Johnathan Bachrach et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 24, 2019

13740093 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/740,093 01/11/2013 Johnathan Bachrach AUTO/1261US 9685
107456 7590 07/24/2019
Artegis Law Group, LLP
John Carey
7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104
Houston, TX 77095
EXAMINER
LUU, CUONG V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2129
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/24/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
algdocketing@artegislaw.com
jmatthews@artegislaw.com
kcruz@artegislaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JOHNATHAN BACHRACH and SAUL GRIFFITH
____________

Appeal 2018-007644
Application 13/740,093
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention pertains to computer-aided design and
manufacturing and, specifically, involves techniques for designing “pop-up”
cards from 3D models. When opened fully, a pop-up card includes a 3D
structure that protrudes outward from the card, thus giving the card a “pop
out” effect, yet enabling the structure to be collapsed when the card is

1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Autodesk, Inc. App. Br. 3.
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closed. To generate a pop-up card, at least two axes are computed based on
the orientation of a three-dimensional (3D) graphics model, and the model
sliced along those axes. Locations are then identified where the slices are
connected to a foldable plane surface. See generally Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 1–2,
21–33. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A computer-implemented method for generating a pop-
up card based on a three-dimensional (3D) graphics model, the
method comprising:
receiving an orientation of the 3D graphics model on a
plane surface having a fold line along which the plane surface
folds;
computing at least two slice axes based on the orientation
of the 3D graphics model;
slicing the 3D graphics model along the at least two slice
axes to generate a plurality of slices;
identifying a first slice included in the plurality of slices
that intersects a second slice included in the plurality of slices at
the fold line, wherein the first slice is diagonal to the folding
line;
identifying a connection location along the first slice
where the first slice is to attach to the plane surface; and
causing an indication of the connection location to be generated
on the first slice when the first slice is manufactured.

THE REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–8.2

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed October
6, 2017 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed April 6, 2018 (“App. Br.”);
(3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 18, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply
Brief filed July 18, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTENTIONS
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea, namely determining how to slice a 3D model into slices to be attached
to a plane surface. Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 3–5. The Examiner adds that the
claims do not include elements that add significantly more than the abstract
idea, but merely recite, among other things, generic computer components
performing their ordinary functions. See Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 4–5.
Appellants argue that the claimed invention is eligible because, among
other things, it recites specific, unconventional limitations that effect a
useful result or technological improvement. App. Br. 12–15; Reply Br. 3–4.
According to Appellants, automatically computing slice axes and generating
slices enables quickly and easily generating a physical version of the 3D
graphics model that is collapsible along a specified folding line—a process
that does not require manual design or testing and, therefore, is said to solve
a technical problem. App. Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 3–4. Appellants add that
the claimed invention adds significantly more to the purported abstract idea
by reciting, among other things, (1) a technological improvement relative to
the prior art; (2) at least one limitation that differs from what is well-
understood, routine, and conventional in the field; and (3) limitations that
pose no danger of preempting an abstract idea. App. Br. 15–17.

ISSUE
Under § 101, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–23 as
directed to ineligible subject matter? This issue turns on whether the claims
are directed to an abstract idea and, if so, whether recited elements—
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considered individually and as an ordered combination—transform the
nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 184 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). That
said, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

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ANALYSIS
Claims 1–23: Alice/Mayo Step One
Representative independent claim 1 recites [a] computer-implemented
method for generating a pop-up card based on a three-dimensional (3D)
graphics model, the method comprising:
receiving an orientation of the 3D graphics model on a plane surface
having a fold line along which the plane surface folds;
computing at least two slice axes based on the orientation of the 3D
graphics model;
slicing the 3D graphics model along the at least two slice axes to
generate a plurality of slices;
identifying a first slice included in the plurality of slices that intersects
a second slice included in the plurality of slices at the fold line, wherein the
first slice is diagonal to the folding line;
identifying a connection location along the first slice where the first
slice is to attach to the plane surface; and
causing an indication of the connection location to be generated on
the first slice when the first slice is manufactured.3
As the disclosure explains, Appellants’ invention pertains to
computer-aided design and manufacturing and, specifically, involves
techniques for designing “pop-up” cards from 3D models. Spec. ¶ 1. When
opened fully, a pop-up card includes a 3D structure that protrudes outward
from the card, thus giving the card a “pop out” effect, yet enabling the
structure to be collapsed when the card is closed. Id. ¶ 2. These 3D

3 Unless otherwise indicated, we italicize or quote text associated with
various recited limitations for emphasis and clarity.
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structures are constructed by cutting and scoring two-dimensional material.
Id.
Pop-up cards are usually difficult to make because not only is the
design process tedious and prone to errors, but manually determining the 3D
structure’s design that allows for expansion and collapse is complicated. Id.
¶ 4.
Turning to claim 1, we first note that the claim recites a method and,
therefore, falls within the process category of § 101. But despite falling
within this statutory category, we must still determine whether the claim is
directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217. To this end, we must determine whether the claim (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) fails to integrate the exception into a practical
application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. If both elements are
satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial exception under the first step of
the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
In the rejection, the Examiner determines that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea, namely determining how to slice a 3D model into slices to be
attached to a plane surface. Final Act. 5. To determine whether a claim
recites an abstract idea, we (1) identify the claim’s specific limitations that
recite an abstract idea, and (2) determine whether the identified limitations
fall within certain subject matter groupings, namely (a) mathematical
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concepts4; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity;5 or (c) mental
processes.6
Here, apart from the recited method being computer-implemented, all
of claim 1’s recited limitations, which collectively are directed to
determining how to generate a pop-up card by determining where to slice an
associated graphics model oriented on a plane surface, fit squarely within at
least one of the above categories of the USPTO’s guidelines.
First, receiving an orientation of the 3D graphics model on a plane
surface having a fold line along which the plane surface folds involves at
least personal interactions, including following rules or instructions, at least
to the extent that a person could receive and store this information entirely
mentally by merely reading pertinent records or other associated information
or writing this information down. Cf. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that limitation
reciting obtaining information about transactions that have used an Internet
address identified with a credit card transaction can be performed by a
human who simply reads records of Internet credit card transactions from a

4 Mathematical concepts include mathematical relationships, mathematical
formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations. See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
5 Certain methods of organizing human activity include fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating
risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of
contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships
or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and
following rules or instructions). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
6 Mental processes are concepts performed in the human mind including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
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pre-existing database). Alternatively, a person could receive that
information by communicating with another person with such knowledge,
such as a colleague, or by writing this information down. Cf. id.; TLI
Comm., LLC v. AV Automotive, LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 610–14 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding ineligible claims reciting recording and administering digital
images including (1) recording images using a digital pick-up unit in a
telephone unit; (2) storing the recorded images; (3) transmitting data
including the images and classification information to a server; (4)
extracting the received classification information; and (5) storing the images
in the server considering that information); In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x 938,
939–41 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding ineligible claims reciting,
among other things, receiving medical records information and transmitting
reports where the claimed invention’s objective was to enable electronic
communication of tasks that were otherwise done manually using paper,
phone, and facsimile machine); Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896
F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that a nontechnical human activity
of passing a note to a person who is in a meeting or conversation as
illustrating the invention’s focus, namely providing information to a person
without interfering with the person’s primary activity); LendingTree, LLC v.
Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 993–94, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(holding ineligible claims reciting, among other things, (1) receiving
selection criteria from lending institutions and credit data from a computer
user, and (2) forwarding the credit data to selected lending institutions as
directed to an abstract idea). Therefore, the recited receiving limitation falls
squarely within the mental processes and methods of organizing human
activity categories of the agency’s guidelines and, therefore, recites an
abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary (1)
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mental processes including observation and evaluation, and (2) methods of
organizing human activity, including personal interactions and following
rules or instructions).
Second, the limitations calling for [1] computing at least two slice
axes based on the orientation of the 3D graphics model; [2] slicing the 3D
graphics model along the at least two slice axes to generate a plurality of
slices; [3] identifying a first slice included in the plurality of slices that
intersects a second slice included in the plurality of slices at the fold line,
wherein the first slice is diagonal to the folding line; and [4] identifying a
connection location along the first slice where the first slice is to attach to
the plane surface can be performed entirely mentally by merely thinking
about—or writing down—(1) the axes computations; and (2) the associated
slices along those axes and their intersections and associated connection
locations—steps that involve involving mere observation and logical
reasoning. Cf. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (noting that a recited step that
utilized a map of credit card numbers to determine the validity of a credit
card transaction could be performed entirely mentally by merely using
logical reasoning to identify a likely instance of fraud by merely observing
that numerous transactions using different credit cards all originated from
the same IP address). Therefore, the recited computing, slicing, and
identifying a first slice and its associated connection location fall squarely
within the mental processes category of the USPTO’s guidelines and,
therefore, recite an abstract idea. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing
exemplary mental processes including observation and evaluation).
Lastly, causing an indication of the connection location to be
generated on the first slice when the first slice is manufactured can be done
by merely writing down this indication on a manufactured slice, such as a
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paper or cardboard slice—a process that involves personal interactions and
following rules or instructions consistent with the identified connection
location. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing exemplary (1) mental
processes including observation and evaluation, and (2) methods of
organizing human activity, including personal interactions and following
rules or instructions).
Although the claim recites an abstract idea based on these methods of
organizing human activity and mental processes, we nevertheless must still
determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application,
namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea, such that the
claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. To this end, we (1) identify whether
there are any additional recited elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2)
evaluate those elements individually and collectively to determine whether
they integrate the exception into a practical application. See id.
Here, the recited computer-implemented method is the only recited
element beyond the abstract idea, but that additional element does not
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application when reading claim 1
as a whole. First, we are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves
a computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise
changes the way those devices function, at least in the sense contemplated
by the Federal Circuit in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a
specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent
Appellants contend that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to
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improve a computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the
way that device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such a contention.
To the extent that Appellants contend that the claimed invention is
rooted in technology because it is ostensibly directed to a technical solution
(see App. Br. 12–15; Reply Br. 3–4), we disagree. Even assuming, without
deciding, that claimed invention can generate a pop-up card based on a 3D
graphics model faster or more efficiently than doing so manually, any speed
or efficiency increase comes from the capabilities of the generic computer
components—not the recited process itself. See FairWarning IP, LLC v.
Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Bancorp
Services, LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more
efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of
the claimed subject matter.”)); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie
Indemnity Co., 711 F. App’x 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (unpublished)
(“Though the claims purport to accelerate the process of finding errant files
and to reduce error, we have held that speed and accuracy increases
stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general-purpose computer do
not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”).
Like the claims in FairWarning, the focus of claim 1 is not on an
improvement in computer processors as tools, but on certain independently
abstract ideas that use generic computing components as tools. See
FairWarning, 839 F.3d at 1095 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Nor is this invention analogous to that which the court held eligible in
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) despite Appellants’ arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 12).
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There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules that
rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using
particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three-
dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 1316.
But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely uses generic computing components to determine how
to generate a pop-up card based on an associated graphics model oriented on
a plane surface. This generic computer implementation is not only directed
to organizing human activity and mental processes, but also does not
improve a display mechanism as was the case in McRO. See SAP Am. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing
McRO).
Nor is this a case involving eligible subject matter as in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.Com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). There,
instead of a computer network operating in its normal, expected manner by
sending a website visitor to a third-party website apparently connected with
a clicked advertisement, the claimed invention in DDR generated and
directed the visitor to a hybrid page that presented (1) product information
from the third party, and (2) visual “look and feel” elements from the host
website. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258–59. Given this particular Internet-based
solution, the court held that the claimed invention did not merely use the
Internet to perform a business practice known from the pre-Internet world,
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but rather was necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a
problem specifically arising in computer networks. Id. at 1257.
That is not the case here. As noted previously, Appellants’ claimed
invention, in essence, determines how to generate a pop-up card based on an
associated graphics model oriented on a plane surface—albeit by using a
computer to achieve that end. The claimed invention here is not necessarily
rooted in computer technology in the sense contemplated by DDR where the
claimed invention solved a challenge particular to the Internet. Although
Appellants’ invention uses a computer, the claimed invention does not solve
a challenge particular to the computer that is used to implement this
functionality.
Appellants’ reliance on Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879
F.3d 1299 (2018) (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 4) is likewise unavailing. There,
the court held eligible claims directed to a behavior-based virus scanning
system. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the claimed
invention employed a new kind of file that enabled a computer security
system to do that which could not be done previously, including
accumulating and using newly-available, behavior-based information about
potential threats. Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305.
That is not the case here. To the extent, Appellants contend that the
claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities
(see App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 4); there is no persuasive evidence on this record
to substantiate such a contention.
We reach the same conclusion regarding Appellants’ reliance on Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (2018)
(Reply Br. 4). There, the court held eligible claims reciting a computing
device that could display an application summary window that was not only
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reachable directly from the main menu, but could also display a limited list
of selectable functions while the application was in an un-launched state.
Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1360–63. Upon selecting a function, the device
would then launch the application and initiate the selected function. Id. at
1360. In reaching its eligibility conclusion, the court noted that the claimed
invention was directed to an improved user interface for computing devices
that used a particular manner of summarizing and presenting a limited set of
information to the user, unlike conventional user interface methods that
displayed a generic index on a computer. Id. at 1362–63.
That is not the case here. To the extent Appellants contend that the
claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer capabilities
(see Reply Br. 4), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such a contention.
We also find Appellants’ reliance on Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA
Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (App. Br. 13) unpersuasive. There,
the court held eligible claims directed to a computer memory system with a
main memory connected to a bus with a cache connected thereto, where the
system’s programmable operational characteristics determined the type of
data stored by the cache. Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1257–62. Notably,
the court emphasized the recited improvement in computer capabilities in
that case, namely using programmable operational characteristics that were
configurable based on the processor’s type. Id. at 1259–60.
That is not the case here. To the extent that Appellant contends that
the claimed invention is directed to such improvements in computer
capabilities (see App. Br. 13), there is no persuasive evidence on this record
to substantiate such a contention.
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We add that the limitation reciting “receiving an orientation of the 3D
graphics model on a plane surface having a fold line along which the plane
surface folds” not only organizes human activity and can be performed
mentally as noted above, but also this receiving function is insignificant pre-
solution activity that merely gathers data and, therefore, does not integrate
the exception into a practical application for that additional reason. See In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds,
561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant
extra-solution activity); see also CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72 (noting
that even if some physical steps are required to obtain information from a
database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such data-
gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability). Accord Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
In addition, “causing an indication of the connection location to be
generated on the first slice when the first slice is manufactured” in claim 1’s
last clause is insignificant post-solution activity, at least in the sense that it is
merely ancillary to the focus of the claimed invention, namely determining
where to slice a graphics model, and identifying the slices and associated
connection locations, given the recited indication’s high level of generality
and context in the claimed invention. Where, as here, the recited connection
location indication is merely ancillary to the slice and connection location
identification focus of the claimed invention, given its high level of
generality and context in the claimed invention, the recited indication
function is insignificant post-solution activity and, therefore, does not
integrate the exception into a practical application for this additional reason.
See In re Brown, 645 F. App’x 1014, 1014–17 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(unpublished) (holding ineligible a recited method of cutting hair where the
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last recited step of using scissors to cut hair was insignificant post-solution
activity that merely applied the previous steps of teaching the stylist how to
choose a hair style); see also id. at 1017 (noting that stating an abstract idea
while adding the words “apply it” is insufficient for eligibility); Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(g)).
Lastly, we find unavailing Appellants’ contention that the claims do
not preempt the alleged abstract idea. App. Br. 16–17. Where, as here, the
claims cover a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully
addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Alice/Mayo framework.
See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
In conclusion, although the recited functions may be beneficial by
determining how to generate a pop-up card by determining where to slice an
associated graphics model oriented on a plane surface, a claim for a useful or
beneficial abstract idea is still an abstract idea. See id. at 1379–80.
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea.

Claims 1–23: Alice/Mayo Step Two
Turning to Alice/Mayo step two, claim 1’s additional recited element,
namely the recited computer implementation—considered individually and
as an ordered combination—does not provide an inventive concept such that
this additional element amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea.
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. As noted
above, the claimed invention merely uses generic computing components to
implement the recited abstract idea.
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To the extent Appellants contend that the recited limitations, including
those detailed above in connection with Alice step one, add significantly
more than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under
Alice/Mayo step two (see App. Br. 15–17), these limitations are not
additional elements beyond the abstract idea, but rather are directed to the
abstract idea as noted previously. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56
(instructing that additional recited elements should be evaluated in
Alice/Mayo step two to determine whether they (1) add specific limitations
that are not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field, or (2)
simply append well-understood, routine, and conventional activities
previously known to the industry (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
Rather, the recited computer implementation is the only additional
recited element—an element whose generic computing functionality is well-
understood, routine, and conventional. See Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d
at 1368 (noting that a recited user profile (i.e., a profile keyed to a user
identity), database, and communication medium are generic computer
elements); Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that using generic computing components like a
microprocessor or user interface do not transform an otherwise abstract idea
into eligible subject matter); Mortgage Grader Inc. v. First Choice Loan
Services, Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that
components such an “interface,” “network,” and “database” are generic
computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement);
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1343–49
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding ineligible claims reciting providing an intelligent
user interface to an online application comprising (1) furnishing plural
hyperlinked icons on a displayed web page, and (2) displaying a
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dynamically generated online application form set responsive to activating
an icon as directed to the abstract idea of retaining information in navigating
online forms); buySAFE v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a
network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Accord Spec. ¶¶ 17–18, 39 (describing generic computer components used
to implement the invention); Final Act. 6 (concluding that the claims’
generic computer functions do not add significantly more than the abstract
idea).
We reach a similar conclusion regarding the recited insignificant
extra-solution activity, namely (1) “receiving an orientation of the 3D
graphics model on a plane surface having a fold line along which the plane
surface folds”; and (2) “causing an indication of the connection location to
be generated on the first slice when the first slice is manufactured.” That the
orientation is received and a connection location indication is generated as
claimed does not mean that these functions are performed in an
unconventional way to add significantly more than the abstract idea to
provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. See Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56. Given these limitations’ (1) high level of generality, and (2)
use of generic computing components whose functionality is well-
understood, routine, and conventional for the reasons noted previously, the
recited extra-solution activity does not add significantly more than the
abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step two. To
the extent Appellant contends otherwise (see App. Br. 15–16), we disagree.
In conclusion, the additional recited elements—considered
individually and as an ordered combination—do not add significantly more
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than the abstract idea to provide an inventive concept under Alice/Mayo step
two. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; see also Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 and claims 2–23 not argued separately with particularity.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–23 under § 101.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED