Jon S. Moorhead

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 8, 2005

No. 78182902 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2005)

Mailed:
Nov. 8, 2005

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Jon S. Moorhead
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Serial No. 78182902
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Patricia A. Walker of Walker & Jocke for Jon S. Moorhead.

Maria-Victoria Suarez, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law
Office 102 (Thomas V. Shaw, Managing Attorney).
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Before Quinn, Hairston and Grendel, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Grendel, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the mark URGENTCASH (in standard character form) for
services recited in the application as “financial services
in the nature of check cashing, deferred deposits,
financial overdraft protection and short-term consumer
loans.”1

1 Serial No. 78182902, filed on November 7, 2002 on the basis of
intent-to-use under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C.
THIS OPINION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE TTAB
Ser. No. 78182902
2
The Trademark Examining Attorney has issued a final
refusal of registration on the ground that applicant’s
mark, as applied to the services recited in the
application, so resembles the mark URGENT MONEY SERVICE,
previously registered (in standard character form) for
services recited in the registration as “cash advance
services,” as to be likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15
U.S.C. §1052(d).
Applicant has appealed the final refusal. The appeal
is fully briefed. We affirm.
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an
analysis of all of the facts in evidence that are relevant
to the factors bearing on the likelihood of confusion
issue. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also In re Majestic
Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis,
two key considerations are the similarities between the

§1051(a). As originally filed, applicant sought to register the
mark as two words, URGENT CASH. Applicant subsequently filed an
amendment to allege use, which alleged November 8, 2002 as the
date of first use anywhere and the date of first use in commerce.
The amendment to allege use also sought amendment of the mark
from URGENT CASH to the compressed term URGENTCASH. The proposed
amendment was accepted by the Trademark Examining Attorney at
footnote 1 of her brief.

Ser. No. 78182902
3
marks and the similarities between the goods and/or
services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976). See also In
re Dixie Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Other of the du Pont factors may be
relevant if evidence pertaining to them is of record.
We turn first to the second du Pont factor, which
requires us to consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
applicant’s and registrant’s respective services. A
printout of an Internet website2 made of record by the
Trademark Examining Attorney includes, under the heading
“Short Term Consumer Loans,” the following text: “Are you
short of money and could use payday loans of up to $500
before your next paycheck? Apply in less than three
minutes and you can have cash in your account overnight
with our fast cash advances.” Based on this evidence, we
find that registrant’s “cash advance services” and
applicant’s “check cashing” and “short-term consumer loans”
are highly similar or legally identical.3 Applicant has
presented no argument or evidence to the contrary. The

2 www.ddrplaace.com/payday-loans/short-term-commercial-loans

3 We also note, in passing, that applicant’s specimen of use
refers to applicant’s services as “cash advance centers.”
[Emphasis added.]
Ser. No. 78182902
4
second du Pont factor weighs in favor of a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
In view of the highly similar or legally identical
nature of the applicant’s and registrant’s respective
services, we also find, under the third and fourth du Pont
factors, that the respective services are marketed in the
same prospective trade channels and to the same prospective
classes of purchasers. Moreover, we find that the
purchasers of these services are ordinary consumers who
would not exercise a great deal of care in making their
decision to purchase the services. Indeed, given the
nature of these services, the relevant purchasers are
likely to be impulse purchasers. The third and fourth du
Pont factors thus weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood
of confusion. Again, applicant has not contended
otherwise.
Applicant’s main argument in support of the
registrability of his mark is that the marks are
dissimilar, under the first du Pont factor. We make our
determination under this factor in accordance with the
following principles.
We must determine whether the marks are similar or
dissimilar when compared in their entireties in terms of
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
Ser. No. 78182902
5
The test, under the first du Pont factor, is not whether
the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-
side comparison, but rather whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial
impression that confusion as to the source of the goods or
services offered under the respective marks is likely to
result. The focus is on the recollection of the average
purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a
specific impression of trademarks. See Sealed Air Corp. v.
Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975). Furthermore,
although the marks at issue must be considered in their
entireties, it is well-settled that one feature of a mark
may be more significant than another, and it is not
improper to give more weight to this dominant feature in
determining the commercial impression created by the mark.
See In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749
(Fed. Cir. 1985). Finally, in cases such as this, where
the applicant’s services are highly similar or legally
identical to the registrant’s services, the degree of
similarity between the marks which is required to support a
finding of likelihood of confusion is less than it would be
if the services were not identical. Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d
1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Ser. No. 78182902
6
In terms of appearance, we find that applicant’s mark
is similar to registrant’s mark insofar as both marks begin
with the word URGENT. It is not dispositive that
applicant’s mark is a compressed term comprising the two
words URGENT and CASH; applicant’s mark still must be
deemed to begin with the word URGENT. The marks are
dissimilar in terms of appearance to the extent that
applicant’s mark is a compressed term consisting of two
words, URGENT and CASH, and registrant’s mark has three
separate words, URGENT MONEY SERVICE.
In terms of sound, the marks are similar to the extent
that the pronunciation of both would start with the word
URGENT. The words CASH in applicant’s mark and the words
MONEY SERVICE in registrant’s mark do not sound similar.
In terms of connotation, we find the marks to be
highly similar. Both marks start with the term URGENT, a
term which has the same meaning as used in both marks. It
connotes the sense of “urgency” facing the purchaser, who
utilizes applicant’s or registrant’s services to obtain
money for emergency needs. CASH and MONEY are similar in
connotation as they are used in the respective marks;
“cash” is a type or form of “money.” SERVICE is a highly
descriptive term as applied to the relevant services. The
word appears (and is disclaimed) in registrant’s mark, and
Ser. No. 78182902
7
its presence contributes little or nothing to the
connotation of the mark. Its absence from applicant’s mark
does not suffice to distinguish the marks in terms of
connotation.
In terms of overall commercial impression, we find
that the marks are similar. CASH and MONEY SERVICE are
highly descriptive of, if not generic for, applicant’s and
registrant’s services, respectively. Because this is so,
we find that URGENT, although somewhat suggestive, is the
dominant feature in both of the marks. Applicant has
submitted third-party registrations which purport to show
that URGENT is a commonly-used term. However, those
registrations all use the term in connection with medical
care services, i.e., “urgent care.” Applicant also has
submitted a printout from the GOOGLE search engine which
lists numerous “hits” which include references to “Urgent
Money Service.” These “hits” are of marginal probative
value in our determination of what the actual contents of
the websites are. See In re Fitch IBCA Inc., 64 USPQ2d
1058 (TTAB 2002). Moreover, the references to “Urgent
Money Service” in the Google “hit” list could easily be
references to registrant itself. Without the benefit of
the actual website contents, we cannot discount this
possibility.
Ser. No. 78182902
8
On this record, we find that applicant and registrant
are the only two users of the term URGENT in connection
with the services at issue in this case. That term, when
combined with the highly descriptive or generic terms CASH
and MONEY SERVICE, dominates the commercial impression of
each of the marks, and leads us to conclude that the marks,
viewed as a whole, are similar in terms of overall
commercial impression. As noted above, where the services
are highly similar or identical, as they are in this case,
the degree of similarity between the marks which is
required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is
less than it would be if the services were more dissimilar.
For the reasons discussed above, we find that
applicant’s mark is similar to registrant’s mark, under the
first du Pont factor.
We shall briefly discuss other arguments made by
applicant.4 Applicant asserts that registrant’s mark is not
famous. However, the Trademark Examining Attorney is not
required to establish that registrant’s mark is famous in
order to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. If
evidence of fame is of record (which often is the case only

4 We have considered all of the evidence and arguments presented
by applicant, including those not specifically discussed in this
opinion. They do not persuade us that our conclusion is
incorrect.

Ser. No. 78182902
9
in inter partes proceedings before the Board), then that
evidence will be considered. However, the absence of
evidence of fame does not weigh in applicant’s favor.
Applicant also asserts that applicant has not
encountered registrant’s mark in the marketplace, that
applicant is not aware of any actual confusion between the
marks, and that the likelihood of confusion is de minimis
because the applicant and registrant operate in different
parts of the country. Even assuming that these assertions
are correct, they are not dispositive, and they do not
outweigh our findings on the other du Pont factors.
Moreover, applicant’s and registrant’s current geographic
separation is likely, as a factual matter, to be the reason
why applicant has not encountered registrant, and why
applicant is not aware of any instances of actual
confusion. There appears to have been no significant
opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred.
To summarize, we find that applicant’s services are
highly similar or legally identical to registrant’s
services, that the respective trade channels and classes of
purchasers likewise are highly similar or legally
identical, and that applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark,
viewed in their entireties, are similar. These findings
lead us to conclude that a likelihood of confusion exists.
Ser. No. 78182902
10
To the extent that any doubts might exist as to the
correctness of this conclusion, we resolve such doubts
against applicant. See In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio) Inc.,
837 F.2d 840, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988); and In re
Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223
USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.