Jody P. Lugo, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (New York Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 12, 2001
01983971 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 12, 2001)

01983971

06-12-2001

Jody P. Lugo, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (New York Metro Area), Agency.


Jody P. Lugo v. United States Postal Service

01983971

June 12, 2001

.

Jody P. Lugo,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(New York Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01983971

Agency No. 4-A-070-1126-96

Hearing No. 170-97-8118X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency action

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges he was discriminated against

on the basis of his disability (reading) when on April 26, 1996, he was

advised that he would not be employed by the agency.

For the following reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND the agency's final

action.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

an applicant for a letter carrier position at the agency's Newark

Processing & Distribution, Newark, New Jersey facility. When viewing

the record in the light most favorable to the complainant, the record

reveals the following: On April 26, 1996, complainant was interviewed by

the Human Resources Specialist (HR) for the position of letter carrier.

During the interview, complainant was asked about certain gaps in his

employment history. Complainant explained that he lived in Puerto Rico

during those gaps in his employment history and was not employed. HR then

asked him to fill in the gaps in his employment on his application.

Complainant asked HR how to spell �unemployed.� HR asked complainant

why he did not know how to spell unemployed. Complainant explained

that he had a problem reading and spelling. HR then had complainant

read a �religious convictions� statement which, according to HR was done

in a �halting� manner and only with her help. HR asked complainant to

explain what he had just read, to which he responded that it was about

applications. HR explained to complainant that he has to be able to

read to be a letter carrier. Complainant responded by stating that his

father and brothers were carriers at the agency and were not required

to read to perform their jobs. HR terminated the interview.

On May 2, 1996, HR's office sent a letter to complainant advising him

that �it has been determined that you do not have the basic competence

in reading, speaking, and understanding English, therefore, you will

not be considered for employment at present for the position.�

In June 1996, complainant met with supervisors at the Plainfield Post

Office requesting an opportunity to show that he was capable of performing

the letter carrier duties. The supervisors at Plainfield Post Office

gave complainant the opportunity to unofficially case mail for one week

to see if he could handle the job. The supervisors determined that

complainant accurately performed his duties during the period of time he

cased mail on a trial basis. These supervisors also attempted to get

Human Resources officials to review complainant's case and reconsider

hiring him. However, Human Resources officials never responded to calls

placed by the supervisors on behalf of complainant.

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on July 28, 1996.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish that he has a

disability as required under the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically,

the AJ noted that while it was undisputed that complainant reads at

a lower grade level (i.e., fourth grade), he did not establish that

his reading and spelling problems rise to a level of an impairment.

In addition, while complainant presented a diagnostic report after

the interview which reveals that complainant possesses �speech and

language deficits ... auditory comprehension/memory deficits along with

poor vocabulary development, limited syntactic competence and reduced

referential communication skills,� the AJ found that he, nevertheless,

failed to show that said deficits rise to the level of an impairment.

Further, the AJ noted that the agency did not receive the diagnostic

report until after its employment decision. The AJ also found that

assuming, arguendo, complainant established that he was disabled under the

Rehabilitation Act, he nevertheless, failed to show disparate treatment

since �another individual, who was not mentally disabled, with reading

comprehension problems was hired by the agency.� Lastly, the AJ found

that the agency articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

its employment decision and complainant did not establish pretext.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision.

Complainant raises no new contentions on appeal. The agency stands on

the record and requests that we affirm its final action implementing

the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not

sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to

affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ

may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that

the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February

24, 1995).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when

she concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact herein.

While we agree that complainant failed to raise a genuine issue of

disputed material fact on the issue of whether he was disabled, he

certainly did raise a genuine issue of disputed material fact on the

issue of whether he was regarded as disabled.

Upon review of the record, we believe there exist sufficient material

facts in dispute which would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude

that complainant was not hired by the agency due to his perceived

learning disability. The record indicates that during the interview,

HR determined that complainant only held a fourth grade reading level.

However, HR was aware that complainant was a high school graduate.

We find that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that HR perceived

complainant's reading and writing problem to rise to the level of

impairment since he also held a high school diploma. In other words,

complainant's lack of reading and writing abilities could have been viewed

by HR as not being the result of a lack of education but rather likely a

mental impairment. In addition, the record indicates that complainant

was born and raised in the United States. If HR knew that English was

complainant's first language, it would support the likelihood that the

agency perceived complainant's fourth grade reading level to be caused

from a mental impairment rather than lack of education. We also find

that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that complainant was regarded

as being substantially limited in the major life activity of learning.

In addition, we find insufficient evidence in the record to support the

finding that complainant was not qualified to perform the essential

functions of the letter carrier position. While the record contains

a �suitability and selection guide� issued by the agency to assist

individuals in charge of making hiring selections, the guide simply

indicates that the selectee must be able to �receive and transmit

information effectively in oral form as required by the job and comprehend

written and oral instructions adequately for safe and effective job

performance.� (emphasis added). There is nothing in the record which

indicates what the specific job of letter carrier requires with respect

to reading and writing. Moreover, the only evidence in the record

which relates to complainant's job qualifications indicates that he

is qualified to perform the job.<1> Accordingly, the record evidence

presents a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of whether

complainant was a qualified individual with a perceived disability within

the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.

The undisputed record shows that HR failed to hire complainant because

he lacked the �basic competence in reading, speaking and understanding

English.� If, after a hearing, a fact finder determines that complainant

was regarded as disabled, this explanation for non-hiring would amount

to direct evidence of discrimination. The agency would then be required

to show that it would have made the same decision absent discrimination.

See Walker v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Request No. 05980504

(April 8, 1999); Stock v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal Request

No. 05980053 (January 8, 1999) (affirming Stock v. Department of Justice,

EEOC Appeal No. 01953223 (September 12, 1997) holding that selecting

official's expressed doubts as to complainant's ability to perform

duties given his medical restrictions amounted to direct evidence of

discrimination based on perceived disability).

There is a remaining question of whether HR's pre-employment disability

related questions and the examination required of complainant were a

per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act. While not completely clear,

the record seems to suggest that complainant voluntarily explained that

he had a learning problem in response to a possibly legitimate request

by HR that complainant fill in the gaps of his employment directly on

his application. When complainant could not spell �unemployed,� the

record seems to indicate that HR became suspicious that complainant had

a learning problem. HR then began to ask complainant about his learning

problem and administered an examination of complainant by requiring that

he read and explain a �religious convictions� paragraph. A reasonable

fact finder could conclude that the examination administered by HR,

helped HR to conclude that complainant was not qualified for the position.

Under the Rehabilitation Act, when an employer reasonably believes that

an applicant will not be able to perform a job function because of a

known disability, the employer may ask that particular applicant to

describe or demonstrate how he would perform such function. We find

that the record could support the finding that HR's requirement that

complainant read and explain a �religious convictions�statement failed to

meet the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act. There is no evidence

in the record which indicates that reading and understanding such a

statement was a job function of the letter carrier position. Moreover,

the requirement seems more likely to have been intended to test the extent

of complainant's learning deficiencies. See ADA Enforcement Guidance:

Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations,

October 10, 1995.

In addition to finding facts sufficient to defeat summary disposition on

the issues set for above, we find that the record could be developed

better so that the open issues raised above could be addressed.

Accordingly, we find that this matter should be remanded for a hearing

on all issues set forth above. We note that the hearing process is

intended to be an extension of the investigative process, designed

to �ensure that the parties have a fair and reasonable opportunity

to explain and supplement the record and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive (MD) 110, as revised, November

9, 1999, Chapter 6, page 6-1; see also 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.109(c) and (d).

�Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute

and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly

deprives complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims.�

Mi S. Bang v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575

(March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996); Chronister v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995).

Since there are numerous issues, both undeveloped and unaddressed by

the AJ, we find remand is appropriate.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, and arguments and

evidence not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission

REVERSES the agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the agency

in accordance with this decision and the ORDER below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the Philadelphia District

Office the request for a hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of

the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit a

copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15)

calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall

provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set

forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings

Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on the

complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the agency shall

issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0900)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order

prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29

C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action

for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the

complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 12, 2001

__________________

Date

1When provided the opportunity, complainant was able to perform the

job without any errors.