Joe Arredondo III, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 28, 2000
01a00802 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 28, 2000)

01a00802

02-28-2000

Joe Arredondo III, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Areas), Agency.


Joe Arredondo III, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01A00802

v. ) Agency No. 1G761-0020-97

) Hearing No. 310-99-5427X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(S.E./S.W. Areas), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the bases of race (Caucasian), national

origin (Hispanic), and reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.<1> Complainant alleges he was discriminated against

when, on October 25, 1996, he was issued a fourteen day suspension for

Unacceptable Performance/Failure to Follow Instructions. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified

at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that complainant, a Motor Vehicle Operator at the

agency's Fort Worth, Texas facility, filed a formal EEO complaint with

the agency on February 5, 1997, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against him as referenced above.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a recommended decision

finding no discrimination.

The AJ found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of race or national origin discrimination because he failed to provide

the names of individuals who committed similar infractions, but were

not issued suspensions. The AJ did find, however, that complainant

established an inference of discrimination with respect to his reprisal

claim.

The AJ then concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that the complainant

had been issued the suspension due to the following: (1) on October 4,

1996, complainant refused to attend a safety meeting; (2) on October 4,

1996, complainant refused to complete a load sheet; (3) on October 5,

1996, complainant used profanity and ran late while delivering his route;

and (4) on October 5, 1996, complainant walked out of a pre-disciplinary

meeting and refused to return despite his supervisor's instructions to

do so.

Specifically, the AJ found credible evidence that complainant knew he

needed to attend the safety meeting, yet he failed to do so. Although

there was no testimony produced at the hearing regarding complainant's

failure to complete load sheets, the AJ did note that the record revealed

complainant's supervisor had previously warned complainant about his

failure to complete load sheets. Regarding complainant's delivery run

on October 5, 1996, the AJ found that complainant became irate when he

was assigned that particular route. Complainant also failed to notify

his supervisor when he ran late, despite the availability of phones and

a reduction in the number of stops on the route. The AJ also found

credible testimony that complainant left a pre-disciplinary meeting,

and failed to return after being told to do so.

Finally, the AJ also found that complainant failed to prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's reasons for its actions

were pretext for discrimination. In so finding, the AJ noted that based

on both documentary and testimonial evidence contained in the record,

she did not find complainant's testimony and assertions to be credible.

The AJ noted that complainant's testimony was often unclear, and contrary

to the weight of the evidence.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred when she questioned

agency witnesses. Complainant argues that this was an attempt to bolster

the agency's position, rather than to clarify the record. Furthermore,

complainant argues through his attorney, that the AJ erred when she denied

a continuance due to a witness' failure to appear. Complainant's brief

also disputes the AJ's findings.

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,

477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not

discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard

Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). Moreover, we also note that the

credibility determinations of the AJ are entitled to deference due to the

AJ's first-hand knowledge, through personal observation, of the demeanor

and conduct of the witnesses at the hearing. Esquer v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960096 (September 6, 1996); Willis

v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05900589 (July 26, 1990).

We disagree with complainant's contentions on appeal, and remind

complainant that an AJ has broad discretion in the conduct of a hearing.

That includes, full responsibility for the adjudication of the complaint,

including overseeing the development of the record. 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37, 657 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �1614.109(a)). We also note

that complainant failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the AJ's

decision to deny a continuance.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's recommended decision summarized the relevant facts and referenced

the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Complainant failed to

present evidence that any of the agency's actions were in retaliation

for complainant's prior EEO activity or were motivated by discriminatory

animus toward complainant's national origin or race. We discern no

basis to disturb the AJ's recommended decision.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

February 28, 2000

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

Date

Equal Employment Assistant

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.