01A13476_r
08-10-2001
Joe D. Prescott, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Joe D. Prescott v. United States Postal Service
01A13476
August 10, 2001
.
Joe D. Prescott,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A13476
Agency No. 4-G-730-0038-00
DECISION
Complainant timely appealed to this Commission from the agency's April 24,
2001 final decision finding no breach of a January 19, 2001 settlement
agreement. The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
(1) [The postmaster] and [complainant] agree that meetings will take place
between the supervisors and their sections to discuss sensitivity issues
and workplace environment, to include but not limited to, issues related
to mutual respect, dignity, and fairness between employees and workgroups.
(2) The postmaster will monitor this process to insure [sic] compliance.
The supervisors will receive sensitivity training prior to February
25, 2000.
(3) [Complainant] and [the postmaster] agree that if another
acceptable position becomes available within the Oklahoma City Area,
that [complainant] has volunteered by letter to [the postmaster], to
relocate upon mutual acceptance by all parties involved on the location
and position.
Complainant alleged breach of the agreement by letter dated April 18,
2001. In this letter, complainant conceded knowledge of sensitivity
training being conducted, but claimed breach of provision (1) because
he was unclear on the type, amount, length, and accountability of the
training. Further, complainant claims that he should have been provided
attendance rosters for the class. Concerning provision (2), complainant
contends that he was never shown that sensitivity training was given to
the supervisors. Finally, complainant argues that he was never offered
a transfer in violation of provision (3), and was told that no positions
were available although other individuals were being transferred.
In its April 24, 2001 decision, the agency found no breach of provisions
(1) and (2), noting that the settlement agreement did not require the
agency to provide complainant with any documentation from the training.
Concerning provision (3), the agency found the claim of breach untimely.
The agency explained that complainant should have known of the alleged
noncompliance when the postmaster told complainant on December 6, 2000,
that there was nothing available, and �regardless of the mediation
nothing would be done.�
On appeal, complainant argues that written documentation is the only
way to ensure the agency's compliance with provisions (1) and (2).
Further, complainant argues that he did not suspect breach until the
postmaster returned from a detail in April 2001, and stated that �the
new District Manager has basically closed all doors on transfers of
limited-duty employees.�
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of
contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has
further held the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with
regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission generally
has relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
The Commission finds no breach of provisions (1) and (2) of the January
19, 2001 settlement agreement. The settlement agreement does not
require the agency to provide complainant with specific documentation of
its sensitivity training classes. If complainant wished to have this
information in order to verify the training, he should have negotiated
for such in the terms of the settlement agreement itself. Further,
complainant concedes that the classes were conducted. Therefore, the
Commission cannot find breach of provision (1) or (2) of the settlement
agreement.
Complainant must raise claims of breach within thirty days of when he
knew or should have known of the alleged noncompliance. See 29 C.F.R. �
1614.504(a). Nonetheless, the Commission finds that complainant's claim
of breach for provision (3) was timely. In his original breach claim,
complainant explained that he approached the postmaster on December
6, 2000 about receiving a transfer. The postmaster confirmed that he
(the postmaster) was being detailed for a minimum of four months, and
therefore, �there is nothing available . . . regardless of the mediation
agreement and . . . after today [the postmaster] was gone and nothing
would be done about it as far as [the postmaster] was concerned.�
According to complainant, the postmaster also said, �I am leaving and
it is up to whoever becomes your boss.�
These statements clearly do not support the agency's final decision.
The postmaster merely told complainant that he would have to work with
his new supervisor to obtain the transfer contemplated in the agreement.
Complainant did not file until the same postmaster, after returning to
the facility, informed complainant that the District Manager would not
allow any transfers of limited-duty employees to go through. Therefore,
complainant's claim of breach for provision (3) was timely.
Regardless, the Commission finds that complainant failed to prove breach
in provision (3). He has not shown that there was a acceptable position
available at another facility, nor that all involved parties consented
to such a transfer.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
August 10, 2001
__________________
Date