John, Michael Sasha.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 18, 2020

12124144 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/124,144 05/20/2008 Michael Sasha John MR4025-19 2181
4586 7590 05/18/2020
ROSENBERG, KLEIN & LEE
3458 ELLICOTT CENTER DRIVE-SUITE 101
ELLICOTT CITY, MD 21043
EXAMINER
MILEF, ELDA G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/18/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptoactions@rklpatlaw.com
ptoactions@yahoo.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MICHAEL SASHA JOHN
____________________

Appeal 2019-005137
Application 12/124,1441
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final
Rejection of claims 1–20 and 22–24, which are all the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. The real party in interest is the inventor, Michael Sasha John.
(Appeal Br. 1.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed May 20, 2008, the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed October 9, 2018, the Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.”) filed March 11, 2019, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”)
mailed May 1, 2019, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed June 24, 2019.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to systems and methods for “automatic and
transparent client authentication and online transaction verification” for “e-
commerce, e-transactions, digital rights management and access control,”
the systems and methods enabling a client to “associate their credit card with
a specific device” and “an e-identity, such as an instant messaging identity,”
the “e-identity [being] contacted as a part of finalizing a payment transaction
so that a client response of ‘approve’ or ‘reject’ can be obtained.” (Title
(capitalization altered); Abstract.)
Claims 1, 18, and 24 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system configured for conducting authorization
processes during an e-commerce transaction comprising:
an e-identity-card linkage database for storing and
retrieving a link between an e-identity and at least one registered
credit card number of a client;
a computer having a first processor configured for
obtaining an authorization request generated by a seller-side
server application module of an e-commerce entity merchant
computer having a second processor, said second processor
being remote from said first processor, said request including at
least a credit card number submitted to the entity during a
transaction, the first processor further configured to:
determine if there exists an e-identity which is
associated with the credit card number using the e-
identity-card linkage database by operating an issuing
entity application module;
determine if the e-identity has a status which is (1)
available, or (2) unavailable wherein a status designated
‘available’ defines a status for an e-identity that has been
linked with a registered credit card number that matches
the credit card number of the transaction and a status
designated ‘unavailable’, defines a status for an e-identity
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that is not associated with the credit card number of the
transaction, and perform the following based upon the
determined status:
if the e-identity status is available, an e-identity
available operation including sending a notice to a
registered computer device associated with the client and
processing the notice by software of the registered
computer device in order to allow or reject an
authorization to be provided according to parameters set
by the client for a profile associated with the e-identity,
said computer device containing a third processor, remote
from said first and second processors; and,
if the e-identity status is unavailable, perform an e-
identity unavailable operation which includes performing
an alternative method of authentication which is a
traditional method of authentication, the alternative
method of authentication resulting in one of two outcomes
including approval or rejection of a transaction associated
with authentication request, the alternative method of
authentication includes at least one step selected from the
group of:
operating the first processor of the computer to
push the transaction to manual review;
operating the first processor of the computer in a
traditional manner to request data traditionally
entered for e-commerce transactions selected from
the group: a consumer’s billing address; a shipping
address; a phone number; the expiration month and
date for a credit card; a security code to verify the
credit card; a VBV, a CVV2, a CVC, or other
security codes that are used by credit card
associations;
operating an algorithm in the first processor of
the computer using an FFT analysis module to
calculate the risk of fraud;
operating an algorithm in the first processor of
the computer to determine whether to automatically
accept, automatically reject and/or introduce the
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intervention of a human operator for manual review
of the transaction; and
operating the first processor of the computer
using a business rule algorithm to determine a set of
thresholds which determine the decision to accept,
reject, or push the transaction to manual review
and wherein the first processor is further configured
to process the e-commerce transaction only after at least
one of the e-identity available operation, or e-identity
unavailable operation, has been completed, and whereby
the risk of a transaction being performed without a client’s
knowledge or permission is decreased and information
obtained in identity theft is not sufficient for transaction
approval.

(Appeal Br. 39–51 (Claims App.).)

REJECTION
Claims 1–20 and 22–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter. (Final Act. 2–6.)

ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claim 1–20, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo.
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we review the Examiner’s § 101 determinations concerning
patent eligibility under this standard.
Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows:
[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
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In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent
protection should not preempt “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Benson”); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(“Mayo”); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(“Alice”). The rationale is that patents directed to basic building blocks of
technology would not “promote the progress of science” under the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, but instead would impede it.
Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not
patent-eligible subject matter. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850
F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter
eligibility in Alice (573 U.S. at 217–18). The first step is to determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77). If so, then the eligibility analysis proceeds to the
second step of the Alice/Mayo test in which we “examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 72, 79). There is no need to proceed to the second step,
however, if the first step of the Alice/Mayo test yields a determination that
the claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
The Patent Office has recently revised its guidance for how to apply
the Alice/Mayo test in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019) (“the Revised Guidance”).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the claim is not
directed to a judicial exception and is patent-eligible under § 101. 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice,
573 U.S. at 217–19, 221. Evaluation of the inventive concept involves
consideration of whether an additional element or combination of elements
(1) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative
that an inventive concept may be present; or (2) simply appends well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.
Applying Step 1 of the Revised Guidance (which is unchanged from
the prior guidance) to the present case, we determine independent claim 1
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(and independent claim 18) recites a “system,” which is a form of
“machine,” thereby falling within one of the categories enumerated under
§ 101 and satisfying Step 1 of the Revised Guidance.
Step 2A—Prong One (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
We proceed to apply Step 2A of the Revised Guidance to determine if
claim 1 is “directed to” a judicial exception. As discussed supra, Prong One
of Step 2A under the Revised Guidance is to determine whether the claim
recites a judicial exception including (a) mathematical concepts; (b) certain
methods of organizing human activity; and (c) mental processes.
Reviewing claim 1, we note the claim involves acts performable in the
mind or with pen and paper, by a person verifying commercial transactions
by (i) searching a database for e-identities linked to particular credit card
numbers (e.g., the claimed “determine if there exists an e-identity which is
associated with the credit card number using the e-identity-card linkage
database”) and (ii) by performing manual review of commercial transactions
to approve or reject transactions (the claimed “perform an e-identity
unavailable operation which includes performing an alternative method of
authentication which is a traditional method of authentication, the alternative
method of authentication resulting in one of two outcomes including
approval or rejection of a transaction associated with authentication
request,” where “the alternative method of authentication” includes
“push[ing] the transaction to manual review,” “introduc[ing] the intervention
of a human operator for manual review of the transaction,” or “using a
business rule algorithm to determine a set of thresholds which determine the
decision to . . . push the transaction to manual review”). (See Appeal Br.
39–41 (claim 1); Final Act. 3; Ans. 4; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
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51–52 (describing an abstract idea category of “Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion)”).)
Step 2A—Prong Two (Integration into Practical Application)
Although claim 1 recites an abstract idea of a mental process, as
provided for in the Revised Guidance, such a claim may nonetheless be
patentable if it recites a particular, practical application of the abstract idea
embodied therein. BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, we proceed to the Prong Two of Step 2A, where we
inquire whether an additional element of the claim integrates the mental
process into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–
55. Such an additional element may reflect an improvement in the
functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another technology or
technical field. Id. at 55; see also McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Finjan Inc. v. Blue Coat
Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018); and Core Wireless Licensing,
S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (claims
were directed to improvements instead of abstract ideas).
Having reviewed the evidence, we disagree with the Examiner’s
findings that “only business problems, not technical problems and solutions,
are addressed by Appellant’s invention,” or that claim 1 is merely directed to
“concepts relating to data comparisons that can be performed mentally or are
analogous to human mental work and concepts relating to organizing or
analyzing information in a way that can be performed mentally or is
analogous to human mental work.” (See Ans. 6; Final Act. 2–3.) Rather, we
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agree with Appellant that claim 1 integrates an abstract idea into a practical
application under the Prong Two of Step 2A. (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54–55; see Appeal Br. 26–28; Reply Br. 2–6.) Particularly, we agree
with Appellant that claim 1 integrates an abstract idea into a practical
application that
provide[s] a technological solution to . . . [an Internet-centric]
problem [concerning transaction security and online fraud in e-
commerce] by associating a card with a specific “registered
computer device,” in the control of the authorized cardholder
(the “client”), through a “linkage database.” The device is
independent of both the merchant and the database manager. A
notice is sent directly to the device when an authorization request
is triggered during a transaction, and the device responds with
the authorization or rejection. This association provides direct
and prompt authorization of each transaction by the cardholder
(or a device known to be in the cardholder’s control) in a manner
ordinarily unavailable on e-commerce websites. Security is
therefore established by confirming that the party making the
transaction is indeed the authorized cardholder. This solution is,
notably, different from the method that is normally used in a
physical marketplace.

(Appeal Br. 26–28 (emphases added); see also Reply Br. 3–4 (citing Spec.
1:27–2:8).) Claim 1 recites a combination of additional elements including:
if the e-identity status is available [which defines a status for an
e-identity that has been linked with a registered credit card
number that matches the credit card number of the transaction],
an e-identity available operation including sending a notice to a
registered computer device associated with the client and
processing the notice by software of the registered computer
device in order to allow or reject an authorization to be provided
according to parameters set by the client for a profile associated
with the e-identity, said computer device containing a third
processor, remote from said first [processor configured for
obtaining an authorization request generated by a seller-side
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server application module of an e-commerce entity merchant
computer, and further configured to process the e-commerce
transaction only after at least one of the e-identity available
operation, or e-identity unavailable operation, has been
completed] and second [of the e-commerce entity merchant
computer] processors.

(Appeal Br. 39–40 (claim 1).) Claim 1’s additional elements provide a
practical application of: (i) notifying a credit card holder (client), in real
time, of a potentially-fraudulent online transaction that uses the client’s
credit card number, by sending a notice to the client’s registered computer
device (e.g., a cellular phone or personal digital assistant (PDA) carried by
the client), thereby allowing the client to review and allow/reject the
transaction by allowing or rejecting an authorization via the registered
computer device; and (ii) allowing an e-commerce merchant to contact the
client’s e-identity as part of the online transaction process, so that the client
may approve or reject the online transaction using the client’s registered
computer device. (See Spec. 4:15–18, 8:27–28, 12:14–18, 38:22–23, 39:15–
22, 65:20–31, 66:6–19.) As Appellant explains, it is “highly ‘time sensitive’
for a credit card holder to be directly notified of a potentially-fraudulent
transaction in real time . . . and be given opportunity to respond before the
transaction completes,” which claim 1 accomplishes by “‘sending a notice to
a registered computer device associated with the client’ to be processed ‘by
software of the registered computer device in order to allow or reject an
authorization’ of the transaction.” (Appeal Br. 30.) Appellant’s claimed
notification and transaction authorization via client’s registered computer
device provide an e-commerce improvement by a technological solution that
bypasses “traditional means of analyzing suspect transactions for a credit
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card,” instead, “send[ing] an authorization request directly to a computer
device associated with the e-identity that has been linked with a credit card,
when such a device has been registered.” (Appeal Br. 28–30; see also Reply
Br. 4–5.) “So long as the [client’s] device and the card are not both
compromised by the same unauthorized party, the authorization provided
through the device is consistently accurate, and additionally quickly notifies
a client when their credit card number has been compromised.” (Appeal Br.
30.)
Thus, Appellant’s claim 1 integrates a technique for verifying
commercial transactions into a process rooted in computer and network
technologies. (See Spec. 4:15–18, 8:27–28, 12:14–18, 38:22–23, 39:15–22,
43:13–26, 64:6–12, 65:20–31, 66:6–19; Appeal Br. 26–28; Reply Br. 5–6;
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257–58 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (holding patent-eligible a claim that “address[es] a business challenge
(retaining website visitors)” by enabling visitors “to purchase products from
the third-party merchant without actually entering that merchant’s website,”
thus providing a “claimed solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks”).) Similar to claim 1, independent claim 18
integrates verifying commercial transactions into a process rooted in
computer and network technologies. (See claim 18 (reciting a “system for
conducting authorization processes during e-commerce transactions”
comprising a “first processor” configured to implement a set of operations
“if the client is associated with an online identity,” the operations
“determin[ing] if the client is authorized to use the credit card number of the
transaction using the client-card linkage database” by “sending notice to a
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registered computer device associated with the client e-identity, and
processing the notice by software of the registered computer device in order
to allow or reject an authorization” and to “provide an approval
authorization signal to the e-commerce entity” or “provide a rejection
authorization signal to the e-commerce entity”).)
Because claims 1 and 18 integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application, we find claims 1 and 18, and their dependent claims 2–
17, 19, 20, 22, and 23 are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under
§ 101. Accordingly, we do not address Step 2B of the Revised Guidance
(corresponding to step two of the Alice/Mayo test).
For these reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–20, 22, and 23 as directed to non-statutory subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101. Because the above-discussed issues are dispositive as to
the § 101 rejections of claims 1–20, 22, and 23, we do not reach additional
issues raised by Appellant’s arguments as to the § 101 rejections of
dependent claims 2 and 7.

Rejection of Claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Applying Step 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine independent
claim 24 recites a “method,” which is a form of “process,” thereby falling
within one of the categories enumerated under § 101 and satisfying Step 1 of
the Revised Guidance.
Alice/Mayo—Step One (Abstract Idea)
Step 2A–Prongs One and Two identified in the Revised Guidance

Step 2A—Prong One (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry (Step 2A, Prong One of
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the Revised Guidance) and similar to claim 1 discussed supra, claim 24
involves acts performable in the mind or with pen and paper by a person
verifying commercial transactions. For example, the method of claim 24
recites “determin[ing] if there exists an e-identity which is associated with
the credit card number using the e-identity-card linkage database,” which
can be practically performed with pen and paper by a person reviewing a
database of links between e-identities and credit card numbers, and
determining whether a particular credit card number has an associated e-
identity. (Ans. 4.) The method of claim 24 further recites performing
manual review of commercial transactions to approve or reject
transactions—with claimed steps that “determine if the e-identity has a
status which is (1) available, or (2) unavailable” and “if the e-identity status
is unavailable, [perform] an e-identity unavailable operation which includes
operating to realize an alternative method of authentication, which is a
traditional method of authentication” that includes “push[ing] the
transaction to manual review” or “introduc[ing] the intervention of a human
operator for manual review of the transaction.” (See Appeal Br. 49–51
(claim 24 (emphases added)); Final Act. 3; Ans. 4; Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 51–52 (describing an abstract idea category of “Mental
processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)”), n.14 (citing Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).)
Our reviewing court has concluded that mental processes include similar
concepts of collecting, providing, and reviewing, data. See Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (the Federal Circuit held “the concept of . . . collecting
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data, . . . recognizing certain data within the collected data set,
and . . . storing that recognized data in a memory” ineligible); see also
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776
F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims are drawn to the basic concept of
data recognition and storage); Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830
F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (merely selecting information, by content
or source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to
differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes); CyberSource v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (purely mental
processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer).
Thus, claim 24 describes transaction verification operations
performable by a person mentally or with pen and paper, thus operations
practically performed in the mind. In conclusion, claim 24 recites an
abstract idea of a mental process as provided for in the Revised Guidance.
Step 2A—Prong Two (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that independent claim 24 is not
directed to an abstract idea. (See Appeal Br. 22–28; Reply Br. 3–6.) At the
outset, we note that Appellant groups claim 24 with claim 1, submitting the
same arguments for claims 1 and 24. (See Appeal Br. 22–23, 26–31; Reply
Br. 4–6.) Independent claim 24, however, does not require the particular
features of claim 1 by which a notice is sent to, and processed by, a
registered computer device associated with the client when the e-identity
status is available. More specifically, claim 24 is a method claim (“A
method for conducting authorization processes during an e-commerce
transaction”) that recites determining “if there exists an e-identity which is
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associated with the credit card number” and determining “if the e-identity
has a status which is (1) available, or (2) unavailable,” followed by
conditional steps performed “if the e-identity status is available” and “if the
e-identity status is unavailable.” (See Appeal Br. 49–51 (claim 24
(emphases added)).) Thus the broadest reasonable construction of claim 24
covers a method in which the claimed e-identity status is unavailable such
that an e-identity unavailable operation is performed and an e-identity
available operation is not performed. See Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-
007847, 2016 WL 6277792, at *3–5 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential)
(discussing construction of conditional limitations in method claims).
Thus, Appellant’s arguments—that the claim provides an e-commerce
improvement and technological solution by “sending a notice to a registered
computer device associated with the client” and “processing the notice by
software of the registered computer device in order to allow or reject an
authorization”—is not commensurate with the scope of claim 24 under its
proper interpretation. (See Reply Br. 4.) More particularly, claim 24 does
not require: the credit card number to be “linked to an e-identity and a
registered computer device thereof, and a client . . . [to be] authenticated in
this circumstance by access to the registered computer device to approve the
transaction” (as argued at Appeal Br. 24 and 27–28); or a “notice . . . sent
directly to the [registered computer] device when an authorization request is
triggered during a transaction, and the device respond[ing] with the
authorization or rejection” (as argued at Appeal Br. 27–28 and Reply Br. 4–
5). As discussed supra, the broadest reasonable construction of claim 24
covers a method in which the claimed e-identity status is determined to be
unavailable such that an e-identity available operation is not performed—
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that is, “sending a notice to a registered computer device associated with the
e-identity to notify a client associated with the e-identity” (i.e., the e-identity
available operation) is not performed. (See Appeal Br. 50 (claim 24).)
Instead, only the e-identity unavailable operation is performed, which
merely includes “a traditional method of authentication” such as “push[ing]
the transaction to manual review.” (See id.)
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we discern
no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in Appellant’s
claim 24 that may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements in claim 24 (e.g., a
“linkage database,” “a computer having a first processor,” “a second
processor,” and an “issuing entity application module”) do not: (1) improve
the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with
any particular machine (except for a generic computer); (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Rather, Appellant’s
claimed hardware components are configured to perform numerous real-
world functions and operations that automate manually performable
operations for verifying a commercial transaction, and use “a traditional
method of authentication.” (See Appeal Br. 50–52 (claim 24).)
Thus, although Appellant’s claim 24 recites hardware components
(“linkage database,” “computer having a first processor,” “second
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processor,” and “issuing entity application module”), the hardware
components are configured to perform numerous real-world functions and
operations (storing data, retrieving data, sending requests, and “a traditional
method of authentication”), adding nothing of substance to the underlying
abstract idea. Thus, the limitations of claim 24 are not indicative of
“integration into a practical application.” Rather, the hardware components
are readily available computing elements using their already available basic
functions as tools in executing the claimed “traditional method of
authentication” and approval or rejection of a transaction. (See Spec. 10:30–
31, 11:10–13, 29:7–15; see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F. 3d
1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018).)
For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner’ determination that
claim 24 is directed to a judicial exception, namely, the abstract idea of a
mental process, identified as such in the Revised Guidance. (Ans. 4–5.)
Alice/Mayo—Step Two (Inventive Concept)
Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance

Appellant challenges the Examiner’s findings as to the second step of
the Alice analysis on the basis that: (i) the “sending a notice” limitation is
“not an abstract operation,” “is unconventional,” and “provides an inventive
improvement” (Appeal Br. 29, 31; Reply Br. 3); (ii) “inventive advantages
and benefits” are realized “[b]ecause clients must register a computer device,
[such that] it is difficult for a fraudulent client to maintain multiple accounts
through a single device without notice, and a device used for previous
fraudulent activity is easily flagged” (Appeal Br. 31); and (iii) the claimed
invention directly notifies a credit card holder of a potentially-fraudulent
transaction in real time by “sending a notice to a registered computer device
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associated with the client’ to be processed ‘by software of the registered
computer device in order to allow or reject an authorization’ of the
transaction” (Appeal Br. 30). Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive
because they rely upon the limitations of sending a notice to a client’s
registered computer device (the e-identity available operation). As
discussed supra, the broadest reasonable construction of claim 24 covers a
method in which the claimed e-identity status is determined to be
unavailable such that an e-identity available operation is not performed.
As recognized by the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” under
Alice step 2 can be evaluated based on whether an additional element or
combination of elements:
(1) “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations
that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity
in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept
may be present;” or
(2) “simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
In this case, however, no element or combination of elements recited
in Appellant’s claim 24 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything
“significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible
application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. For example, Appellant’s abstract idea
of verifying a commercial transaction by operations performable by a person
mentally or with pen and paper, and using “a traditional method of
authentication” to approve or reject a transaction, does not provide a
technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a
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“solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks”
as the claims in DDR. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. Appellant’s
method recited in claim 24 also does not entail an “unconventional
technological solution . . . to a technological problem” that “improve[s] the
performance of the system itself,” as Amdocs’ claims do. See Amdocs (Isr.)
Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellant also has not demonstrated the claimed generic database, computer,
and first and second processors are able to perform functions that are not
merely generic, as the claims in DDR. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258.
Rather, Appellant’s claim 24 merely uses generic technology to perform “a
traditional method of authentication” such as “operating the computer to
push the transaction to manual review” or “operating the computer in a
traditional manner to request data traditionally entered for e-commerce
transactions.” (See Appeal Br. 50–52 (claim 24).) “[T]he use of generic
computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface” to perform
conventional computer functions “do not alone transform an otherwise
abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.” FairWarning IP, LLC v.
Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256).
Because Appellant’s claim 24 is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract
concept and does not recite an “inventive concept” by providing a solution
to a technical problem under the second step of the Alice analysis, we sustain
the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claim 24.

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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20, 22, and 23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is REVERSED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
AFFIRMED.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20, 22–24 101  Eligibility 24 1–20, 22,
23
Overall Outcome 24 1–20, 22,
23

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART