John Schimenti et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2019

15451515 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/451,515 03/07/2017 John Schimenti L544.0026US1 3520
27367 7590 12/31/2019
WESTMAN CHAMPLIN & KOEHLER, P.A.
SUITE 1100
121 South Eighth Street
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
HICKS, ROBERT J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3736
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@wck.com
tsorbel@wck.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN SCHIMENTI and BRIAN C. YEGGY
Appeal 2019-002628
Application 15/451,515
Technology Center 3700
Before JOHN C. KERINS, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
CHARLES N. GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 6–17, 19, and 20. See Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Hexagon Technology
AS. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 15/451,515

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a wound-in end protection component for a
pressure vessel. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. An assembly including:
a pressure vessel for containing a fluid, the pressure vessel
including an outer surface and a domed end portion; and
a component positioned at the domed end portion, wherein
the component is attached to the outer surface by a plurality of
filament bands wound upon the domed end portion and over at
least a part of the component.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
McDill US 3,114,470 Dec. 17, 1963
Harmon US 3,907,149 Sept. 23, 1975
Otsubo US 8,727,174 B2 May 20, 2014
Herzer US 2011/0278316 A1 Nov. 17, 2011
Bruce WO 2010/096517 A1 Aug. 26, 2010

REJECTIONS2
Claims 1 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being
anticipated by Otsubo. Final Act. 2.
Claims 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 15, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Bruce. Final Act. 3.
Claims 3, 4, 10, 11, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Bruce and Herzer. Final Act. 5.

2 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 7, 12, and 19 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Bruce and Harmon. Ans. 3.
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Claims 13, 14, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Bruce and McDill. Final Act. 8.
OPINION
The anticipation rejections, whether predicated on Otsubo or Bruce,
are substantially similar such that they can be discussed together. In each
case the Examiner relies on a broad construction of “the outer surface” in the
phrase “the pressure vessel including an outer surface.” The Examiner
reasons, “[t]he claimed invention recites the component is attached to an
outer surface of the pressure vessel, but not to the outermost surface of the
entire structure.” Ans. 4. We think the skilled artisan would understand the
recited “outer surface” to be that of the pressure vessel itself as opposed to
the outer surface of some internal structure.
Arguably, claim 1 could have been more precise in its reference to the
“outer surface.” Claim 1 recites “the pressure vessel including an outer
surface” but (unlike claims 8 and 17) never expressly refers to that outer
surface as being that “of the pressure vessel” (claim 17) or a portion thereof
(claim 8). The Examiner does not appear to differentiate claim 1 from claims
8 and 17 on this basis and neither will we. See In re Stepan Co., 660 F.3d
1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (It is the PTO’s obligation to provide timely
notice to the applicant of all matters of fact and law asserted.)
Although the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation, this interpretation must be consistent with the one that those
skilled in the art would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). “Prior art references may be ‘indicative of what all those skilled
in the art generally believe a certain term means ... [and] can often help to
demonstrate how a disputed term is used by those skilled in the art.’
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Accordingly, the PTO’s interpretation of claim terms should not be so broad
that it conflicts with the meaning given to identical terms in other patents
from analogous art.” Id. (Citations omitted).
The Examiner cites “an outer surface [30a, near collar]” in Otsubo
(Final Act. 2) and “an outer surface [at liner 20, Fig. 4]” in Bruce (Final Act.
3).
Otsubo (col. 5, ll. 61–65) provides:
The tank main body 10 includes a wall layer having, for
example, a two-layers structure, and includes a liner 20 which is
an inner wall layer and, for example, a Fiber Reinforced Plastic
(FRP) layer 21 as a resin fiber layer (a reinforcing layer) which
is an outer wall layer outside the liner.
Bruce (para. 2) provides:
Vessel 10 has a main body section 12 with end sections 14. A
metal boss 16 (e.g., aluminum) is provided at one or both ends of
the vessel 10 to provide a port for communicating with the
interior of the vessel 10. The vessel 10 is formed from an inner
polymer liner 20 covered by an outer composite shell 18. In this
case, “composite” means a fiber reinforced resin matrix material,
such as a filament wound or laminated structure. The composite
shell 18 resolves all structural loads and the plastic liner 20
provides a gas barrier.
Thus, in the case of both Otsubo and Bruce the wound fiber layer is
itself considered to form the “outer” surface of the pressure vessel. In both
cases the fiber layer is placed on the outside of the liner as opposed to the
outside of the vessel itself. As Appellant correctly points out, because in
both Otsubo and Bruce the fiber layer is required for structural integrity, it is
a component of what each of those references refers to as the pressure vessel
as opposed to something wound upon or over it. Appeal Br. 8, 9–10. The
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fiber layer’s function is relevant to ascertaining the broadest reasonable
construction of the claim phrases “pressure vessel” and “outer surface.” This
is relevant to both the anticipation and obviousness inquiries. See Ans. 5
(“functionality of the prior art, which is subject [sic] for an obviousness
rejection”); Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citations omitted) (claim construction is the first step in both
anticipation and obviousness).
Paragraph 56 of Appellant’s Specification, by contrasting completely
covered structures such as those of Otsubo and Bruce, provides an indication
that one way for the wound layer to not be considered as the pressure vessel
“outer surface” itself is by including gaps in the filament bands:
The use of a plurality of filament bands 44 to secure end
component 22 to vessel 10 requires less filament than if the entire
vessel 10, or even just the entire end portion 15, were covered in
a layer of filament windings.
Such gaps are not present in the completed pressure vessels of Otsubo
and Bruce. The Examiner does not articulate a reasonable basis for reading
the claim to cover the arrangements of Otsubo and Bruce which are similar
to those expressly contrasted by the Specification. See also e.g., Figure 1.
“[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest
reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see also In
re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (CCPA 1969) (“‘[R]eading a claim in
light of the specification,’ to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in
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the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the
specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by
implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the
claim.”).
As all of the Examiner’s rejections presently before us are predicated
on a construction of “outer surface” that extends beyond the ambit of
reasonableness we reverse the Examiner’s rejections on the record presently
before us.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 17 102(a)(1) Otsubo 1, 17
1, 2, 6, 8, 9,
15, 17
102(a)(1) Bruce 1, 2, 6, 8, 9,
15, 17
3, 4, 10, 11,
20
103 Bruce, Herzer 3, 4, 10, 11,
20
13, 14, 16 103 Bruce, McDill 13, 14, 16
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–17,
19, 20

REVERSED