John L. Faile, Jr., Complainant,v.Stephen A. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 7, 2005
01a43466 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 7, 2005)

01a43466

07-07-2005

John L. Faile, Jr., Complainant, v. Stephen A. Perry, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.


John L. Faile, Jr. v. General Services Administration

01A43466

July 7, 2005

.

John L. Faile, Jr.,

Complainant,

v.

Stephen A. Perry,

Administrator,

General Services Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A43466

Agency No. 2002R3PBSJLF8

Hearing No. 170-A3-8202X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final

order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Realty Specialist, GS-1170-07

Intern under an accepted service appointment at the Charleston, West

Virginia Group Office, filed a formal EEO complaint on March 14, 2002,

alleging that the agency discriminated against him on the basis of

disability (low back and left knee impairments) when he was harassed

and terminated during his probationary period.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). After a hearing, the AJ issued a decision

finding no discrimination.

In her decision, the AJ drew several adverse inferences against the agency

for not completely and fully responding to discovery requests and/or

for not securing the presence of two witnesses at the hearing. First,

at the hearing, the AJ refused to allow the agency to enter any documents

into the record and to question any of the witnesses. Additionally, the

AJ drew an inference that a management official, in December 2001, asked

complainant on more than one occasion for information which he expressed

that he did not have. Additionally, the AJ drew an inference that from

January 1, 2001 through March 2002, management officials did not ask

any employee other than complainant to wash dishes, change water cooler

bottles, and/or move furniture or other office equipment. The AJ also

drew an inference that complainant's supervisor was aware of complainant's

impairments; that is, that complainant had been given a 10 point veteran's

preference based on eligibility from the Department of Veteran's Affairs

and received a disability retirement for service connected disability.

The AJ also inferred that complainant's supervisor was aware of a United

States Postal Service letter which was in complainant's job application,

stating that he was rejected from a part-time job due to disability.

Additionally, the AJ drew an inference that complainant presented at

least one or two topics prior to the deadline for his oral presentation,

and that they were rejected by management, and that management set

the deadline for March 2002 for the topics to be presented. The AJ

additionally inferred that an intern in another office and supervised

by different individuals, was given short-term rotational assignments in

Philadelphia, was issued a palm pilot and a cell phone, and complainant

was not given these opportunities in West Virginia. Finally, the AJ

inferred that a different intern in the Philadelphia office was allowed

to attend the monthly realty meetings in Philadelphia.

The AJ then found that complainant did not establish that he was a

qualified individual with a disability at the time he was terminated from

the agency. The AJ assumed arguendo that complainant was an individual

with a disability, and found that complainant did not show that he was

treated differently than similarly situated individuals, not in his

protected group. The AJ noted that he found that the other interns

who worked in the Philadelphia Office were not similarly situated

to complainant as they had different supervisors and were trained

by different coaches and trainers. Additionally, the AJ found that

complainant did not show a causal connection between his impairments

and any actions taken by the agency. The AJ addressed complainant's

assertion that the interns had a separate trainer and coach, and noted

that the record shows that there were not enough Realty Specialists

available in the West Virginia office to allow complainant or the

Building Management Intern to have a trainer and a separate coach.

Regarding complainant's contention that he was not given a cell phone,

the AJ noted that complainant was given an agency telephone card.

Regarding complainant's contention that he was asked to wash dishes and

change the water cooler bottle and then ridiculed by his co-workers as he

changed it, the AJ found that there was no evidence that complainant was

asked to perform these tasks because of his impairment.<0> Additionally,

the AJ noted that complainant admitted he did not tell anyone he could

not perform the tasks because of his impairment. Regarding being asked

to move desks, the AJ found that complainant failed to show that other

employees were never asked to move furniture. Again, the AJ found that

complainant did not tell anyone that he was unable to perform this duty.

Regarding complainant's contention that there was a lack of lighting

in his office, the AJ found no evidence that complainant was denied

lighting because of his impairment or that his request constituted any

kind of reasonable accommodation.

Regarding the termination, the AJ found that the supervisor (S1) testified

that complainant was terminated because he failed to successfully

perform the duties and responsibilities or his position, and did not

meet the written performance standards. S1 stated that during the

first six months of complainant's internship, complainant was mostly

in a training mode, and that the successful rating given to him on his

first evaluation panel review in September 2001 was primarily based on

complainant's successful completion of training. S1 stated that by the

second rating issued on November 21, 2001, he raised concerns which had

surfaced regarding complainant's communication and interpersonal skills.

S1 stated that although he gave complainant the benefit of the doubt

and gave him a �Satisfactory� rating, he documented his concerns in

great detail, and provided these notes to complainant. S1 testified

that by the time the evaluation panel met on January 12, 2002, it was

clear that complainant was not making satisfactory progress in meeting

his critical element.<0> S1 additionally found that complainant could

not show that the agency's reasons were pretexts. In so finding, the

AJ noted that other management officials provided supporting testimony

as to the reasons for complainant's termination. The agency's final

order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal,<0> complainant, through counsel, contends that the AJ's

findings are incorrect and must be reversed. Specifically, complainant

contends that he is an individual with a disability because he currently

has physical impairments that substantially limit his major life activity

of sleeping. Additionally, complainant contends that he has a �record� or

having physical impairments that, for a period of six years, substantially

limited his major life activity of working. Further, complainant alleges

that similarly situated individuals were treated differently than he,

and that he has established pretext. In response, the agency requests

that the Commission affirm the final order.<0>

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

As to complainant's allegation of harassment, we note that based on the

standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17

(1993), in order to prevail on a claim of harassment, complainant must

prove that: (1) he was subjected to harassment that was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment

and create an abusive or hostile environment; and (2) the harassment

was based on his membership in a protected class. See EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc. at 3, 6; Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). The evidence in the record is insufficient

to support a finding that management's actions towards complainant were

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of

employment and create an abusive or hostile environment.

We now address complainant's contention that he was subjected to disparate

treatment during his employment. Assuming arguendo that complainant is

an individual with a disability, we find that the agency has articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which complainant

has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, are pretext

for discrimination.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record

and that the AJ's decision referenced the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's

final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 7, 2005

__________________

Date

0 1The AJ noted that co-workers testified that they laughed when

complainant did these duties because he had initially acted as if such

duties were beneath him.

0 2For instance, S1 stated that he had concerns about complainant's

attitude, alienation of his trainer, judgment and ability to deal with

various levels of stress and performance, failure to identify a topic

in a timely manner for his intern oral presentation, and failure to be

prepared for a meeting on his assigned projects.

0 3The agency contends that the Commission never acted on complainant's

request for an extension to file a brief in support of appeal, and that

therefore, complainant's supporting brief should not be considered.

We note, however, that the record contains a letter from the Commission,

addressed to complainant, and copied to the agency, stating that an

extension would be granted until July 6, 2004. Complainant's brief was

postmarked July 6, 2004, and was therefore, timely submitted.

0 4We note that in the �Agency's Response To Appeal,� the agency argues

that the AJ erred concerning sanctions, the testimony of a physician,

and collateral estoppel. We will not entertain such arguments, however,

as the agency fully implemented the AJ's decision in its final order.