Jonathan Alperin

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2021

2020001675 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/011,134 01/21/2011 Jonathan Alperin 4366-535 4060
48500 7590 04/02/2021
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
BORISSOV, IGOR N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JONATHAN ALPERIN
____________

Appeal 2020-001675
Application 13/011,134
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 and 24–36.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our decision references the Specification (“Spec.,” filed Jan. 21, 2011),
Non-Final Office Action (“Non-Final Act.,” mailed Apr. 16, 2019), Appeal
Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 16, 2019), Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Oct. 28,
2019), and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Dec. 30, 2019). We use the term
“Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies Avaya Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
2 The Examiner indicates that dependent claims 4–6, 9, 21, and 23 contain
allowable subject matter. Non-Final Act. 23. Claims 2, 3, 7, 8, 10–20, and
22 were cancelled. Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims Appendix).
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to emergency notification
systems” and, more specifically, to “notification systems that notify visitors
at a site.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 24, and 36 are the independent claims on appeal. Claims 1
and 24, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, are illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
[(a)] registering, by a microprocessor and at a visitor
register, contact information and location information about a
previously unregistered visitor to a site, wherein the contact
information comprises contact information associated with the
visitor and/or another contact and the location information
comprises location information associated with the visitor;
[(b)] storing, by the microprocessor, the contact
information and the location information in an emergency
database, each of the contact information and the location
information being represented in the emergency database as a
data structure stored in a tangible, non-transitory computer
readable medium;
[(c)] detecting by an emergency detector, an emergency
at the site; and
[(d)] notifying by the microprocessor and a notification
system and via a tangible, nontransitory notification, the visitor
and/or the other contact of the emergency based on the location
information,
[(e)] wherein the microprocessor, the visitor register, the
emergency database, the emergency detector, and the
notification system, are elements of the emergency system and
the emergency system manages emergency services using the
microprocessor, the visitor register, the emergency database, the
emergency detector, and the notification system, and
[(f)] wherein the emergency detector is in
communication with the visitor register.

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24. A method, comprising:
[(a)] registering, by a microprocessor, location
information associated with a visitor to a site and contact
information associated with at least one of the visitor and another
contact at the site;
[(b)] storing, by the microprocessor, each of the contact
information and the location information in an emergency
database;
[(c)] receive information about an emergency at an area
of the site;
[(d)] comparing, by the microprocessor, the location
information and the area to determine an emergency notification
to send; and
[(e)] sending, by the microprocessor, the emergency
notification to at least one of the visitor and the other contact
using the contact information.

Appeal Br. 22, 24 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTIONS3
Claims 24–36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 24–36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Halbritter (US 2007/0038570 A1, pub. Feb. 15, 2007), Onishi (US

3 Should there be further prosecution of this application, the Examiner may
wish to consider whether claim 1 is directed to eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in accordance with the most recent published
guidance. Although we are authorized to reject claims by issuing a new
ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be
drawn when we elect not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure §§ 1213.02 (Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (“MPEP”).
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2007/0049259 A1, pub. Mar. 1, 2007), and Official Notice, as evidenced by
Uchida (US 6,696,956 B1, iss. Feb. 24, 2004) and Connor (US 5,673,304,
iss. Sept. 30, 1997).4
Claims 24, 30, and 36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Halbritter and Onishi.5
Claims 29 and 30 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Halbritter, Onishi, and Turcan (US 2004/0146047 A1,
pub. July 29, 2004).
PRIOR DECISION
This is the second appeal taken by Appellant. See Ex parte Alperin,
No. 2015-008201, 2017 WL 4418878 (PTAB Sept. 26, 2017) (non-
precedential) (“Prior Decision”). Appellant’s first appeal culminated in the
Decision, in which we affirmed at least one ground of rejection with respect
to each claim on appeal. Prior Decision 19.

4 The Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 takes Official Notice that it is “old
and well known to access a database with pre-stored telephone numbers to
execute a call in case of emergency, said emergency detected by an
emergency detector,” but does not indicate the Official Notice in the
rejection heading. Non-Final Act. 13, 15. In the Answer, the Examiner
includes this Official Notice in the rejection heading. Ans. 3.
5 In the Answer, the Examiner revises the rejection headings for claims 24,
29, 30, and 36 to include Official Notice. See Ans. 3. However, the
Examiner only takes Official Notice to reject claim 1. See Non-Final
Act. 15–20; Ans. 13–19. Accordingly, we treat the Examiner’s inclusion of
Official Notice in the rejection headings for these claims as an inadvertent
typographical error.
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ANALYSIS
Written Description
The Examiner maintains that the rejection of claims 24–36 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is proper because the Specification does not
disclose the step of “comparing, by the microprocessor, the location
information [of the visitor] and the area to determine an emergency
notification to send,” as recited in limitation (d) of independent claim 24,
and similarly recited in independent claim 36. Non-Final Act. 4.; see also
Ans. 5 (maintaining that the Specification does not disclose the “comparing”
step reproduced above). Instead, the Examiner finds that the Specification
discloses “storing contact information and location information regarding a
visitor, and notifying the visitor and/or another contact in an emergency
based on the location information.” Non-Final Act. 4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 15–
25, Figs. 1–4); see also Ans. 4–6 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 3–5, 17, 18, 26, 30, 31, 35,
Figs. 3, 4).
However, we agree with Appellant that paragraphs 17 and 18 of the
Specification reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that Appellant was
in possession of the invention at the time of filing. Appeal Br. 8–9. In
particular, those portions of the Specification provide an example in which a
visitor named Jon visits his friend, Sam, at company XYZ. Spec. ¶¶ 17–18.
After entering company XYZ, Jon checks-in by “providing his name
(contact information), cellular telephone number (contact information), and
that he is meeting Sam in his office from 1:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M. (location
information).” Id. ¶ 17. At 2:00 P.M., emergency detector 112 detects a fire
in the building where Sam’s office is located. Id. ¶ 18. Because Jon’s
location information indicated that he is in Sam’s office from 1:00 P.M. to
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3:00 P.M., notification system 113 notifies Jon by calling Jon’s
communication device and/or a communication device in Sam’s office. Id.
Although this excerpt does not provide in haec verba support for the
claimed subject matter at issue, we find it reasonably conveys to persons
skilled in the art that emergency detector 112 and notification system 113,
both of which are components of emergency system 110 (see Spec. ¶ 13,
Fig. 1), are capable of working together to compare the location information
(e.g., Jon being in Sam’s office from 1:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M.) with the area
of the site at which an emergency occurs (e.g., the building where Sam’s
office is located) to determine an emergency notification to send. See
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“In order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as
originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the
claimed subject matter at issue. Nonetheless, the disclosure must . . . convey
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that . . . [the inventor] was
in possession of the invention.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 24–36
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Principles of Law
35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent eligible if it is a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.” E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
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(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), and Alice, “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that
analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts,” such as an abstract idea. Id. According to
Supreme Court precedent, concepts determined to be abstract ideas include
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (id. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)).
If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the
second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually
and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional
elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78).
This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original).
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USPTO Guidance
We are also guided by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
guidance, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”), which has been
incorporated into the MPEP §§ 2104–06. “The guidance sets out agency
policy with respect to the USPTO’s interpretation of the subject matter
eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 in view of decisions by the
Supreme Court and the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Federal Circuit.”
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. However, the “guidance . . . does not create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party
against the USPTO” and “[r]ejections will continue to be based upon the
substantive law.” Id.
Under the Guidance, the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework is a
two-prong inquiry. MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A); see also Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54 (“Step 2A of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance is a two-prong inquiry.”). “Prong One asks does the claim recite
an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon?” MPEP
§ 2106.04(II)(A)(1); see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. For determining
whether a claim recites an abstract idea, the guidance defines enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas, distilled from precedent. MPEP § 2106.04(a);
see also id. § 2106.04(a)(2) (defining abstract idea groupings); Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52. If the claim recites a judicial exception, then the claim
requires further analysis at Prong Two. MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(1);
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. “Prong Two asks does the claim recite
additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application?” MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A)(2); see also id. § 2106.04(d),
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the additional
elements, individually or in combination, provide an inventive concept. See
MPEP §§ 2106(III), 2106.05.
“An inventive concept ‘cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law
of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.’” Id. § 2106.05(I)
(quoting Genetic Techs. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). Among the considerations in determining whether the additional
elements, individually or in combination, amount to significantly more than
the exception itself, we look to whether they add a specific limitation beyond
the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in
the field or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(II); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Rejection
Focusing on claim 24, the Examiner determined that the claim recites
a method for notifying registered visitors about an emergency at a site.
Ans. 7; see also Non-Final Act. 5–6. The Examiner determined that the
steps of registering, storing, receiving, comparing, determining, and sending,
as recited in limitations (a) through (e) of claim 24, could be performed in
the mind, and thus, cover a mental process, i.e., an abstract idea. Non-Final
Act. 5–6, 12; see also Ans. 7–8. Alternatively, the Examiner determined
that the concept is an abstract idea in the form of a certain method of
organizing human activity. Non-Final Act. 5; Ans. 7–8. The Examiner
further determined that claim 24 does not recite additional elements that
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integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or that amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 6–12; Ans. 8–13.
The Examiner also determines that claims 29–36 do not recite any additional
elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application or
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 12–13.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2A)
Appellant argues claims 24–36 as a group. Appeal Br. 11–14; see
also Reply Br. 3–5. We select claim 24 as representative. Consequently,
claims 25–36 stand or fall with claim 24. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry
applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject
matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d
1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a
specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including
the claim language) that claim 24 focuses on a process that itself qualifies as
an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a
technical field.
The Specification is titled “USE OF LOCATION AWARE CHECK-
IN BY VISITORS TO SUPPORT EMERGENCY SERVICES,” and
describes, in the Background section, an increasing demand on enterprises to
be responsible for the safety and well-being of not only their employees, but
also visitors to their premises. Spec. ¶ 2. Conventionally, visitors to a site
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provide information, such as the employee being visited and the company of
the visitor, but this information is not coupled with any emergency system.
Id. ¶ 3. As a result, locating and/or notifying visitors during an emergency is
problematic. Id. The Specification describes a need for a system that “can
couple visitor information with existing emergency notification systems to
better meet the increasing demands on the enterprise.” Id.
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 24 recites a method comprising:
“registering . . . location information associated with a visitor to a site and
contact information associated with at least one of the visitor and another
contact at the site” (limitation (a)); “storing . . . each of the contact
information and the location information . . . ” (limitation (b)); “receiv[ing]
information about an emergency at an area of the site” (limitation (c));
“comparing . . . the location information and the area to determine an
emergency notification to send” (limitation (d)); and “sending . . . the
emergency notification to at least one of the visitor and the other contact
using the contact information” (limitation (e)).
We agree with the Examiner that limitations (a) through (e), when
given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite a method for notifying
registers about an emergency at a site. Ans. 7; see also Non-Final 5–6. This
concept pertains to “commercial or legal interactions,” including “business
relations,” as well as “managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people (including . . . following rules or instructions),”
which are two subgroupings of the “certain methods of organizing human
activity” grouping of abstract ideas. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II);
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. For example, extending emergency services
to visitors due to increasing demand on the business to ensure the safety and
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well-being of its visitors pertains to business relations. Further, limitations
(a) through (e) of claim 24 recite a set of rules for managing the visit (i.e., an
interaction between the visitor and business) that, when executed, results in
extending emergency services to the visitor.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 24
recites a mental process. Appeal Br. 11. Specifically, Appellant asserts that
“[i]t is plausible that there would be many different names, phone numbers,
locations, and other information included in the contact and location
information for multiple visitors and/or contacts,” such that “memorization
would realistically and reasonably be impractical for a human to perform in
their mind.” Id. Contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, storing contact
information and location information associated with one visitor would
satisfy the limitations of claim 24. The claim language does not require
storing an amount of information so voluminous that it would be impractical
for a human to store mentally or with pen and paper. Appellant’s
Specification supports our understanding. See Spec. ¶ 3 (disclosing that
visitor information is typically tracked on paper).
To the extent Appellant contends that use of pen and paper to help
perform a mental step negates the mental nature of the claim limitations,
Appellant is mistaken. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(B); see also
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (holding that steps that could be performed in the human mind or by a
human using a pen and paper are unpatentable mental processes). In
CyberSource, the Federal Circuit explained that a step of “constructing a
map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions” could be met
by a person “writing down a list of credit card transactions made from a
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particular IP [Internet Protocol] address,” and, thus, is an unpatentable
mental process. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370, 1372. The Federal Circuit
found that an exemplary “map of credit card numbers” consisted of “four
listed credit card transactions denoted by their dates, times, cardholder
names, card numbers, IP addresses, transaction amounts, and shipping
addresses.” Id. at 1373. Here, a person could write down contact
information and location information associated with a visitor in a manner
analogous to the list of credit card transactions described in CyberSource,
indicating that the argued limitations are mental processes and, thus, abstract
ideas.
However, even accepting Appellant’s assertion that claim 24 does not
recite a mental process, Appellant has not explained why the claim
limitations cannot be characterized as a certain method of organizing human
activity, which is an abstract idea. See Non-Final Act. 5 (determining that
claim 24 covers “certain methods of organizing human activity”); see also
Ans. 7–8 (arguing the same). Accordingly, Appellant does not persuaded us
that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 24 recites an abstract idea.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 24 is
not “directed to” an abstract idea because it integrates the recited abstract
idea into a practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two). Appeal Br. 11–14.
In this regard, Appellant argues that “contacting people in an emergency to
provide a notification is very practical.” Id. at 11; see also Reply Br. 4
(contending that the invention is “a very practical application”). However,
the relevant question under Step 2A, Prong 2 is not whether the claimed
invention itself is a practical application. Instead, the question is whether
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the claim includes additional elements beyond the judicial exception that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Here, the only additional elements recited in claim 24 beyond the
abstract idea are a “microprocessor” for performing limitations (a), (b), (d),
and (e), and an “emergency database” (limitation (b)). Appellant argues that
the invention “us[es] various computer components” to improve
notifications. Appeal Br. 12. In the Reply Brief, Appellant further argues
that the claim must notify visitors in a non-abstract way, such as with “a
noise that makes a physical wavelength through space or a visual or audible
notification on a device that requires the movement of electrons within the
device.” Reply Br. 3; see also id. at 3–4 (arguing that the use of a
microprocessor to perform certain limitations “require[s] the physical
transfer of electrons” within the device). Yet, not every claim that recites
concrete, tangible computer components escapes the reach of the abstract-
idea inquiry. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611
(Fed. Cir. 2016); see also MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I) (explaining that using a
computer to perform an abstract idea is not sufficient to integrate an abstract
idea into a practical application).
Appellant’s Specification makes clear that the claimed invention is
implemented using generic computer components to perform generic
computer functions. See Spec. ¶¶ 11, 13, 27. We find no indication in the
Specification that the method steps recited in claim 24 require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, invoke any allegedly inventive programming, or
that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
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LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Appellant argues that the method steps of registering, storing,
comparing, and sending, as recited in limitations (a), (b), (d), and (e) of
claim 24, reflect “an improvement to the technical field,” by “provid[ing]
improved notifications regarding emergencies using technical solutions.”
Appeal Br. 11–12. According to Appellant, the claimed invention
“improv[es] the speed of traditional emergency services by necessarily using
computer-related technology.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 12–13 (contending
that the invention provides “physical improvements to emergency
notifications and also operational improvements, including faster and more
effective and efficient emergency notifications”); 14 (asserting that
limitations (a), (b), (d), and (e) are an improvement to the technical field);
Reply Br. 4 (arguing that the “technology provid[es] faster notifications to
relevant people/locations before an emergency gets worse”).
However, the Federal Circuit has routinely held that using a computer
to perform tasks more quickly or more accurately is not sufficient to render a
claim patent eligible. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine
tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent
eligible.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d
1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[C]laiming the improved speed or efficiency
inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer [does not] provide a
sufficient inventive concept.”).
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Appellant contends that claim 24 is “necessarily rooted in computer-
related technology” and “reflect[s] an improvement to the technical field” by
“extend[ing] traditional emergency services to visitors at a site.” Appeal
Br. 12. Yet, extending traditional emergency services improves a process
that qualifies as an abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely as
a tool. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“[P]atent law does not protect such claims[, i.e., claims to an asserted
advance in the realm of abstract ideas], without more, no matter how
groundbreaking the advance.”); see also MPEP §§ 2106.04(d); 2106(d)(1);
2016.05(a).
Although Appellant contends that the claimed invention “address[es]
technological issues that did not exist prior to the invention of computer
notifications” and “provide[s] improvements to a technical field” (Reply Br.
5), the limitations of claim 24 do not recite technological implementation
details for any of the elements. Claim 24 recites the method steps of
registering, storing, receiving, comparing, and sending such that they are
capable of being achieved by any means. Put simply, claim 24 “provides
only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how [it is
accomplished]. Our law demands more.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
To the extent that Appellant argues that claim 24 improves emergency
notification systems by improving the information collected and analyzed to
be extended to include visitors, this argument is unpersuasive. See BSG
Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[A]n
improvement to the information stored by a database is not equivalent to an
improvement in the database’s functionality.”). “As many cases make clear,
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even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to
particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the
collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP, 898 F.3d at 1168. The
“character of [the] information simply invokes a separate category of
abstract ideas.” Id. Such an asserted improvement “lies entirely in the realm
of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-abstract
application realm.” Id. at 1163.
We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 24 recites a
method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more
than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited
abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that
provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 24 is
directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (Guidance, Step 2B)
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 24 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of
the Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether
claim 24 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that
provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements
amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself. MPEP
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§ 2106.05(I); Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. We agree with the Examiner
that it does not.
Claim 24 additionally recites a microprocessor and database —
elements described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See
Spec. ¶¶ 11, 13, 27. We agree with the Examiner that these limitations,
considered individually and as an ordered combination, do not provide an
inventive concept.
Appellant advances the same argument under step two as advanced
with respect to Prong Two — namely, that limitations (a), (b), (d), and (e) of
claim 24 reflect an improvement to a technical field. Appeal Br. 14. For the
reasons described above, we are not persuaded that extending emergency
systems to visitors is a technological improvement as opposed to an
improvement to the abstract idea that uses a microprocessor and database.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded, on the present record, that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101of
claim 24 and claims 25–36, which fall with claim 24.
Obviousness
Independent Claim 1
Appellant argues that “Halbritter is silent regarding an emergency
detector” and, thus, “cannot teach or suggest an emergency system that has
the elements of a microprocessor, a visitor register, an emergency database,
an emergency detector, and a notification system,” as recited by claim 1,
limitation (e). Appeal Br. 16. Yet, the Examiner finds that the combination
of Halbritter and Onishi discloses the claimed emergency system. See Ans.
13; see also Non-Final Act. 14–15. Specifically, the Examiner relies on
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Halbritter as disclosing most aspects of the claimed emergency system,
including notifying visitors regarding an emergency. See Non-Final Act.
13–14; see also Ans. 13 (citing Halbritter ¶ 125); Halbritter ¶ 125 (“One of
skill in the art will recognize that such functionality may also be used for . . .
important announcements including, for example, . . . emergency
information.”). The Examiner finds that Halbritter’s emergency system
suggests, but does not teach, an emergency detector that detects an
emergency at the site. Non-Final Act. 14. However, the Examiner relies on
Onishi for teaching this aspect of the claim language. Id.; see also Ans. 13
(citing Onishi Figs. 6–7, ¶¶ 40, 43).6
Appellant argues that “Onishi does not provide that which Halbritter
lacks because Onishi is also silent regarding an emergency system that has
the elements of a microprocessor, a visitor register, an emergency database,
an emergency detector, and a notification system,” as recited by claim 1,
limitation (e). Appeal Br. 16. Yet, the Examiner relied on Halbritter for the
microprocessor, visitor register, emergency database, and notification
system, and Onishi for an emergency detector. As such, Appellant’s
individual attacks against Halbritter and Onishi fail to address the
obviousness rejection as articulated by the Examiner, which is based on the
combined teachings of Halbritter and Onishi. See In re Young, 927 F.2d
588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that the test for obviousness is what

6 Appellant contends in the Reply Brief that the Examiner cites to “Gigs. 6–
7; [0040]; [0043]” of Onishi, and that “Appellant is unsure what ‘Gigs. 6–7’
refers to, and therefore cannot address this citation.” Reply Br. 5. We
interpret “Gigs. 6–7” as a typographical error for “Figs. 6–7,” particularly in
light of the Examiner’s further citations to paragraphs 40 and 43 of Onishi,
which discuss Figures 6 and 7, respectively.
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the combined teachings of the references would have taught or suggested to
one with ordinary skill in the art).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the alleged
deficiencies of Connor and Uchida, because these references are not applied
by the Examiner to teach or suggest any particular limitation of claim 1.
Appeal Br. 16. Instead, these references are cited by the Examiner to
support taking Official Notice that “access[ing] a database with pre-stored
telephone number to execute [an emergency] call” is “old and well known.”
Non-Final Act. 15. In addition, the Federal Circuit has recognized that
evidence submitted in support of an obviousness rejection (e.g., additional
references to demonstrate that storing and accessing telephone number is a
database is old and well known) may be considered to demonstrate the state
of the art. See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (emphasizing that additional prior art references or evidence are not
for the purpose of changing the prior art combination that forms the basis of
the ground of rejection, but rather are merely for the purpose of providing
evidence of the state of the art, including the background knowledge of one
of ordinary skill in this art).
Appellant argues that the Examiner improperly relied on Official
Notice for teaching or suggesting that “the emergency detector is in
communication with the visitor register,” as recited in claim 1, limitation (f).
See Appeal Br. 16. According to Appellant, “the Examiner seems to agree
that Halbritter and Onishi each (alone or in combination) fail[s] to teach or
suggest this limitation” because the Examiner takes Official Notice. Id.
Appellant asserts that by taking Official Notice that “it is old and well
known to access a database with pre-stored telephone numbers to execute a
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call in case of [an] emergency . . . detected by an emergency detector[,]” the
Examiner “improperly limit[s] the meaning of the present claim.” Id.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. The Examiner relies on the
combination of Halbritter and Onishi as teaching limitation (f) of claim 1.
Specifically, the Examiner finds that Halbritter does not teach that the
emergency detector is in communication with the visitor register. Non-Final
Act. 14. As Appellant correctly acknowledges, the Examiner does not take
Official Notice that limitation (f) of claim 1 is well-known. Appeal Br. 16.
Instead, the Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to modify
Halbritter to communicate with Onishi’s emergency detecting device to
“advantageously provide patrons with a safest path to escape the dangerous
situation.” Non-Final Act. 15 (citing Onishi ¶ 46).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the Examiner changed the
basis of the obviousness rejection from the Non-Final Action to rely on
Official Notice, rendering the obviousness rejection unclear and improper.
Reply Br. 5–6. Yet, the Examiner took Official Notice in the Non-Final
Action (Non-Final Act. 15), and Appellant, as set forth above, argued that
the Examiner’s Official Notice was improper (Appeal Br. 16). Accordingly,
we are not persuaded that the Examiner changed the thrust of the
obviousness rejection between the entry of Non-Final Action under appeal
and the entry of the Examiner’s Answer.
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s rational to combine the
teachings of Halbritter and Onishi is insufficient because the prior art does
not discuss “any relationship between communications with an emergency
detecting device and ‘providing . . . a safest path.’” Appeal Br. 17.
Appellant asserts that “a safest path is not related to a communication —
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they are different and distinct items” and that the Examiner’s “disconnect in
logic” is not addressed in the taking of Official Notice. Id. Yet, the
Examiner does not find that Onishi’s safest path is a communication
between the emergency detector and visitor register. Instead, the Examiner
determines that one of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to modify
Halbritter’s emergency system to provide patrons with a safest path to
escape the dangerous situation. Non-Final Act. 15.
Appellant further contends that “devices communicating over a public
network may not, and most likely cannot communicate with each other due
to differences in networking technologies, software components, and/or
operating systems,” and the proposed combination would not yield
predictable results. Appeal Br. 16. Yet, Appellant provides no persuasive
evidence that modifying Halbritter’s emergency system to include Onishi’s
emergency detector would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise
beyond the skill of those in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Halbritter and Onishi.
Independent Claims 24 and 36 and Dependent Claim 30
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claims 24 and 36 because the combination of
Halbritter and Onishi does not teach or suggest “registering . . . contact
information associated with at least one of the visitor and another contact at
the site” and “sending . . . the emergency notification to at least one of the
visitor and the other contact using the contact information,” as recited in
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limitations (a) and (e) of claim 24, and similarly recited in claim 36. Appeal
Br. 17–19.
Appellant argues that Halbritter teaches using a patron’s address to
register a patron, but does not teach or suggest using the patron’s address to
send an emergency notification to the patron. Id. at 18 (citing Halbritter
¶ 35). Yet, Appellant’s Specification broadly defines “contact information”
to include
information such as a name and/or phone number of the visitor,
an email address of the visitor, an Instant Message (IM) address
of the visitor, a name and/or phone number of a person at the site,
an email address of a person at the site, an IM address of a person
at the site, emergency contact(s) of the visitor, a list of allergies
of the visitor, contacts for 911 responders, and the like.
Spec. ¶ 13 (emphasis added).
In addition to storing a patron’s address, Halbritter discloses storing a
patron’s name, address book, location information, and unique patron
identifier in a patron account file for the patron. Halbritter ¶ 35. For
example, to send a message to a patron, a patron’s name (i.e., contact
information) could be selected from an address book. Id. ¶¶ 35, 75, 87, 88,
90; Figs. 5, 6B.
Appellant argues that Halbritter does not teach “comparing, by the
microprocessor, the location information and the area to determine an
emergency notification to send,” as recited in limitation (d) of claim 24, and
similarly recited in claim 36. Appeal Br. 18. Yet, we understand the
Examiner to rely on Onishi for this aspect of the claim language. Non-Final
Act. 17 (citing Onishi Abstract, ¶¶ 15, 40). Onishi describes a detecting
device configured and arranged to detect location information of smoke or
noxious gas and an information sending unit configured and arranged to
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send location of the smoke or noxious gas and/or evacuation information.
Onishi ¶ 15. By detecting the direction of dissemination of the smoke or
noxious gas, an “optimum safe area and escape route guidance to the safe
area can be displayed.” Id. ¶ 46.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the Examiner in the Answer
changed the basis of the obviousness rejection to rely on Official Notice,
rendering the rejection unclear and improper. Reply Br. 5–6 (citing Ans. 3;
Non-Final Act. 13). Because neither the Non-Final Office Action nor the
Answer describes taking Official Notice with respect to independent claims
24 and 36, we treat the revised heading at page 3 of the Answer as an
inadvertent typographical error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 24 and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Halbritter
and Onishi. Appellant additionally argues that claim 30, which depends
from claim 24, is allowable for the same reasons advanced by Appellant
with respect to claim 24. Appeal Br. 19. We find these arguments
unpersuasive for the same reasons described above with respect to
independent claim 24. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Halbritter and
Onishi.
Dependent Claims 29 and 30
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 29 and
30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Turcan does not cure the deficiencies
with respect to the rejection of independent claim 24 over Halbritter and
Onishi. See Appeal Br. 20–21. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive for
the same reasons described above with respect to the rejection of claim 24.
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We also are not persuaded that by Appellant’s argument that Turcan
fails to teach the claimed “sending,” as recited in claim 29, because “Turcan
is silent regarding the emergency notification as claimed and the site and
emergency as claimed.” Appeal Br. 20. Yet, the Examiner finds that Turcan
discloses a school emergency notification system that notifies a third party,
which is an entity not associated with the site or the emergency, as required
by claim 29. See Non-Final Act. 18–19; see also Ans. 18.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Turcan fails
to teach the claimed “sending,” as recited in claim 30, because Turcan does
not disclose location information. Yet, the Examiner finds that Turcan
discloses a school emergency notification system that sends an emergency
notification to students and registered guests, which are associated with a
location corresponding to the location information.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that the Examiner in the Answer
changed the basis of the obviousness rejection to rely on Official Notice,
rendering the rejection unclear and improper. Reply Br. 6 (citing Ans. 3;
Non-Final Act. 18). Because neither the Non-Final Office Action nor the
Answer describes taking Official Notice with respect to dependent claims 29
and 30, we treat the revised heading at page 3 of the Answer as an
inadvertant typographical error.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 29 and 30
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Halbritter, Onishi, and
Turcan.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
24–36 112, ¶ 1 Written Description 24–36
24–36 101 Eligibility 24–36
1 103(a) Halbritter, Onishi,
Official Notice
1
24, 30, 36 103(a) Halbritter, Onishi 24, 30, 36
29, 30 103(a) Halbritter, Onishi,
Turcan
29, 30
Overall
Outcome
1, 24–36
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED