to
go with the crane operator to get the stock when needed.)
Schrader then testified that he went back where Herdman
was waiting, about 20 or 25 feet away, and commented to
Herdman, "Yes, union business. You are going to have to
write him up," but then changed his mind and said, "No,
never mind. I will write it up." (I credit the testimony by
Schrader's secretary that the delay in giving the written
warning was caused by a delay in her getting it typed.)
While testifying, Schrader appeared tense and nervous. He
did not impress me as a candid witness.
Foreman Herdman testified that about 8:50 that mom-
ing (about 10 minutes before talking to Schrader), he saw
Beasley "doing something with papers. He had his briefcase
opened and he had a grievance report laying to his left side
which I looked down and saw. It was very plain," with the
heading, "Grievance Report." Yet, claiming to have been
busy at the time, going to another span to get some stock
transferred, Herdman testified that he walked on by, not
saying anything to Beasley. After taking care of the other
matter, "I intended to talk to Mr. Beasley on the way back
about his machine not running and I happened to see Mr.
Schrader coming towards me. So I decided I would let him
do it instead." He testified that there was no stock on the
machine, and that the torches were not lit. When asked what
happened after Schrader talked to Beasley, Herdman an-
swered, "Mr. Schrader just walked away." Then he was
asked if Schrader said anything to him after Schrader talked
to Beasley. He readily answered positively, "No, sir." But
then he appeared to realize that this would conflict with
Schrader's testimony, and retracted the answer, testifying,
"I'm sorry, sir, he did. He said `You had better write him
up,' and then he hesitated and said, `No, I will do it myself."'
Herdman gave further dubious testimony about talking
to Beasley "at least a half a dozen times" about conducting
business on company time without permission. He testified
that the only specific occasion he could remember was 2
days earlier, March 16, when also around 9 a.m., Beasley
had his briefcase opened, "and I walked up to him and said,
`There will be no more union business on company time. Do
JOS. T. RYERSON & SONS, INC. 471
your work.' ... I did mention it to Mr. Schrader," telling
him, "something would have to be done about that man
doing union business on company time ." (When questioned
about this, Beasley testified , "I was off on a 13-week vaca-
tion and March 16 was my first day back to work. I had no
contact with Russell Herdman at all.... I was glad to get
back to work. I went around about my business and Russell
Herdman never approached me." Beasley also testified, "I
have never received a verbal warning .") It appears most
unlikely that if Herdman actually had seen Beasley with his
briefcase open on March 16 and had given him a verbal
reprimand then, Herdman would have remained silent on
the morning of March 18 upon seeing Beasley again with his
briefcase open , this time with also a "Grievance Report"
form beside the case . It appears also unlikely that if Herd-
man had made the report to Schrader only 2 days before,
Schrader would have answered only "Yes" to the question
on the warning form, "Does this employee have a previous
record of ... censure and if so , when and to what extent,"
instead of reciting the purported similar incident . It further
appears unlikely that if Herdman had been present in span
7 at the time on March 18, and had seen Beasley writing
again instead of working , Schrader would have listed only
his own name as a witness , and not Herdman 's, on the
warning form . After considering all the evidence , evaluating
Herdman's testimony , and considering the witnesses' de-
meanor on the stand, I credit Beasley's and Branc 's testimo-
ny and find that Herdman was not even present in span 7
on March 18 at the time that Schrader spoke to Beasley. I
also discredit Herdman 's testimony about a similar incident
on March 16.
The evidence does support the Company's contention
that there was a concentration of union officials and com-
mitteemen in span 7 of the plant, and that on March 6
(during Beasley's 3-month vacation), Superintendent
Schrader told the union representatives at a regular monthly
meeting that he was having too many complaints from his
foreman about committeemen in span 7 conducting union
business on company time without permission , and that this
simply would have to stop. However, this fact does not
support the Company's further contention that "Schrader
on the morning of the 18th had every reason to believe that
Beasley was in fact engaged in union business ." When Beas-
ley replied that he was working on company business (as
Beasley credibly testified), Schrader failed to look to see for
himself what Beasley was doing . Contrary to the Company's
denial in its brief that the incident was "deliberately invent-
ed," I find from all the circumstances , and the Company's
resentment or hostility toward Beasley because of his union
activity (previously described), that Schrader deliberately
failed to verify what Beasley was doing in order to profess
a good-faith belief that he was doing union business on
company time . I therefore find that in issuing the written
warning to Beasley , the Company did so, as alleged in the
complaint, "because of and in order to discourage"
Beasley's union activities , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. (I note that a grievance was filed to protest the
issuance of the written warning and the first steps of the
grievance procedure were followed . However , as credibly
testified by Union President Branc , the Company and the
Union agreed to postpone further consideration of the
grievance until Beasley 's return to work.)
C. Threat of Reprisal
Here again , there are sharp conflicts in the testimony.
Recording Secretary Beasley testified that on March 25
(actually March 23), General Manager Rieker called him to
the office to ask for a verbal extension of time for submitting
a grievance answer in the Chilcher case . After discussing
that case , according to Beasley, Rieker then asked him if he
intended to continue backing up the grievances . Beasley
replied that as a union officer , he felt that "anyone that had
a complaint I would see that it would be heard . I would back
them up if I could . If there is anything I could do." Then,
according to Beasley , Rieker said that if he continued to
back up the grievances , he would have a "hard time" with
the Company . (Such a threat , if made , would tend to be
particularly coerceive when made to Beasley , because of his
severe disability from the 1967 industrial action.)
The Company 's witnesses , Rieker and General Fore-
man Frank Lekan , both testified that in the meeting , Ricker
mentioned reducing the number of "unnecessary" griev-
ances , but denied that the threat was made.
Having found Beasley to have been a conscientious
and forthright witness, I do not believe he would fabricate
the threat if it had not been made . I therefore credit his
testimony, and discredit Rieker 's and Lekan's denials. Ac-
cordingly, I find , as alleged in the complaint , that the Com-
pany threatened the employee with reprisal because of his
union activities , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By discriminatorily issuing a union official a written
warning because of and in order to discourage his union
activities , the Company engaged in an unfair labor practice
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By threatening the union official with reprisal be-
cause of his union activities , the Company further violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
The Respondent will be ordered to cease and desist from
the unfair labor practices found and from like or related
invasions of the employees ' Section 7 rights, to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act, and to post appropriate notices.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing findings and
conclusions , and on the entire record , I issue , pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act , the following.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]