Jones, Kim Stephen. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2019

14085148 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/085,148 11/20/2013 Kim Stephen Jones 83395042 6123
117396 7590 12/31/2019
FGTL/Burgess Law Office, PLLC
P.O. Box 214320
Auburn Hills, MI 48321-4320
EXAMINER
SAHNI, VISHAL R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3657
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KIM STEPHEN JONES, CLIVE JOHN BARTON, and
LUDWIG FEIN
Appeal 2019-003186
Application 14/085,148
Technology Center 3600
Before LINDA E. HORNER, JILL D. HILL, and LISA M. GUIJT,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HORNER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1‒11 and 13‒18. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Examiner rejected the claims on appeal as anticipated by, and
obvious over, the prior art. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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finding that the prior art discloses the claimed subject matter and the
Examiner failed to articulate an adequate reason to combine the prior art in
the manner claimed. For the reasons explained below, we do not find error
in the Examiner’s anticipation rejection. We agree, however, with
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings
of the prior art in the obviousness rejection of some of the claims is
inadequate. Thus, we affirm in part.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a method for bleeding a hydraulic brake
system of a vehicle. Spec. ¶ 3. Claims 1, 14, and 17 are independent.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced
below.
1. A method for bleeding a vehicle brake system
including a brake circuit having a brake line containing a
hydraulic fluid, a bleed valve in the brake circuit, and a pump
comprising the step of using the pump to increase hydraulic
fluid pressure in the brake line and on the bleed valve for a
specified period of time without opening the bleed valve during
bleeding of said brake system.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Schmidt US 2004/0251740 A1 Dec. 16, 2004
Koons US 2013/0032438 A1 Feb. 7, 2013
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REJECTIONS
The following rejections are on appeal:
1. Claims 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Schmidt.
2. Claims 3‒8, 11, and 14‒16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Schmidt and Koons.
OPINION
Rejection of claims 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 18 as anticipated by Schmidt
Independent claim 1
The Examiner found that Schmidt discloses a method for bleeding a
vehicle brake system that includes the step of using a pump to increase
hydraulic fluid pressure in the brake circuit and on the bleed valve for a
specified period of time without opening the bleed valve during bleeding of
the brake system, as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 2 (citing Schmidt ¶¶ 26‒
27, Fig. 1). In making this finding, the Examiner applied Appellant’s
definition of “bleeding,” as set forth in paragraph 15 of the Specification, to
mean a procedure that “eliminates or reduces the presence of a compressible
gas.” Id. at 2‒3. The Examiner noted that Appellant’s definition of
“bleeding” “does not align with the understood meaning by those skilled in
the art” because it “apparently may include merely dissolving the gas into
the fluid.” Id. (citing Examiner Interview Summary, dated March 21, 2018).
The Examiner explained that “bleeding” occurs prior to Schmidt’s
degassing phase, “when the system and valve(s) are closed and gas is
potentially dissolved in the brake fluid.” Ans. 8. The Examiner found that
“[t]he eventual possibility of the dissolved gas reappearing as air bubbles
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due to a pressure drop and an eventual need to degas the system does not
negate the fact that Schmidt discusses the initial procedure that constitutes
Appellants’ construction of ‘bleeding.’” Id. at 9.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding that Schmidt
discloses the method of claim 1 because “Schmidt expressly discloses
opening the valve 28 to remove the gas bubbles from the brake fluids or ‘in
other words to degas the brake fluid.’” Appeal Br. 5 (quoting Schmidt ¶ 26).
Appellant argues that “Schmidt explains that gas may be dissolved in the
brake fluid; however, it still requires degassing of the brake fluid” because
“[d]issolving the gas in the brake fluid does not eliminate or reduce the
presence of the compressible gas.” Id. at 6. Appellant argues that “[u]sing
the pump 40 of Schmidt to increase hydraulic fluid pressure for a specified
period of time does not eliminate or reduce the presence of compressible gas
as required in claim 1 because the dissolved gas will reappear as air bubbles
when the pressure is reduced, a pressure change.” Reply Br. 2‒3.
As we understand the Examiner’s position, during operation of
Schmidt’s system prior to opening the valve during the degassing phase,
Schmidt discloses that the pressure in the system reaches high enough to
cause some of the gas to be dissolved in the brake fluid, thereby reducing, at
least temporarily, the presence of the compressible gas in the fluid while the
valve remains closed. Appellant’s position is that, in Schmidt, the gas
reappears when the pressure is reduced, and, thus, the presence of gas is not
permanently eliminated or reduced while the valve is closed. Thus, the issue
before us turns on the scope of the term “bleeding” as defined in Appellant’s
Specification, and, specifically, whether “bleeding” requires the air to be
permanently eliminated from the brake fluid, or whether the temporary
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reduction of air in the brake fluid due to the air dissolving in the fluid
suffices.
Appellant’s Specification describes generally that “[b]leeding as
applied to hydraulic brake systems is a process used to purge or evacuate air
or gas bubbles from the brake system.” Spec. ¶ 5. The Specification
provides, however, a slightly different definition of “bleeding” as used in the
written description to refer to “a procedure performed on a brake system that
eliminates or reduces the presence of a compressible gas, for example air
bubbles, in an incompressible liquid, for example brake fluid, located in the
brake system.” Id. ¶ 15. This definition does not make clear whether the
reduction of the presence of air bubbles in the brake fluid encompasses
temporary dissolution of the gas bubbles in the brake fluid under sufficient
pressure to cause the dissolution. We look to the remainder of the
Specification for further clarification and context.
The Specification describes that “[a]pplying relatively high pressures
in the brake system without opening bleed valves ultimately leads to
permanent removal of air from the brake system even after the pressure
increase has ended.” Id. ¶ 16. The Specification describes that “[t]he
residual air or trapped air in the brake system dissolves in the brake fluid at
the applied high pressures and essentially remains dissolved or chemically
bound therein because of chemical or physical processes.”2 Id. ¶ 17. This
disclosure would lead one to believe that the claimed bleeding method

2 The Specification does not provide any further details as to the chemical or
physical processes that allow for the air to remain dissolved or chemically
bound in the brake fluid, and thus, permanently removed from the brake
fluid without escaping to atmosphere.
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requires the air to be permanently eliminated or reduced from the brake fluid
even after the pressure is reduced in the brake fluid without opening the
bleed valve.
The Specification further describes, however, that “[i]n addition, the
residual air dissolves in the brake fluid and then with low pressures at other
locations of the brake system, especially in the vicinity of the normally
present master cylinder, precipitates out during communication with the
expansion tank or master cylinder and ultimately escapes to the
atmosphere.” Id. ¶ 18. The Specification’s description that the air
precipitates out of the brake fluid at low pressures leads one to believe that
the claimed bleeding method allows for air to be only temporarily eliminated
or reduced from the brake fluid while the brake fluid remains under
sufficient pressure to prevent the air from precipitating back out of the fluid.
In light of these disparate descriptions of the effect of high pressure on
the air within the brake fluid, we understand the definition of “bleeding”,
when read in the context of Appellant’s Specification, to mean a procedure
that causes the air to dissolve in the brake fluid, and either remain dissolved
or chemically bound therein so that the air is permanently removed from the
brake system even after the pressure increase has ended, or remain dissolved
therein temporarily until the brake fluid reaches an area of relative lower
pressure where the air precipitates back out of the brake fluid.
Schmidt discloses a hydraulic vehicle brake system 10 having two
hydraulic pumps 14, driven by motor 16, and high-pressure hydraulic
reservoir 18 connected to a pressure side of pumps 14. Schmidt ¶ 18, Fig. 1.
An intake side of pumps 14 is connected to brake fluid reservoir 24. Id.
Wheel brake cylinders 30 are connected to high-pressure hydraulic reservoir
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18 via brake pressure buildup valves 28. Id. ¶ 19. Schmidt describes that
“[b]y means of the hydraulic pumps 40 and/or the hydraulic reservoir
18 . . . , air and/or compressed gas from the hydraulic reservoir 18 can get
into the brake fluid.” Id. ¶ 26. Schmidt discloses that the gas “may either be
dissolved in the brake fluid or contained in it in the form of gas bubbles” and
that “[g]as dissolved in the brake fluid can also form gas bubbles as a result
of a pressure change or enrichment.” Id. Schmidt describes that a drawback
of the presence of gas in the brake fluid is that the brake fluid becomes
compressible, which diminishes the function of the auxiliary brake system.
Id. Thus, Schmidt provides a method to “avoid gas bubbles in the brake
fluid or to remove them from the brake fluid or in other words to degas the
brake fluid.” Id.
In Schmidt’s degassing method, brake pressure buildup valves 28 are
opened. Id. ¶ 27. Schmidt describes that “[b]rake pressure that is under
pressure flows out of the hydraulic reservoir 18 of the external energy source
12 through the brake pressure buildup valves 28, the open disconnection
valves 52, and the master cylinder 50, into the brake fluid reservoir 24,
where gas bubbles can escape from the brake fluid.” Id.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that, in the operation of
Schmidt’s system, pressure within the system causes some of the gas to be
dissolved in the brake fluid prior to opening valve 28. Schmidt ¶ 26.
Schmidt discloses that through operation of pumps 14 air is caused to be
dissolved in the brake fluid, and remain dissolved therein temporarily until
the brake fluid reaches an area of relative lower pressure where the air
precipitates back out of the brake fluid. This disclosure meets Appellant’s
broad definition of “bleeding” because the temporary dissolution of air in the
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brake fluid leads to a reduction of the presence of air in the brake fluid.
Thus, we find adequate support in Schmidt for the method of claim 1
wherein “bleeding” occurs by using the pump to increase hydraulic fluid
pressure in the brake line and on the bleed valve for a specified period of
time without opening the bleed valve during “bleeding” of the brake system.
As noted by the Examiner, these events all transpire prior to the
opening of any valves. Ans. 7, 9 (citing Schmidt ¶ 26). The fact that
Schmidt subsequently opens valve 28 during the degassing process does not
negate the fact that Schmidt discusses the claimed method in which pressure
applied by pumps 14 causes a reduction of the air bubbles in the brake fluid.
Id. at 9.
For these reasons, Appellant has not identified error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by Schmidt. Appellant does not present
separate arguments for the patentability of claim 9, which depends from
claim 1. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 9 as anticipated by
Schmidt.
Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the pump
provides for pressure build-up in the brake circuit during operation of an
electronic dynamic driving control system.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims
Appendix). The Examiner relied on the same disclosure in paragraph 26 of
Schmidt to find the subject matter of claim 2 anticipated by Schmidt. Final
Act. 3. Appellant argues that the cited paragraph of Schmidt does not
disclose an electronic dynamic driving control system. Appeal Br. 7. The
Examiner responded that “this limitation is clearly met because that is how
these brake systems operate – it provides electronic dynamic control and the
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pumps increase pressure in the brake line.” Ans. 9 (citing Schmidt ¶¶ 21,
26). We find adequate disclosure in Schmidt to support the Examiner’s
finding.
Schmidt describes that vehicle brake system 10 has an electronic
control unit 38, which receives signals from sensors and controls electric
motor 16 of hydraulic pumps 14 and valves 28, 32, 36 of vehicle brake
system 10. Schmidt ¶ 21. Because Schmidt discloses using an electronic
control unit 38 to control the motor and pumps, Schmidt’s pumps 14 provide
for pressure build-up in the brake circuit during operation of an electronic
dynamic driving control system, as recited in claim 2. Thus, Schmidt
anticipates the subject matter of claim 2, and we sustain the rejection of
claim 2 as anticipated by Schmidt.
Claim 10
Claim 10 depends from claim 1 and further recites “the step of
carrying out the bleeding process after the brake system is first filled with
hydraulic fluid during the production process of a vehicle including the
brake system.” Appeal Br. 20 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner relied on
the same disclosure in paragraph 26 and Figure 1 of Schmidt to find the
subject matter of claim 10 anticipated by Schmidt. Final Act. 3. Appellant
argues that Schmidt does not disclose this claimed step because “Schmidt
explains to degas the brake fluid, the brake pressure buildup valves are
opened.” Appeal Br. 7. This argument is the same argument we found
unavailing above in our discussion of claim 1. For the same reasons
discussed above, we sustain the rejection of claim 10 as anticipated by
Schmidt.
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Claim 13
Claim 13 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the increased
pressure causes any air to dissolve in the hydraulic fluid and essentially
remain dissolved therein when the pressure is reduced.” Appeal Br. 21
(Claims Appendix). The Examiner noted that because claim 13 does not
specify the amount by which the pressure is reduced, Schmidt anticipates the
claimed subject matter because it encompasses increasing the pressure
beyond the pressure required to dissolve the gas in the brake fluid, so that
even if the pressure is thereafter reduced slightly, the pressure would remain
above the level required to maintain the gas as dissolved. Final Act. 3. In
other words, the pressure could be reduced somewhat as long as it is not
reduced to a level that would allow the gas to precipitate out of the brake
fluid.
Appellant argues that “[n]othing in Schmidt discloses that the air
dissolved in the hydraulic fluid remains dissolved therein when the pressure
is reduced.” Appeal Br. 8 (arguing that Schmidt acknowledges the need to
degas by opening the brake pressure buildup valves).
Appellant’s argument fails to address the breadth of the claim
language as interpreted by the Examiner. We agree with the Examiner’s
reading of the claim language. In other words, the scope of the claim
language encompasses an instance in which the pressure is reduced only
slightly so that it remains above the pressure level that allows for the gas to
precipitate out of the brake fluid. Due to the breadth of the claim language,
we do not find error in the Examiner’s rejection. Further, the language is not
commensurate with Appellant’s Specification, which also allows for gas to
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precipitate out of the brake fluid during communication with the expansion
tank or master cylinder at low pressures. Spec. ¶ 18.
For these reasons, Appellant has not identified error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 13 as anticipated by Schmidt. Thus, we sustain this
rejection of claim 13.
Independent Claim 17
Claim 17 recites a method for bleeding a vehicle brake system that
includes the step of “during bleeding of said vehicle brake system using the
controller to activate the pump for a specified period of time and thereby
increasing hydraulic fluid pressure in the brake line of the brake system, and
correspondingly at the bleed valve, without opening the bleed valve.”
Appeal Br. 22 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner relied on the same
interpretation of “bleeding” and findings as to Schmidt as relied on in the
rejection of claim 1 to find the subject matter of claim 17 anticipated by
Schmidt. Final Act. 3‒4. Appellant presents the same arguments discussed
above in our analysis of the rejection of claim 1. Appeal Br. 8‒9. For the
same reasons discussed above, we find no error in the Examiner’s findings
as to Schmidt’s disclosure of the claimed method step. Thus, we sustain the
rejection of claim 17 as anticipated by Schmidt.
Claim 18
Claim 18 depends from claim 17 and recites “wherein the step of
increasing the pressure in the brake line of the brake system causes any air in
the brake line of the brake system to dissolve in the brake fluid and
essentially remain dissolved therein when the pressure is reduced.” Appeal
Br. 22 (Claims Appendix). Appellant presents the same argument as
discussed above in our analysis of the rejection of claim 13. Appeal Br. 9‒
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10. For the same reasons discussed above, we sustain the rejection of
claim 18 as anticipated by Schmidt.
Rejection of claims 3‒8, 11, and 14‒16 over Schmidt and Koons
Claims 3‒5
Claims 3‒5 each depend from claim 1 and recite increasing the
pressure: to more than 50 bar, to more than 100 bar, and between 180 to 200
bar, respectively. Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner found
that Koons discloses increasing the pressure to the recited levels. Final
Act. 4 (citing Koons ¶ 41); Ans. 10 (stating that Koons teaches that “pumps
in hydraulic brake systems may be operated at pressure at least as high as
180 bar and may be operated for durations at least as long as 15 seconds”).
The Examiner determined that it would have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to combine these references because “Koons
discusses increasing accumulator pressure to 180 bar in 15 seconds ‘during
the ignition event’” and “this particular pressure and time range is typical for
operation of pumps in vehicle brake systems.” Final Act. 4‒5.
The Examiner explained that “[t]he Schmidt brake system is not being
modified by Koons” and that “Koons is merely a teaching reference for the
specific values at which hydraulic brake pumps operate.” Ans. 10. The
Examiner further explained that, because “Koons discusses increasing pump
operating pressures for certain durations during ignition, this must concern
the Schmidt phase of operation prior to degassing – the pressure clearly
cannot increase when there is degassing and the system is open.” Ans. 11.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s determination of obviousness is
in error because the Examiner fails to provide a reason why one having
ordinary skill in the art would have used the increased pressure and duration
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of Koons in the method of Schmidt. Appeal Br. 11‒12; Reply Br. 3‒4.
Appellant asserts that “Koons explains using the pump 242 to pressure the
hydraulic accumulator to 44 until hydraulic pressure reaches a
predetermined threshold or until a predetermined amount of time has
elapsed.” Reply Br. 3 (citing Koons ¶ 41).
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s articulation in the
rejection lacks an adequate reason use the pressure of Koons in the system of
Schmidt. As noted by Appellant, Koons describes a process for calibrating a
braking system and describes that when an ignition of the vehicle is turned
on, the system runs a pump to provide hydraulic pressure for an accumulator
until the pressure reaches a predetermined threshold or until a predetermined
amount of time has elapsed. Koons ¶ 41. The Examiner has not explained
adequately a reason that would have led one having ordinary skill in the art
to use this predetermined pressure threshold, as disclosed in Koons, in the
system of Schmidt. In other words, simply because Koons discloses a
system in which a pump is used to achieve a pressure within the claimed
range for purposes of calibration is not adequate to explain why one would
have used Schmidt’s pumps in this manner at the claimed pressure. For this
reason, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 3‒5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Schmidt and Koons.
Claims 6‒8
Claims 6‒8 each depend from claim 1 and recite applying the
increased pressure with the vehicle stationary for a period of time of: at
least 5 seconds and less than 2 minutes, at least 10 seconds and less than 1
minute, and between 10 seconds and 20 seconds, respectively. Appeal
Br. 19‒20 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner found that Koons discloses
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applying the increased pressure for a period of time that falls within the
claimed ranges. Final Act. 4 (citing Koons ¶ 41). For the same reasons
discussed above in our analysis of the rejection of claims 3‒5, the rejection
of claims 6‒8 likewise suffer from the deficiency of an inadequate
explanation of a reason to modify Schmidt to apply increased pressure with
the vehicle stationary for the claimed duration. Thus, we do not sustain the
rejection of claims 6‒8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Schmidt
and Koons.
Claim 11
Claim 11 depends from claim 1 and provides further details of an
electronic brake controller. Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix). The
Examiner found that Koons discloses the subject matter of claim 11. Final
Act. 5. Appellant does not contest this finding. Appeal Br. 13 (“Claim 11
stands with claim 1.”). For the reasons discussed above in our analysis of
claim 1, we likewise sustain the rejection of claim 11 as unpatentable over
Schmidt and Koons.
Claims 14‒16
Independent claim 14 recites a method for bleeding a vehicle brake
system comprising the steps of using the pump to increase the pressure in the
brake line to between 180 and 200 bar and applying the pressure for a period
between 10 and 20 seconds. Appeal Br. 21 (Claims Appendix). For the
same reasons discussed above in our analysis of the rejection of claims 3‒5,
the rejection of independent claim 14 and its dependent claims 15 and 16
likewise suffer from the deficiency of an inadequate explanation of a reason
to modify Schmidt to apply increased pressure at the claimed pressure level
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for the claimed duration. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 14‒
16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Schmidt and Koons.
CONCLUSION
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) of
claims 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 18 and the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103 of claim 11. We do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 3‒8 and 14‒16. Thus, we affirm in part.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 9, 10,
13, 17, 18
102(a)(1) Schmidt 1, 2, 9, 10,
13, 17, 18

3‒8, 11, 14‒
16
103 Schmidt, Koons 11 3‒8, 14‒16
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 9‒11,
13, 17, 18
3‒8, 14‒16
AFFIRMED IN PART