Joel Souza et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 20, 202013103490 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 20, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/103,490 05/09/2011 Joel P. de Souza YOR920100053US1 9398 33233 7590 05/20/2020 LAW OFFICE OF CHARLES W. PETERSON, JR. Yorktown 12793 Thacker Hill Ct. Suite 1B Oak Hill, VA 20171 EXAMINER GOLDEN, ANDREW J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1726 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/20/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Bill@CWPeterson.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte JOEL P. DE SOUZA, HAROLD JOHN HOVEL, DANIEL INNS, JEEHWAN KIM, CHRISTIAN LAVOIE, CONAL EUGENE MURRAY, DEVENDRA K. SADANA, KATHERINE L. SAENGER, GHAVAM SHAHIDI, DAVOOD SHAHRJERDI, and ZHEN ZHANG ____________ Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 Technology Center 1700 ____________ Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and JAMES C. HOUSEL, Administrative Patent Judges. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 requests our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 2–9, 11–13, 16–22, 25, and 28–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over at least the combined prior art of Watanabe (JP 2002-252358, published Sept. 6, 2002; as translated), Brandhorst (US 4,131,486; issued Dec. 26, 1978), Thornton (Schottky- 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to the “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies International Business Machines Corporation as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 2 Barrier Elevation by Ion Implantation and Implant Segregation, in 17 ELECTRONICS LETTERS 485 (1981)), and Qiu et al. (A Comparative Study of Two Different Schemes to Dopant Segregation at NiSi/Si and PtSi/Si Interfaces for Schottky Barrier Height Lowering, 55 IEEE TRANSACTION ON ELECTRON DEVICES 396 (2008)).2 We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claim 25 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 25. A method of forming a Schottky barrier solar cell, comprising: providing a semiconductor wafer with a lightly-doped absorber; forming at least one of a p-doped region and a high work function region on a surface of the lightly-doped absorber; and forming at least one of a n-doped region and a low work function region abutting the lightly-doped absorber surface and being spaced apart from the at least one of p-doped region or high work function region, a Schottky barrier junction being formed at least at one of the abutted regions; 2 The additional reference of Atanackovic (US 2009/0038669 A1; published Feb. 12, 2009) was applied to independent claim 20 and all claims dependent thereon, and is listed in the Summary Table located at the end of this Decision. The additional references of Kaye (US 3,359,137; issued Dec. 19, 1967), Jiun-Hua Guo & Jeffrey E. Cotter (Laser-Grooved Backside Contact Solar Cells With 680-mV Open-circuit Voltage, IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices, vol. 51, (2004)), and Borland (US 2010/0037942 A1; published Feb. 18, 2010) were applied to various dependent claims and are also listed in the Summary Table. A discussion of these references is not necessary for disposition of this Appeal. Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 3 driving in a dopant to the surface of lightly-doped absorber at said Schottky barrier junction, driving in said dopant comprising: implanting dopant into at least one of said low work function region and said high work function region; and annealing said lightly-doped absorber in a drive-in anneal, said implanted dopant diffusing to the abutted absorber surface, the drive-in anneal forming a dopant-segregated interface at said respective absorber surface, said dopant-segregated interface adjusting the Schottky barrier potential difference to at least 0.2 volts, wherein the Schottky barrier solar cell includes at least one work function region with said dopant-segregated interface. Independent claims 20 and 32 are likewise directed to a “method of forming a Schottky barrier solar cell” comprising steps similar to those of claim 25, with claim 20 reciting an additional “passivating” step3 (Appeal Brief Claims Appendix 15, 17). Appellant argues the claims as a group, focusing on limitations common to independent claims 20, 25, and 32, and they do not present additional arguments for any claim (Appeal Br. 6–11). For convenience, our discussion refers to claim 25. We have considered the Appellant’s arguments to the extent applicable to each ground of rejection. OPINION Upon consideration of the evidence of record and each of Appellant’s contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief, as well as the Reply Brief, we determine that Appellant has not demonstrated reversible error in the 3 Atanackovic is relied upon in the rejection of claim 20 for the obviousness of such a passivating step (e.g., Final Act. 8). A discussion of this reference is not necessary for disposition of this Appeal. Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 4 Examiner’s rejections (e.g., see generally Ans.). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellant(s) to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). We sustain the rejections for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis. It has been established that “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264– 65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom). Appellant does not present any arguments directed to the Examiner’s findings and reasoning with respect to Watanabe’s method of forming a Schottky barrier solar cell, or Bradhorst’s lightly doped absorber step, or Atanackovic’s passivating step, or Thornton’s silicon induced dopant segregation (SIDS) step for driving the dopant down to form a dopant segregated interface at a solar cell Schottky barrier (e.g., Appeal Br. 7, 8, 11). Rather, Appellant’s main contention is since Thornton uses a silicon induced dopant segregation (SIDS), it would not have been obvious to modify further with Qiu’s exemplified alternative method using silicide as a diffusion source (SADS) (Appeal Br. 9 (Appellant states “SIDS and SADS are alternatives and not combinable methods.”)). Appellant contends that replacing SIDS as taught by Thornton with SADS as taught by Qiu changes Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 5 the principle of operation of Thornton and, therefore, is non-obvious (Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 4). Appellant also argues that Qiu teaches away from replacing SIDS with SADS and that SADS uses two separate steps, silicidation and dopant incorporation, which one would view as disadvantageous over a SIDS single step (Appeal Br. 10). Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible error for reasons presented by the Examiner (Ans. 35–44). It is well established that a prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole, when determining if it would lead one of ordinary skill in the art away from the claimed invention. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (whether a reference teaches away from a claimed invention is a question of fact). One of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred and readily appreciated that a known SADS technique, such as explicitly taught in Qiu to be an alternative to the SIDS technique of Thornton, may be useful in making the Schottkey barrier solar cell of Watanabe/Brandhorst (or Watanabe/Brandhorst/Atanackovic) (e.g., Ans. 40-44). Indeed, as pointed out by the Examiner, Qiu discusses that SADS has a benefit in that it “addresses the adverse effect of dopant on silicidation [SIDS] by separating silicidation from dopant incorporation” (Qiu, Abstract p. 396; also see the Conclusion p. 402; e.g., Ans. 37, 38). Thus, an artisan of ordinary skill would have weighed the advantages and disadvantages of these two known dopant techniques, SIDS as taught in Thornton and the alternative SADS (and SIDS) taught in Qiu. “The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 6 modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s argument that SIDS and SADS cannot be combined (Appeal Br. 8, 9), Qiu teaches that SIDS and SADS could be combined (Qiu, p. 402, bottom left column; Ans. 40). Likewise, Appellant’s arguments that Qiu impermissibly changes the principle of operation of Thornton (Appeal Br. 4; Reply Br. 2) are also unpersuasive for the reasons given above, mainly that SIDS and SADS are known (alternative) methods and the use of either one (or both) would have been within the ordinary skill in the art. That is, the arguments fail to account for “the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Thus, Appellant has not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s obviousness determination of the claimed method. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (the predictable use of known prior art elements or steps performing the same functions they have been known to perform is normally obvious; the combination of familiar elements/steps is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results); Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (under the flexible inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court, the PTO must take account of the “inferences and creative steps,” as well as routine steps, that an ordinary artisan would employ) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of independent claim 25, as well independent claims 20 and 32, and all claims dependent Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 7 thereon, noting that no claims are separately argued, even those separately rejected (Appeal Br. generally). CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 25, 30–34 103 Watanabe, Brandhorst, Thornton, Qiu 25, 30–34 2–9, 13, 16, 18–20, 22, 28, 29 103 Watanabe, Brandhorst, Atanackovic, Thornton, Qiu 2–9, 13, 16, 18–20, 22, 28, 29 214 103 Watanabe, Brandhorst, Atanackovic, Thornton, Kaye, Qiu 21 11, 17 103 Watanabe, Brandhorst, Atanackovic, Thornton, Qiu, Guo 11, 17 12 103 Watanabe, Brandhorst, Atanackovic, Thornton, Qiu, Borland 12 4 Although the Examiner refers to claims 10 and 21 in this rejection (Ans. 16; Final Act. 17), claim 10 apparently was earlier cancelled, as the Examiner does not list it (on the cover sheet of the Final Act.), and the Appellant does not list it (Appeal Br. 6) nor include it in the Claims Appendix. Appeal 2019-006155 Application 13/103,490 8 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed Overall Outcome 2–9, 11–13, 16–22, 25, 28–34 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation